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                                               Abstract 
Motivation. In the Sub-Saharan Africa countries there are several factors contributing to the 
collapse of firms. Most firms have failed due to poor corporate governance practices. The 
recent collapse of some firms in the financial and non-financial sectors in the Sub-region 
shows that there are challenges hindering effective corporate governance of firms in the Sub-
region. Consequently, this study uses empirical evidence to identify views about the 
important components of good corporate governance practice for listed firms: institutional 
characteristics; the board of directors; and the effects of external factors.  
Research question. The pertinent research question that this study addresses is the 
identification of the components that are essential for good corporate governance of firms in 
the Sub-region. This study tries to prioritise the components. 
Methodology. Data were collected by questionnaire administered to stakeholders of 
corporate governance of listed firms in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. Regression is used 
to estimate the relationship between institutional characteristic, responsibilities of the board 
of directors and external factors on corporate governance system.  
Main findings. 
 1. Enforcement, disclosure, transparency and regulatory frameworks may be necessary to 
improve corporate governance practice in all the countries in the Sub-region (SSAA).  
2. There is evidence that commitment of board members to disclosure and communication 
may provide effective corporate governance practice. 
3. Board duality (separation of role between chairman and CEO) is likely to hinder corporate 
governance practices.  
4. We found that in all the countries in the Sub-region accounting system plays a major role 
to promote sound corporate governance practice. However, the political environment, societal 
and cultural factor, corruption, and economic factors such as macro-economic policies may 
hinder corporate governance practices. 
 
. 
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Policy recommendations:  
This study recommends that corporate governance stakeholders should adopt a whistle 
blowing method and also that institutional bodies should be more prudent in monitoring of 
rules and laws with stringent penalties. In addition, there should be adequate information and 
disclosure on the rights and obligation of the shareholder of firms in the sub-region region. 
There is need to increase the number and role of independent directors, increase the use of 
advisory vote by shareholders on executive compensation and facilitation of shareholders 
activism. 
Furthermore, there is a need to have autonomous regulatory bodies and supervisory agencies 
free from any political/ government interference in the implementation of the Code and 
Guideline of corporate governance. The regulatory bodies and the supervisory agencies 
should be manned or be under the leadership of people of goodwill, good character and trust. 
The Code or Guideline of corporate governance of Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries 
should take cognisance of and be aligned with socio-cultural environment of the countries in 
the Sub-region. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction to the Study    
1.1 Background of the study 
The collapse of high- profile firms such as Enron, Worldcom, Tyco and Xerox and the 
believe that poor corporate governance contributed to their collapse have generated renewed 
interest in determining the best practices of corporate governance (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, 
World Bank 2002, OECD 1999). Moreover, in 1997 the East Asian financial crisis occurred 
as a result of the lack of corporate governance mechanisms which highlighted the weaknesses 
of economic institutions (Vaughn and Ryan 2006). The situation in Sub-Saharan Africa is no 
different; corporate governance has received some attention in recent times, due to poor 
performance of corporations in the region.  
The establishment of the Institute of Directors (IoD) combined with other arrangement 
such as existing companies’ code in individual countries and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in Sub-Saharan Africa countries; provide the basic channels through 
which corporate issues are addressed. These issues concern board composition structure and 
mechanism, relationship with stakeholders and shareholders, executive reward compensation, 
disclosure and transparency, employee and investor protection (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). 
 In the Nigeria context, the progress on the improvement of corporate governance 
practice has been very slow. Nigeria is one of Africa’s most important financial markets for 
goods and services with an estimated population of one hundred and sixty million. However, 
the corporate frameworks in the country seem to be weak. The weaknesses in the Nigeria 
context may include corrupt corporate behaviour such as the recent exposure in Cadbury 
Nigeria Plc and the management failure to disclose corporate financial information to 
shareholders (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011). This was also due to a lack of accountability 
and bribery scandal involving top management of Halliburton Nigeria (Adegbite and 
Nakajima, 2011).  
Moreover, some Chief Executive Officers (CEO) of companies in Sub-Saharan Africa 
such as Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa have reported that there are factors contributing to 
the collapse of corporate governance in the region (Business Times Nigeria, October 2010).  
These Chief Executive officers (CEOs) found that most firms failed due to poor corporate 
governance. Recent failure in financial and non- financial sectors in countries such as Nigeria 
Chapter One: Introduction to the Study 
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and Ghana show that there may be challenges hindering the effective corporate governance in 
the Sub-region.  The board of some companies are populated by some family members and 
colleagues who compromise standards for personal benefit and in the interest of their 
benefactors. There may be an underlying structure that is hindering the development of 
corporate governance of firms in the Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries. These 
challenges discourage effective corporate governance practice. If these challenges can be 
addressed, corporate governance will be enhanced in the region. This development will 
attract quality foreign trade partners, integrity, and manpower; this will create an acceptable 
global brand for the firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries (SSAA).  
The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA, 2004) revealed that there are major issues 
and challenges of corporate governance in Sub-Saharan Africa which include the following: 
weak codes of corporate governance practices which is affecting the performance of firms; 
The issue of board structure and composition and duality where the chairman is also the CEO 
of the firm, the issue of disclosure and transparency in decision making and relationship with 
stakeholders and shareholder. An investigation of the institutional frameworks impacting 
corporate governance of firm is important to the extent that good corporate governance will 
bring confidence in minds of existing and potential investors as well as other stakeholders of 
firm and there will be confidence in the banking industry. It will also have a positive effect on 
the economy as a whole, by making the economic growth to be stable. The capital markets 
will be developed and all these are essential for sustained economic growth and development 
of the countries in the region.    
In addition to the issue raised by ECA, according to the World Bank report ROSC 
(2004,) it was revealed that corporate governance of firms in Nigeria has numerous 
challenges. The challenges include institutional weakness in regulation, compliance with 
enforcement and lack of compliance with International Accounting Standards. The World 
Bank Report ROSC (2005) found that corporate governance in Ghana has a weak 
institutional foundation and absence of institutional investors, shareholders passivity, and 
enforcement gap. Furthermore, South Africa is counted among the promoters of good 
corporate governance in emerging economies (Moyo 2010, Vaughn and Ryan (2006). Moyo 
(2010) revealed that the compliance result has not been as expected due to numerous 
challenges such as weak enforcement and prosecution, insufficient board independence, 
balance of power and insufficient disclosure.  
Chapter One: Introduction to the Study 
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The need for corporate governance for firms cannot be over-emphasised.  As a result, 
Sub-Saharan Africa as a continent needs development finance to raise the living condition of 
its growing population. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC, 2006) revealed that a 
survey conducted by Mckinsey consulting group in 2002, found that eighty-five percent of 
respondents consider corporate governance in Sub-Saharan Africa to be more important than 
financial issues in deciding which companies to invest in. Furthermore, the importance of 
robust corporate governance in developing countries is evident from the fact that several 
recent studies have suggested that a strong corporate governance system is necessary to 
encourage inward investment and nourish long-term economic growth (Burton, et.al 20009; 
Johnson, et.al 2000). 
The research question is which components are important for good corporate governance 
in developing countries (such as Sub-Saharan African Anglophone countries) where detailed 
corporate governance rules have been introduced. The underlying frameworks and structure 
are sufficient to suggest that there are challenges in corporate governance of firm in the Sub-
region. The first section of this study identifies views about the importance of each 
component (institutional characteristics) of corporate governance practice.  
The regulatory framework, enforcement, disclosure and transparency, shareholders’ 
rights and ownership concentration are institutional characteristic variables that impact the 
efficient practice of corporate governance of firms. Consequently, It is argued that for any 
country, successful implementation of economic policy, like corporate governance depends  
on the efficiency of relevant  institutional bodies such as  the Central Bank,  the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC), Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), Judiciary or legal and 
other bodies concerned  with the regulatory and enforcement of corporate governance 
practices. As a result, if rules and regulations, enforcement, disclosure and transparency, 
shareholders rights and ownership concentration are not well implemented the corporate 
governance system (such as rules, laws, power, resources and authority of supervisory and 
enforcement agencies) will be affected. The structure and organisation of legislature and 
competency of the regulatory and enforcement agencies will also be affected.  
There are some numbers of studies on issues of corporate governance in Africa; however 
authors such as Ayogu (2001) focus on regulation, legalities and governance practices. 
Okeahalam and Akinbode (2003) expand the study of Ayogu (2001). Another study by Okike 
Chapter One: Introduction to the Study 
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(2007) examined corporate governance the status quo, Rossouw (2005) considered business 
ethic. Burton et al. (2009) and Okpara (2010) examined the framework of corporate 
governance. The studies of these authors are not detailed and are narrow in scope. The 
current study attempts to fill the gap in the literature by using empirical evidence to identify 
views about the significance of each component (institutional characteristic of corporate 
governance such as regulatory frame work, enforcement and monitoring, disclosure and 
transparency, shareholders’ rights, ownership concentration). 
Corporate governance scandals of firms in various parts of the world are due to financial 
mismanagement that led to the collapse of some firms and the cause of failure have been 
traced to the key players in the corporate terrain which are the board of directors. As a result, 
their role and responsibility have been strengthened by corporate governance reform which 
resulted from the global corporate failures (Van den Berghe and Leveran 2007). 
Consequently, in the UK the Cadbury report published in 1992 explained the functions and 
responsibilities of the board of directors.  In developing countries such as South Africa the 
King Reports II and III published in 1994 and 2010 respectively also addressed the issue of 
board of directors of firms in South Africa.  In addition, in Nigeria the code of best practice 
of corporate governance was issued in 2003 and 2011 by Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and also the code of corporate governance for banking industry was 
issued by Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in 2006. All these codes highlighted the roles and 
responsibilities of the board of director for non-financial and financial listed firms in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, the Ghana Securities Exchange Commission issued corporate governance 
guidelines on best practice in 2009 which focus on the importance of the board of directors 
for listed firms in Ghana.  
From the heart of corporate governance debate, Dennis and McConnell (2003) posit that 
the boards of directors are internal governance mechanism specifically charged to represent 
the interest of shareholders, where they hire, fire, and monitor and compensate management. 
This makes the boards of directors an effective corporate governance mechanism. Cadbury 
(1999) argues that board of directors serve as a bridge between shareholders who are 
suppliers of capital and the management who are in charge of running the firms. In addition, 
Van den Berghe and Leveran (2007) revealed that the board of directors are guardian of 
shareholders interest. Thus the board of directors are still being opposed for failing to meet 
their role and responsibilities in firms. Also, OECD, 1999; 2004 explained that board of 
directors is the main organ responsible for establishing and enforcing the corporate 
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governance mechanism within the firms. Beside this, Weisbach and Hermalin (2003) note 
that the boards of directors are seen as economic institutions and they satisfy various 
regulatory requirements. This economic function is determined by the difficulties within their 
firms.  
There are scanty empirical studies on the issue of the board of directors of firms in Sub-
Saharan Africa Anglophone countries. This is due to the difficulties of gaining access to 
boardrooms and directors. However, Mikailu et.al (2005) studied board characteristics and 
firms’ performance in Nigeria. In addition, Ogbechie and Koufopolous (2007) examined the 
effectiveness of boards in Nigerian Banking industry. The second section of this study 
therefore seek to fill the gaps in literature by using empirical evidence to show the effect of 
role and responsibilities of board of directors on corporate governance system. 
Moreover, for any country the corporate governance system will consider the effect of 
the political, economic, socio-cultural, and corruption factors. These embody the political 
economic, legal institution, social and technology influence and the ethical disposition of 
listed firms (Amaeshi and Amao, 2009). If a nation has a weak corporate governance system, 
the management of the firms are bound to be corrupt and there will be cases of insider abuse 
and financial mismanagement. Consequently, the corporate governance system or 
environment determines the context for assessing a country firm performance and corporate 
strategy. The codes of best practice of corporate governance, guidelines of corporate 
governance practice and the King Report code of corporate governance were established as 
instruments to safeguard listed firms against corruption, and corporate mismanagement. They 
were also intended to promote transparency accountability, economic growth and social 
development (Okeahalam, and Akinboade, 2003). Despite the implementation of these codes, 
guideline and the Report on corporate governance, many financial and non-financial firms in 
Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa have 
collapsed as a result of poor corporate governance.  
The OECD (2004) ‘’explained the importance of regulatory, supervisory and 
enforcement agencies for effective corporate governance framework, also the organisation 
stated that corporate governance framework should promote transparency, efficient market 
and be consistent with rule of law’’ In addition, Rossouw, 2005; La Portal, et al. 1998; 
Johnson, et al. 1999; Klapper, and Love 2004 these authors posited the effect of legal and 
regulatory frameworks on corporate governance of firms. Also, economic factors have an 
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effect on corporate governance such that the OECD (2004) ‘’stated that corporate 
governance is part of the larger economic context in which firms operate such as macro-
economic policies and the degree of competition in product market’’ Thus, Coffee (2005) 
argues that corporate scandals, state of the economy and underlying ownership structure of 
firms led to the most recent global economic downturn. These factors are associated with 
accounting scandals fraud and financial irregularities. The author further stated that effective 
corporate governance can enhance economic growth, and long term investment stability 
through attraction of local and foreign investors.  
 The type of political system and government in operation in a country plays a vital role 
in shaping the society and this can also influence the likelihood of sound corporate 
governance practices. ECA (2002) explained that institutions of government have the 
capacity to manage resources efficiently, formulate, implement and enforce sound policies 
and regulations of corporate governance.  Furthermore, corporate governance best practices 
can only be really achieved in an environment free of internal socio-political, economic and 
cultural corruption and free of trans-organised financial crimes (Bakre 2011).  Burton et al. 
(2009) revealed that corruption remains endemic in Africa nations and in some cases; this 
becomes institutionalised as a result of collective behaviours 
  There are a number of studies on ownership structure, performance and value of firms. 
However, Denis and Mconnell (2003) found that the effect of ownership structure, firm value 
and performance are mixed and the results are inconclusive. La Portal, et al (1999) revealed 
that except in economies with very good shareholder protection, few firms are widely held. 
The quality of accounting system has influence on corporate governance practice such that 
OECD (2004), Cadbury (2002) revealed the importance of the accounting framework in 
promoting disclosure and transparency. It is stated that information should be prepared and 
disclosed in accordance with a high quality standard of accounting and financial and non-
financial disclosure.  Consequently, accounting information plays a major role in the effective 
corporate governance of a firm because it enables relevant parties to monitor the performance 
of managers and use that information to hold the managers accountable in their firms (Gray, 
et al 1996). 
From the foregoing, the third section of this study provides empirical evidence of views 
about the important of each external factor (such as economic, cultural and societal, political, 
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corruption, ownership structure and accounting system) affecting the development of 
corporate governance.  
1.2 Issues and motivation of the study. 
The issue of corporate governance continues to receive a high level of attention as a 
result of a series of corporate scandals that occurred in different parts of the world in the early 
part of this decade such as Adelphia, Enron, World com and XL holiday. Consequently, this 
has shaken investors’ faith in the capital market and the efficiency of corporate governance 
practices in promoting, transparency and accountability. Since then, governments around the 
world have undertaken various measures to strengthen their regulatory framework in order to 
restore investors’ confidence and enhance corporate transparency and accountability 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, World bank 2002, OECD 1999).  
In developed countries authors such as Cadbury (1992) UK, Morck and Nakamu (1999) 
Japan, Georgen, et.al (2008) Germany, and Tam (2000) China have carried out various 
studies on corporate governance. The studies mention above have emphasised the importance 
of corporate governance but it is still unclear how these findings relate to sub-Saharan Africa. 
The differentiations may be as a result of corporate attitude, and enforcement of corporate 
governance policy in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries. This study used a survey 
questionnaire with questions based on international corporate governance norms from Okpara 
(2010), Burton et al. (2009) and literature from corporate governance. 
This study therefore used empirical evidence to identify views about the importance of 
each component of corporate governance practice of listed firms in the sub-region.  The 
research question that this study addresses includes the identification of the components that 
are important for good corporate governance of listed firms in the sub-region. In addition, an 
empirical study of roles and responsibilities of the board of directors of firms in Sub-Saharan 
Africa Anglophone countries is necessary. This is because despite the issue of code of 
corporate governance practices by regulatory bodies of each country in the region, there have 
been a scandal among the board of directors such as Cadbury Plc in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, in the banking industries in Ghana and Nigeria in recent times, the Bank of 
Ghana and  Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) sacked some board of directors of banks as a 
result of gross insider abuse, mismanagement of funds and this led to consolidation, merger 
and acquisition of these banks (SEC,2011).  Thus, the purpose of this paper is to fill this gap 
as much as possible by identifying the impact of the role and responsibilities of the board of 
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directors on corporate governance system of firms. In particular this paper addresses the 
research question which asks to what extent the role and responsibilities of firm’s boards’ 
directors has affected the corporate governance system in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone 
countries.  
Moreover, for any country the corporate governance system will consider the effect of 
the political, economic, socio-cultural, corruption and ownership structure and accounting 
system factors. Thus, this study contributes to the body of knowledge on the subject by 
examining views about the effect of each external factor (such as economic, political, 
corruption and bribery, societal and culture, ownership structure and accounting system) on 
the corporate governance practice in sub-Saharan Anglophone countries. 
The scope of this study covers listed firms in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. These 
countries are English speaking countries and their selection is based on a regional approach, 
which gives a wider scope. In addition, these countries have growing and strong economies 
with large markets. For instance Ghana with the fastest growing economy in the sub-region 
after the discovery of crude oil, South Africa which  is the strongest economy in the sub-
region and Nigeria having a huge population and large markets, blessed with abundant 
natural resources such as  crude oil and land fertile  for  agriculture.   
1.3 Summary of the contributions and recommendations  of the study 
Based on the empirical evidence from this study, the contribution and recommendation 
for this thesis are divided into three sections. 
1.3.1 Contribution to the study  on the effects of institutional characteristics of corporate 
governance practice 
The findings from this study make a contribution to the literature that enforcement, 
disclosure and transparency are likely to improve corporate governance system in all the 
countries together. In addition, there is a positive significant relationship between the 
regulatory framework and enforcement of corporate governance in each country such as 
Ghana and South Africa.  
Another contribution of this study is that in Nigerian firms, regulatory framework has a 
significant negative effect on corporate governance system. This finding seems to be due to a 
lack of proper implementation of regulatory framework of corporate governance by the 
institutional bodies such as Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Central Bank of Nigeria 
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(CBN) and National Insurance Commission (NAICOM). Moreover, lack of proper 
implementation may possibly be as a result of corruption among the officials of institutional 
bodies. Furthermore, there are laws in the books and laws in practice, however in Nigeria 
there are laws in the book for regulatory framework and enforcement policy of corporate 
governance but there are no laws in practice to execute those rules and regulation and 
enforcement of corporate governance practices. The institutional bodies and corporate 
governance system may look good on papers but when they are compromised with 
corruption, lack of implementation and incompetence the result is likely weak corporate 
governance practices among firms in Nigeria. 
This study find that in Nigerian and Ghanaian firms larger concentration of ownership 
and preferential treatment to large shareholders may have influence on rules and laws of 
corporate governance practices. The implication is that ownership concentration is prevalent 
in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone firms. As a result, the controlling owner will be 
unwilling to dilute their ownership, generally known as non-dilution of entrenchment 
(Claessens et al. 2002). This may affect effective corporate governance system in terms of 
decision making, control rights and cash flow rights. 
In a situation of using firms in Nigeria and Ghana as dummy variables, each country has 
a negative significant relationship on corporate governance system. However, South African 
firms that serve as reference category can be regarded as positively significant on corporate 
governance system. This result suggests that corporate governance practice in Ghanaian and 
Nigerian firms may be relatively weak when compared with South African firms. This 
finding supports the World Bank ROSC (2010) group report on firms in Ghana and Nigeria 
that generally there is a need for improvement of corporate governance practice for those 
countries. However, the improvements of corporate governance practices in South African 
firms have been found to be important because of King Report 1994, and King Report of 
2002. The primary objective of the Reports is to promote the highest standard of corporate 
governance in South Africa. 
The sub-variables of regulatory and enforcement of corporate governance may be better 
in Ghanaian than Nigerian firms. In particular, the rules and regulation for formal 
transparency in board nomination, election process, disclosure and communication these sub-
variables have significant positive effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
in Ghana. Also, enforcement sub-variables such as investigation of apparent compliance with 
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rules and regulation by enforcement agency, investors’ protection and mechanisms for 
investigating the illegal treatment of minority shareholders have a positive impact on rules 
and laws that promote corporate governance in Ghana. 
 In Nigerian firms, the degree of investigation on non-compliance with laws or 
regulations by enforcement agency seem to be very weak to move the corporate governance 
system forward in terms of rules and laws that promote corporate governance. Also 
disclosure and transparency in Ghanaian firms in terms of insider trading, equal access to 
information and merger and acquisition may promote rules and laws on corporate 
governance. In South African firms the confidentiality and autonomy of auditors may be 
better to enhance sound corporate governance systems. 
 The basic shareholders rights are expected in promote effective corporate governance 
system firms in Ghana than firms in Nigeria. This result is consistent with World Bank ROSC 
(2010) group report on firms in West Africa Sub-region, that firms in Ghana have better basic 
shareholder protections. This is likely due to the reason for some foreign investors within 
West Africa Sub-region moving to Ghana in recent times. In Nigerian firms, the violations of 
the rights of minority shareholders hinder corporate governance system. There is evidence to 
show that shareholders are allowed to speak at company meeting only if they are known to 
agree with boards of directors. Consequently, this may deters corporate governance system in 
Nigerian firms.  
In the first section, this study make the contribution by classifies the result of the 
estimate into two categories such as regulatory bodies and non regulatory stakeholders of 
corporate governance. We find that the key difference is that regulatory bodies believe in 
enforcement of corporate governance practices in promoting sound corporate governance. 
Thus, based on the evidence from this study the regulatory bodies have most likely failed in 
the implementation of the regulatory framework which is part of corporate governance codes 
of best practices issued by Securities Exchange Commission and relevant bodies. This may 
be due to socio political corruption and lack of competency among the officials from the 
institutional bodies in charge of corporate governance practices of firms in the countries 
(SSAA).  
Moreover, there is also evidence of convergence for firms in Ghana and Nigeria which 
are negatively significant with corporate governance system when using Ghana and Nigeria 
as dummy variables with South Africa as a reference category or base. This finding indicates 
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that Ghanaian and Nigerian firms have weak corporate governance systems when compared 
with firms in South Africa.   
1.3.2 Recommendations  on the effects of institutional characteristics  of corporate governance 
practice 
Based on the findings which are the perception or opinion of the respondents from the 
finding of first section on this study, we recommend that there is need for general reform of 
corporate governance of firms in Nigeria by issue only one corporate governance code of best 
practices for each industry such as financial or non-financial. This should follow the 
international standard both in context and the implementation of the codes. The corporate 
governance code should be reviewed as happened in UK Financial Reporting Council in 
2012, and to be tailored towards international corporate governance standard such as Cadbury 
Report 1992 and King Report (1994, 2002). 
The establishment of Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria FRC Act 2011 is 
significant; under this Act there is section four which provide for a directorate of corporate 
governance with objectives and function toward effective corporate governance practices of 
firms. As a result, this Act should be well implemented without any interference from 
politicians. Also, there should be prudent monitoring of law and stringent penalties with 
requirements of corporate governance rules, regulatory framework and enforcement policy 
under this FRC 2011 Act. Therefore, any official of the institutional bodies or any 
stakeholders found guilty of the offence under this Act should be punished in form of penalty. 
 In Ghana there is a need for Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in order to have more 
regulatory and supervisory bodies on corporate governance practices for financial and non-
financial firms. The respondents from this study provide comments that the Ghana 
Companies law of 1963 Act 179 have been found to be outdated. There should be a reform of 
the Companies Act 179 which must include modern corporate code and law guiding Business 
Corporation. This must also include norms on international standard for corporate governance 
practices. Furthermore, the shareholders of firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone 
countries need strong shareholders’ activism through the establishment of shareholders 
association with aims and objectives of promoting the interest, welfare, enlightenment, and 
dissemination of information related to management of firms. 
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1.3.3 Contribution to the study on the effects of  role and responsibilities of the board of 
directors of firms 
As regard the contribution on the effect of role and responsibilities of the board of 
directors the following are stated below based on the findings from the second section of this   
of the study. 
 In all the countries together the commitment of board to transparent in board nomination 
and election process is likely to improve corporate governance system. However, board 
duality (separation of role between chairman and CEO) hinder corporate governance 
practices. This may be due to incompetence and inefficiency of both chairman and CEO. This 
evidence implies that there may be a separation of role and the responsibility between the 
Chairman and Chief Executive officer. However, this may be less likely to promote good 
corporate governance. 
 Another contribution is that the attention of board members to executive compensation 
by board members has a negative influence on rules and laws of corporate governance of 
firms. This finding suggests that when there is absence of executive compensation committee 
this may give chance for the directors to award themselves compensation; this is not good for 
the interest of the shareholders. In addition, there are indications that board effectiveness has 
a positive effect on corporate governance system. This implies that when the board members 
are effectively committed to their roles and responsibilities this can enhance sound corporate 
governance practice in firms.  
There are indications that commitment of the board to transparency in board nomination 
and election processes, board disclosure and communication are likely to promote sound 
corporate governance practice. These two variables have a significant positive effect on rules 
and laws, power and authority of the regulatory agencies of corporate governance. This result 
implies that the formal and transparent board nomination and election processes have more 
influence to promote sound corporate governance in term of rule and law and the power and 
authority of the regulatory agencies in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries. In 
addition, supervising process of disclosure and communication is also more likely to enhance 
sound corporate governance in term of rule and law, power and authority of the regulatory 
agencies.  
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Moreover, within each country we observe that for Ghanaian firms’ commitment of the 
board members to a process of disclosure and communication has a positive effect on rules 
and laws of corporate governance practice. Also, there is evidence that disclosure and 
communication positively influence power and authority of corporate governance agencies. 
This result suggests that board of directors of firms in Ghana are more committed to the 
process of disclosure and communication and this may likely promote the corporate 
governance of firms. However, in Ghanaian firms’ executive compensation seem to have 
negative effect on all the sub-variables of corporate governance system. This indicates that 
executive compensation is not promoting effective corporate governance practice. This may 
be due to absence of executive compensation committee. As a result, this may give a chance 
for director to award themselves compensation; this may not be in the interests of the 
shareholders. 
In Nigerian firms, commitment of the board members to the process of disclosure and 
communication has a negative influence on rules and laws of corporate governance practice. 
This result suggests lack of commitment of board members on disclosure and communication 
may hinder rules and laws on corporate governance practice. In addition, board effectiveness 
to their responsibility is more pronounced within Nigerian firms. This is due to various 
financial scandals that occurred recently in financial and non-financial firms in Nigeria. This 
allowed the regulatory and supervisory bodies of corporate governance to strengthen their 
roles and responsibility so that they can be more effective.  
 In South African firms’ board effectiveness, executive compensation and board duality 
(separation between the role and responsibility of Chairman) strongly promote sound 
corporate governance. This result suggests that this may be a result of King II and III Reports 
that lay more emphasis on the issue of the board of directors’ effective role and 
responsibility, separation of role and responsibility between Chairman and CEO and 
executive compensation.  
1.3.4 Recommendation on the  effects of the role and responsibilities of the board of directors of 
firms. 
This study recommend that in the area of corporate strategy, improvement is needed by 
increasing the number and role of independent directors that will see the development of 
corporate strategy as a team work among themselves and management. This will enable them 
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to work together to make valuable contributions to corporate strategy development. This 
recommendation is for all the firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries.   
In addition, within each country such as Ghanaian and Nigerian firms the regulatory and 
supervisory bodies of corporate governance need to lay emphasis on nonbinding advisory 
vote by shareholders on executive compensation as it happens in the UK. This will allow 
shareholders to express their opinion on executive compensation. Also, there is need for more 
competent and efficient person as either Chairmen or Chief Executive Officers of firms in 
Ghana and Nigeria. The person should ensure that their role and responsibilities will enhance 
good corporate governance practice.  
Furthermore, in all countries together there is need for strengthening of the role and 
responsibility of firm’s board of directors and proper monitoring of the board members by 
regulatory and supervisory agencies of corporate governance. 
 The shareholders ability to have control over the boards of directors by using voting 
power and also there is need for shareholders to hold the board of directors liable for non-
performance through shareholders activism. The shareholders can influence corporate 
behaviour through shareholders activism in order to exercise their rights as the owners of the 
firms. They should ensure that the board of directors are qualified for their position, have a 
clear understanding of their role and are not subjected to undue influence. The above 
recommendations are reflection of the opinion of the respondents from the survey 
questionnaire.  
 1.3.5 Contribution to the study on the effects  of external factor on corporate governance 
practice 
This study finds that in all the countries in the Sub-region the accounting system plays a 
major role to promote sound corporate governance practice. This result suggests that it is 
through the quality of accounting system that shareholders, potential investors and other 
stakeholders of firms will be able to receive financial information about their firms.   
There is evidence from this study that political environment seem to hinders promotion 
of corporate governance system. This finding is due to politicians and friends of officials of 
the government in power interfering with the work of regulatory and supervisory bodies of 
corporate governance. Also, the prolonged military dictatorship across the countries in the 
region did not help the matter because during the military regimes there were no corporate 
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governance frameworks and no strong institutions to formulate policy. It was during 
democratic rule that such institutional frameworks and reform on corporate governance was 
introduced, such as Code of Best practices or guideline on principle and practice of 
corporate governance in Nigeria and Ghana.  
Another contribution of this study is that in Nigerian firms, ownership structure may 
deter the promotion of corporate governance system. This may be due to a lack of proper 
procedure in acquiring the shares of firms, and most cases board of directors and senior 
management are likely the majority stockholders of firms.  
In addition, in all the countries particularly in Ghana, societal and cultural factors are 
unlikely to promote corporate governance system. This result indicates that in the Sub-
region corporate governance Code of Best practices needs to take into consideration of 
socio-cultural environment when formulating corporate governance policy.   
Moreover, we estimate the effect of sub-variables of external factors on rules and laws 
that promote corporate governance in all the selected countries. We find that macro-economic 
policies can hinder promotion of corporate governance practices. This finding implies that 
when there is a lack of proper implementation of macro-economic policies it may be a result 
of poor quality of governance. This indicates that government expenditure seem to be 
misappropriate, this may be due to corruption, lack of transparency and accountability in the 
countries. This may lead to an increase in national deficit. Thus an increase in national deficit 
brings a weak economy such as high inflation rate, high interest rate and high unemployment 
rate. Consequently, investors may move from equity or capital markets to money markets 
because the money markets are free but capital markets may be risky.  
In Nigerian, growth and development of firms that influence the economy may promote 
good corporate governance. The policy for development of growth of the firms has been 
recently implemented through the introduction of various economic reforms by past and 
present democratic governments in Nigeria.  
Beside this, in all the countries studied, particular in South African firms’ foreign 
investment attraction is likely to promote corporate governance through inflow of capital and 
new corporate strategy. This result suggests that promotion of effective corporate governance   
attract investors by building more confidence for them in order to invest across the countries 
in the region. 
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Furthermore, in all the countries together particularly in Ghana the sub-variables such as 
national culture that affect procedure in accounting systems, business ethics and socio-
political culture may hinder  rules and laws that promote corporate governance. These results 
suggest that the governments in the Sub-region (SSAA) need to take into consideration the 
socio-cultural and business ethics environment of the Sub-region in the formulation of 
guideline on corporate governance practice or Code of Best practice on corporate governance 
of firms. 
In addition, corruption of sub-variables has a negative effect on the rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance as a result of institutionalised corruption in all countries in the 
Sub-region (SSAA). This finding supports the evidence that in recent time corruption is 
prevalent across sectors of the economy and in society at large. As a result, the rules and laws 
can be easily altered or not properly implemented by the enforcement and supervisory 
agencies of corporate governance.  
1.3.6 Recommendation on the effect of external factors on corporate governance practice. 
The findings from this study which is reflection from the opinion of the respondents, we 
recommend that the guidelines and regulation of corporate governance across countries in the 
Sub-region should be drawn in such a way that they reflect the socio-political and cultural 
environment.  
The regulatory and supervisory respondents believe that reduction in corruption and 
bribery may promote effective corporate governance. As a result, there is a need to strengthen 
the anti-corruption agencies to provide more campaign against corruption and allow the legal 
institution to prosecute corrupt officers and politicians in society. Also, the government and 
politician should stop interfering with ministries and agencies responsible for monitoring, 
enforcing corporate governance particularly in Nigeria.   
Moreover, the sale of state-owned companies and the appointment of the board of 
directors should follow due process in order to bring transparency and accountability to the 
firms. This may promote sound corporate governance practice of firms’ particularly in 
Nigeria.  
Finally, there is a need for local investors enforce corporate governance by giving them 
their rights to be able to express their own view and use their voting power. The issue of the 
board members and senior management having majority stocks in firms; in such situations 
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the regulatory and supervisory agencies of corporate governance should make sure that the 
minority shareholders rights are not violated. 
1.4 Limitation of the study 
The above recommendations for each of the chapters (section) are based on the reflection 
from opinion of the respondents from the survey questionnaire used for this study. 
Consequently, the limitation of this study is that the opinion of the respondents cannot be 
probe. In addition, there may be other components or factors that affect corporate governance 
of listed firms in SSAA countries which this study has not mentioned in the survey 
questionnaire this may be for further research study.  
1.5  Structure of the Thesis : 
 Figure 1: Shows the structure of the study 
 
 
The remaining Chapters of this study are organised as follows: Chapter 2 describes the 
literature review on corporate governance. Chapter three describes the methodology for 
chapter 4, 5, and 6.  Chapter 4 explains the results of the data analysis for the impact of 
institutional characteristics of corporate governance on corporate governance system. Chapter 
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5 indicates the results of the data analysis on the effect of role and responsibilities of the 
board of directors on corporate governance system. Chapter 6 describes the results of the data 
analysis on the effect of external or environmental factors on corporate governance system. 
Finally, Chapter 8 provides the conclusions and recommendations based on the results for 
chapter 4, 5 and 6 of the study. 
1.6 The Summary of the study 
                                   Motivation of the study 
• The emergence of corporate governance debate: corporate scandals across the 
developed countries. This is due to corporate scandals that occurred across developed 
countries 
• The debate also in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone countries:  There are scandals in 
Cadbury Plc, banks in Nigeria and Ghana.  
• The pertinent research question that this study addresses is the identification of the 
components that are essential for effective corporate governance of firms in the Sub-region 
                               Methodology of the study 
• The study used stratified random sampling method to collect data from 12 categories 
of respondents who are stakeholders of corporate governance of firms in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Anglophone (SSAA) countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa 
• The instruments used to collect data for this study are from modified version of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) corporate governance 
assessment instrument Okpara (2010), Burton et.al (2009) and corporate governance 
literatures 
The key findings from chapter four: The effect of the institutional characteristics of corporate 
governance on corporate governance system  
• We found that in all the firms in the two countries (Ghana and South Africa) 
regulatory framework variables of corporate governance have a positive significant effect on 
the corporate governance system. 
• In the Nigerian firms, regulatory framework has a negative effect on corporate 
governance system.  
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• This may be due to lack of implementation of regulatory frameworks of corporate 
governance by the regulatory bodies/agencies in Nigeria. 
• In Nigerian firms, the following sub-variables such as non-compliance with 
law/regulation (Q17) and Shareholders violation (Q25) seem to hinder rules and laws that 
promote effective corporate governance.  
• While in Ghanaian firms preferential treatment of large shareholders (Q30) also deter 
rules and laws that promote effective corporate governance. 
The key finding in chapter five: The role and responsibilities of firms board of directors 
• Transparency in board nomination and election processes (Q35), commitment of 
board to disclosure and communication (Q37) may promote effective corporate governance 
system.  
• Board duality (separation of Chairman and CEO) (Q38) seems to inhibit corporate 
governance system except in South African firms. 
• The board of directors are not committed to the rules of executive compensation 
(Q32) this hinders sound corporate governance practices except in South African firms 
The main findings of the study for chapter six: The effect of external factors on corporate 
governance system:  
• Accounting system adopted may affect the corporate governance system 
• The political environment seems to hinder sound corporate governance system 
• In Ghanaian firms societal and cultural factors may decrease the promotion of 
effective corporate system 
• In Nigerian firm ownership structure may inhibit promotion of good corporate 
governance 
• In South Africa corruption seems to hamper effective corporate governance 
   Conclusion of the study 
• Proper implementation of regulatory framework and enforcement policy on corporate 
governance practice 
• Commitment of the board of directors of firms to transparency and accountability, 
disclosure and communication 
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 Proper implementation of regulatory framework and enforcement policy on corporate 
governance practice 
• Commitment of the board of directors of firms to transparency and accountability, 
disclosure and communication 
• Adoption of proper accounting system 
Recommendations of the study: The following recommendations are based on the opinion or 
perception of the respondents. 
• Adopt a whistle blowing method 
• Institutional bodies should be more prudent in monitoring of rules and laws with 
stringent penalties 
• Increase the use of advisory vote by shareholders on executive compensation and 
facilitation of shareholders activism 
• Autonomous regulatory bodies and supervisory agencies 
• Ensure competent and effective Chairman and CEO 
• The Code or Guideline of corporate governance for listed firms should take 
cognisance of and be aligned with socio-cultural environment of the countries. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
Literature Review on Corporate Governance of Firms 
Summary 
The chapter provide a review of literature on corporate governance in the context of 
globalization and in less developed emerging economies. It highlights the different perceptive 
and elements with relate theories of corporate governance. The chapter finally examines role 
and responsibilities of board of directors of firms and external factors affecting corporate 
governance practice, leading to the formulation of the hypotheses for this study.  
2.1 Definition of corporate governance 
There is no universally held or single definition of corporate governance and certainly no 
definition that all countries agree on Mayes et al. (2001). As a result, corporate governance 
can be defined and practiced in different way globally depending upon the relative power of 
owners, managers and provider of capital Craig (2005). Generally, corporate governance can 
be defined as a procedure, customs, laws, policies, and institutions that affect the way a 
corporation is directed, administered or controlled. It can also be the relationships between 
stakeholders and the goals that are already laid down for the corporation to follow, in which 
the principal stakeholders are the following: shareholders, management, and the board of 
directors. In addition, employees, customers, creditors (banks and bond- holders) are 
stakeholders. The important objective of corporate governance is to ensure the accountability 
and transparency of those involved in the policy of organisation through mechanisms that 
will reduce the incidence of principal- agent problem.    
In term of corporate governance mechanism and structure, Keasey and Wright (1993) 
defined corporate governance as a framework for effective monitoring, regulation and control 
of companies which allows alternative internal and external mechanisms for achieving the 
laid down objectives. These mechanisms include those internal to the firm and its 
organisation, and those external to the firm such as statutory requirement and the operation of 
the markets. The internal mechanisms are the board composition, managerial ownership, and 
non-managerial shareholding which involve institutional shareholding. The external 
mechanisms are the following: statutory audit, the market for corporate control effectiveness 
in hostile takeovers, and stock market evaluation of corporate performance. However, the 
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advantages of the entire corporate governance framework will be determined by the 
interaction among these governance mechanisms.  
Using the agency theory approach, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) defined corporate 
governance as a process in which a supplier of finance to firms assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment. The authors posited that corporate governance is mainly 
concerned with principal agency problem between ownership and control. The authors 
emphasized that corporate governance should be seen as a set of mechanisms through which 
outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by insiders. In addition, Cadbury 
(2002) defined corporate governance as the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled by shareholders. In addition, in terms of attainment of company goals, objectives 
and performance, OECD (1999) view corporate governance as a set of relationship between 
the company’s management, its board, its shareholders and stakeholders. It also provides the 
structure through which objectives of the company are set and the means of attaining those 
objectives, and monitoring performances. 
2.2 Corporate governance in Less Developing and emerging economies 
This section critically examines corporate governance practices in less developing 
economies. As a result, these are the studies and findings of various authors. Tsamenyi and 
Uddin (2008) argue that adoption is becoming a main issue in less developed and emerging 
economies. Some factors such as Asian financial crisis, the adoption of international donor 
led reforms, and globalisation of capital market are factors that are moving corporate 
governance reforms forward in less developed and emerging economies. Adu-Amoah et.al 
(2008) revealed empirical evidence on corporate governance practices of rural banks in 
Ghana. The authors posited that corporate governance practices in rural banks are with social 
and political relations thereby questioning the reason for adoption of western corporate 
governance model without any adjustment to the system. The purpose of their study is that 
the design and implementation of corporate governance in these types of firms should 
consider the local, social cultural and political context. Ndiweni (2008) examines corporate 
governance in South Africa in social and cultural context. The author found the same 
evidence from Ghana by Adu-Ahmoah et.al (2008) with corporate governance in South 
Africa. 
 In addition, Edward et.al (2008)  build up this paper on a number of previous studies  of 
corporate governance in Nigeria such as  Oyejide and Soyibo, 2001; Yakasai,2001; 
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Ahunman, 2002; Okike 2007) As a result the authors  examined the effect of ethnicity, 
gender, and power, and power relationships on corporate practices in Nigeria. The author 
found that the corporate governance practices in Nigeria are based on developed world.  
However; there are inadequacies in Nigerian regulatory system and lack of mechanism for 
implementation and enforcement of corporate regulation in Nigeria.    
Furthermore, Akisi (2008) examines the relationship between the inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and its determinants in 27 emerging markets between 1997 and 2005, the 
author focus on the role of accounting standard and corporate governance. The author found 
that high-quality accounting standard and effective corporate governance may leads to 
increase in foreign direct investment. As a result of this, the author concludes that emerging 
markets can attract foreign investment (FDI) through improvement in the quality of financial 
reporting and corporate governance. Liew (2008) revealed that appropriate corporate 
governance system will play a significant role in resolving the problems that link with the 
interlocking and concentrated ownership structure of Malaysian corporations. The author also 
argues that    internal politics and family relations influence the ownership, management and 
corporate governance of Malaysian corporation. Othman and Zeaghal (2008) claimed that the 
impact on corporate governance disclosure depend on the emerging market country’s legal 
system. The authors found that common law emerging markets have a higher level of 
corporate governance disclosure than civil law ones. Also corporate governance disclosure 
has a positive significant effect on the size of the capital market for emerging market and for 
common law and civil countries.  
  Moreover, Soobaroyen and Mahadeo (2008) show the level of compliance with 
corporate governance code in Mauritius in African developing economy. The author found 
that a reasonable level of compliance with more visible requirements of the code. However 
there is no non-compliance particularly in relation to the low number of company boards 
being chaired by independent directors. In addition, there is non-compliance to uncertainties 
on the actual operation of board committee, and to the widespread non-disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration. They also found that compliance statements are inconsistent with 
extent of compliance disclosure in the reports, and this suggests that many of the companies 
are into selective compliance.  
 In Uganda, CMA (2006), found that there are  difference effort  that have been made by 
various organisation like bank of Uganda, the institute of corporate governance of Uganda, 
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and the Capital Market Authority (CMA)  to improve the corporate governance system. The 
CMA designed the guideline in a minimum standard for sound corporate governance practice 
by public companies and issuers of corporate debt in Uganda. This development in the 
regulatory frame work of the CMA is very important at this period as a result of awareness 
the importance of governance in both emerging and developing economies for improvement 
of domestic and regional capital market growth.  It was based on this, that CMA conducted a 
survey of compliance level of seven listed companies by using the data from annual report of 
those companies. The organisation found that there are needs for better clarity when 
providing for corporate information, and there is need for improvement in degree of reporting 
and most companies provide generic information.          
Furthermore, in the Middle East and North African region Sourial (2007) overviewed the 
governance model of the corporate sector and securities market of eleven countries in the 
region out of eighteen countries. The author revealed   that recently the region has undergone 
some reforms and restructuring on legislative, but the main issue is the gap between 
legislative framework and enforcement. In addition he found that Middle East and North 
Africa (MEND) market corporate sector is fully with block holder (insider) and they depend 
on banks for sources of financing. In the region banking sector are  having burdened with 
non-perform loan (NPLs), resulting from over lending couple with conflict of interest, and 
international fraud and over value of collaterals. Market disciplines with various guideline 
and tools are yet to developed to extent of improving corporate governance practices and 
markets are either inefficient or mainly weakly efficient.  Moreover, the family business in 
the region has a foundation, and is the backbone of the regional countries’ economies, and it 
was like that for long period of time. The author recommended that the tradition and cultures 
should be allowed to choose their acquaintance measure with number of reforms measures 
that will bring better corporate governance practices. The new innovation might bring 
resistance to reforms and it may collapse.  Finally, the author suggested that the banks should 
play their role properly, as the main stakeholders as they are far developed in compared with 
securities market in the region.   
In Nigeria, Ahunwan (2002) provided the account of the system of corporate governance 
in Nigeria and examined the prospect for recent reform and how it will contribute to more 
governance. The author found that the judiciary system is weak, and the economy is made of 
underdeveloped market institution, a high level of information asymmetries, deeply rooted 
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with corruption and disregard for rule of law. As a result, the majority of the shareholders 
expropriated the benefit of control without taking the interest of the minority shareholders 
into consideration. However, the author revealed that although the reforms have brought 
some progress, the reform has to address the deeper causes of the problem for example an 
ineffective legal system, ownership structure and capital market. In addition, the author 
claimed that ultimately, the successes of corporate governance reforms are associated with 
broader government reforms of Nigeria state and this will make the country to compete in the 
global economy. 
 Furthermore, Rossouw, et al (2002) explained that since the publication of the Cadbury 
report that defined corporate governance as the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. The King’s report in South Africa used this definition as a base in formulation of 
corporate governance system in South Africa. The authors reviewed the corporate governance 
that currently exists in South Africa by looking at both financial and ethical dimensions of 
corporate governance. The authors posited that there are indications that corporate 
governance in South Africa is developing with confusion and the cause of this confusion 
makes the revision of corporate governance an on-going concern.  For South African to 
participate in the global economy they have to meet the international corporate governance 
standards; however, they have to do this without separating themselves from the rest of the 
African continent. The authors found that confusion with South African corporate governance 
was noticed by the globalization of South Africa companies and their reliance on foreign 
capital flows. The situation in the country is also complicated as a result of insufficient 
statutory and legal backing on the broad corporate governance level for the directives that 
have developed on the narrow corporate governance level. 
The authors suggested that the companies have to solve local challenges such as economic 
empowerment of the black majority in South Africa, how to eliminate the crime such as fraud 
and money laundering, the reality of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and 
how to deal with poverty in the country.   
 2.3. Literature review on institutional characteristics of corporate governance of firms  
The section provides detail of the findings from prior literature which suggested that 
those institutional characteristic of corporate governance such as (regulatory framework, 
enforcement, disclosure and transparency, shareholder rights and ownership concentration) 
can affect corporate governance practices in firms. Below are the outcomes of various 
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academic scholars, and international organisations finding toward the filling the gap in 
different aspect of the literature in corporate governance of corporations.  
2.3.1 The regulatory, legal, and enforcement of corporate governance  
The knowledge of the main concept of corporate governance is rule and procedure of 
transactions that can affect the implementation of corporate governance. This also can 
include the law, rules and regulation of appointment of auditors, the commitments on the part 
of government agencies that are responsible for enforcement. It includes issue of listed 
companies in compliance with corporate governance guidelines, law regarding to the 
protection of investors which can affect the dividend policy, and shareholders rights 
especially minority rights. This will not allow majority shareholder to exploit the minority. In 
addition, procedure of board nomination and election process, rule and regulation related to 
disclosure and accountability.  
The level of legal protection of investors in any country is an important factor in 
determining the development of the financial market of company in that country. The 
systematic differences in structure of law and enforcement among various countries in area of 
historical trend of their laws, level of corruption, and the quality of their enforcement will 
surely determine the difference in financial development. As a result, these are the findings of 
authors toward the study of legal protection and enforcement in corporate governance of 
different countries. 
La Port. et.al (1998, 2008) posited that countries which their legal systems have origin in 
common law are more substantial shareholder protection than civil-law system. Also the 
authors claimed that greater shareholder protection increase the level of stock market 
development. In addition, Armour et.al (2009) revealed the same finding that common law 
system exhibits a higher level of shareholder protection than civil-law system. It may be that 
common law countries adopted corporate governance code rapidly than civil-law countries. 
However, the authors found that civil-law system are experience more rapid increase in 
shareholder protection over the same period. Moreover, the authors found that the legal origin 
may affect the structure of legal rule; however the level of legal protection is not positively 
related with financial development, this may due to greater stringency in corporate 
governance. 
La Porta et al. (1998) examined the legal rules covering protection of corporate 
shareholders and creditors, the origin of the rules and quality of enforcement in 49 countries. 
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Using empirical analysis the result revealed that common law countries have the strongest, 
French countries have the weakest, and the German-and Scandinavian-civil- law countries are 
at the middle. In addition, the authors found that concentration of ownership of shares in 
largest public companies was negatively related to investor protections, and the same with 
hypothesis that small, and diversified shareholders are not likely to be recognized in countries 
that cannot protect their right. Klapper and Love (2004) used current data on corporate 
governance (CG) ranking in firms across 14 developing markets. Using empirical evidence 
the authors found that there was variation in firm- level of governance in the sample and the 
firm-level of governance was lower in those countries that have weak legal systems and firm 
level of corporate governance should take seriously for countries with weaker legal system. 
In addition, better corporate governance was correlated with higher operating performance.  
Johnson, et al. (1999) empirically used the Asian financial crises to revealed how legal 
institution affected corporate governance on the depreciation and stock market. The authors 
found that managerial agency problem can make countries with weak legal system loss the 
confidence of investor and in a cross-country regression, corporate governance variables 
enumerate more of the variation in exchange rate and stock market performance during the 
Asian crises than macroeconomic variables.  The author found that the protection of minority 
shareholder right was one of the main reasons for depreciation and stock market declines 
during the crises. 
 La Porta, et al. (2000) examined the level of protection by law on investors, both 
shareholders and creditors from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders 
of firms. The authors explained the differences in law and how effective in implementation 
across countries, given the origin of these differences, enumerate their consequences, and 
examined the strategies of the corporate governance reform. The authors posited that legal 
approach was more meaningful way to understand corporate governance and its reform   than 
the conventional differentiations between bank-centred and market-centred financial system.  
 Furthermore, La Porta, et al. (2002) formulated a model of the effects of legal protection 
of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by controlling shareholder on the 
valuation of firms. The model was tested empirically using sample of 539 large firms from 27 
developed economic countries. The results revealed that, higher valuation of firms in 
countries with well protection of minority shareholders, and firms with higher cash-flow 
ownership by controlling shareholders. The finding of this study was consistent with 
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DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985). The study also contributed to the theoretical framework on 
the effects of corporate ownership structure on valuation (Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
Morck, et.al (1988).  
Shleifer and Vishny, (1997) examined the corporate governance with special focused to 
the importance of legal protection of investor, and ownership concentration in corporation 
around the world. According to the authors, corporate governance deals with agency 
problem, the separation of management and finance, the question of corporate governance 
was how to assure the supplier of capital that they get return on their investment.  The authors 
proceed forward, by posited that agency problem gives an opportunity for the managers to 
run away with suppliers of capital fund or used them on irrelevant project with well 
documented. In the absent of governance it will be failure, as a result of the above, legal 
protection of investors rights, was one of important element of corporate governance. The 
concentration ownership through large shareholders, takeover, and bank financing are general 
method of control that can help investors to get back their money. Even though large 
investors can be assist effectively in providing solution to agency problem, but they may be 
inefficient in redistribution of the wealth from other investor to themselves. 
OECD (2004) explained the important of legal regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement 
agencies so that corporate governance framework will be effective in a firm. The organisation 
revealed that corporate governance framework should enhance transparency, consistent with 
rule of law, and there should be division of responsibility for supervisory regulator and 
enforcement agency in each country in which the firm operate. The organisation further 
explained that the bodies in charge of setting the principle of corporate governance in each of 
the country must make sure that there is no conflict between the codes or principle and the 
existing law of each of the country. In case if there is conflict appropriate legislation will be 
enacted. Although, when there is no conflict the legislation is required to support some area 
of corporate governance   
OECD (2004) principles also suggest that supervisory, regulatory and enforcement 
authorities must have the power, integrity, and resources needed to carry out their duties in a 
professional and objectives miner, however the rulings of these authorities should always be 
at appropriate time, transparent, and should be explain clearly. In addition, ECA (2002) 
explained that separating the government’s policy making and regulatory roles through 
establishing independent regulatory mechanisms and increase the development of regulatory 
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expert can enhance the stability in the regulatory environment. Also Rossouw (2005) posited 
that lack of an effective legal and regulatory framework hinder good corporate governance, 
this prevent  firms from listing because they are under highly scrutiny and they need to 
increase their level of disclosure. However, the author further explained that a legal 
framework is compulsory so that it can offer sufficient incentives for firms to become more 
transparent   
Moreover, La Porta, et al. (2000) examined the level of protection by law on investors, 
both shareholders and creditors from expropriation by the managers and controlling 
shareholders of firms. The authors explained the differences in law and how effective in 
implementation across countries, given the origin of these differences, enumerate their 
consequences, and examined the strategies of the corporate governance reform. The authors 
posited that legal approach is more meaningful way to understand corporate governance and 
its reform   than the conventional differentiations between bank-centred and market-centred 
financial system.  
In addition, Arun and Turner (2004) revealed that there is need for appropriate laws to 
protect investors, increase financial disclosure, and putting fiduciary duties on directors and 
company executives. Doidge et.al (2007) distinguish between the investor protection by the 
state and investor protection adopted by firm, the authors claimed that in a countries with 
weak development, it is very costly to improve investors protection because institutional 
infrastructure is lacking and sound governance has political cost. The authors revealed that in 
such countries an opportunity of improving corporate governance is not too much as a result 
of weak capital market and this indicate such countries have poor investor protection. They 
explained further that there is evidence of interrelationship between country-level of investor 
protection and firm-level of governance. 
2.3.2 The disclosure and transparency of corporate governance 
In recent time as a result of corporate governance scandal, government of both developed 
and developing countries have adopted a numbers of regulatory changes. As a result,   Okpara 
(2010) revealed that this regulatory change as increase the disclosure requirement and 
transparency. OECD (2004) explained that corporate governance framework should ensure that 
timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters pertaining to the company. This 
includes the financial situation, performance, ownership, merger and acquisition and 
governance of the company.  
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2.3.3 The Shareholders rights  
Okpara (2010) revealed that shareholder rights are not the same from country to country, 
for example in North America shareholder rights tend to be more developed than other 
developed countries. As a result there is standard for purchase of common stock. The 
shareholders rights are documented in corporations’ laws and stock markets rule and regulation 
for any country, then the issues of shareholder rights is important for the protection of investors 
against poor management of firm. In developing countries the issue of protection of shareholder 
rights have been have become a serious challenge for implementing effective corporate 
governance system  
OECD (2004) specified the following as the basic shareholder rights this including the right 
to secure method of ownership registration, convey or transfer share, obtained relevant and 
material information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis. Then participate and vote 
in general shareholder meeting, elect and removed members of the board, and share in the profit 
of the corporation. In addition, shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to be 
sufficiently informed on decision concerning fundamental corporation changes, for example 
amendments to status or articles of incorporation, the authorisation of additional share and 
extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or substantially all assets that in effect 
result in the sale of the company. 
 QECD (2004) further explained that capital structures and arrangements that enable certain 
shareholders to obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their equity ownership should be 
disclosed, and the exercise of ownership rights by shareholders, including institutional 
investors, should be facilitated. Furthermore, the organisation revealed that corporate 
governance should ensure that equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and 
foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtained effective redress 
for violation of their rights. The confidence of minority shareholders is enhanced when the legal 
system provides mechanism for minority shareholders to bring lawsuits when they have a 
reasonable point to believe that their rights have been violated. 
2.3.4 The power of shareholders  
Oluyemi (2005) posited that shareholder is presenting a major role in the provision of 
corporate governance. Moreover, the author asserted that small or diffused shareholders exert 
corporate governance by directly voting on critical issues such as mergers, liquidation and some 
fundamental changes in the business strategy. They also indirectly elect the boards of directors 
to represent their interests and oversee the myriad of managerial decisions. The author further 
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revealed that incentive contracts are common mechanism for aligning the interest of managers 
with those of shareholders. Then the board of directors may negotiate managerial compensation 
with believe that it will yield a particular results. In addition, the author argue  that large 
ownership is another mechanism will disallowed the managers from deviating too much from 
the interest of the owners.  Large shareholders have incentives to obtain information and 
monitoring managers, and they can also elect their representative to the board of director and 
check managerial control of the board. They can also be more effective in exercising their 
voting rights than an ownership structure which is dominated by small and uniformed investors.  
Consequently, large shareholders can  be more effective in the negotiation of managerial 
incentive contract that align owner and manager interests than poorly informed small 
shareholders whose representative the board of director can be manipulated by the management.  
 
DeAngelo and DeAnglo (1995) revealed that large ownership brings some corporate 
governance problems, this occur when the large  investors exploit business relation with other 
firm they own which will profit them at the expense of the bank. Moreover, with larger 
shareholders private benefits of control can be maximised at the expense of smaller 
shareholders.      
OECD (2004) specified the following as the basic shareholder rights this including the right 
to secure method of ownership registration, convey or transfer share, obtained relevant and 
material information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis. Then participate and vote 
in general shareholder meeting, elect and removed members of the board, and share in the profit 
of the corporation. In addition, shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to be 
sufficiently informed on decision concerning fundamental corporation changes, for example 
amendments to status or articles of incorporation, the authorisation of additional share and 
extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or substantially all assets that in effect 
result in the sale of the company. Moreover, capital structures and arrangements that enable 
certain shareholders to obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their equity ownership 
should be disclosed, and the exercise of ownership rights by shareholders, including 
institutional investors, should be facilitated (OECD, 2004). 
Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishiny (1997) revealed that in more extreme situation large 
shareholders have outright control of the firm and their management with fifty-one or more 
per cent ownership. As a result, they address the agency problem in the sense that they have 
general interest in profit maximization and have enough over the assets of the firm so that 
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their interest  are respected. In addition, the authors argue that because large shareholders 
control by exercise their voting rights, their power based on the degree of legal protection of 
their votes. Majority ownership only works if the voting mechanism works, and majority 
ownership dictate the decision of the company and in which they need the enforcement by 
courts.   
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) explained that shareholders should focus their attention on the 
financial and strategic performance of the company and they should not use the corporate 
governance system to pursue social and political ends. The authors revealed that such activity 
only increased the tension between shareholders, managers and directors, diverting the latter 
two groups from focusing the way they will improve the performance of the company.  
 Payne, et al. (1996) posited that legally, institutions that are acting as fiduciaries should 
take the interest of beneficiaries as important. Also fiduciary agents are banks trustees which 
are not to consider self-interest or interest of the third parties on decision making that affect 
asset value (shareholder voting). Moreover, management may work to established themselves 
firmly at the expense of outsider shareholders and may force the institutional investors to vote 
in support of their proposals. The study provide an empirical analysis whether banks voting 
system is consistent with beneficiary interest. The results shows that where directors interlock 
and income-related relationships occurs, bank tend to vote in favour of management anti-
takeover proposal. If there are no businesses relationships banks tend to vote against the 
proposal (Payne, et al. 1996). 
OECD (2004) revealed that corporate governance should ensure that equitable treatment 
of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have 
the opportunity to obtained effective redress for violation of their rights. The confidence of 
minority shareholders is enhanced when the legal system provides mechanism for minority 
shareholders to bring lawsuits when they have a reasonable point to believe that their rights 
have been violated. The provision of such enforcement mechanisms is a main responsibility 
of legislators and regulators.  
 Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishiny (1997) posited that a substantial minority shareholder 
has the incentive to obtain information and monitor the management, thereby avoiding the 
traditional free rider problem. They have enough voting control to put pressure on the 
management in some situations, or have power to force the management out through a proxy 
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fight or takeover. The authors explained that large minority shareholders are more 
complicated since they have to make alliance with other investors in order to exercise control. 
The power of the managers to interfere in this alliance is highly enhanced, and the courts have 
the power to protect their rights. As a result the  large minority shareholding may be relevant 
only in countries with relatively powerful legal systems, while in countries with weak legal 
system are more likely to have outrights majority ownership.   
In addition, Oluyemi (2005) found that minority shareholders may exert corporate 
governance directly through their voting rights and indirectly by the board of directors 
electing them, but there are some factors that can prevent minority shareholder from 
effectively exerting corporate control. This occurs as a consequence of large information 
asymmetries between managers and minority shareholders, as managers have enormous 
direction over the flow of information. The minority shareholders frequently lack the 
expertise to monitor managers accompanied by each of the shareholder’s small stake which 
can induce a free rider problem. This indicates that each shareholders relies on others to 
undertake the costly process of monitoring managers, this imply that there is too little to 
monitoring.        
2.3.5 Ownership concentration  
Ownership structure means various patterns by which shareholders seem to set up respect 
to a specific group of firms. The structure of ownership of firm is always used by policy-
makers, Academician, and researcher in their various analyses of corporate governance of a 
country or firms.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) revealed that ownership concentration is link 
with legal protection and this one of two main element of determinant of corporate 
governance. There are situation where large shareholders can benefit minority shareholders 
because of their power and incentive they used to prevent expropriation by managers. As a 
result, ownership concentration can view as an efficient governance mechanism Okpara, 
(2010). However, Johnson et.al (2000) claimed that large shareholder can align with 
managers to expropriate minority shareholder this benefit is known as tunnelling. La porta 
et.al 1999; 2000 argues that this situation is one of the main agency problems in countries 
with poor shareholder protection.  In addition, Morck et.al (1988) found that controlling 
shareholders may pursue an objective that will not favour minority shareholders.  
  Furthermore, Okpara (2010) posited that the relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm efficiency is a complicated issue. The author found that when ownership of shares is 
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widely dispersed. A higher ownership concentration is likely mitigating the free-rider 
problem and this will improve firm efficiency. The author further explained that when the 
fractional ownership of the higher shareholders concentration exceeds a certain threshold, a 
higher ownership concentration raises the likelihood of tunnelling and reduce firm efficiency. 
In addition, La Porta et.al (1999) used the data on ownership structures of large companies in 
the 27 richest economies to investigate the fundamental controlling shareholders of these 
firms. The empirical analysis of the sample revealed that, except in economies with very 
good shareholder protection, few of these firms are widely held. The findings do not match 
Berle and Mean’s view on Modern Corporation. Instead, these firms are controlled by 
families or the state. The equity control through financial institution is very rare and the 
controlling shareholders have power over firms in excess of their cash flow rights. This 
happens through the use of hierarchy and taken part in the management activities. 
2.4.  Theoretical framework on role and responsibilities of the board of directors 
The composition of the board of directors is very important for the board to perform their 
functions without any control from anybody. The board should include individual with good 
personal character and ability to perform the board’s duties, integrity, having sense of 
accountability, record of success, and leadership qualities. In addition, he or she must be 
expert in the field of finance with experience, and must always think strategically. The 
directors must show his committed to the organisation by prepared and present for meeting.  
Okpara (2010) argues boards’ structures are not uniform across the country, there is 
diversity of ownership structure around the world, countries such as France, Germany, 
Netherland, and China their company law required listed firms to adopt a two-tier board (dual 
board system). However, Mallin (2010) found that most Europeans countries  such as, have a 
unitary board structure, example are UK, Spain and Ireland  although majority have option 
for of a dual structure and some provide employee role in supervisory. In such countries there 
is supervisory and managerial role in the companies examples are Austria, Denmark, and 
Germany.   
Moreover, Mallin (2010) explained that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is 
responsible for the running of the company’s business activities, while the chairman is 
responsible for running of the board. The author argues that the two roles should not be 
combined and carried out by one person because it gives the individual person too much 
power in the company. The empirical evidence of Brickley et.al (1997) show that separating 
the chairman of board and CEO will reduce agency cost in firm and improved performance. 
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Weisbach and Hermalin (2003) asked this question that why there are boards of 
directors. The authors answer by argues that boards of directors exist as a result of regulation 
between the country corporate law and Stock Exchange Commission (SEC) requirement. The 
authors further argue that boards of directors are market solution to firms’ design problems 
and it is an endogenous determines institution that improves the agency problem that is 
affecting large firms.  
OECD (2004) principle of corporate governance explained the responsibilities of the 
boards which include the following; reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of 
action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plan. The responsibilities also include setting 
performance objectives, monitoring implementation, corporate performance; and overseeing 
major capital expenditure acquisition and divestiture. The organisation also stated that the 
function of board of director should include; selecting, compensating, monitoring, replacing 
key executives and overseeing succession planning.  This function of the board is aligning 
key executive officer and board remuneration with the longer term of the company interest of 
the company and its shareholders. In addition, the board should ensure a formal and 
transparent board nomination and election process, overseeing the process of disclosure and 
communications. The board should ensure the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and 
financial reporting standard which include the independent audit system and compliance with 
law, regulation, and standards. The board play the role of monitoring the effectiveness of 
company’s governance practices and they should able to commit themselves effectively to 
their responsibility (OECD, 2004).  
The composition of the board of directors is very important for the board to perform their 
functions without any control from anybody. The board should include individual with good 
personal character and ability to perform the board’s duties, integrity, having sense of 
accountability, record of success, and leadership qualities. In addition, he or she must be 
expert in the field of finance with experience, and must always think strategically. The 
directors must show his committed to the organisation by prepared and present for meeting. 
Most of the empirical studies on effect of board composition on firm performance are given 
difference result, contrary to expectation.  
Furthermore, Heracleous (2001) argues that the accepted ‘‘Best Practices’’ on corporate 
governance has generally failed to find convincing link between these practices and 
organisation performance. Using empirical analysis, the result shows that the relationship 
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between two best Practices CEO/chair duality and insider and outsider composition and 
organisation performance to be insignificant. He proposes four possibilities and implication 
for each of the possibilities for this relationship that is mutually exclusive.  Firstly, the 
possibility that best practices in corporate governance’s index is not a determinant to 
organisation performance and the implication is that corporate governance best practice needs 
to be seriously reorganised without any doubt. Secondly, that operational performance of 
theoretical concept has low face validity and there is need for higher face validity of 
operation by behavioural observation and interview of the directors. Thirdly, the studies are 
not wide to aiming to show board characteristics to organisational performance and not to 
take note of systemic factor and there is need for research models and paradigms that can 
explain the systemic and multi-directional influences. Lastly, that difference type of 
organisation performance need difference practice in corporate governance and this indicate 
that a contingency idea needs to be incorporated in the study of governance.  
Bhagat and Black (2002) noticed that on the board of directors of American Public 
companies, independent directors are more numerous, and many financial analysts and 
institutional investors are confident that a monitoring board composed of independence 
directors is an important structure of good corporate governance. The authors used  empirical 
evidence to disprove the believed by  using the first large sample, to determine the degree of 
board independence (Proxies by fraction of the board of independence directors minus the 
fraction of inside directors on a company’s board) correlate with different measures of long-
term performance of large American firms. The authors found that low-profitability firms 
increased the independence of their board of directors, but there was no evidence that this 
method succeeded, firms with a more independent board did not perform better than other 
firms. The author results support the method of the firm to test the board structure that 
rejecting the conventional monitoring of board.  
Moreover, Prasanna (2006) investigate whether the board independence has any 
influence in maximizing value. The author revealed that the empirical analysis did not 
produce evidence to show that there was relationship between independence board and value 
maximization. The author suggested that other related controlling variables such as 
shareholding pattern, market presence, and industry growth should be include in the study. 
However, the corporate governance reforms changing from non-executive director to 
independent which shows that over the past five years corporate board have change 
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drastically. Currently most of the boards of companies have the highest number of non-
executive directors. The institutional body in-charge of regulating is monitoring seriously to 
make sure that there are present of non-executive directors on the board of company. 
In addition, Raheja (2005) models the interaction of firm insiders and outsiders on a 
corporate board and discussed the question of board’s ideal size and composition. In the 
model the results shows, that the board duties was for monitoring and making CEO 
succession decision. The insider directors are better informed on the quality of the firm 
investment projects, although outsiders can use CEO succession to encourage insiders to 
show their superior knowledge and assist the board in implementation of higher value 
projects. The optimal board structure was determined by trade-off between maximizing the 
ability of outsiders not to accept inferior projects and the optimal board size  and composition 
are function of director’s and the firm’s features. Finally, the author developed testable 
implication for cross-sectional variation in the optimal board structure across firms. 
In case of the board size, there is clear indication of negative relationship appears to 
occur between board size and firm performance. Yermack (1996) conducted an empirical 
study to show the relationship between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large US 
firms. The author found an inverse relationship between board size and firm value, that 
largest fraction of lost value occurs as board increases from small to medium size. The 
financial ratio, which are profitability, and operating efficiency decreases as the board size 
increases and provide stronger CEO performance incentives from compensation and risk of 
dismissal. The results robust to different control variables for company size, industry 
membership, and insider stock ownership growth opportunities, and alternate corporate 
governance structure. Tanna, et al. (2008) empirical revealed that board size has a link with 
efficiency. The authors show evidence on the effect of board size and composition on the 
efficiency of UK banks, although the impact was no rousted across various samples and 
specifications. 
 Furthermore, Jensen (1993)  argues that when boards are small in size this can help to 
improve performance and  when board member are more than seven or eight people they are 
less to function effectively  and  are easier to control by CEO. This due to the coordination 
and process problem overwhelm the advantages gained from having more number of people 
on board. The author explained that firms with larger boards’ size cost of remuneration, 
sitting allowance, and other expenses are higher than firms with fewer board sizes. In 
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addition, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) claimed that a smaller board size will make directors to 
know each other, in other to deliberate on issues more effectively with directors making 
contribution and reaching a true agreement from the deliberation.  
Moreover, Andres, and Vallelado, (2008)  in their presentation of  a paper on role of the 
board of directors in corporate governance in banking with a large sample of international 
commercial banks to test the hypothesis of dual role of directors. The empirical study 
revealed an inverse relationship between bank performance, and board size, and also between 
the proportion of non-executive directors and performance. This indicated that bank board 
composition and size are related to director’s ability to monitor and advice management, 
therefore, larger independent boards might prove more efficient in monitoring and rendering 
more valuable advice. 
2.4.1 Power separation between board chairperson and CEO  
Several of the studies that examined the separation of board chairperson and CEO argue 
on the basis that agency problem is higher when the same officer holds both positions 
because there will be too much power vested in one person and conflict of interest (Mallin, 
2010). Bhagat and Bolton (2008) examined empirically the relationships among corporate 
governance, performance, corporate capital structure and ownership structure. The result 
shows that CEO-Chairman separation was significantly correlated with operating 
performance. Baliga and Moyer (1996) investigate the relationship between the CEO duality 
and firm performance, it consider the pronouncement effect in duality structure, accounting 
measure of corporate performance. The empirical analysis of data shows that market was 
indifferent to changes in duality status of firms, there was little evidence of operating 
performance changes around duality status, and there is weak evidence that duality status 
affect long-term performance when other factors that can impact the performance have been 
control. 
2.4.2 Board corporate strategy  
This involves the level of participation of board members in commitment to decision 
making that can affect the long term performance of firms, the strategic decision which is 
based on long term trust and the direction of the firm (Ogbechie et.al 2009). The authors 
relate the board characteristics such as board size, outsider and inside board of director and 
CEO duality in relation to board involve in strategic decision making. As a result, the authors 
found that boards have to be more effective in strategy process. OECD (2004) explained that 
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board should be involved in reviewing and guiding corporate strategy such as major plan of 
action, risk policy, setting performance objective, and annual budget with business plan. 
Others include monitoring implementation, corporate performance, overseeing major capital 
expenditure and acquisition and divestitures.  
2.4.3 Executive compensation 
In the heart of corporate governance debate the issue of executive compensation have 
attracted much attention worldwide (Okike 2007). OECD (2004) explained that the board 
should have sufficient numbers of non-executive directors capable of exercising independent 
judgement on key responsibility such as payment of executive compensation. Therefore, 
board members of firm have a responsibility to pay attention to issues of executive 
compensation. Consequently, Shah et al, (2009) revealed in academic debate the determinant 
of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation is mainly on economic factor globally, this 
may likely be due to various market demands, work place diversity, heterogeneity in firms’ 
level and the growth opportunities of the firms. Thus the authors found that the size of firms, 
firm performance, market risk, power, tenure, CEO ownership and firm growth have being 
used to determine the executive compensation. 
2.5.Theoretical framework on the effects of external factors on corporate governance of 
firms  
The section of this study provides detail of the theories from prior literature which 
suggest that those factors mentioned below can affect corporate governance practices in 
firms. These theories will explain the way these factors can influence corporate governance. 
This includes the following.  
2.5.1 The Economic factors 
Burton et.al (2009) explains that macro-economic policies affect the ways in which 
organisations are managed. Therefore, economic factors such as the level of poverty, 
inflation, unfavourable foreign exchange rate and increasing cost of doing (high interest rate) 
are challenges to corporate governance structure. Also the attraction of local and foreign 
investors will depend on the type of business environment and corporate governance practice 
in the region and this can affect the growth and development of the firms. The authors further 
explain that economic and financial developments have more influence on a nation’s 
corporate governance than firm characteristics. In addition, corporate governance has positive 
effect on growth opportunities and need for external financing. Also country peculiarities 
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affect the costs that firm incur and this has benefit for adopting good corporate governance 
practices. However, the authors argues that  in a country with poor financing and economic 
development there is less access to external funding and thus it is possible that large 
shareholders will extract private benefit more readily as there is less monitoring by outsiders. 
Against this background, it shows that economic factor may influence corporate 
governance practices. OECD (2004) the organisation principle explained that the economic 
situation in a country may have a role to play in effective governance. As a result the 
organisation believes that corporate governance is only part of the larger economic context in 
which a firm operate such as macroeconomic policies and degree of competition in product 
and factor markets. Coffee (2005) revealed that corporate scandals with state of economy, the 
kind of ownership structure, accounting scandal, financial irregularities such as earnings 
manipulation all these are linked with the  recent economic downturn. Consequently, the 
author argues that the activities of the stock market, and economic policies put in place by 
government is affecting firm performance negatively and affect their competitiveness. As a 
result, the author found that sound corporate governance practice can enhance economic 
success, attraction of local and foreign investors and long term stability of the economic. Also 
this improves market discipline, transparency, accountability, and country reputation. 
However,  Kapuma, (2001), Mensah (2001)  argue that in  most developing countries many 
listed companies are subsidiaries of foreign, multinationals and that minority of shares are 
allocated to  local investors. As a result, the public investors’ cannot use their voting power to 
enforce corporate governance, and lack of effective corporate control due to limited trade 
able shares. 
Moreover, Doidge et.al (2007) claimed that economic and financial developments have 
more impact on a country’s corporate governance practices than firm characteristics. The 
authors revealed that corporate governance is positively significant with growth opportunities 
and availability of external finance.  Also factor of the country affect the cost that firm incur 
and the gain obtained from practicing sound corporate governance.  Burton et.al (2009) 
explained that in a country with poor financial and economic development there is less access 
to external funding, therefore it is possible for large shareholders to extract private benefit 
more readily due to less monitoring by outsiders.  In addition, Mueller (2006) argues that 
several studies have revealed adverse effects of Asian financial crisis are more severe in 
countries with weak corporate governance institutions. Based on this finding the author found 
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that in countries with poor shareholder protection and investment performance it will be 
difficult for firms in again higher sum of money in equity market. This will have adverse 
long-term effect on growth prospect on such countries. The author argues that weak corporate 
governance institutions in developed may result to wasteful over-investment and weak 
corporate governance institutions in developing countries may result to under investment. 
This  suggest that the best development strategy for emerging market country is to create a 
condition that will produce a higher equity market, and the best  step is to this direction is to 
install strong corporate governance institutions that will enhance higher equity market.     
In addition, financial intermediation is affecting the corporate governance practices in 
developing economies. As a result Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) reveal that banks play a 
predominant role in financial intermediation of firms in developing countries, as a result they 
maintain a good relationship with other firms in order to protect them and bring profit to the 
business environment. The authors further explained that this will bring a cordial relationship 
between the borrower and lender. In some countries firms own and control major local banks 
by creating a conglomerates business with the organisation and this will be easier to finance 
the whole companies. 
 Furthermore, there are challenges emanating from privatisation of state-owned 
companies which is affect the corporate governance practices of firm. Consequently, Estrin 
(2002), Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) posited that one of the reasons for privatisation of 
firms is to improve managerial incentives and raise corporate efficiency. However, in most 
developing countries there are conflict and problems associated with corporate governance 
before or privatisation of state-owned companies.  The authors revealed that there is lack of 
independence in the valuation of the assets; most sales of the companies are for their friends 
and lack of transparency in the appointment of the board of the companies. This enhances 
corporate governance problem in the privatisation of companies in developing country. 
2.5.2 The societal and cultural factors  
Burton et.al (2009) argues that the individual nature of each developing country can 
affect corporate governance practices, such that a situation where there is pressure from 
individual families and clan for financial support may encourage corruption and bribery. The 
head of a family makes decisions for a family-owned business without following the 
corporate governance guideline. Such decisions include issues of employment, board 
members, attitude towards women and tribalism. All these issues can bring in incompetent or 
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unqualified person to control the management of firms. In some cases the position you hold 
will influence your decision at management level in a firm family, extended family and clan 
may likely influence your decision on issues related to employment. Therefore this will also 
attract unqualified person to hold a position in a firm.  
Furthermore, Bhaumik and Gregoriou (2010) examined the literature on issues such as 
why family firms are found in various business organisations. The authors focused on the 
mechanisms by which family retain control over firms and the incentives for the families in 
control to expropriate other stakeholders by way of tunnelling. In addition, the authors found 
evidence on issue of earning management in family firms. 
In addition, Burton et.al (2009) further explained that protection of employee and 
payment of decent living wages can influence the level of corruption in a firm, and behaviour 
of board members if they focused more on financial reward than other issues may affect the 
board’s oversights function. As a result, all these issues may likely influence the practice of 
corporate governance. (Aguilera and Jackson 2003, Filatotchev et.al 2005,  Adu-Ahmoah 
et.al  2009,) argues that as a result of  corporate mismanagement and failure, there is need for 
a new policy initiative where corporate governance guideline should be  drawn in a way that 
better serve the individual nature of each country. This is because of differences in the socio-
political and cultural environment of each country. Burton et.al (2009) argues that cultural 
and social framework is important in the context of ethical environment in which the modern 
firms operate. They revealed that culture and social factors significantly impacted on 
corporate governance of developing countries. Vintiadis (2004) found that conflicts of 
interest, unsound ethic and greed are among causes of major corporate failures.  
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) claim that cultural factors are important because the traditions 
of a nation are instilled in its people and this might help to explain why things are as they are. 
The authors found that family members sitting on the board of firms may influence on 
disclosure practices; therefore this can affect the corporate governance of firms. In addition, 
Dawson (2004) posits that confidence in firms and capital market can be a pillar on the 
actions, values and beliefs of those in the management of the corporation. The ethical 
framework within which a firm operate such as values held by culture, society, internal 
corporate practices and moral value held by employee may also affect the confidence in firms 
and capital market.   
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Moreover, Gray  and Adams (1996) argues that prior research has shown that there are 
different patterns of accounting and the development of national systems of corporate 
financial reporting is related to environmental factors. The author formulated a framework for 
analysis of the impact of culture on the development of accounting system. He identified that 
value dimensions at the accounting subculture level that is professionalism, uniformity, 
conservatism and secrecy and these have link to cultural value dimension at society level. 
The author formulated hypotheses to test the relationship between culture and accounting 
system in the context of systems authority and enforcement characteristic, and measurement 
and disclosure. Against this background, the  author  suggests that the influences of  any 
change  factors need to be taking into account as a result  of  existences of external influences 
arising from colonization, war, foreign investment, activities of multinational companies and 
large international accounting firms. Based on the above, this shows that culture influences 
corporate governance through the guardians or gateway of accounting system that is 
operating in each country. In addition, Stolowy et.al (2005) found that cultural values have 
more impact than legal origin in explaining divergence from international accounting 
standards (IAS), this indicate that culture influences corporate governance because there are  
a lot of issues of corporate governance in international accounting (IAS).  
  Besides this, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that the proportion of family members in 
the board composition of a firm may influence disclosure practices, the authors believe that in 
a firm where families have substantial equity holding there is no separation between those 
who own and those who manage capital. Moreover Ahikari and Tondkar (1992) revealed that 
capital owners do not have to rely on public disclosure to monitor their investment since they 
have more access to internal information as a result the demand for public disclosure and 
reporting will be very low. This is evidence to show that family is an important factor that 
can influence corporate governance of a firm.  
2.5.3 The Corruption and bribery factor 
Socio-political corruption can influence corporate governance practice among parties or 
players of corporate governance. This parties include; the regulatory bodies, the Chief 
Executives Officers, (CEO) the board of directors, management, shareholders, auditors and 
other stakeholders.  The level of corruption is cut across the responsibility, duties or task been 
given to each of them in their capacity.  Burton et.al (2009) claimed that the improvement of 
corporate governance can reduce the level of corruption and this may influence confidence of 
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domestic and foreign investors. The authors argue further that corruption and bribery can 
affect the enforcement of corporate governance through regulatory officers and the judiciary. 
Furthermore, an issue of business ethic involves the procedure of privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises with the aim to improve managerial incentive and raise corporate efficiency. The 
procedure for this privatisation will influence the valuation of state assets, the stock market, 
the way and manner those in authority carry out the exercise will affect the corporate 
governance in term of ownership and control. Moreover, Rossouw (2005) revealed that 
ethical concepts concern transparency, accountability, responsibility, the function of board 
and their composition, reporting, disclosure and respect for the rights of all stakeholders of 
firms. The author further explained that business ethics consider an integral and essential part 
of sound corporate governance based on the analysis of various national codes of corporate 
governance. 
The various scholars involved in corporate governance such as the report of Second 
African Consultant Forum on Corporate Governance, (2003), suggest that corporate 
governance best practices must consider other stakeholders interest. While Stermberg, (2004) 
argues that corporate governance should ideally concern between individual and community 
goals. Cadbury committee, (1992), explained transparency in decision making. (Filatotchev 
and Boyd, (2009) argues that corporate governance should involve managing risk, engaging 
stakeholders and making accountability real. However, Bakare, (2011) argues that all these 
issues mentioned above concerning corporate governance best practices can only be really 
achieved in an environment free of internal socio-political, economic and cultural corruption 
and free of trans-organised financial crimes  
Furthermore, Burton et.al (2009) reveals that corruption remains endemic in developing 
African nations and in some cases; this becomes institutionalised as a result of collective 
behaviours. In addition Okike (2004) posits that corruption is through the wealth and 
economic well-being of a nation with fast growing economies can easily be prone to 
corruption. In addition, lack of adequate internal control system in a firm may led to 
corruption among employee in organisations. However, the author further argues that when 
there is economic hardship people easily sell their conscience. Against this background, this 
indicate that corruption, and bribery can easily influence the corporate governance practices    
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2.5.4 The political factors 
Burton et.al (2009) claimed that a nation’s political environment affects the practice of 
corporate governance in terms of fiscal and monetary policies, security and stability and type 
of political leadership (democratic or autocratic) in power. This will affect government 
interferences with work of regulatory and supervisory bodies, appointment of chairman of 
corporation and incentive for company executives. Government ministries are responsible for 
monitoring and enforcement of corporate governance principles and this can be influenced by 
politicians or the type of leadership in that country. In addition, ECA (2002) explained that 
good economic governance exist in economies that institutions of government are capable to 
manage resources efficiently, formulate, implement and enforce sound policies and 
regulation. They can be monitored and held accountable if there is respect for rules and 
norms of economic interaction. Also economic activity is unimpeded by corruption and other 
activities that are inconsistent with public trust. The organisation further explained that the 
main elements toward an environment for good economic governance are transparency, 
accountability, and enabling environment for private sector, growth and development, and 
institutional development and effectiveness. 
Furthermore, Burton et.al (2009), Chryssides and Kaler, (1996) argue that the business 
sector operate in accordance with laws, rules regulations, and policies that are in place as a 
result of political decision by the government in power. As a result the authors’ beliefs that 
effective development of fiscal and monetary policies, the laws governing commercial 
interaction, and sound enforcement will provide a stable framework for business activities.  
Moreover, La Portal et al (1998) found that a well organised legislative branch, passing and 
monitoring appropriate law, with sound regulatory and supervisory agencies in place, then 
providing example of well practices at higher level. All these will definitely promote good 
corporate governance. Based on above mentioned point, it is clear that political climate can 
influence the practice of corporate governance. 
Ahunwan (2002) revealed that the problem associated with ownership in developing 
countries is that government may likely influence the ownership structure especially in a 
multinational corporation or firm wholly or partial -owned by government. In such situation 
there will be partisan politics and this will affect the ownership structure. The author further 
explained that several year of  military rule  and high level of corruption have negatively 
affect the management of public and private  corporation  in some developing countries. 
Especially in the appointment to the board, senior management position and even lower 
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officer all are based on political connection, instead using efficiency and professional 
qualification for the appointment. All these will surely have adverse effects on corporate 
governance practice. 
2.5.5 Ownership structure factors 
It is rarely difficult to separate ownership and control within any firms, thus the 
controllers always have some degree of ownership of the equity of the firms they control, also 
in some cases owners by virtue of the size of their equity position they have some effective 
control over the firms they own (Denis and McConnel, 2003). As a result, the authors believe 
that ownership structure which is the identities of a firm’s equity holders and the sizes of their 
position is a vital element of corporate governance of firms (Denis and McConnel, 2003). 
Consequently, most of the finding of studies on ownership structure of firms by academicians 
and researchers in a country is used by policy-makers of corporate governance. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) reveal that ownership concentration is linked with legal protection and this is 
one of two main element of determinant of corporate governance.  
There are situations where large shareholders can benefit minority shareholders because 
of their power and incentive used to prevent expropriation by managers. As a result, 
ownership concentration can be seen as an efficient governance mechanism Okpara, (2010). 
However, Johnson et.al (2000) claimed that large shareholders can align with managers to 
expropriate minority shareholders this benefit is known as tunnelling. La portal et.al 1999; 
2000 argues that this situation is one of the main agency problems in countries with poor 
shareholder protection.  In addition, Okpara (2010) posited that the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm efficiency is a complicated issue. The author found that 
when ownership of shares is widely dispersed, a higher ownership concentration may likely 
mitigate the free-rider problem and this will improve firm efficiency. The author further 
explained that when the fractional ownership of the higher shareholders concentration 
exceeds a certain threshold, a higher ownership concentration raises the likelihood of 
tunnelling and reduce firm efficiency.    
La Portal, et.al (1999) used the data on ownership structures of large companies in the 27 
richest economies to investigate the fundamental controlling shareholders of these firms. The 
empirical analysis of the sample provides the evidence that, except in economies with very 
good shareholder protection, few of these firms are widely held. The findings do not match 
Berle and Mean’s view on Modern Corporation. Instead, these firms are controlled by 
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families or the state. The equity control through financial institution is very rare and the 
controlling shareholders have power over firms in excess of their cash flow rights. This 
happens through the use of hierarchy and taking part in the management activities. 
2.5.6 The accounting system 
The level of financial reporting is one of the important elements for effective corporate 
governance system. The accountants and auditors are primary providers of information to 
shareholders and potential investors. As a result, the board of directors should expect that 
management prepares the financial information in compliance with statutory and ethical 
obligation and based on auditors’ competence (SEC, 2010). There may be conflict of interest 
which places the financial reporting in doubt to client pressure to please the management. 
Such example is the collapse of Enron due to misleading of financing reporting. Moreover, 
the Accounting professional in each of the countries can play a significant role in 
effectiveness and enforcement of corporate governance practices by making use of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) (SEC, 2010). The appointment of 
independent auditor should follow the normal procedure so that there will be no interference 
from the management (SEC, 2011).  Therefore all this issues mentioned above can affect 
transparency, disclosure, and risk management which are part of corporate governance 
principles. Having said this, OECD (2004) principles explain the importance of accounting 
framework in promoting disclosure and transparency by stating that information should be 
prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards of accounting, financial and 
nonfinancial disclosure.  Consequently, Gray and Adams (1996) revealed that accounting 
information may play a key role in enhancing a sound corporate governance of a firm; this 
will enable relevant parties to monitor the performance of managers and uses the information 
to hold the managers accountable.   
Moreover, Cadbury report (1992) explained the importance of financial reporting system 
by stating that a basic weakness in the current system of financial reporting is the possibility 
of different accounting treatment being applied to essentially the same facts, with the 
consequence that different results or financial positions could be reported each apparently 
complying with the overriding requirement to show a true and fair view. The report further 
highlighted that regardless financial reporting of how far the market can understand the 
implication of alternative accounting treatments or see through presentation design to show a 
company’s figure in most flattering light. In addition, the report also revealed that there are 
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advantages to investors, analysts, others accounting users and ultimately to the company itself 
in financial reporting rules which limit the scope for uncertainty and manipulation.  
Monks and Minow (2004) revealed that annual audits carry out by independent, 
competent and qualified auditors as it being recommended by the OECD principles, that it 
should provide an external and objective assurance to the management board and 
shareholders about financial situation and performance of the firm. Whittington (1993), 
Okike (2007) the authors claimed that financial reporting is one of the important elements in 
corporate governance; as a result some of the corporate failure is likely due to inadequate 
financial reporting. The authors argue that lack of authors’ independence; corrupt 
environment on auditors in discharging their responsibilities will surely affect the financial 
reporting of firms.  
Furthermore, Burton et.al (2009) argue that the accounting standards that are used in 
recording, and presenting the transactions of a company are tools to transfer financial 
information to the users of the financial statements issue by the companies. This will enable 
the company’s management to be accountable to the stakeholders. This argument is 
consistent with Jones and Wolnizer (2003), who claim that the use of consistent accounting 
principles by various companies will enables users assess the performance of the companies 
using uniform standard. Also this will enable the users to evacuate the performance of 
management in area of governance of the firms and their level of accountability to 
shareholders. Consequently Bushman and Smith, (2001)  posits that the body  that is 
responsible for setting up the nation’s accounting standard should make sure they encourage 
the reporting of  a true and fair view of the transactions. In addition, the body should make 
sure that these standards are applied uniformly across the firms in same way the standards 
have been set by the body. Moreover, DeAngelo, (1988); Bushman and Smith, (2001) 
revealed that the quality of the standards and the implementation of the standards may have 
effect on the confidence of the users of the information.  
2.6 Corporate governance practices in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries, institutions 
economy and political environment 
This section reviews the historical background of corporate governance and emerging issues 
in the development and practice of corporate governance. The section examines the role of 
government on corporate governance of listed firms, regulatory and enforcement, and 
institutional bodies of corporate governance in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. Other issues 
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are examine this include board structure, and role and responsibilities of board of directors 
and external factors that affect corporate governance such as politics, corruption, economic, 
and ownership structure of firms. Table below provide the differences and similarities 
between three countries used as case of study. 
Table 2.1: Summary of the  corporate governance institutions, politics, and economy in Sub-
Saharan Africa Anglophone Countries. 
Characteristic   Ghana  Nigeria  South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
Role of the government 
Legislation is based on  
Companies code Act 
1963 Act 179 
There are no major 
reforms of corporate 
governance. 
There is  Guideline of 
corporate governance 
practice  
 
Legislation is based on  
Companies Allied Matter 
Act (CAMAD) 1990 
There are major reforms 
of corporate governance 
such Code of corporate 
governance by SEC in 
2003, CBN 2004 for 
banks SEC 2011, and 
establishment of 
Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) 
 There is Code of 
corporate governance 
best practices 
 
Legislation is based on 
Companies Act 1973 
There are major reforms 
such as King Report I, II, 
and III Code of corporate 
governance.  
There is Reform of JSE 
and Insider Trading Act 
1998. 
 
 
Institutional 
bodies/Agencies 
Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Bank 
of Ghana, Ghana Stock 
Exchange (GSE), 
Registrar General 
Department  (GRD), 
Private Enterprises 
Foundation) 
Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC), 
Nigeria Stock Exchange 
(NSE), Corporate Affair 
Commission (CAC),  
Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN), National 
Insurance Commission 
(NAICOM), Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) 
Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE), 
Financial Services Board 
(FSB), South Africa 
Reserve Bank   
 
 
Role of professional 
bodies  
Institute of Directors 
(IoD), Ghana  Institute of 
Chartered Accountants 
(GIA), Africa Capital 
Market Forum 
Institute of Directors 
IoD), Association of 
Corporate Governance, 
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nigeria 
(ICAN), Association of 
Shareholder of Nigeria 
(ASN)   
Institute of Directors 
(IoD), South Africa 
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (SAIC),  
South Africa Institute  of 
Chartered Secretaries  
 
  Code or Guideline  of 
Corporate governance 
on  regulatory 
framework 
The same as it explain in 
Corporate governance  
Guideline issued by SEC  
The same as it explain in 
Code of best practices 
issued by SEC  
The same as it explain in 
King I. II and  III Report 
Code of corporate 
governance 
Enforcement  of 
Corporate governance  
The same with other 
countries 
The same with other 
countries 
The same the same with 
other countries 
Ownership structure Ownership is concentrated Ownership is concentrated Ownership is concentrated 
 
Number of Listed firms  
in Stock Exchange  
Few firms (about 32) in 
number  are listed 
because controlling 
owner of  unlisted firms 
do not want to lose 
control 
 
Many firms (206) 
 
Many firms (620) 
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 Code or guideline on  
board structure, 
management and role of 
the board of directors 
 
The same with other 
countries 
 
The same with other 
countries 
 
The same with other 
countries 
 Code or Guideline of 
corporate governance  
on  role of auditors and 
audit committees 
The same with other 
countries 
The same with other 
countries 
The same with other 
countries 
Code or Guideline on 
corporate governance 
on remuneration of the 
directors  
The same with other 
countries 
The same with other 
countries 
The same with other 
countries 
 
Institutional Investors 
        
        No 
There are institutional 
investors  
There are strong 
institutional  investors 
Shareholders 
association  
         
        No 
 
      Yes  
  
Yes, but not active 
 
Politics, government 
and corruption 
Previously military rules, 
for the past two decade 
stable democratic 
government 
There is corruption 
Previously military rule, 
for the past one decade 
stable democratic rule 
There is corruption 
Previously apartheid for 
the past two decades 
stable democratic ruler   
There is corruption 
Economy, markets and 
investments 
Fastest growing 
economy, recently 
discover oil, capital 
market not strong 
Largest  market because 
of population, abundant 
natural resources such as 
oil and agriculture  
Strongest economy and 
capital market in the  sub-
region, depend on mining 
industry  
Sources: GSEC, 2009, 2010, SEC, 2010 & 2011, and JSE  
2.6.1 Summary of corporate governance practices, institutions, politics and economy in Sub-
Saharan Africa Anglophone countries 
In terms of board structure, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa are using a unitary type of 
board structure. South Africa board structure is in King I, II and III Reports that contain the 
Code of corporate governance. In Ghana and Nigeria the structure of the board is the same 
and the legislation and code guiding the board is the same but in Nigeria there are codes of 
best practice of corporate governance while in Ghana there are guidelines for practices of 
corporate governance. The two documents are issued by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC); it has the same content and role and responsibility of the board of 
directors. The companies’ law and legal system are the same because Ghana, Nigeria and 
South Africa originated their common law in British common law. 
 Furthermore, corruption is common in developing countries and as a result, Sub-Saharan 
Africa Anglophone countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa cannot be excluded 
from corruption.  Moyo (2010) revealed that one of the contributing factors to poor corporate 
governance of firms in South Africa is corruption because this South Africa is ranked low by 
Transparency International. Also Roussouw et.al (2002) argue that for South African 
corporate governance to meet the international standard there is need for the government to 
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deal with their local challenges  such as  financial crime, fraud within the private and public 
sector, and money laundering.  
In Ghana Mensah et.al (2003) documented that the Ghana Centre for Democracy and 
Development and the World Bank found that corruption is prevalent in both the private and 
public sector in Ghana. In addition, in Nigeria Bakare (2011) posited that socio-political 
corruption has been an obstacle to economic development in Nigeria because corruption is 
being institutionalised and Nigeria is ranked high in the global corruption index. Based on the 
evidence from the above, it shows that corruption is common in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Anglophone countries.  
Table 2.2: Presents foreign direct investment for Ghana Nigeria and South Africa 
Years Ghana  Nigeria South Africa 
 Billion US$ Billion US$ Billion US$ 
2002    0.06    1.87        1.88 
2003    0.14    2.01        0.23 
2004    0.14    1.87       -0.60 
2005    0.14    4.97        5.61 
2006    0.64    4.53       -6.11 
2007    1.38    5.16        2.75 
2008    2.71    7.15        11.76 
2009    2.37    7.03        4.02 
2010    2.53    5.13        1.39 
2011    3.19    8.03        6.22 
Source: World Bank 
 
Table 2.2 Illustrate the net foreign direct investment in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. 
There are evidence in Ghana and Nigeria that FDI increases from 2002 to 2010. This result 
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implies that as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is increase this is necessary to have an 
impact on domestic investment in Ghana and Nigeria. This result suggests that corruption, 
government/politician influence and weak corporate governance system hinder the promotion 
of increase in foreign direct investment to promote higher level of domestic investment.  
In South Africa, we observer that FDI there are negative value for FDI (Billion US$-0.60) in 
2004 and (Billion US$-6.11) in 2006. This indicates that there is more outflow of FDI in 
South Africa than the inflow, this suggest that South Africa invests in other countries than 
Nigeria and Ghana. Table 2.1 support the evidence that the economy of South Africa is 
stronger than Ghana and Nigeria economy. 
2.7 Formulation of hypotheses 
In order to fill the gap in the literature the following hypotheses are formulated so that 
the evidence provides in this study shows the impact of institutional characteristic of 
corporate governance on corporate governance system. The institutional characteristics of 
corporate governance such as regulatory framework, enforcement, disclosure and 
transparency shareholders’ rights and ownership concentration these are the ingredients or 
real inputs to guild the efficient practice of corporate governance system. The corporate 
governance system include adequate and effective law that can promote corporate 
governance, institutional bodies that have the power, resources and authority to enforced 
compliance with laws regulations that guide on corporate governance. The hypothesis on 
institutional characteristics of corporate governance stated that; 
There is a relationship between regulatory framework, enforcement, disclosure and 
transparency, shareholder rights, level of ownership concentration  and corporate governance 
system. In addition the hypothesis on role and responsibilities of the board of directors of 
firms indicate that there is a relationship between role and responsibilities of the board of 
directors and corporate governance system. 
Based on the literature on external factor affecting   corporate governance of firms the 
following hypotheses are also formulated. There is a relation between external factor such as 
economic, societal and cultural, corruption and bribery, political environment, ownership 
structure, accounting system and corporate governance system of firms. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a comprehensive overview of literature review of corporate 
governance corporate governance institutions, board structure, economy, and political 
environment in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. The chapter covers the key institutions of 
corporate governance, board structure and management of listed firms, economic and 
political environment of those countries which are also used as case studies. The aim of the 
chapter is to describe the differences and similarities   of institutional framework of corporate 
governance, economic, and political environment in those countries. The next chapter (Three) 
will discuss the methodological approach, descriptive statistics, and correlation analysis on 
institutional characteristics of corporate governance, role and responsibilities of board of 
directors and external factor on corporate governance practices.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Methodology and Descriptive Statistics of the study 
Summary: 
The previous chapter (Two) examined the institutions of corporate governance, board 
structure and management of listed firms, economic and political environment of Ghana, 
Nigeria and South Africa. Consequently, this leads to the methodology and descriptive 
statistics for this study. Therefore Chapter three discusses the methodological approach   to 
identifying the important components of corporate governance practice. These components 
include regulatory framework, enforcement, disclosure and transparency, shareholder rights 
and ownership concentrations. Others include the roles and responsibilities of board of 
directors and external factors affecting corporate governance. The first section in this chapter 
describes the data instrument and source of the instrument. The second section explains the 
pilot study. The third section focuses on the data collected by survey questionnaire to the 
stakeholders of corporate governance of listed firms in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. The 
next section illustrates the definition of variables and sub-variables of corporate governance, 
description of OLS estimate (empirical model) used in the analysis of the data, and 
formulation of the hypothesis. Finally the last section (for each of the components of 
corporate governance) describes the descriptive statistics for the variables and sub-variables 
of corporate governance components for listed firms in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. 
3.1 Methodology on Institutional Characteristic of Corporate Governance of Firms 
This section describes the data instrument and source of the instrument, and explains the 
pilot study. Also focuses on the data collected by a survey questionnaire from the 
stakeholders of corporate governance of listed firms in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. 
3.1.1 The source of data instrument 
The instruments used to collect the data for this study was a survey questionnaire derived 
firstly, from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development principles of 
corporate governance  the 2004 OECD  which been assessment instrument for Okpara 
(2010), also from  Burton et.al (2009). Secondly, from various corporate governance 
literatures, and in order to make sure that the data instrument is not subjective. This study 
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modified the data assessment instrument so that it is tailored toward codes of best practices of 
corporate governance in Nigeria and guidelines of corporate governance practice in Ghana. 
Also, the King I, II, III Report of corporate governance in South Africa was considered in the 
data instrument. As a result, the institutional frameworks for corporate governance for Ghana, 
Nigeria and South Africa are all formulated from OECD principles of corporate governance. 
The above countries received their independence from Britain and the companies’ laws are 
derived from British common law. Consequently, the rules, laws and legal systems for each 
of these countries are considered in the data assessment instrument. 
The reason for using questionnaire is that there is lack of information on corporate 
governance variables in developing region such as Africa. The finding of this study may 
reveal the reality of the situation in those countries selected (Ghana, Nigeria and South 
Africa). The limitation of using questionnaire method is that the finding from the respondents 
is an opinion about what is happening on the issues of corporate governance of firms in Sub-
Saharan Africa Anglophone countries. Also the respondents may not be questioned or 
probed. In addition, there is a level of researcher imposition, this implies that when 
developing the data instrument (survey questionnaire), we may be making our own 
assumption as to what is important and not important. Thus the researcher may be missing 
something that is of important. 
The OECD (2004) explained   the importance of legal and regulatory framework of 
corporate governance. As a result ‘’the organisation argues that the following are framework 
guiding the corporate governance principle. This include that the stakeholders of corporate 
governance should ensure the basis for an effective corporate governance framework. This 
implies that corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient 
market. Also corporate governance should be consistent with rule of law and clearly 
articulated the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities’’ (OECD, 2004 Page 17).  
In addition, the OECD (2004) principles of corporate governance examined the rights of 
shareholders and key ownership. ‘’It stated that the corporate governance framework should 
protect and facilitate that exercise of shareholders rights. It also explained the equitable 
treatment of all shareholders such as minority and foreign shareholders and all shareholders 
have the opportunity to obtained effective redress for violating their rights. (OECD, 2004 
Page 18-22). 
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 Moreover, OECD (2004) principle of corporate governance explained the issue of 
disclosure and transparency. The organisation revealed that corporate governance 
framework should ensure that there is timely and accurate disclosure on all material matter 
regards to firms such as financial position, firms performance, ownership structure, insider 
trading, and autonomy of the auditor, merger and acquisition and the governance of the 
firms’’(OECD, 2004 Page 22-23). 
3.1.2 Description of Survey Instrument  
The instrument used to collect data for this study is through a survey questionnaire 
consisting of 30 statements (items) which are divided into various sections. The Section A 
comprises  the background of the respondents which consists of seven questions, Section B 
comprises of 4 items which measuring effective corporate governance, Section C consists of 
5 items which proxies for regulatory framework of corporate governance, Section D is make 
up of 3 items which measure enforcement of corporate governance, Section E comprises of 4 
items that measure transparency and disclosure of firms, Section F consists of 4 items that 
proxies for shareholders’ rights and Section G is indicates for ownership concentration, 
consists of 3 items.  
The Table below show the detail of each section with description of each statement or item of 
the survey questionnaire.  
Table 3.1 Show the section, type and description of each statement or item of the survey 
questionnaire for corporate governance of firm  
     Section   Type of statement or item Description of the statement or item 
    A   
Characteristic of the respondents in the 
survey questionnaire 
Gender, Occupation, years of experience in 
occupation, Formal education, Location, Level of 
knowledge of respondent on corporate governance of 
listed firm, Type of firm  
   B  
 
Level of effectiveness of corporate 
governance system 
Rules and Laws that can promote good practice of 
corporate governance. 
 
Power, resources and authority to implement, enforced 
corporate governance in compliance with law, 
regulation and guideline on corporate governance 
practice. 
 
A good legal system in a country helps to promote 
corporate governance. 
  
A well-organised legislature and sound regulatory and 
supervisory agencies in place promote corporate 
governance.  
 
C 
 
 
Regulatory framework of corporate 
governance 
These are rules and regulation that deal with 
following;  
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stock markets, appointment and removal of auditors, 
transparency of board nomination and election 
process, disclosure and communication, independent 
status of board members 
  
D 
 
 
Enforcement and implementation of 
corporate governance 
This section deal with enforcement and 
implementation on issue such as compliance with 
rules and regulation. 
 The level of legal protection of investors and creditor 
from fraud by  managers and controlling shareholders  
The level of appropriate mechanisms for investigating 
the illegal or inappropriate treatment of minority 
shareholders. 
 
E 
 
Transparency and disclosure of corporate 
governance 
This section concern with law, rule and regulation on 
insider trading. 
 
Equal access of information to shareholders. 
 
Confidentiality in autonomy and independency of 
auditors. 
 
Transparency in merger and acquisition   
 
 
 
F  
 
 
 
Shareholders rights’ 
Under this section rule and regulation concerning 
shareholders such as basic shareholders rights are 
protected. 
 
Whether minority rights of shareholders are violated. 
  
Rights of minority shareholders to expression their 
view at general meeting. 
 
Whether shareholder can only  allowed to speak in a 
meeting  
Only if they are agree with the directors. 
 
 
G  
Ownership concentration  
Whether the firm in a country variety of ownership 
concentration. 
 
Whether there is large concentration of ownership 
(few shareholders having majority of shares) in a 
firms. 
 
Whether preferential treatment is often given to 
shareholders 
 
These statements or items above (items) are based on a likert scale of five-point 
(1=strongly disagree to 5= strongly agreed.). The reason for using this scale is to measure 
intensity of feeling about the area in question. The justification of choice five likert scales is 
based on Bryman (2008) who posited that five likert scales is important because it enables the 
respondents to express their level of agreement with the statement in the question effectively.   
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In addition, de Vacus (2002) explains that the five point likert scale format provides five 
response alternatives which give more flexibility and also provides a measure of intensity, 
extremity and direction. To allow all the items or variables to be in one direction the 
negatively worded item are re-worded such that if is equal= 1 it is now 5, 2 now 4, 3 is still 3, 
4 now 2 and 5 is 1. The items or statements in these sections are not in the same direction 
because there is need for the respondents to think very well before they tick the option in the 
survey questionnaire and this will not allow them thick those questions in one way. This 
happened under regulatory framework in section C, shareholders rights in section F and 
section G which consist items for the role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors in 
the survey questionnaire. 
3.1.3 Pilot study 
Generally in a quantitative research study such as   survey questionnaire, prior to the time 
of using this survey questionnaire to collect the data there is a need to conduct a pilot study.  
In addition, Saunders et.al (2009) revealed that prior to using a questionnaire to collect data, 
it should be piloted tested. Firstly, the purpose of the pilot test is to refine the questionnaire so 
that respondents will have no problem in answering the questions. Secondly, to ensure that 
there is no problems in recording the data and to obtain some assessment of the questions’ 
validity and reliability of the data that will be collected so that the research question will be 
answered. Through pilot study validity and reliability can be measured in order to make sure 
that the survey questionnaire actually represents the reality what the study are to measure. In 
making sure the scale of the study is reliable we checked the reliability of the scale by 
checking the internal consistency through Cronbach’s alpha coefficient and the result 
indicated 0.80 Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. Ideally, Pallant (2010) explained that 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of a scale should be above 0.7  
Thirdly, there is need for pilot study because it is a form of trial run for the survey 
questionnaire so that we can determine whether the questionnaire will be successful after 
collection from the respondents. Besides this, during the pilot study we used Bell (2010) 
suggestion that in order to indentify the time of completion of the survey questionnaire. This 
also includes the clarity of the instructions for the survey questionnaire (if there are any 
questions that are unclear or ambiguous). In addition, to identify the question that are not 
easy to answer by respondents, the lay out and how attractive the questionnaire to the 
respondents.  
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At the end of the pilot study alteration were made to the question including adjustment to 
layout. The survey questionnaire works best with standardised questions that one can be 
confident with and interpret in the same way by all the respondents. As a result, the survey 
questionnaire tends to be used for descriptive or explanatory research such as opinion on 
issues in organisation and organisational practices. 
Against this background, a pilot study was carried out for the stakeholders of corporate 
governance who are repsented according to the category of their occupation and organisation 
in the below Table. 
Table 3.2 Describe the characteristics of the respondents in the pilot study  
  Stakeholders of corporate occupation   N Name of the organisation or company 
   
 
Academician  
   
3 Brunel University London UK 
1 Queen Mary University London UK 
1 Bournemouth University UK 
1 Cranfield  School  of Management UK  
    
Individual shareholders  
2 First group Transport station Uxbridge, Middlesex 
London UK  
1 HSBC Bank Uxbridge, Middlesex London UK   
   
 
 
 
Company employee  
2 HSBC Bank Uxbridge, Middlesex London UK   
1 Lloyds Banking group Uxbridge London 
1 Barclays Bank Uxbridge Middlesex, London  
1 Abbey Bank Uxbridge Middlesex, London 
1 Royal Bank of Scotland  Middlesex, London 
1 First group Transport station Uxbridge, London UK 
2 Tesco Supermarket West Drayton Middlesex UK   
1 Tesco Supermarket West Drayton Middlesex UK   
1 Mark and Spencer Uxbridge, London UK 
1 Adecco Group Uxbridge Middlesex UK 
Accountant /Auditor 1 Apex Accountancy Chartered Certified Accountant and 
Taxation Practitioner West Drayton Middlesex  
Legal  1 IBB Solicitor Capital Court Windsor street Uxbridge  
Middlesex London   
 
Students  
2 PhD student, Business School Brunel University 
London UK 
2 PhD student, Economic and Finance Dept. Brunel 
University London UK 
 
The purpose is to examine the important components on corporate governance system of 
firms such as regulatory framework, enforcement, disclosure and transparency, shareholders 
rights and ownership concentration (institutional characteristics). Others also include the 
effect of role and responsibility of board and impact of external factors such as economic, 
politics, societal and culture, corruption, ownership structure and accounting system. 
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At the end of the pilot study we are able to adjust to those errors such as spelling of 
words and sentences. Also, ensure that the lay out and the quality of the paper used for the 
survey questionnaire are more colourful and attractive to the respondents. There was no 
difficulty in answering the questions, and the validity and reliability of the data collected was 
tested. After the pilot study some academic scholars assisted in assessing the survey 
questionnaire and gave useful suggestions so that the data instrument can meet the doctorate 
(PhD) quality standard.  Their names, universities and suggestions are indicated in the Table 
below. 
Table 3.3 show the characteristic of the Academic scholars for useful suggestion in the design of 
the survey questionnaire  
 Name  Position University Suggestion 
 
Dr Kenneth Amaeshi  
 
Reader in strategy and 
international business  
 
University of Edinburg 
Business School  
 
Suggested that l should  
reduce the length of 
words of the  survey 
questionnaire 
 
l need to give the survey 
questionnaire to those 
who have the knowledge 
of corporate governance 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Bruce Burton  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reader in Finance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Dundee  
Business School, Dept. 
of Accounting and 
Finance 
Assisted in rewording the 
sentence to meet 
professional standard  
 
Suggested the ideal of 
whether the respondent 
will like to have a copy of 
the result after the study 
(either Yes or NO) 
With the e-mail and 
addresses of respondent 
 
Give the suggestion that 
there should be a 
comment on the issue of 
corporate governance at 
the end of the 
questionnaire 
 
 
 
Dr Dimitrios Koufopoulos 
 
 
 
Senior Lecturer  
 
Brunel University 
Business School 
London  
 
Suggested  for the 
structure and format of 
questionnaire so that it 
can be more attractive  
 
Dr Timothy Milewa 
 
Lecturer and 
Research fellow in  
Sociology 
  
Brunel university 
School of Social 
Science Dept. of 
Sociology and 
Communication 
 
Support in given note 
material on how to design 
a survey questionnaire 
 
Assisted in rewording 
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the sentence to  meet 
professional standard  
 
 
 
3.1.4 Data Sources 
A survey questionnaire was administered through a stratified random sampling to 
respondents which comprise the following; legislators, regulators, academician, individual 
investors, institutional investors, accountants/auditors, executive directors, non-executive 
directors, company executives (CEO) company employees, judiciary/legal and other such as 
students.  
In Ghana out of 200 survey questionnaire administered to the respondents, 150 were 
received this indicates 75 percent response rate. In Ghana, there are thirty-four listed firms on 
the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE). As a result, the respondents from this study are from more 
than twenty listed firms which include banking, mining, food and beverages, breweries, 
conglomerates, insurance, chemical and paints, textiles, agriculture, and petroleum 
(marketing). When I was in Ghana apart from visiting some listed firms, regulatory agencies 
offices l also visited secretariat of the Institute of Director (IoD) in Accra and they assisted 
me in filling the survey questionnaire.    
In the case of Nigeria, 400 survey questionnaires was administered to the categories of 
respondents and 320 was received, representing 80 percent response rate. In Nigeria, there are 
206 listed companies on Nigeria stock Exchange (NSE). The respondents from this study are 
up to 100 listed firms.  I was able to attend 20 Annual General Meeting (AGM) of listed 
firms; including an AGM of shareholders in Lagos and Abuja. This gave me the opportunity 
to distribute the survey questionnaire.  
Moreover, during fifty years anniversary of Nigerian Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC Project 50), l was present throughout the event activities and this gave me an 
opportunity to meet some board of directors, senior managers and Chief Executives of some 
listed firms who also filled the questionnaire. When I was in Lagos for this research survey, 
apart from normal distribution of the questionnaire to the firms, I also visited the secretariat 
of the Society for Corporate Governance in Nigeria. This society comprises chairman, board 
of directors, academicians, professionals and government officials; also some members of 
this society are members of Institute of Directors (IoD) in Nigeria. They all participated in 
Chapter Three: Methodology and Descriptive Statistics of the study 
 
75 
 
filling of the survey questionnaire. Consequently, among  the respondents are employees  of 
the  listed firms in Nigeria, with  at least one respondent is from each of the sector such as 
banking, agriculture, airline, breweries, building material, chemical and paints conglomerate, 
construction, food and beverages, healthcare, hotels, industrial/domestic product, insurance, 
textiles, and petroleum (marketing). This also applied to each shareholder; some of them have 
shares in about ten or fifteen different listed companies.  Generally, in Ghana and Nigeria, in 
order to improve the response rate the survey questionnaire was delivered by hand to 
individuals in their offices and then received back at an appointed date.     
In South Africa 100 survey questionnaire were administered to the respondents and 71 
was received back, this representing 71 percent response rate. The survey questionnaires were 
sent and received back by e-mail. But some was send and received back through postage. In 
addition, the South Africa embassy in Nigeria assisted in sending and receiving some of the 
survey questionnaires. The respondents for South Africa covered investors, academician, 
legal/judiciary, accountants/auditors, board of directors and company employees for some of 
the financial and non-financial listed firms; also some of the regulatory and supervisory 
agencies.  
The data instrument for this study (survey questionnaire) was administered to firms in 
South Africa. The firms are in the banking industry, the mining industry such as diamond and 
platinum industry and other manufacturing companies. The researcher make sure that each 
one of the survey questionnaire reached the top mining industries and financial sectors 
because the South Africa economy is based on mining, finance house and financial sectors.  
3.1.5 The Sample of the study 
The study uses a stratified random sampling method to collect the data from twelve 
categories of respondents who are stakeholders of corporate governance in in the SSAA 
region. The instruments used are from modified version of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2004) Okpara (2010), Burton et.al (2009) and 
corporate governance literatures. The data consist of 541 returned out of 700 survey 
questionnaire administered to the respondents, this give a response rate of 77.29 percent. Out 
of the total of 541 respondents 150 respondents were   from Ghana, 320 from Nigeria, and 71 
respondents from South Africa.   
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This study extends its coverage to listed firms in Anglophone countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa such as Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa. These countries are English speaking 
countries. Their selection is based on regional approach, this gives a wider scope. In addition, 
these countries have strong economy with large markets. For instance Ghana with the fastest 
growing economy in the sub-region after the discovery of crude oil, South Africa which  is 
the strongest economy in the sub-region and Nigeria a having huge population and large 
markets, blessed with abundant natural resources such crude oil and land fertile  for  
agriculture.   
The regulation, control and governance of corporations of these countries are largely 
contained within provision of company legislations which have their root from British 
colonial laws. Based on this, Ghanaian, Nigerian and South African legal systems and 
corporate governance mirror the United Kingdom pattern (Okike, 2007). Therefore, it is 
necessary for this study to review the development of corporate governance structures of 
listed firms for each of these countries in order to highlight different reforms, issues and 
factors hindering corporate governance of firms in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. The 
corporate governance rules and laws have influence the companies’ law of each country. 
Thus, the three countries derived their companies’ laws from British companies’ law and the 
Code or guideline of corporate governance of each of the country is similar. 
Moreover, another justification for the choice of Ghanaian, Nigerian and South African 
firms is that there are several reforms of corporate governance that occurred in these three 
countries. These include the King Reports I, II and III in South Africa published in 1994, 
2002 and 2010 respectively. In addition, in Nigeria the code of best practice of corporate 
governance was issued in 2003 and 2011 by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
also the code of corporate governance for banking industry was issued by Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) in 2006. Also the Ghana Securities Exchange Commission issued corporate 
governance guidelines on best practice in 2009. Despite the issuance of code of corporate 
governance practices by regulatory bodies in each of the three countries there have been 
corporate failure due to poor corporate governance. The corporate failure includes Cadbury 
Plc in Nigeria, majority of the banks in Ghana and Nigeria.  
In addition, South Africa has undergone several corporate governance reforms (King 
Report I, II and III); despite this South Africa Corporate governance has not met the standard 
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of developed countries such as the UK and the USA. Against this background, this study 
reveals the challenges facing corporate governance practices in Ghana, Nigeria and South 
Africa by identify the components that are essential for good corporate governance of firms 
and tries to prioritise the components. 
3.1.6 The differences between Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries (SSAA) and other    
Africa countries. 
The North Africa countries such as Egypt and Morocco are different from Anglophone 
countries because their cultures are predominantly Islamic. Consequently, sharia law has little 
influence on corporate governance practices (Nganga et.al 2003). Thus, the government of 
Egypt in recent years has been trying to upgrade the legal structures and corporate 
governance practices to world standard. In Morocco the framework for commercial law was 
obtained from French commercial law. As a result of government interest in issue of 
corporate governance there was some changes in their law so that it can meet the global 
corporate governance standard (Nganga et.al 2003). In addition, in Tunisia their Law is based 
on French Napoleonic Code Tunisia has sound legal institutions, the country was ranked first 
on the quality of its legal system in the World Economic Forum’s Africa Competiveness 
Report (Nganga et.al 2003). 
Moreover, majority of Africa countries (Western, central and Northern part) are French 
speaking, consequently the framework for their companies law originated from French 
companies law which influenced the corporate governance practices in those countries. 
However, the Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries are English speaking countries, their 
companies laws originated from British companies’ laws. 
The Table below provides the number of listed firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone 
countries 
Table 3.4 Illustrate the number of listed firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries 
                 Country           No of listed firms 
      Botswana        35 
      Gambia          6 
     Ghana         34 
     Kenya         60 
     Liberia         - 
     Malawi        15 
     Mozambique          2 
     Nigeria        206 
     Namibia        34 
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    Sierra Lone         6 
    South Africa       620 
    Tanzania        15 
    Ugandan       17 
    Zambia       16 
    Zimbabwe       35 
  
           Source:  Each country stock exchange website 
3.2: Justification for each items or statements in the Survey Questionnaire 
 
Section A: Questions 1-7 are related to your background.  
The following are the justification for asking each of the questionnaires from the respondents. 
Q1. Gender: This is to classify the respondents whether they are male or female  
Q2. Occupation: This is the different categories of respondents that questionnaire will be 
administered to, and the information from them is collected and process as data, for analysis 
of result of the study. They include the following: 
Legislators: They passes  laws and acts in order to make sure there is framework that will 
promote  transparent and efficient market and this will be consistent with the rule of law and 
acts   
Regulators: They have supervisory, regulatory and enforcement power with integrity and 
resources to fulfil their duties in a professional and objective manners. Regulators are also 
involved in the implementation of principles, guidelines and code of conduct of corporate 
governance practices of firms in each country. In Nigeria, regulatory institutions are 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC) and Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). In case   of Ghana 
there is Ghana Securities Exchange, and Central Bank of Ghana and in South Africa 
regulatory body such as South Africa Securities Exchange Commission.  
 Academician:  These are authors, researchers, lecturers and teachers who have knowledge 
and ideal on issue of corporate governance 
Individual Investors: The individual investors have fiduciary duties to play in a firm and 
they need to fulfil them by voting and expecting return from their investment in such firm. In 
addition, they assist in checking the mechanism on the activities of directors and their powers 
so that chances of mismanagement are reduced. 
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 Institutional Investors: These are  large investors such as pension fund, mutual fund, hedge 
fund, and exchange-trade fund, others investors group such as insurance companies, bank, 
brokers, and other financial institutions. The rise of the individual investors has increased 
professional diligence which has improved regulation of the stock market (but not necessarily 
in the interest of the small investor or of the naïve institutions of which they are many). 
According to the principle of corporate governance OECD (2004) which stated that corporate 
governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders including 
minority, and foreign shareholders. In addition, all shareholders should have the opportunity 
to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. Mallin (2010) revealed that 
institutional investors have potential to exert significant influence on companies with a clear 
implication for corporate governance, especially in term of the corporate governance 
standards and issues concerning enforcement. Moreover, institutional investors’ dialogue 
with companies based on their mutual understanding objectives, evaluation of companies 
arrangement and they have a responsibility to consider use of their vote. 
Accountants/Auditors: Accountants are the primary providers of information to capital 
market participant, they provide financial information in compliance with statutory and 
ethical obligation and they rely on auditor competence. OECD (2004) principle of corporate 
governance practice stated that an annual audit should be conducted by an independent, 
competent and qualified auditor. This will provide an external and objective assurance to the 
board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and 
performance of the company.  
Executive Directors:  Executive directors are full time employee of the company, they 
design, and implement strategic plan for the organization. They are responsible for day to day 
operation of the company including managing committee, staff and developing business plan 
in collaboration with the board to future plan of the organization.  Mallin (2010) explained 
that the chairman is responsible for the running of the board, make sure the board meet 
frequently. 
Non-Executive Directors: A non-executive director or outside director is a member of the 
board of directors of a company who does not form part of executive management team. 
They should be independent and capable of exercising independent judgment in board 
decision making. Mallin (2010) explained that according to combined code 2008 senior 
independent director should be available to shareholders if there are issues which the 
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chairman, chief executive or finance director have failed  to resolve. Cadbury (2002) stated 
that non-executive director should bring independent judgment on issues such as strategy, 
performance, resources, key appointment and standard of conduct.    
Company Executive (CEO): This includes the chairman, Chief Executive officer (CEO) and 
head of departments. Cadbury report (1992) explained that they are primarily responsible for 
working of the board, for it balance of membership subject to board and shareholders’ 
approval. The chairman also ensure  that all relevant issues are on agenda and ensure that all 
directors, executive directors and non-executive are enabled and encouraged  to play their full 
part in its activities. They also ensure that their boards are in full control of the company 
affairs and inform the shareholders about the activities of the company. The Chief Executive 
officer is responsible to running of the company, carry out strategic plan and policies as 
established by the board of director. In addition, other head of department control the day to 
day activities of their department and report to the chief executive officers.   
Company employee: They are part of the stakeholders of a firm, and they are parties to 
corporate governance whether direct or indirect to the effective performance of the 
organization. They receive salaries, wages, benefits and reputation from the firms. OECD 
(2004) principle of corporate governance revealed that individual employee and their 
representative bodies should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or 
unethical practices to the board and their right should not be compromised for doing this. The 
corporate governance framework recognizes the interest of the company employee and their 
contribution to the long-term success of the company. In addition, companies provide 
information on key issue relevant to employee such as management employee relations. 
Judiciary/legal: The Judiciary or legal is the system of court that interprets and applies the 
law in the name of the nation and they provide resolution for dispute. OECD (2004) stated 
that the legal and regulatory requirements that affect corporate governance practices in a 
jurisdiction should be consistent with rule of law, transparent and enforcement. 
Other: This is the public excluding those categories mentioned above, they are potential 
investors; they will like to know the strengths of the companies so that they can take part in 
the capital market. They are customers; they will like to know what is going on in the 
management of companies, marketing of the product, social, environmental and ethical aspect 
of corporate behaviour.      
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Q3. Year of experience in your position: It will indicate the level of experience, knowledge 
on the position of the respondents and this will allow them to give reliable information in the 
filling of the questionnaires.  
Q4. Formal Education: This is to indicate the level of academic so that the respondents can 
understand the questions very well and also to classify the respondents.  
Q5. Your location: This is to indicate the name of the country in which the respondents are 
residing in order to fill the questionnaire and this necessary so as to classify the sample. 
Q6. How do you rate your knowledge on corporate governance of firms in your 
country: This necessary so that the researchers will be able to know the ability of the 
respondents on issue of corporate governance and also for classification. 
Q7. Type of firm: This is for classification of the sample firm for the purpose of the results 
of the study. 
 Section B: Statements 8-11 relate to your views on effectiveness of corporate 
governance practice. 
OECD (2004)  ‘’explained that to ensure an effective corporate governance framework, there 
must be effective legal, regulatory and institution upon which all markets participants will 
rely on in order to establish their private contractual relations’’ Against this background the 
following questions below are asked. 
Q8. There are adequate and effective rules and laws that promote the practice of good 
corporate governance of firms in my country of operation. 
The Justification of asking above question is that the knowledge of the main concept of 
corporate governance such as rule procedure of transaction, can affect the implementation of 
corporate governance. This also can include the laws, rules and regulation of appointment of 
auditors, the commitments on the part of government agencies that are responsible for 
enforcement. It includes issue of listed companies in compliance with corporate governance 
guidelines, law regarding to the protection of investors which can affect the dividend policy, 
and shareholders rights especially minority rights. This will not allow majority shareholder to 
exploit the minority. In addition, procedure of board nomination and election process, rule 
and regulation related to disclosure and accountability.  
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Q9. The supervisory, regulatory and enforcement agencies have the power, resources 
and authority to enforce compliance with laws and regulations on guidelines of 
corporate governance for firm in your country. 
This question is being asked because according to OECD (2004) principles suggest that 
‘’supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities must have the power, integrity, and 
resources needed to carry out their duties in a professional and objectives manner, however 
the rulings of these authorities should always be at appropriate time, transparent, and should 
be explained clearly. The Justification for asking questions on legal, regulatory and 
supervisory is based on the legal, supervisory and enforcement framework according to the 
following; OECD (2004) explained the importance of legal regulatory, supervisory, and 
enforcement agencies so that the issue of corporate governance framework will be effective 
in a firm. The organization revealed that corporate governance framework should enhance 
transparency, consistent with rule of law, and there should be division of responsibility for 
supervisory regulator and enforcement agency in each country in which the firm operate. The 
organization further explained that the bodies in charge of setting the principle of corporate 
governance in each of the country must make sure that there is no conflict between the codes 
or principle and the existing law of each of the country. In case if there is conflict 
appropriate legislation will be enacted. Although, when there is no conflict the legislation is 
required to support some area of corporate governance’’   
In addition, ECA (2002) explained that separating the government’s policy making and 
regulatory roles through establishing independent regulatory mechanisms and increase the 
development of regulatory expert can enhance the stability in the regulatory environment.  
Q10. A good legal system in my country of operation helps to improve the corporate 
governance of firms. 
The question above is asked as a result of La Portal, et al. (2000) who explained that the 
differences in law and how effective in implementation across countries, given the origin of 
these differences, enumerate their consequences, and examined the strategies of the corporate 
governance reform. The authors posited that legal approach is more meaningful way to 
understand corporate governance and its reform. In addition, La Portal et al. (2000) argues 
that the legal system is a fundamental important corporate governance mechanism. The 
author further explained that the extent to which those laws are enforced are the most basic 
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determinant of the ways in which corporate finance and corporate governance will be 
developed in that country.  
Q11. A well-organized legislature and sound regulatory and supervisory agencies in 
place promote good corporate governance. 
The question from the above is being asked as a result of the study of La portal et al 
(1998) found that a well organized legislative branch, passing and monitoring appropriate 
law, with sound regulatory and supervisory agencies in place, then providing example of well 
practices at higher level. All these will definitely promote good corporate governance.  
Section C: Statements 12-16 relate to your views on regulatory framework of 
corporate governance practice in your country.  
 
OECD (2004) explained that to ensure an effective corporate governance framework, 
there must be effective legal, regulatory and institution upon which all markets participants 
will rely on in order to establish their private contractual relations. The organization further 
explained that the regulatory framework will include the following elements such as 
legislation, regulation, voluntary commitments and this must follow the historical and 
tradition of each country. However, Rossouw (2005) posited that lack of an effective legal 
and regulatory framework hinders good corporate governance; this prevents firms from 
listing because they are under highly scrutiny and they need to increase their level of 
disclosure. However, the author further explained that a legal framework is compulsory so 
that it can offer sufficient incentives for firms to become more transparent   
Q12. Stock markets listing rules and corporate codes of conduct for firm are abused 
and often ignored. 
  The justification for asking above question is that OECD (2004) principle of corporate 
governance stated that all shares should carry the same rights; all investors should be able to 
obtain information about the rights attached to all series and classes of shares before they are 
purchases 
Q13. The Rules and regulation for appointing and removal of auditors are frequently 
violated. 
OECD (2004) principle of corporate governance states that external auditors should be 
accountable to the shareholders and owe a duty to the company to exercise due professional 
care in the conduct of audit. The organization explained that external auditors are 
recommended by an independent audit committee of the board or an equivalent body and the 
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external auditors are appointed either by that committee or body by the shareholders’ 
meeting.  
Q14. Rules and regulations for a formal and transparent board nomination and election 
process of firms are often ignored  
OECD (2004) specified the following as the basic shareholder rights this including the right 
to secure method of ownership registration, convey or transfer share, obtained relevant and 
material information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis. Then participate and vote 
in general shareholder meeting, elect and removed members of the board, and share in the profit 
of the corporation. In addition, shareholders should have the right to participate, and to be 
sufficiently informed on decision concerning fundamental corporation changes, for example 
amendments to status or articles of incorporation. This also includes the authorization of 
additional share and extraordinary transactions, also the transfer of all or substantially all assets 
that in effect result in the sale of the company.  
Q15. Rules and regulation for disclosure and communication are not often followed 
 
The principle of OECD (2004) explained that the function and responsibilities of the 
board with respect to disclosure and communication need to be clearly established by the 
board. As a result, in some companies there are now an investment officer who report directly 
to the board on process of disclosure and communication. 
 
Q16.  Rules and regulations regarding the independent status of board members are 
often violated. 
 
The purpose of this question is based on OECD principles (2004) which stated that the 
corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guideline of the company, the 
effective monitoring of the management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the 
company and shareholders. The organization also stated that the boards should consider 
assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board members capable of exercising 
independent judgment to task where there is potential of conflict of interest, such as 
nomination of board members and key executives. Wagner, et al. (1998) used two studies to 
empirically examine the common belief that corporate boards are likely to have positive 
effects on organization performance when outside directors are included. The study shows 
that, on average the greater presence of outsider is relate to higher performance. Bhagat and 
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Black (2002) noticed that on the board of directors of American Public companies, 
independent directors are more numerous, and many financial analysts and institutional 
investors are confident that a monitoring board composed of independent directors is an 
important structure of good corporate governance. 
 
Section D: Statements 17-19 relate to your views on enforcement of corporate 
governance practice.  
The World Bank’s report (2003) corporate governance revealed that most developing 
and emerging economies have failed to enforce laws, and regulation regarding to corporate 
governance. As a result in recent times there are various reforms on corporate governance in 
developing and emerging economies countries. The questions below are being asked as to 
find out the level of enforcement of law, rules and regulation of corporate governance in 
those countries. 
Q17. There is sufficient investigation of apparent non-compliance with laws/regulations. 
 
The reason for this question is as a result of OECD (2004) principle which stated that the 
legal and regulatory requirement that affect corporate governance practices in a jurisdiction 
should be consistent with rule of law, transparent and enforcement. 
Q18.There is appropriate legal protection of investors, shareholders and creditors from 
fraud perpetrated by managers and controlling shareholders within firms. 
 
The above question is based on the issue that, level of legal protection of investors in any 
country is an important factor in determining the development of the financial market of 
company in that country. The systematic differences in structure of law and enforcement 
among various countries in area of historical trend of their laws, level of corruption, and the 
quality of their enforcement will surely determine the difference in financial development. 
Arun and Turner (2004) revealed that there is need for appropriate laws to protect investors, 
increase financial disclosure, and putting fiduciary duties on directors and company 
executives. In addition, Doidge et.al (2007) distinguish between the investor protection by the 
state and investor protection adopted by firm, the authors claimed that in a countries with 
weak development, it is very costly to improve investors protection because institutional 
infrastructure is lacking and sound governance has political cost. 
Q19. There are appropriate mechanisms for investigating the illegal or inappropriate 
treatment of minority shareholders within firms. 
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The justification for this question is that OECD principle (2004) explained that corporate 
governance should ensure that equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and 
foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtained effective 
redress for violation of their rights. The confidence of minority shareholders is enhanced 
when the legal system provides mechanism for minority shareholders to bring lawsuits when 
they have a reasonable point to believe that their rights have been violated. The provision of 
such enforcement mechanisms is a main responsibility of legislators and regulators.  
Section E: Statements 20-23 relate to your views on transparency and disclosure of 
corporate governance practice.  
  
 
In recent time as a result of corporate governance scandal, government of both developed 
and developing countries have adopted a numbers of regulatory changes. As a result,   Okpara 
(2010) revealed that this regulatory change as increase the disclosure requirement and 
transparency. Against this background the following question are asked. 
Q20. Generally, in firms in your country, insider trading laws, rules and regulations are 
followed  
 
OECD (2004) revealed that insider trading takes place when there is manipulation of the 
capital markets and this should be prohibited by securities regulation, company law or 
criminal law in most developed countries. The organization explains that not all jurisdictions 
prohibit such practices and enforcement is not vigorous. This affect the principle of equitable 
treatment of shareholders and this can have effect on corporate governance practice. 
Q21. There is equal access to information for all shareholders of firms  
Based on the OECD (2004) corporate governance principle  which stated that corporate 
governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all 
material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, and  
performance, ownership, and governance of the company. Gray et.al (1996) revealed that 
accounting information may play a key role in enhancing a sound corporate governance of a 
firm; this will enable relevant parties to monitor the performance of managers and uses the 
information to hold the managers accountable.   
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Q22. There is confident in the autonomy and independence of auditors for firms within 
my country  
This question is formulated from OECD (2004) corporate governance principle which stated 
that an annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified auditor in 
order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the 
financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in 
all material respects.  
Q23. There are transparency in mergers and acquisitions of firms in your country 
This question is being formulated according to OECD (2004) Principle of corporate 
governance; the organization explained that investors have the basic rights to be informed 
about the ownership structure of the enterprises and vis-à-vis the rights of other owners. The 
rights of such information should also include information about the structure of a group of 
companies and intra-group relationship, objectives, structure and nature of the group. This 
also includes major shareholders, direct and indirect control, controlling the company through 
special voting rights, and shareholders agreement.    
Section F:        Statements 24-27 relate to your view on shareholders’ rights of your firm 
in your country.  
 
 
OECD (2004) specified the following as the basic shareholder rights including the right to 
secure method of ownership registration, convey or transfer share, obtained relevant and 
material information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis. Then participate and vote 
in general shareholder meeting, elect and removed members of the board, and share in the profit 
of the corporation. In addition, shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to be 
sufficiently informed on decision concerning fundamental corporation changes, for example 
amendments to status or articles of incorporation, the authorization of additional share and 
extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or substantially all assets that in effect 
result in the sale of the company. Moreover, capital structures and arrangements that enable 
certain shareholders to obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their equity ownership 
should be disclosed, and the exercise of ownership rights by shareholders, including 
institutional investors, should be facilitated. Furthermore, the organization revealed that 
corporate governance should ensure that equitable treatment of all shareholders, including 
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minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain 
effective redress for violation of their rights. The confidence of minority shareholders is 
enhanced when the legal system provides mechanism for minority shareholders to bring 
lawsuits when they have a reasonable point to believe that their rights have been violated. 
 
Q24.The basic shareholders rights in your firm are not protected. 
 
The level of legal protection of investors in any country is an important factor in 
determining the development of the financial market of company in that country. Okpara 
(2010) posited that issue of shareholder rights is important for the protection of investors 
against poor management of firm. In developing countries the protections of shareholder 
rights have been have become a serious challenge for implementing effective corporate 
governance system. La portal, et al. (1998) examined the legal rules covering protection of 
corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of the rules and quality of enforcement in 49 
countries. Using empirical analysis the result revealed that common law countries have the 
strongest, French countries have the weakest, and the German-and Scandinavian-civil- law 
countries are at the middle. The authors found that concentration of ownership of shares in 
largest public companies was negatively related to investor protections, and the same with 
hypothesis that small, and diversified shareholders are not likely to be recognized in countries 
that cannot protect their right. 
  
Q25.Minority shareholder rights of your firm are often violated. 
OECD (2004) principle of corporate governance explained that all shareholders should 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. The confidence of 
minority shareholders is enhanced when the legal system provides mechanism for minority 
shareholders to bring lawsuits when they have a reasonable point to believe that their rights 
have been violated. 
 
 
Q26.Minority shareholders are often not allowed to express their view at general 
meetings of firms in your country.  
 
OECD (2004) Principle of corporate governance stated that shareholders should 
participate and vote in general shareholder meeting, elect and remove members of the board, 
and share in the profit of the corporation. In addition, shareholders should have the right to 
Chapter Three: Methodology and Descriptive Statistics of the study 
 
89 
 
participate in, and to be sufficiently informed on decision concerning fundamental 
corporation changes, for example amendments to status or articles of incorporation, the 
authorization of additional share and extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all 
or substantially all assets that in effect result in the sale of the company. 
Q27.Shareholders is allowed to speak at company meeting only if they are known to side 
with the board of directors. 
 
OECD (2004) principle of corporate governance asserted that shareholders have rights to 
participate in general meeting and this is a fundamental right for shareholder without 
interference from any officers from the company.  Holderness (2003) revealed that equity 
ownership by insiders can align insiders’ interest with those of other shareholders; hence this 
can lead to better decisions or higher value. However, lager ownership by insiders’ will likely 
result to higher degree of management control and this may entrench the managers.   
 
Section G:      Statements 28- 30 relate to your view on ownership concentration  
 
Ownership structure means various patterns by which shareholders seem to set up respect 
to a specific group of firms. The structure of ownership of firm is always used by policy-
makers, Academician, and researcher in their various analyses of corporate governance of a 
country or firms. Denis and McConnell (2003) posited that ownership structure of firm   is a 
potentially important element and one of the primary interest in internal mechanism of 
corporate governance, this because it is the identities of equity holders and the sizes of their 
position in the firms. As a result the following questions below are asked. 
Q28. The firms in your country have different composition of ownership 
 
OECD (2004) principle of corporate governance explained that there should be equitable 
treatment of all shareholders including minority, local and foreign shareholders. The 
organization stated all investors should have information about rights attached to all series 
and classes of share before purchase. In addition the organization explained that if there are 
any changes in voting rights it should be subject to approval by those classes of share which 
are negatively affected.   
La portal, et.al (1999) used the data on ownership structures of large companies in the 27 
richest economies to investigate the fundamental controlling shareholders of these firms. The 
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empirical analysis of the sample revealed that, except in economies with very good 
shareholder protection, few of these firms are widely held. The findings do not match Berle 
and Mean’s view on Modern Corporation. Instead, these firms are controlled by families or 
the state. The equity control through financial institution is very rare and the controlling 
shareholders have power over firms in excess of their cash flow rights. This happens through 
the use of hierarchy and taken part in the management activities. 
Q29. There is large concentration of ownership (few shareholders having majority of 
shares) in firms in your country 
 
Denis and McConnell (2003) found that there is evidence that concentration of 
ownership structures are more typical ownership structure around the world than relatively 
diffuse structure in large publicly traded US and the UK firms. This finding by the authors 
shows the differences across the countries with respect to the degree of ownership 
concentration and the identification of the block holders.  Moreover, Faccio and Lang (2002) 
revealed that in Western European countries the listed firms are generally widely held and 
this common in the UK and Ireland and family-owned firms are common in Continental 
Europe. Blass et.al (1998) found that there is ownership concentration in Israel with bank and 
affiliated institutional investors as the real non-insiders holders. In China Xu and Wang found 
concentrate ownership in Chinese firms, this split between the government institution and 
local individuals. Valadares and Leal (2000) noticed that there is high level ownership 
concentration in Brazil and majority of block holders are corporations and individual.  
 
In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) revealed that ownership concentration is linked with 
legal protection and this one of two main element of determinant of corporate governance. 
There are situation where large shareholders can benefit minority shareholders because of 
their power and incentive they used to prevent expropriation by managers. As a result, 
ownership concentration can view as an efficient governance mechanism Okpara, (2010). 
 However, Johnson et.al (2000) claimed that large shareholder can align with managers to 
expropriate minority shareholder this benefit is known as tunnelling. La portal et.al 1999; 
2000 argues that this situation is one of the main agency problems in countries with poor 
shareholder protection.  In addition, Morck et.al (2000) found that controlling shareholders 
may pursue an objective that will not favour minority shareholders. Okpara, (2010) posited 
that the relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is a complicated 
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issue. The author found that when ownership of shares is widely dispersed. A higher 
ownership concentration is likely mitigating the free-rider problem and this will improve firm 
efficiency. The author further explained that when the fractional ownership of the higher 
shareholders concentration exceeds a certain threshold, a higher ownership concentration 
raises the likelihood of tunnelling and reduce firm efficiency. 
 
Q30. Preferential treatment is often given to large shareholders of firms in your country 
OECD (2004) principle of corporate governance explained that there should be equitable 
treatment of all shareholders including minority, local and foreign shareholders. The 
organization stated all investors should have information about rights attached to all series and 
classes of share before purchase. In addition the organization explained that if there are any 
changes in voting rights it should be subject to approval by those classes of share which are 
negatively affected. Johnson et.al (2000) claimed that large shareholder can align with 
managers to expropriate minority shareholder this benefit is known as tunnelling. La portal 
et.al 1999; 2000 argues that this situation is one of the main agency problems in countries with 
poor shareholder protection.  In addition, Morck et.al (2000) found that controlling 
shareholders may pursue an objective that will not favour minority shareholders. 
 
Section H:      Statements 31-38 relate to your view regarding role and responsibility of 
board of directors.  
 
The composition of the board of directors is very important for the board to perform their 
functions without any control from anybody. The board should include individual with good 
personal character and ability to perform the board’s duties, integrity, having sense of 
accountability, record of success, and leadership qualities. In addition, he or she must be 
expert in the field of finance with experience, and must always think strategically. The 
directors must show this commitment to the organization by preparing for and being present 
at meeting.  
 
Q31. Board members are not fully committed to reviewing and   guiding corporate 
strategy in your firm. 
 
Chapter Three: Methodology and Descriptive Statistics of the study 
 
92 
 
OECD (2004) principle of corporate governance explained the responsibilities of the 
boards which include the following; reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of 
action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plan. The responsibilities also include setting 
performance objectives, monitoring implementation, corporate performance; and overseeing 
major capital expenditure acquisition and divestiture. 
 
Q32. Board members of companies in your country do not pay adequate attention to 
executive compensation in your firm.  
 
Denis and McConnell (2003) argue that one of the main task assigns to the board of 
director is that of determining the structure and level of compensation of the top executive of 
firm. There are authors such as Murphy (1999), Core et.al (2003) they survey the level of 
executive compensation in the US and the authors found that compensation issue is very 
important aspect of corporate governance and it is the degree to which executive 
compensation aligns top executive interest with those of their shareholders example of this is 
the sensitivity of executive pay to performance. In addition,    OECD (2004) stated that the 
function of board of director should include; selecting, compensating, monitoring, replacing 
key executives and overseeing succession planning.  This function of the board is aligning 
key executive officer and board remuneration with the longer term of the company interest of 
the company and its shareholders. 
 
Q33. Board members of companies in your country are not effectively committed to 
their responsibility in your firm 
 
OECD (2004) explained that the board should play the role of monitoring the 
effectiveness of company’s governance practices and they should able to commit themselves 
effectively to their responsibility. Furthermore, Denis and McConnell (2003) asserted the one 
the internal mechanism of corporate governance that is of primary interest is board of 
directors. The authors explain further that in the US the board members exist mainly to hire, 
fire, monitor, and compensate management and maximizing shareholder value. 
 
Q34. The board members often demonstrated a lack of concern as to integrity of 
companies’ financial reporting system of firm in your country. 
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OECD (2004) stated that the board should ensure the integrity of the corporation’s 
accounting and financial reporting standard which include the independent audit system and 
compliance with law, regulation, and standards. 
 
Q35. Board members show lack of concern in ensuring a formal and transparent board 
nomination and election process in your firm. 
 
OECD (2004) principle revealed that shareholders have a role to play in the nomination 
and election of the board members the organization belief that the board should ensure 
nomination and election process are respected. In addition, the board has to identify potential 
members for the board with knowledge, competencies, skill so that it can add value to the 
company. 
Q36. In your firm of country operation, board members do not show concern about 
proper monitoring and enforcement of laws, rules and regulations of corporate 
governance practices. 
 
OECD (2004) revealed that monitoring and enforcement of law by board include 
continuous review of the internal structure of company so that there is there proper 
accountability for management in all department of the organization. As a result of this, a 
number of countries have recommended self- assessment by board of their performance and 
reviews of individual board members and the CEO/Chairman. 
 
Q37. Board members do not adequately supervise the process of disclosure and 
communication in your firm. 
 
The principle of OECD (2004) explained that the function and responsibilities of the 
board with respect to disclosure and communication need to be clearly established by the 
board. As a result, some companies there are now an investment officer who report directly to 
the board on process of disclosure and communication. 
 
Q38. There is separation between the roles of the chairman and Chief Executive officer 
of firms in your country.  
 
Okpara (2010) argues  that boards’ structures are not uniform across the countries, there 
is diversity of ownership structure around the world, countries such as France, Germany, 
Netherland, and China their company law required listed firms to adopt a two-tier board (dual 
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board system). However, Mallin (2010) found that most Europeans countries  such as, have a 
unitary board structure, example are UK, Spain and Ireland  although majority have option 
for of a dual structure and some provide employee role in supervisory. In such countries there 
is supervisory and managerial role in the companies examples are Austria, Denmark, and 
Germany.   Moreover, the author further explained that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is 
responsible for the running of the company’s business activities, while the chairman is 
responsible for running of the board. The author argues that the two roles should not be 
combined and carried out by one person because it gives the individual person too much 
power in the company. The empirical evidence of   Brickley, and Jarrel, et.al (1997) show 
that separating the chairman of board and CEO will reduce agency cost in firm and improved 
performance. 
 
Section C: Questions 39-48 relate to your views on economic factor with regard to 
corporate governance practices.  
 
The justification for the following questions under the economic factors that affect the 
corporate governance is based on economic framework of OECD (2004) principles which   
stated that the economic conditions existing in a given country may have a role to play in 
effective governance. The organization further stated that corporate governance is only part 
of the larger economic context in which a firm operates such as macroeconomic policies and 
degree of competition in product and factor markets. 
Q39. Good corporate governance practice within firms is important to attracting 
domestic investment in a nation. 
 
This question is ask based on Burton et.al (2009) the authors explained that macro-
economic policies affect the ways in which organizations are managed. Therefore economic 
factors such as the level of poverty, inflation, ability and knowledge of the manager of 
company can affect company during financial crisis so that they will not mislead the 
shareholders. The attraction of local and foreign investors will depend on the type of business 
environment and corporate governance practice in the region and this can affect the growth 
and development of the firms. 
Q40. Good corporate governance practice of firms is important in attracting foreign 
investment for a country  
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The justification for this question is on Coffee (2005) who revealed those corporate 
scandals with state of economy, the kind of ownership structure, accounting scandal, and 
financial irregularities such as earnings manipulation all these are linked with recent 
economic downturn. Consequently, the author argues that the activities of the stock market, 
and economic policies put in place by government is affecting firm performance negatively 
and affect their competitiveness. As a result, the author found that sound corporate 
governance practice can enhance economic success, attraction of local and foreign investors 
and long term stability of the economic. 
Q41. Corporate governance influences the growth and development of firms and this, in 
turn influences the economy of a nation. 
The reason for this question is based on the study of Coffee (2005) who  revealed that 
corporate scandals with state of economy, the kind of ownership structure, accounting 
scandal, financial irregularities such as earnings manipulation all these are link with recent 
economic downturn. Consequently, the author argues that the activities of the stock market, 
and economic policies put in place by government is affecting firm performance negatively 
and affect their competitiveness. As a result, the author found that sound corporate 
governance practice can enhance economic success. 
Q42. Shareholder protection can affect the level of equity markets. 
This question is based on the study of Mueller (2006) who argues that several studies 
have revealed adverse effects of Asian financial crisis, this  are more severe in countries with 
weak corporate governance institutions. Based on this finding the author found that countries 
with poor shareholders protection and investment performance this, will be difficult for firm 
in such countries to gain higher sum of money in equity market. This will definitely have 
adverse long-term effect on growth prospect on such countries. The author also found that 
weak corporate governance institutions in developed countries may result to wasteful over-
investment and weak corporate governance institutions in developing countries may result to 
under investment. This suggests that the best development strategy for emerging market 
country is to create a condition that will produce a higher equity market and the best step to 
this direction is to install strong corporate governance institutions that will enhance higher 
equity market.     
Q43. Macro-economic policies influence the way firms are managed in such way as to 
influence the relationship between firms and shareholders. 
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The above question is based on OECD principle (2004) which stated that the 
organization economic situation in a country may have a role to play in effective governance. 
As a result the organization believe that corporate governance is only part of the larger 
economic context in which a firm operates such as macroeconomic policies and degree of 
competition in product and factor markets. 
Q44. Banks play a predominant role in financial intermediation of firms in your 
country. 
 
Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) argue that the relationship between financial 
developments stimulates economic growth and therefore financial development enhanced 
efficiency in allocation of resources and this stimulates the growth process. The authors 
further explained that financial system decrease liquidity risk and facilitate the management 
of risk and savers and investors. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) claimed that saving into long 
term assets that are more productive than short-term assets. In addition, the financial system 
facilitates portfolio diversification for investors this will allow more choice to them and 
allocate resource in more productive activities. Financial system also found out information 
about investment project more effectively at a lower cost than investors because of 
economies of scale, Consequently total cost of investment will be  lower and this will 
enhanced economic growth (King and Levine 1993).  
 Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) explained that financial intermediation have effect   
on corporate governance practices in Africa economies. As a result bank play a predominant 
role in financial intermediation of firms in some developing countries, but in Africa the 
financial system is weak. The author argues that bank needs to maintain a good relationship 
with firm in order to protect them and bring profit to the business environment. The authors 
further explained that this will bring a cordial relationship between the borrower and 
lenders. In some countries firms own and control major local banks by creating a form of 
conglomerates business with the organization and this will be easier to finance the whole 
companies. 
Q45. Firms in your country own and control major local banks by creating a form of 
conglomerate business organization.  
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Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) argue that in some countries firm own and control 
major local bank by creating a form of holding or conglomerate business organization, this 
will bring a cordial relationship between the borrower and lenders. In such countries this will 
be easier to finance the whole companies, which is a form of financial intermediation and this 
will improved the corporate governance practice.  
Q46. There are conflict and problem associated with corporate governance before or 
after privatization of state-owned companies in your country. 
There are challenges emanating from privatization of state-owned companies which is 
affecting the corporate governance practices of firm. Consequently, Estrin (2002), 
Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) posited that one of the reasons for privatization of firms is 
to improve managerial incentives and raised corporate efficiency. However, in most 
developing countries there are conflict and problems associated with corporate governance 
before or privatization of state-owned companies.  The authors revealed that there is lack of 
independence in the valuation of the assets; most sales of the companies are for relative or 
friends of the politician that is power. There is lack of transparency in the appointment of the 
board of the companies; this will result to poor corporate governance practice in the 
privatized companies.  
Q47. There is no transparency in the sales of state-owned companies and appointment 
of the board of director in your country. 
 
There are challenges emanating from privatization of state-owned companies which is 
affecting the corporate governance practices of firm. Consequently, Estrin (2002), 
Okeahalam and Akinboade (2003) posited that one of the reasons for privatization of firms is 
to improve managerial incentives and raised corporate efficiency. However, in most 
developing countries there are conflict and problems associated with corporate governance 
before or privatization of state-owned companies.  The authors revealed that there is lack of 
independence in the valuation of the assets; most sales of the companies are for relative or 
friends of the politician that is power. There is lack of transparency in the appointment of the 
board of the companies; this will result to poor corporate governance practice in the 
privatized companies.  
Moreover, Megginson et.al, (1994), Boubakari and Cosset (1998) found that privatized 
firm experience increase in profitability, efficiency and increase in work force. However, 
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) revealed that state-owned firms are less profitable, and labour 
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intensity than privatized firm. In addition, the authors claimed that higher profit did not 
directly relate to privatization, and increased in profit is observed immediately prior to 
privatization.  Denis and McComell (2003) posited that government decide to privatized 
firms, but the  future prospect of firms is to improve performance, therefore  good  corporate 
governance  practices will improved performance.   
Q48. The local investors are unable to use voting power to enforce corporate governance 
and there is no effective corporate control. 
 
OECD (2004) principle of corporate governance explained that there should be equitable 
treatment of all shareholders including minority, local and foreign shareholders. The 
organization stated that all investors should have information about rights attached to all series 
and classes of share before purchase. In addition the organization explained that if there are 
any changes in voting rights it should be subject to approval by those classes of share which 
are negatively affected. In addition, Kapuma, (2001), Mensah (2001) argue that in most 
developing countries, many listed companies are subsidiaries of foreign, multinational and 
minority of shares for the local investors. As a result, the public investors’ cannot uses their 
voting power to enforce corporate governance, and lack of effective corporate control due to 
limited trade able shares. 
Section J: Statements 49-52 relate to your views on societal and cultural factors 
upon corporate governance practices.  
 
OECD (2004) principles explained that the procedure for business rule and regulation, 
ethics, corporate awareness of the environment and societal interest will have influence on 
reputation and long term success of a firm. In addition, Burton et.al (2009) revealed that 
cultural and social framework may play a role in context of the environment that modern 
firms carried out their operational activities. The authors further explained that cultural and 
social factor may likely affect the practice of corporate governance in developing countries, 
for instance pressure from families and clan for financial support. Family making decision for 
family-owned business or family dominated business without expecting to be question about 
the decision. Moreover once you are in good position in a firm, it is cultural you must employ 
your family whether the person qualified or not. All these will surely affect the corporate 
governance practices of a firm.    
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Q49. Corporate governance practices within firms should consider the interests of 
Stakeholders, individual and community goals.  
 
The above question is based on the finding of Dawson (2004) who posited that 
confidence in firms and capital market can be a pillar on the actions, values and beliefs of 
those in the management of the corporation. The ethical framework within which a firm 
operates such as values held by culture, society, internal corporate practices and moral value 
held by employee may also affect the confidence in firms and capital market.   
Q50. Corporate governance guidelines and regulations should be drawn in such a way 
that they reflect the socio-political and cultural environment of each nation.   
 
The question is based on argument of the following authors;  Aguilera and Jackson 2003, 
Filatotchev et.al 2005,  Adu-Ahmoah et.al  2009, argues that as a result of  corporate 
mismanagement and failures, there is need for a new policy initiative where corporate 
governance guideline should be  drawn in a way that better serve the individual nature of 
each country. This is because of differences in the socio-political and cultural environment of 
each country. Burton et.al (2009) argues that cultural and social framework is important in 
the context of ethical environment in which the modern firms operate. The authors revealed 
that culture and social factors significantly impacted on corporate governance of developing 
countries. 
Q51. National culture affects enforcement procedures in accounting systems and these 
influences corporate governance practice of firms in your country. 
Moreover, Gray, (1988) argues that prior research has shown that there are different 
patterns of accounting and the development of national system of corporate financial reporting 
is related to environmental factors. The author formulated a framework for analysis the impact 
of culture on the development of accounting system, He  identified that value dimensions at the 
accounting subculture level that is professionalism, uniformity, conservatism and secrecy and 
these have link to cultural value dimension at society level .The author formulated hypotheses 
to test the relationship between culture and accounting system in the context of systems 
authority and enforcement characteristic, and measurement and disclosure. Against this 
background, the  author  suggests that the influences of  any change  factors need to be taking 
to account as a result  of  existences of external influences arising from colonization, war, 
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foreign investment, activities of multinational companies and large international accounting 
firm. Based on the above, this show that culture have influence on corporate governance 
through the guardians or gateway of accounting system that is operating in each of the country. 
Q52. The business ethics and values that characterize a society will influence the level of 
confidence in the integrity and probity of firms and capital markets.  
 
The question is based on the argument of Dawson (2004) who posited that confidence in 
firms and capital market can be a pillar on the actions, values and beliefs of those in the 
management of the corporation. The ethical framework within which a firm operates such as 
values held by culture, society, internal corporate practices and moral value held by employee 
may also affect the confidence in firms and capital market.   
Section k: Statements 53-58 relate to your views on the influence of corruption and 
bribery on corporate governance practices. 
 
The overall question under corruption and bribery  is based on Okike (2004) who  
posited that corruption is known through the wealth and economic well-being of a nation  
with fast growing economy can easily be prone to corruption and lack of adequate internal 
control system in firms because all employee in various organization can be bribed. However 
the author further argues that when there is economic hardship people can easily sell their 
conscience. Burton et.al (2009) revealed that there is always pressure from families and clan 
for financial support for people working in a firm and this can lead to corruption and bribery. 
Against this background, this indicates that corruption, and bribery can easily influence the 
corporate governance practices. 
Q53. Reduction in corruption and bribery will help to improve corporate governance 
practices of firms.   
 
Socio-political corruption can influence corporate governance practice among parties to 
corporate governance. This parties include; the regulatory bodies, the Chief Executives 
Officers, (CEO) the board of directors, management, shareholders, auditors and other 
stakeholders.  The level of corruption is cut across the responsibility, duties or task been 
given to each of them in their capacity. Therefore if there is improvement of corporate 
governance practices the level of corruption that cut across all level in firm will surely have 
positive effect on corruption.  
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Q54. Levels of corruption in a country influence the ability of regulatory authorities to 
enforce compliance with corporate governance principles and accountability within 
firms. 
 
Burton et.al (2009) claimed level of corruption can influence corporate governance and 
this may influence confidence of domestic and foreign investors. The authors argue further 
that corruption and bribery can affect the enforcement of corporate governance through 
regulatory officers and judiciary. 
Q55. Protection of employees and the payment of living wages will influence the level of 
corruption in a firm.  
 
The African Consultant Forum on Corporate Governance, (2003), suggests that corporate 
governance best practices must consider other stakeholders interest.  Okike (2004) argues that 
when there is economic hardship people can easily sell their conscience and take bribe. As a 
result this will have effect on corporate governance practices of a firm. Burton et.al (2009) 
revealed that there is always pressure from families and clan for financial support for people 
working in a firm and this can lead to corruption and bribery. 
Q56. Conflicts of interest, unsound ethics and greed influence the corporate governance 
practices of a firm.  
 
The reason for this question is based on the study of Rossouw (2005) revealed that 
ethical concepts are concern with transparency, accountability, responsibility, the function of 
board and their composition, reporting, disclosure and respect for the rights of all 
stakeholders of firms. The author further explained that business ethics are considered an 
integral and essential part of sound corporate governance based on the analysis of various 
national codes of corporate governance. 
Q57. Economic hardship will influence levels of corruption among employees to the 
extent that corporate governance practices are undermined within firms.  
The justification for this question is from the finding of Okike (2004) who posited that 
corruption is known through the wealth and economic well-being of a nation with fast 
growing economy can easily be prone to corruption. 
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Q58. Lack of internal control system will influence levels of corruption among employees 
to the extent that corporate governance practices are undermined within firms. 
Okike (2004) also argues that when there is lack of adequate internal control system in a 
firm, employee in such may be bribed. However the author further argues that when there is 
economic hardship people can easily sell their conscience.  
 
Section L: Statements 59-63 relate to your views on how a country’s political 
environment may influence corporate governance practices within firms.  
 
The ECA (2002) explained that good economic governance exist in economies that 
institutions of government are capable to manage resources efficiently, formulate, implement 
and enforce sound policies and regulation. They can be monitored and held accountable in 
which there is respect for rules and norms of economic interaction. Also economic activity is 
unimpeded by corruption and other activities that are inconsistent with public trust. The 
organization further explained that the main elements toward an environment for good 
corporate governance are transparency, accountability, and enabling environment for private 
sector, growth and development, and institutional development and effectiveness. 
Q59. The government exerts substantial influence over the ownership of companies in 
my country of operation  
The question from the above is based on the finding of Ahunwan (2002) who reveal that 
the problem associated with ownership in developing countries is that government may likely 
influence the ownership structure especially in a multinational corporation or firm wholly or 
partial -owned by government. In such situation there will be partisan politics and this will 
affect the ownership structure 
 
Q60. The political environment, by influencing fiscal and monetary policies, has a 
substantial impact on corporate governance practices.  
 
From the study of the  following authors, the above question is formulated;  Burton et.al 
2009, Chryssides and Kaler, 1996 argue that the business sector operate in accordance with 
laws, rules regulations, and policies that are in place as a result of political decision by the 
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government  in power. As a result the authors’ beliefs that effective development of fiscal and 
monetary policies, the laws governing commercial interaction, and sound enforcement will 
provide a stable framework for business activities.  
Q61. Prolonged period of military or civilian rule in a country will influence the 
corporate governance practices of firms.  
 
The Justification of the question is from Ahunwan (2002) who explained that several 
year of military rule and high level of corruption have negatively affected the management of 
public and Private Corporation in some developing countries. This happen  in the 
appointment to the board, senior management position and even lower officer all are based on 
political connection, instead of using efficiency and professional qualification for the 
appointment. All these will surely have adverse effect on the corporate governance practice 
of the firms. 
Q62. The government interferes with the work of regulatory and supervisory bodies with 
regard to appointments or incentives for company executive within firms. 
The reason for the above question is based on the finding of Ahunwan (2002) who 
argues that several year of military rule and high level of corruption have negatively affected 
the management of public and private companies in some developing countries. Especially in 
the appointment to the board, senior management position and even lower officer all are 
based on political connection, instead of using efficiency and professional qualification for 
the appointment. All these will surely have adverse effect on the corporate governance 
practice of the firms. 
Q63. Politicians exert undue influence over the ministries and agencies responsible for 
monitoring and enforcement corporate governance guidelines and regulations within 
firms.   
 
The reason for this question is from  Burton et.al (2009)  who claimed that nation’s 
political environments affect the practice of corporate governance in term of fiscal and 
monetary policies, security and stability and type of political leadership whether democratic 
or military dictatorship in power. This will affect government interferences with work of 
regulatory and supervisory bodies, appointment of chairman of corporation and incentive for 
company executive. The government ministries are responsible for monitoring and 
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enforcement of corporate governance principles and this can be influenced by politician or 
the type of leadership in that country. 
 
Section M:      Statements 64- 68 relate to your view on ownership structure in your 
firm.  
 
Diane and McConnell (2003) found that among the corporate governance mechanism, 
ownership structure have been studied mostly in the US and the rest of the world .The authors 
revealed that the ownership structure is more significantly concentrated in non-US countries 
than it is in US, it is also matter more in non-US countries than does in US, especially in firm 
performance and value. As a result the following question is being asked. 
 
Q64. The Board members and senior management are majority stock holders of 
company in your country 
 
Holderness (2003) revealed that equity ownership by insiders can align insiders’ interest 
with those of other shareholders; hence this can lead to better decisions or higher value. 
However, lager ownership by insiders’ will likely result to higher degree of management 
control and this may entrench the managers. In the UK, Short and Keasey (1999) found that 
effect of managerial beginning to dominate at twelve percentage of ownership but at a higher 
level of ownership managers become entrenched. However, Morch et.al (1988) claimed that 
entrenchment and domination start at five percent managerial ownership. 
Q65. Foreign nationals are the majority shareholders of the company in your country. 
 
OECD (2004) principle of corporate governance explained that there should be equitable 
treatment of all shareholders including minority, local and foreign shareholders. The 
organization stated all investors should have information about rights attached to all series 
and classes of share before purchase. In addition the organization explained that if there are 
any changes in voting rights it should be subject to approval by those classes of share which 
are negatively affected. However,  Kapuma, (2001), Mensah (2001)  argue that most 
developing countries such as many listed companies are subsidiaries of foreign, multinational 
and minority of shares for the local investors. As a result, the public investors’ cannot uses 
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their voting power to enforced corporate governance, and lack of effective corporate control 
due to limited trade able shares. Makhija and Spiro (2000), Hingorani and Makhija (1997) 
found that  share prices are positively correlated with foreign ownership, while the latter 
authors posited that insider and foreign ownership mitigate agency problem  through 
incentives that align the interest of the managers and investors. In addition, Cosset and 
Guedhami (2001) claimed that in developing countries profitability and efficiency gain of 
firms are link with the presence of foreign owner.  
 
Q66. The government holds the majority of stock in company in your country. 
 
Ahunwan (2002) revealed that the problem associated with ownership in developing 
countries is that government may likely influence the ownership structure especially in a 
multinational corporation or firm wholly or partial-owned by government. In such situation 
there will be partisan politics and this will affect the ownership structure. Boubbakri and 
Cosset (1998) found that when government relinquished voting control over firms there will 
be increase in performance of the firms, this finding is consistent with Megginson and Netter 
(2001) that revealed that ownership of a firm by government is linked with poor performance 
of that firm, because there will be significant change in board   structure which can easily 
affect the performance of the firm.  
 
Q67. Family members hold majority stocks in company in your country. 
 
 The above question is based on the study of Burton et.al (2009) which they explained 
that the head of a family makes decision for family-owned business without following the 
corporate governance guideline. Such decisions include issue of employment, board 
members, attitude toward women, tribalism. All these issues can bring in incompetent person 
or unqualified person to control the management of the firms. In some cases the position you 
holds will influence your decision   at management level in a firm family, extended family 
and clan may likely influence your decision on issue related to employments. Therefore this 
will also attract unqualified person to hold a position in a firm 
 
Q68. Where a single family dominates the management of a firm, this will be reflected 
in corporate governance practice of firm.  
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Haniffa and Cooke (2002) claimed that family members sitting on the board of firms 
may influence on disclosure practices; therefore this can affect the corporate governance of 
firms. Furthermore, the authors’ belief that cultural factor is important because the traditions 
of a nation are instilled in its people and this might help to explain why situation are like that. 
The authors found that family members sitting on the board of firms may influence on 
disclosure practices; therefore this can affect the corporate governance of firms. Moreover , 
Ahikari and Tondkar (1992) revealed that capital owner do not have to rely on public 
disclosure to monitor their investment since they have more access to internal information as 
a result the demand for public disclosure and reporting will be very low. This evidence shows 
that family is an important factor that can influence corporate governance of firm.   
 
 
Section N: Statements 69-71 relate to your views on how accounting systems 
influence the corporate governance of firm within countries.  
 
The level of financial reporting is a crucial element for corporate governance system to 
function effectively. The accountants and auditors are primary providers of information to 
shareholders and potential investors. As a result, the directors of the corporation should 
expect that management prepares the financial information in compliance with statutory and 
ethical obligation and rely on auditors’ competence. There may be conflict of interest which 
places the financial reporting in doubt to client pressure to please the management. Such 
example is the collapse of Enron due to misleading of financing reporting. Moreover, the 
Accounting professional in each of the countries can play a significant role in effectiveness 
and enforcement of corporate governance practices by making use of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). The appointment of independent auditor should follow the 
normal procedure so that there will be no interference from the management.  Therefore all 
this issues mentioned above can affect the transparency, disclosure, and risk management 
which is part of corporate governance principle. 
Q69. Firms prepare financial information that accord with statutory and ethical 
obligations in my country. 
 
The justification of this question is based from the following; OECD (2004) principles 
explained the importance of accounting framework in promoting disclosure and transparency 
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by stating that information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality 
standards of accounting, financial and nonfinancial disclosure.  Consequently, Gray et.al 
(1996) revealed that accounting information may play a key role in enhancing a sound 
corporate governance of a firm; this will enable relevant parties to monitor the performance 
of managers and uses the information to hold the managers accountable. Monks and Minow 
(2004) revealed that annual audits carry out by independent, competent and qualified auditors 
as it being recommended by the OECD principles, that it should provide an external and 
objective assurance to the management board and shareholders about financial situation and 
performance of the firm. 
Q70. The Institute of Chartered Accountants (or what I regard as its national 
equivalent) is effective in enforcing good accounting and financial reporting practices in 
my country of operation. 
 
The above question is derived from Burton et.al (2009) the authors  argues that the 
accounting standards that are used in recording, and presenting the transactions of a company 
are tools to transfer financial information to the users of the financial statements issue by the 
companies. This will enable the company’s management to be accountable to the 
stakeholders. This argument is consistent with Jones and Wolnizer (2003), who claimed that 
the use of consistent accounting principles by various companies will, enables users to assess 
the performance of the companies using uniform standard. Also this will enable the users to 
evacuate the performance of management in area of governance of the firms and their level of 
accountability to shareholders. 
 
Q71. The Accounting Standards Board (or what I regard as its national equivalent) 
issues standards that are in line with international accounting standards. 
 
  This question is based on Bushman and Smith, (2001) they posited that bodies that are 
responsible for setting up the nation’s accounting standard should make sure they encourage 
the reporting of a true and fair view of the transactions. In addition, the body should make 
sure that these standards are applied uniformly across the firms in same way the standard 
have being set by the bodies. Moreover, DeAngelo, 1988; Bushman and Smith, 2001 
revealed that the quality of the standards and the implementation of the standards may have 
effect on the confidence of the users of the information.        
 
Section O:      Statements 72 deal with any further comments  
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Q72. Any further comments on issue of corporate governance of firms in your country 
 
The Justification for asking above question is to allow the respondents to contribute their 
own view on issue of corporate governance. This may improve the rate of response and to 
make the exercise to be interesting so that it will not be only the person that administers the 
questionnaires that is in control of the study 
Table 3.5 Illustrate reliability statistics test for the data instrument of the study   
Section              Main Variable Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient No of item 
 B Corporate governance system            0.87    5 
 C   Regulatory framework              0.86    5 
 D Enforcement              0.72    3 
  E Disclosure and transparency             0.80    4  
  F Shareholder rights            0.90    4 
  G Ownership concentration             0.73    3 
  H Board of directors responsibilities            0.84    8 
  I Economics factor            0.78    10 
  J Social and cultural factor            0.74    4 
  K Corruption and bribery            0.77    6 
  L Political environment            0.73    5 
  M Ownership structure            0.78    5 
  N Accounting system             0.75    3 
    
 
Table 3.5 above provides the reliability statistics test for each section of the survey questionnaire 
(section b to N). The purpose of this test is to check that each scales is reliable with particular sample. 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is one of the indicators to measure internal consistency which is the 
value for reliability test.  Pallant (2010) explained that when Cronbach’s alpha coefficient value is 
above 0.7, this indicate that the scale is reliable with the sample or have a reliable internal 
consistency. In making sure the scale of the study is reliable we checked the reliability of the 
scale by checking the internal consistency through Cronbach’s alpha coefficient and the result 
indicated 0.78 Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. Consequently, the result from the above Table 
indicate that the five liker-scale used for this study is reliable with the sample and the internal 
consistency is accurate for the study.  
The table below shows the characteristic of the respondent for the survey questionnaire 
on challenges of corporate governance practices of firms in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone 
countries.  
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Table 3.6 Characteristics of survey respondents on Corporate governance practices of 
firms for each country in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries 
  Total Ghana  Nigeria South Africa 
  N % N % N % N % 
Characteristics          
Gender         
Male 363 67.1 87 58 222 69.4 40 56 
Female 178 32.9 63 42 98 30.6 31 44 
Total 541 100 150 100 320 100 71 100 
         
Occupation         
Legislator 17 3.1 5 3.3 11 3.4 1 1.4 
Regulator 125 23.1 38 25.3 77 24.1 10 14.1 
Academician 28 5.2 10 6.7 13 4.1 5 7. 
Individual investor 89 16.5 28 18.7 52 16.3 9 12.7 
Institutional  
investor 
 
13 
 
2.4 
 
- 
 
- 
 
9 
 
2.8 
 
4 
 
5.6 
Accountant/Auditor 40 7.4 10 6.7 23 7.2 7 9.9 
Executive director 27 5. 5 3.3 16 5 6 8.5 
Non-executive 
director 
 
33 
 
6.1 
 
5 
 
3.3 
 
25 
 
7.8 
 
3 
 
4.2 
Company executive 
(CEO) 
 
44 
 
8.1 
 
9 
 
6. 
 
29 
 
9.1 
 
6 
 
8.5 
Company 
employee 
 
88 
 
16.3 
 
25 
 
16.7 
 
49 
 
15.3 
 
14 
 
19.7 
Judiciary/legal 26 4.8 10 6.7 10 3.1 6 8.5 
Other (Student) 11 2 5 3.3 6 1.9 - - 
 541 100 150 100 320 100 71 100 
         
Number of year in 
occupation 
        
1-10 263 48.6 90 60 146 45.6 27 38 
11-20 204 37.7 54 36 120 37.5 30 42.3 
21-30 65 12 5 3.3 48 15 12 16.9 
30 above 9 1.7 1 0.7 6 1.9 2 2.8 
 541 100 150 100 320 100 71 100 
         
Formal Education         
Diploma/Certificate 27 5 9 6 11 3.4 7 9.9 
Professional 
certificate//Other 
 
99 
 
18.3 
 
23 
 
15.3 
 
62 
 
19.4 
 
14 
 
19.7 
Bachelor Degree 171 31.6 39 26 113 35.3 19 26.8 
Master  Degree 209 38.6 68 45.3 112 35.0 29 40.8 
Doctoral Degree 35 6.5 11 7.3 22 6.9 2 2.8 
 541 100 150 100 320 100 71 100 
         
Location         
Ghana 150 27.8       
Nigeria 320 59.1       
South Africa 71 13.1       
 541 100       
Knowledge on 
corporate 
governance   
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Low 1 0.2 1 0.7 - -  - 
Medium 82 15.1 23 15.3 50 15.6 9 12.7 
High 458 84.7 126 84 270 84.4 62 87.3 
 541 100 150 100 320 100 71 100 
Type of Firm         
Financial  247 45.7 70 46.7 146 45.6 31 43.7 
Non-Financial 219 40.4 59 39.3 124 38.8 36 50.7 
Both Financial and 
Non Financial 
 
75 
 
13.9 
 
21 
 
14 
 
50 
 
15.6 
 
4 
 
5.6 
 541 100 150 100 320 100 71 100 
 
Table 3.6 describes the characteristics of respondents which include the level of 
knowledge of respondents on corporate governance. The purpose is to determine the level of 
understanding of the respondents on the issue of corporate governance of firms in their 
country. The above Table indicates that above 80 per cent of the respondents in each of the 
country shows that they have high knowledge on corporate governance. Firstly, the data 
instrument (survey questionnaire) was administered to 12 categories of reputable 
professionals. These include legislators, regulators of corporate governance, academician, 
individual investors and institutional investors. Others are   non-executive directors, company 
executive (CEO and Chairman), Judiciary/legal practitioners’ and finance, economic, 
business accounting and management students who are mainly masters and PhD students. 
Secondly, the number of years in their occupation also matter to determine the level of 
their knowledge on issue of corporate governance in their firms. Table 3.6 indicate that those 
who have spent within 10years in their firms are above 40 per cent of the sample and those 
who spent above 10 years are 30 per cent of the sample. 
Thirdly, the formal education of the respondents is important in order to determine the 
level of knowledge of the respondents on corporate governance issue. The above Table 
illustrate that 31.6 per cent of the respondents have Bachelor degree and 38.6 have Master 
degree. 
Against this background, the evidence from the above based on occupation, numbers of 
year of experience in their profession and degree they acquired indicate that the respondents 
knowledge on corporate governance practice are high and they are reputable people as it 
shown in the Table 3.6 However, the limitation is that the individual knowledge of the 
respondents on issue of corporate governance in their firms is based on their opinion or 
perception. As a result, the level of knowledge of the respondents on issue of corporate 
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governance in their firms cannot be easily questioned by the researcher. Nevertheless, the 
respondents are reputable people with integrity in their various carriers and profession.  
The type of firms is determined based on occupation of the stakeholders of corporate 
governance. For instance financial firms provided financial services such as depository 
institution for example banks, contractual institution such as insurance companies and 
pension fund and investment institutions which include brokerage firms and investment 
banks. The respondents under financial firms are among 12 categories of respondents from 
the above classification. 
The non-financial firms are firms that do not deal with financial or investment related 
goods and services. This includes those respondents who are involved with the following 
firms; manufacturing, telecommunication, agriculture, airline, hotel and petroleum marketing. 
The study classified the sample into financial and non-financial firms because of the 
investors who have shares in both financial firms and non-financial firms. In addition, 
because of regulatory bodies of corporate governance of firms such Securities Exchange 
Commission who is the regulator for both financial and non-financial of listed firms in each 
country. 
3.3 Definition of the variables for institutional characteristics of corporate governance 
Each of these 30 statements (items) is divided into section showing in the Tables below:  
Table 3.7.1: Definition of the variables for section B: Corporate governance system 
Section Variable                       Statements 
 
 
 
 
B 
 
 
 
 
  
Rules and Laws 
(Rules_cs)  (Q8)  
There are adequate laws and rules that promote the practice of good 
corporate governance of firms in my country. 
 
Agencies power 
(Q9) 
(Agencies_cs) 
The supervisory, regulatory and enforcement agencies have power, 
resources and authority to enforce compliance with laws and regulations 
and guideline on corporate governance              
Legal system 
(Q10) 
(Legal_cs) 
A good legal system in my country of operation helps to improve the 
corporate governance of firm 
Agencies-org A well organised legislature and sound regulatory and supervisory 
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 (Q11)  
(Organise_Cs) 
agencies in place promote good corporate governance 
Total corporate 
governance 
system 
(Total_cs )       
This addition of all variables for corporate governance system of firms 
under section B of the survey questionnaire. 
 
3.3.1 The dependent variables  
Where corporate governance system (Total_cg) is the addition of Rules and legal 
system (Rules_cs), Agencies power of corporate governance (Agencies_cs), Legal system 
(Legal_cs) and well orgainsed agencies (organised_cs). These dependent variables is 
illustrate above in Table 4.4.1 
Therefore the Total corporate governance system proxy as dependence variables can be 
expressed as: 
Total_cs = Rules_cs +   Agencie_cs +   Legal_cs+ Organise_Cs  
 
Table 3.7.2: Definition of the variables for section C: regulatory framework of corporate 
governance 
Section Variables                          Statements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
  
Stock markets 
(Stk_Mkt) (Q12) 
Sock markets listing rules and codes of conduct for firms are often abused 
or ignored. 
 Auditors  
Appointment 
(Q13) 
(Appt_Aud) 
The rules and regulations for appointing and removal of auditors are 
frequently violated 
Board 
nomination 
(Q14) 
(Bod_Nom) 
Rules and regulations for a formal and transparency board nomination and 
election process of firms are often ignored 
Disclosure (Q15) 
 (Dis_Com) 
Rules and regulations for disclosure and communication are not  often 
followed 
Independent 
board (Q16) 
(Statu_Bod) 
Rules and regulations regarding the required independent status of 
board members are often violated 
Total 
regulatory 
This comprises the addition of all the variables under regulatory 
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framework 
(Trfw) 
framework in section C of the survey questionnaire 
   
Table 3.7.3 Definition of the variables for section D: Enforcement of corporate governance 
 
Section Variables                           Statements 
 
 
 
 
D 
  
Non-compliance 
(Non_Compl) 
(Q17) 
There is sufficient investigation of apparent non-compliance with 
laws/regulations by the enforcement agency 
Investor 
protection (Q18) 
(Invtr_Protc) 
There is appropriate legal protection of investors and creditors from fraud 
perpetrated by managers and controlling shareholders within firms 
 Minority 
shareholders 
(Q19) 
(Mino_Trt) 
There are appropriate mechanisms for investigating the illegal or 
inappropriate treatment of minority shareholders within firms. 
Total 
enforcement 
(Tenfm_D)
  
This is the addition of all variables under enforcement of corporate 
governance under section D of the survey questionnaire. 
Table 3.7.4: Definition of the variables for section E: Disclosure and transparency 
Section  Variables                      Statements 
 
 
 
 
 
E 
 
 
 
  
Insider trading 
(Q20) 
(Insder_Trad) 
Generally in firms in your country, insider trading laws, rules and 
regulations are followed 
Information access 
(Q21) 
(Equl_AcInfm) 
There are equal access to information for all shareholders in your  firm  
Auditor  (Q22) 
independent 
(Confd_Audtr) 
There are confidence in the autonomy and independence of auditors 
for firms within your country.  
Merger  Acquisition  
(Trsp_MA) (Q23) 
There are transparency of mergers and acquisitions of firms in your 
country 
Total disclosure and 
transparency 
(Tdis_E) 
This variable comprises addition of all variables under disclosure and 
transparency of firms in section E of the survey questionnaire 
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Table 3.7.5: Definition of the variables for section F: Shareholders’ rights 
Section Variables                           Statements 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
  
Shareholders 
rights (Q24) 
  (Shd_Prot) 
The basic shareholder rights in your firm are not protected 
shareholder 
violation (Q25) 
(Mino_Violt) 
Minority shareholder rights of your firm are often violated  
Shareholders 
meeting (Q26) 
(Mino_Meet) 
Minority shareholders are often not allowed to express their view at 
general meeting of firms in your country. 
Shareholders 
alignment (Q27) 
(Shd_Allg) 
Shareholders are allowed to speak at company meetings only if they are 
known to agree with the board of directors.   
Total 
shareholders’ 
rights (Tdis_F) 
This is addition of all sub variables under shareholders’ rights in section 
F of the survey questionnaire. 
 
Table 3.7.6: Definition of the variables for section G: Ownership concentration of firms. 
Section Variables                                 Statements 
 
 
 
 
G 
  
Composition of 
ownership (Q28) 
(Own_Comp) 
The firms in your country have a variety of composition of ownership 
Large 
concentration 
(Q29) 
(Larg_Con) 
There is large concentration of ownership (few shareholders having 
majority of shares) in firms in your country. 
Preferential 
treatment (Q30) 
(Pref_Treat) 
Preferential treatment is often given to large shareholders of firms in 
your country. 
Total ownership 
concentration 
(Towc_G) 
This consists addition of variables under ownership concentration of 
firms  which is  section G of the survey questionnaire   
3.3.2 The Independent variables 
The independent variables are the addition of all the sub-variables in each section from C to 
G as it illustrated from Table 4.4.2 to 4.4.6 this includes the following below:  
Trfw_(Q12-16) is denoted as the Total variable for regulatory framework which is the addition 
of statements (12 to 16 sub-variables) under the regulatory framework in section C of the 
survey questionnaire. 
Tenfm_ (Q17-19) is proxy as Total enforcement variable which is the addition of statements 
(17 to 19 sub-variables) under enforcement of corporate governance in section D of the 
survey questionnaire. 
Tdis_(Q20-23) indicated as the Total disclosure variable, this is the addition of all variables 
from statements (20 to 23 sub-variables) which is under section E of the survey 
questionnaire. 
Chapter Three: Methodology and Descriptive Statistics of the study 
 
115 
 
Tshrt_(Q24-27) is denoted as Total shareholders’ right variable which is the addition of all the 
sub-variables from statements (24 to 27) under section F of the survey questionnaire. 
Towc_(Q28-30) is represented as Total ownership concentration variables and is the addition 
of all sub-variables from statements (28 to 30) under section G of the survey questionnaire. 
Other control variables which is the country dummies indicating if the respondents are from  
Ghana (G), Nigeria (N) and the reference category being South Africa.  In addition, if the 
respondents are regulators. Finally, µi is the random error term which is independently and 
identically distributed. 
3.3.3 The model for the analysis of institutional characteristics on corporate governance system 
This equation (1) below examines the contribution which each aspect of corporate 
governance (Such as regulatory framework, enforcement, disclosure and transparency, 
shareholders rights and level of ownership concentration) makes to the corporate governance 
system. 
Thus for i-th respondent total corporate governance system of firm (Total_Q8-11) can be 
determined as follows: 
 
1. Total_(Q8-11) = β0 +β1(Trfw_Q12-16) + β2 (Tenfm_Q17-19) + β3(Tdis_Q20-23) + β4(Tshrt_Q24-27) + β5(Towc_Q28-30) +β6(G) + β7(N) + μi     
This equations (2-6) below examines the contribution of each sub-variable under 
(regulatory framework, enforcement, disclosure and transparency, shareholder rights and 
ownership concentration) makes to the rules and laws of corporate governance practice. 
Thus for i-th respondent rules and law guiding corporate governance of firm (Rules_Q8) can be 
determined as follows for sub-variables under regulatory framework, enforcement, disclosure and 
transparency, shareholders rights and ownership concentration as it is indicated from the equation 2-6 
below: 
1. Rules_Q8= β0 +  β1(Stk_Mkt12) +  β2(Dis_Com15)  + β3(Ind_Bod16) β4(G) + β5(N) + μi =Regulatory framework   
 
2. Rules_Q8= β0 +  β1(Non_compl17) +  β2(Invtr_Prot18)    + β3(Mino_Shdt19) β4(G) + β5(N) + μi =Enforcement  
 
3. Rules_Q8= β0 +  β1(Insd_Trad20) +  β2(Inform_Accf21)   + β3(Aud_Indpend22) + β4(MA_23)+ β5(G) + β6(N) + μi =Dis 
 
4. Rule_Q8= β0 +  β1(Shd_rigt24) +  β2(Shd_Violt25)   + β3(Shd_Allg27) +β4(G) + β5(N) + μi =Shd. Rights 
 
5. Rules_Q8= β0 +  β1(Larg_Con29) +  β2(Pref_Treat30)   + β3(G) + β4(N) + μi = Ownership Concentration 
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3.4 The descriptive statistics on institutional characteristics of corporate governance 
variables 
This section presents the descriptive statistics (mean, and T-test) for corporate 
governance variables based on average per question for each section (group) in the survey 
questionnaire. The Table below illustrate the result of the descriptive statistics. 
Table 3.8: Showing descriptive statistic of corporate governance variables based on average per 
question for each group in the survey questionnaire  
 Firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone region  
Variables      Code Mean T-test N 
Regulatory framework Trfw_(Q12-16) 2.53* -10.51 541 
Enforcement Tenfm_(Q17-19) 2.64* -10.60 541 
Disclosure and Transparency Tdis_(Q20-23) 2.48* -12.47 541 
Shareholder rights Tshrt_(Q24-27) 3.34* 6.54 541 
Ownership concentration Towc_Q28-30) 4.28* 49.62 541 
Corporate governance system TCg_(Q8-11) 3.57* 21.04 541 
     
Ghanaian firms     
Regulatory framework Trfw_C 3.02 0.37 150 
Enforcement Tenfm_D 2.06* 11.75 150 
Disclosure and Transparency Tdis_E 2.54* -6.26 150 
Shareholder rights Tshrt_F 3.17* 2.74 150 
Ownership concentration Towc_G 4.25* 22.85 150 
Corporate governance system TCg_styB 3.18* 4.50 150 
     
Nigerian firms     
Regulatory framework Trfw_C 1.99* -24.42 320 
Enforcement Tenfm_D 2.22* -15.00 320 
Disclosure and Transparency Tdis_E 2.15* -19.44 320 
Shareholder rights Tshrt_F 2.40* -19.88 320 
Ownership concentration Towc_G 4.23* 41.51 320 
Corporate governance system TCg_styB 3.47* 17.16 320 
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South African firms      
Regulatory framework Trfw_C 3.90* 11.32 71 
Enforcement Tenfm_D 3.52* -9.74 71
Disclosure and Transparency Tdis_E 3.85* 10.09 71
Shareholder rights Tshrt_F 3.39* 8.22 71
Ownership concentration Towc_G 4.25* 15.26 71
Corporate governance system TCg_styB 4.55* 32.65 71
Note: This table reports the summary descriptive statistic for the variables of the study. The dependent variable is indicated 
as total corporate governance system which is represented by Total_cg is the addition of all the items or variable under 
section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent variables are regulatory framework is shown as total regulatory 
framework indicated by Trfw_C which is the addition of all items or variables under section C of the survey questionnaire, 
enforcement is illustrated as total enforcement represented as Tenfm_D which is the addition of all the items or variable 
under section D of the survey questionnaire, transparency and disclosure is shown as total disclosure and transparency is 
indicated as Tdis_E which is the addition of all items or variable within section E of the survey questionnaire, Total 
shareholder rights represented as Tshrt_F is the addition of all items under shareholders rights in section F, and  ownership 
concentration shown as Towc_G  is the total items or variable under section G of the survey questionnaire.  
* T-Test Indicate that the response is significantly different from 3 (Undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96). SD is 
shown as standard deviation for each variable based on average per question for each group in the survey questionnaire 
*T-Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n) 
3.4.1 Results of the descriptive statistic of institutional characteristic of corporate governance 
variables in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries 
Table 3.8 shows the results of descriptive statistic on each country; there is evidence 
that South Africa firms have the highest mean value of corporate governance system 
(TCg_(Q8-11) has a mean value of 4.55 with with highest T-test value. This implies that the 
respondents agreed that there is effective corporate governance system of firm in South 
Africa. This also suggests that this may likely be as a result of the reforms that took place in 
South Africa on issue of corporate governance such as the King Reports (1994, 2002) which 
followed the international standard such as Cadbury report of UK and OECD guideline on 
corporate governance practices. 
 Nigeria firms have the lowest mean value for regulatory framework (Trfw_Q12-16) of 
1.99 with highest T-test value. This result indicates that the respondents agreed that the rules 
and regulations for regulatory frameworks are not followed. This implies that although there 
is code of best practices of corporate governance that is issued by regulatory agencies such 
as Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), National Insurance Commission (NICOM), Nigeria 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). 
However, there is lack of implementation of the rules and regulation, the institutional bodies 
that are established to regulate the firms on corporate governance practice lack competence, 
and officers responsible for implementation may be corrupt. In Ghanaian firms, the 
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regulatory framework (Tfrw_Q12-16) mean value is 2.97; this is lower than that of South 
African firms. This result suggest that the regulatory framework of Ghana firms is not as 
strong as South Africa because there is no major reform  on regulatory framework of 
corporate governance  in Ghana in compared with South Africa. 
In Nigeria firms’ enforcement have lower mean value of 2.22 and that of Ghana firms is 
2.06. This implies that respondents disagreed that there is enforcement of corporate 
governance in firms for these two countries. This may likely be as result of lack of 
implementations of rules and regulations, weak legal system, corruption, and the institutional 
bodies to enforced corporate governance are not competent to carry out enforcement of 
corporate governance. However, in Ghana and Nigeria firms the mean value of disclosure and 
transparency are 2.54, and 2.15 respectively, this indicates a lower value which mean the 
respondents disagreed that there is disclosure and transparency in their firm.  This may due to 
non-compliance and lack of implementation of code of best practices of corporate governance.      
Moreover, in Nigeria firms the shareholders’ rights is the lowest with a mean value of 
2.40. The lowest mean value of shareholders rights in Nigeria firm indicate that on average 
respondents agreed that there no basic shareholders protection in Nigeria. This result is 
consistent with recent report of ROSC World Bank on shareholders rights which rated Nigeria 
low; while that of Ghana firm basic shareholder right may be  better.  
 In Nigeria, shareholders have no voice in decision taking within firms this happen as a 
result of impediment for shareholders to influence decision of the firms. In addition, the 
descriptive statistic shows that the mean value of ownership concentration for each country 
such as Ghana firms is 4.25, Nigeria firms 4.23, and South Africa firms, 4.28 This implies that 
the respondents agreed that there is ownership concentration of firms in all these countries in 
Sub-Saharan African. This suggests that when there is large concentrated ownership the 
controlling owner will be unwilling to dilute their ownership, generally known as non-dilution 
of entrenchment. This may likely have effect on corporate governance practices in term of 
ownership structure and decision taking in a firm especially if it is family-ownership, alliance 
with their cronies, friends and associate.    
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Table 3.8.1 Provides the  descriptive statistic on corporate governance system of firms in Sub-
Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries 
          Variables Countries N Mean T-stat. 
 
 
Rules and Laws (Q8) 
 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa  
 Sub-region (SSAA 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.17* 
1.70* 
4.46* 
2.33* 
 
 
-9.16 
-36.34 
21.21 
-13.32 
 
Agencies Power (Q9) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.14* 
3.51* 
4.46* 
3.26* 
 
-9.66 
8.52 
21.21 
4.76 
 
Legal system (Q10) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.14* 
4.25* 
4.62* 
4.27* 
 
20.53 
27.61 
27.86 
39.39 
 
Agencies- org (Q11) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.25* 
4.42* 
4.66* 
4.41* 
 
19.63 
36.81 
27.43 
46.85 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96). 
Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n).  
 
The findings from the above Table indicate that adequate and effective rules and laws 
that promote corporate governance of firms in Ghana are weak, as a result of low mean value 
of 1.70 and high T-test of -36.34. The respondents disagreed that there are adequate and 
effective rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. This evidence may be due 
to outdated Company law of 1963, Act 179 which many Ghanaian and even World Bank 
ROSC (2005) have found it outdated and there is need of reform. Also, the power, resources 
and authority to enforce compliance with law and regulation and guideline of corporate 
governance by supervisory, regulatory and enforcement agencies have a mean value of 2.14 
and the respondents disagreed with the statement. Although, presently there is no Code of best 
practices of corporate governance in Ghana, there is a guideline for corporate governance 
practices but respondents believe that there is the need for a code of corporate governance 
practice.    
The results indicate that adequate and effective law to promote corporate governance of 
firms in Nigeria have a mean 1.70. This suggests that for firms in Nigeria there is Code of 
corporate governance practices and Companied Allied Matter Decree (CAMAD) 1990. 
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However, there is a lack of proper implementation of CAMAD and Code of best corporate 
governance of firms. The respondents believe that rules and laws are not promoting sound 
corporate governance practice. 
South African firms show the highest value of mean compared with Ghana and Nigeria. 
This result may be as a result of the past reforms carried out by South African government on 
corporate governance practices of firms such as the King Reports of corporate governance 
(1994, 2002). This Reports followed the international guidelines on corporate governance 
(norms) such as Cadbury report of UK and OECD guideline on corporate governance 
practices. 
Table 3.8.2 presents the descriptive statistic on regulatory frameworks of corporate governance 
of  firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries.  
        Variables Countries N Mean T-stat. 
 
 
Stock market  (Q12) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa  
 Sub-region SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.83* 
3.90* 
2.11* 
3.36* 
 
-1.58 
15.78 
-8.93 
6.54 
 
 
Auditor appointment (Q13)  
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.34* 
3.85* 
2.14* 
3.20* 
 
-6.68 
14.34 
-7.25 
3.47 
 
Board nomination (Q14) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
3.79* 
4.07* 
2.07* 
3.19* 
 
-8.06 
19.9 
-8.43 
3.30 
 
Disclosure  (Q15) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
3.90* 
4.21* 
2.10* 
3.72* 
 
8.82 
23.53 
-8.82 
13.62 
 
Independent board (Q16) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.04* 
4.03* 
2.23* 
3.87* 
 
12.92 
21.18 
-7.10 
16.68 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96).Test value 
is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n).  
From the above Table, the result indicates that in Nigerian firms the T-test and the mean 
value for all the sub-variables under regulatory framework is very high.  This finding 
suggests that there may be weak regulatory framework in Nigerian firms which is likely the    
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lack of proper implementation for code of best practice on corporate governance.   In Ghana 
and South African firms the mean values are not too high as compared to Nigerian firms. 
 
Table 3.8.3  Illustrates the  descriptive statistic on enforcement  of corporate governance of 
firms  in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries.  
          Variables Countries N Mean T-stat. 
 
 
Non-compliance (Q17) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa  
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
1.95* 
2.25* 
2.21* 
3.05 
 
-12.73 
-12.90 
   5.94 
   0.88  
 
Investor protection (Q18) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.19* 
2.23* 
4.14* 
2.41* 
 
-8.49 
12.75 
12.98 
-11.34 
 
Minority shareholder (Q19) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.05* 
2.20* 
4.11* 
2.47* 
 
-10.48 
-13.01 
10.39 
-9.78 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96).Test value 
is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n).  
There is evidence from the above Table that respondents disagreed with statements or items 
of the survey questionnaire on enforcement of corporate governance of firms in Ghanaian and 
Nigerian firms. This provides   very low mean value as compared to South African firms 
except sub-variable non-compliance (Q17). This suggests that it is likely that enforcement of 
corporate governance is weak in Ghanaian and Nigerian firms. However, in South African 
firms the respondents agree that there are adequate investors’ protection and mechanisms for 
investigating the illegal treatment of minority shareholders within firms. This finding implies 
that although there are reforms of corporate governance in South Africa such as King Report 
1, 2 and 3.The issue of sufficient investigation of non-compliance with laws/regulations by 
enforcement agency need to be address urgently. 
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Table 3.8.4 Indicates the descriptive statistic on disclosure and transparency of corporate 
governance for firms in  Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries..  
    Variables Countries N Mean T-stat. 
 
Insider Trading(Q20) 
 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa  
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.11* 
2.07* 
4.17* 
2.35* 
 
-8.26 
-17.51 
13.69 
-11.10  
Information Access (Q21) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.13* 
2.08* 
3.38* 
2.27* 
 
-9.27 
-17.88 
  2.67 
-15.16 
 
Auditor Independence (Q22) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
3.73* 
2.34* 
3.92* 
2.93 
 
 6.77 
-11.35 
  8.34 
  1.23 
 
Merger and Acquisition (Q23) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71        
541 
 
2.17* 
2.12* 
3.90* 
236* 
 
-8.33 
-15.14  
   8.82 
-12.20 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96). Test  
value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n).  
 
 
 The finding from the above Table show that the mean value for sub-variables on disclosure 
and transparency in Ghana and Nigeria is low However, in South African firms the mean 
value is higher.  This implies that the respondents believe that disclosure and transparency in 
Ghanaian and Nigerian firms are not really sound as compared to South African firms. This 
may be as a result of lack of implementation of disclosure and transparency in the code of 
corporate governance best practices for Ghanaian and Nigerian firms. 
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Table 3.8.5 Showing  descriptive statistic on shareholder rights  of firms in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Anglophone (SSAA) countries. 
             Variables Countries N Mean T-stat. 
 
 
Shareholder rights (Q24) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa  
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.79 
4.18* 
1.89* 
3.48* 
 
-1.68 
20.49 
13.55 
 7.70  
 
Shareholder violation (Q25) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.73* 
4.13* 
2.52* 
3.51* 
 
 -2.30 
21.28 
  -3.68 
  8.72 
 
Shareholder meeting (Q26) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.53* 
3.71* 
2.20* 
3.17* 
 
  4.17 
11.24 
  -6.74 
  2.93 
 
Shareholder alignment (Q27) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71      
541 
 
2.73* 
3.66* 
2.14* 
3.17* 
 
  -2.36 
10.45 
  -7.79 
   2.97 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96).Test value 
is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n).  
Table 3.8.5 indicate that in Nigerian firms all the sub-variables under shareholders rights 
have high of T-test and mean value. However, in Ghanaian and South African firms the T-
test and mean value are lower. This indicates that the respondents agree that there is lack of 
proper implementation of shareholder rights in Nigerian firms.   
 
Table 3.8.6 Present the  descriptive statistic on ownership concentration of firms in Sub-
Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries. 
Variables Countries N Mean T-stat. 
 
Ownership Composition (Q28) 
                                    
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa  
 Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.35* 
4.20* 
4.39* 
4.37* 
 
24.31 
32.52 
15.02 
47.56  
 
Large Concentration (Q29) 
                                     
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.21* 
4.31* 
4.21* 
4.28* 
 
17.64 
29.29 
10.73 
36.31 
  
Preferential Treatment (Q30) 
                                        
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
 
150 
320 
71 
 
4.17* 
4.20* 
4.15* 
 
 13.65 
 28.62 
   9.89 
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Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
541 4.18*  31.55 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance  
(1.96).Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number  
(μ-3/SD/√n).  
 
In Table 3.8.6 there is indication that all the variables under ownership concentration 
have a higher T-test for Ghanaian and Nigerian firms. While that of South Africa T-test is a 
bit lower. Generally, in each country the mean value is high. This result implies that for firms 
in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, there are a variety composition of ownership, 
preferential treatment of large shareholders and concentration of ownership. 
3.5 Results of the correlation analysis of the institutional characteristics of corporate 
governance of firms  
We present the correlation analysis of corporate governance variables of firms when for 
all the observation for the countries, and at country level for each country such as Ghana, 
Nigeria and South Africa.  
Table 3.9.1 Correlation analysis on variables of institutional characteristic of corporate 
governance of firms in SSAA region. 
Variables Code corp gov. 
systm. 
(1).  
Regulatory 
Framework 
(2) 
Enforcem
ent 
 
(3) 
Disc. &  
Trpy 
(4) 
Shd. Rght 
 
(5) 
Ownership 
Concentrat
ion 
(6) 
1 Corporate 
gov. Sytm 
TCg(Q8-11) 1      
2.Regulatory 
framework 
Trfw(Q12-16) 0.24** 1     
3.Enforcement Tenfm(Q17-19) 0.46** 0.19** 1    
4.Disclosure and 
Transp. 
Tdis(Q20-23) 0.38** 0.68** 0.44** 1   
5.Shareholders’ 
rights 
Tshrt(Q24-27) 0.14* 0.63** 0.20** 0.56** 1  
6. Ownership 
concentration 
Towc(Q28-30) -0.02 -0.27** -0.26** -0.34** -0.32** 1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
3.5.1 Results of correlation analysis on institutional characteristic of corporate governance of 
firms in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone region. 
This study provides empirical evidences using correlation analysis to show the effect of 
challenges of corporate governance on corporate governance system of firms in Sub-Saharan 
Africa Anglophone region.  
Table 3.9.1 provides Pearson correlation coefficient result shows that regulatory framework 
has a significant positive correlation of 0.24 with corporate governance system. This result 
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supports the hypothesis that stated that there is a relationship between regulatory framework 
and corporate governance system. 
In addition, enforcement has positive significant correlation of 0.46 and disclosure and 
transparency has positive significant correlation of 0.38 with corporate governance system. 
This result is consistent with hypothesis that there is a relationship between enforcement, 
disclosure and transparency and corporate governance system, shareholders’ rights have a 
positive significant correlation of 0.14 with corporate governance system. This also supports 
the hypothesis that there is a relationship between shareholders rights and corporate 
governance system.  
Table 3.9.2 Correlation analysis on variables of institutional characteristic of corporate 
governance in Ghanaian firms.  
Variables Code  corp gov. 
systm. (1) 
Regulatory 
Framework 
(2) 
Enforcement 
 
(3) 
Disc. & Trpy 
 
(4) 
Shd. 
Rght 
(5) 
Ownsh 
Con. 
(6) 
1 Corporate gov. 
Sytm 
TCg(Q8-11) 1      
2.Regulatory 
framework 
Trfw(Q12-16) 0.52** 1     
3.Enforcement Tenfm(Q17-19) 0.64** 0.50** 1    
4.Disclosure and 
Transp. 
Tdis(Q20-23) 0.54** 0.53** 059** 1   
5.Shareholders’ 
rights 
Tshrt(Q24-27) 0.23** 0.23** 0.34** 0.26** 1  
6. Ownership 
concentration 
Towc(Q28-30) -0.42** -0.41** -0.65** -0.52** -
0.22** 
1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
3.5.2 Results of correlation analysis on institutional characteristic of corporate governance of 
firms in Ghana. 
In Table 3.9.2 illustrates the significant correlation of firm at each country, in Ghana 
firms there is evidence that regulatory framework has a positive significant correlation of 
0.52, shareholders rights 0.23, enforcement has a positive significant correlation of 0.64 and 
disclosure also has positive significant correlation of 0.54 with corporate governance system. 
However, ownership concentration has a negative significant correlation of -0.42 with 
corporate governance system. These results are consistent with the hypothesis of the study 
respectively. 
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Table 3.9.3: Correlation analysis on variables of institutional characteristic of  corporate 
governance in Nigeria firms.  
Variables Code  corp.gov. 
systm(1) 
Regulato
ry 
Framew
ork 
(2) 
Enforcement 
 
(3) 
Disc. &  Trpy
 
(4) 
Shd. 
Rght 
(5) 
Ownsh 
Con. 
(6) 
1 Corporate gov. 
Sytm 
TCg(Q8-11) 1      
2.Regulatory    
framework 
Trfw(Q12-16) -0.16** 1     
3.Enforcement Tenfm(Q17-19) -0.09 0.44** 1    
4.Disclosure and 
Transp. 
Tdis(Q20-23) -0.07 0.56** 0.58** 1   
5.Shareholders’ 
rights 
Tshrt(Q24-27) -0.14* 0.53** 0.45** 0.58** 1  
6. Ownership 
concentration 
Towc(Q28-30) 0.18** -0.30** -0.33** -0.35** -0.42** 1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
3.5.3 Results of correlation analysis on institutional characteristics of corporate governance of 
firms in Nigeria. 
Table 3.9.3 provides the significant correlation of firm for firms in Nigeria and there is 
evidence that regulatory framework has a negative significant correlation of -0.16, and 
shareholders rights have a negative significant correlation of -0.14, with corporate governance 
system. 
In addition, ownership concentration has a positive significant correlation of 0.18 with 
corporate governance system. However, in Nigeria firms, the regulatory framework has a 
negative significant correlation of -0.16, while enforcement is not significant. This result 
implies that regulatory framework of Nigeria corporate governance is weak and this may 
likely be due to weak legal system that can promote sound regulatory framework and 
enforcement policy. In addition, lack of implementation of listing rules and corporate codes 
conduct for firms is also common in Nigeria.  
The institutional bodies such as Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), National Insurance 
Commission (NICOM), Nigeria Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and Corporate 
Affairs Commission (CAC) that are established to implement the regulatory framework and 
enforcement of corporate governance practices may be incompetent, and officers responsible 
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to carried out their duties  may be corrupt. As a result of the above, this will not promote 
sound corporate governance practices of firms in Nigeria. 
Table 3.9.4: Correlation analysis on variables of institutional characteristic of corporate 
governance in South Africa firms.  
Variables Code corp.gov. 
systm  
(1) 
 Regulatory 
Framework 
(2) 
Enforcement 
 
(3) 
 Disc. &  Trpy
 
(4) 
Shd. 
Rght 
(5) 
 Ownsh 
Con. 
(6) 
1 Corporate gov. 
Sytm 
TCg(Q8-11) 1      
2.Regulatory 
framework 
Trfw(Q12-16) 0.33** 1     
3.Enforcement Tenfm(Q17-19) 0.30* 0.10 1    
4.Disclosure and 
Transp. 
Tdis(Q20-23) 0.21 0.53** 0.24* 1   
5.Shareholders’ 
rights 
Tshrt(Q24-27) 0.02 0.20** 0.13 0.36** 1  
6. Ownership 
concentration 
Towc(Q28-30) 0.15 -0.19 0.05 -0.21 -0.23 1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
3.5.4 Results of correlation analysis on institutional characteristic of corporate governance of 
firms in South Africa. 
In Table 3.9.4 shows the correlation analysis of corporate governance structures for 
firms in South Africa. The result indicates that regulatory framework has a positive significant 
correlation of 0.33, and enforcement with positive significant correlation of 0.30.  
This suggests that in South Africa have better functioning legal system and better 
implementation of regulatory and enforcement policy of corporate governance.  In conclusion  
the finding of this study suggest  that at each country,   firms in  Ghana, Nigeria and South 
Africa,  regulatory framework and enforcement of corporate governance practices is a vital 
mechanism  for effective’s corporate governance practices. Other mechanisms such as 
disclosure and transparency, shareholders rights and ownership concentration will improve 
once there are sound regulatory and enforcement implementation policy for such country.   
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3.6 Methodology on the effect of the role and responsibility of board of director on 
corporate governance system        
This section provides the definition of variables, sub-variables methodology of the effect 
of the role and responsibility of a firm’s board of directors of listed firms. This is assessed 
through survey questionnaire based on international corporate governance norms (OECD), 
and Okpara (2010). The categories of respondents for this study include the following; 
legislators, regulators, academician, individual investors, institutional investors, 
accountants/auditors, executive directors, non-executive directors, company executives 
(CEO) company employees, Judiciary/legal and other such as students. 
3.7 The Variables. 
This section comprises of eight statements or items that measure the role and 
responsibility of board of directors of firms. As illustrated in Table below: 
 Table 3.10. Definition of the variables for section H: Role and responsibility of firm’s boards of 
directors 
Section Variables                                         Statements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H 
corporate strategy  
(Corp_strgy) (Q31) 
 
Board members are not fully committed to reviewing and guiding 
corporate strategy 
executive 
compensation (Q32) 
(Bod_Exec) 
 
Board members in your companies do not pay attention to executive 
compensation  
Board effectiveness 
 (Q33)  (Bod_Eff) 
 
Board members in your companies are not effectively committed to 
their responsibility 
Financial reporting  
(Q34) (Bod_Frepte) 
 
The board members often demonstrate lack of a lack of concern as 
to the integrity of companies financial reporting system 
Board transparency 
 (Q35) 
(Bod_Trpy) 
 
Board members show lack of concern in ensuring a formal and 
transparent board nomination and election process 
 
 
 
 
H 
Enforcement rules 
(Q36) 
 (Bod_Mer) 
 
Board members do not show concern about proper monitoring and 
enforcement of laws, rules and regulation of corporate governance 
practices 
Disclosure (Q37) 
Bod_disc 
Board members do not adequately surprise the process of disclosure 
and communication 
Board duality (Q38)  
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Bod_duality There are separation between the roles of the Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) 
 3.7.1 The dependent variable 
The corporate governance system (Total_cs) is the addition of statements (from 8 to 11) 
under section B of the survey questionnaire. This items or statements under this section are 
proxies as independent variables are rules and legal systems (Rules_cs), agencies power 
(Agecy_Pow), Legal system (Leg_Syt) and well organised Agencies (Well_Agecy). These 
dependent sub-variables are shown in Table…  
Therefore the Total corporate governance system proxy as dependence variables can be 
expressed as: 
Total_(Q8-11) = Rules_Q8 +   Agencie_Q9 +   Legal_Q10+ Organise_Q11  
3.7.2 The Independent variables 
The Independent variables comprise of eight statements under section H that measure the 
role and responsibility of board of directors such as the level of commitment to corporate 
strategy (Corp_strgyQ31), adequate attention to executive compensation (Bod_ExecQ32), 
and effective committed to their responsibility (Bod_EffQ33). This is illustrated in Table…..  
 In addition, independent variables also represented as Level of ensuring of a formal and 
transparent board nomination and election process (Bod_TrpyQ34). This is shown in Table… 
Others independent variables are level of concern about enforcement of corporate 
governance policies (Bod_MerQ35), supervision of process of disclosure and communication 
(Bod_DiscQ37) and separation of  roles  and responsibilities of Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) (Bod_dulity38). As it indicated in the above Table….  
 3.8. The model for the analysis of role and responsibility of firm’s board of directors and 
corporate governance system  
The equation below examines the contribution of role and responsibilities of the board of 
directors make to the corporate governance system. 
Thus for it respondent total corporate governance system of firm (Total_cs) can be determined as 
follows: 
Total_(Q8-11) = β0 +β1(corp_strgy31) + β2 (Exec_comp32) + β3(Bod_Eff33) + β4(Bod_Frept34) + β5(Bod_Trpy35)  
+ β6(Bod_enfm36)+ Β7(Bod_Disc37) + β8(Bod_Duality38) + β9(G) + β10(N) + β11(GR) +  β12(NR)  + μi      
   
Where the corporate governance system is the dependent variable and it is measured by 
the addition of items or statements from (8 to 11) under section B of the survey questionnaire.  
Also are countries, regulatory agencies dummies indicating if the respondent is located in 
Ghana, Nigeria (the reference category being South Africa), in addition, if the respondent is 
Chapter Three: Methodology and Descriptive Statistics of the study 
 
130 
 
regulator. Finally, μi is the random error term, which is independently and identically 
distributed.  
3.8.1 The model for the analysis of role and responsibility of firm’s board of directors and rules 
and laws of corporate governance  
The equation below examines the contribution of role and responsibilities of the board of 
directors make to the rules and laws corporate governance practice. 
Thus for i-th respondent rules and laws of corporate governance of firm (Rules_cs) can be determined 
as follows: 
Rules_Q8 = = β0 +β1(corp_strgy31) + β2 (Exec_comp32) + β3(Bod_Eff33) + β4(Bod_Frept34) + β5(Bod_Trpy35)  
+ β6(Bod_enfm36)+ Β7(Bod_Disc37) + β8(Bod_Duality38) + β9(G) + β10(N) + β11(GR) +  β12(NR)  + μi      
Where the rules and laws of corporate governance is the dependent variable and it is 
measured by the statements 8 under Section B of the survey questionnaire.  
Also are countries, regulatory agencies dummies indicating if the respondent is located in 
Ghana, Nigeria (the reference category being South Africa), in addition, if respondent is 
regulator. Finally, μi is the random error term, which is independently and identically 
distributed.  
3.8.2 The model for the analysis of role and responsibility of firm’s board of directors and 
power and authority of the regulatory agencies of corporate governance.  
The equation below examines the contribution of role and responsibilities of the board of 
directors make to the power and authority of the regulatory agencies of corporate governance. 
 
Thus for i-th respondent power and authority of regulatory and supervisory agencies of corporate 
governance of firm (Agencies_cs) can be determined as follows: 
Agencies_Q9 = = β0 +β1(corp_strgy31) + β2 (Exec_comp32) + β3(Bod_Eff33) + β4(Bod_Frept34) + β5(Bod_Trpy35)  
+ β6(Bod_enfm36)+ Β7(Bod_Disc37) + β8(Bod_Duality38) + β9(G) + β10(N) + β11(GR) +  β12(NR)  + μi      
Where the power and authority of regulatory and supervisory agencies of corporate 
governance is the dependent variable and it is measured by the statements 9 under section B 
of the survey questionnaire. There are countries, regulatory agencies dummies indicating if 
the respondent is located in Ghana, Nigeria (the reference category being South Africa), in 
addition, if the respondent is regulator. Finally, μi   is the random error term, which is 
independently and identically distributed.  
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3.9 Results of the descriptive statistics on role and responsibilities of firm’s boards of 
directors. 
This section shows the descriptive and frequency distribution for items or statements 
related to the role and responsibility of firm’s board of directors. 
The Tables below illustrates the findings of the descriptive statistics and frequency 
distribution.  
Table 3.11. showing the descriptive statistic on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of 
directors in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries 
       Variables Countries N Mean   T-stat. 
 
Corporate Strategy (Q31) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.33* 
4.13* 
2.01* 
3.04 
 
 
 
-6.46 
26.25 
-10.83 
0.69 
 
 
Executive Compensation  (Q32) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
1.85* 
1.82* 
1.72* 
1.90* 
 
 
-17.39 
-31.51 
-13.48 
-30.46 
 
Board Effectiveness   (Q33) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
3.02 
3.45* 
2.03* 
3.15* 
 
 
  0.81 
  6.60 
11.68 
  2.68 
 
 
Financial   Reporting    (Q34) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
3.34* 
3.84* 
2.17* 
3.48* 
 
 
  2.85 
13.79 
  -9.20 
   8.59 
 
Board    Transparency    (Q35) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
3.70* 
3.92* 
2.06* 
3.62* 
 
  6.54 
15.82 
11.48 
11.63 
 
Enforcement   Rules   (Q36) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.84 
3.64* 
2.01* 
3.21* 
 
 
-1.43 
 9.38 
-9.81 
3.62 
 
Board disclosure    (Q37) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
3.97* 
4.08* 
2.52* 
3.84* 
 
  9.48 
18.76 
 -3.89 
16.01 
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Board duality    (Q38) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.49* 
4.48* 
4.53* 
4.50* 
 
26.07 
35.30 
19.83 
48.86 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at   5% level    of  
Significant (1.96). SD is shown as standard deviation for each of the statement in the survey questionnaire- 
T-Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-
3/SD/√n).  
 
In Table 3.11 there is  evidence that for Nigerian firms the corporate strategy variable has 
a higher T-test value and mean value. This indicates that the respondents believe that board 
members are not fully committed to reviewing and guiding corporate strategy. However, in 
Ghanaian and South African firms the T-test and mean value are lower. This implies that the 
respondents indicate that there is more commitment for board members on corporate strategy 
in Ghanaian and South African firms.  
In South African firms’ issues of financial reporting (Q36), enforcement of rules (Q36), 
and board disclosure (Q37) has a lower mean value. This indicates that the respondents agree 
that the board members are committed to issues of financial reporting, enforcement of rules 
on corporate governance and disclosure in their firms.   
3.10 Results of correlation analysis on the role and responsibility of firm’s boards of 
directors  
In this section, we provide the correlation analysis on role and responsibility of firm’s 
board of directors and corporate governance system in term of rules and laws.  
The correlation analysis shows the strength and direction of the linear relationship 
between the variables. Thus, the Tables below illustrate the finding of the correlation analysis 
of the variables on role and responsibility of firm’s directors’ base on the Sub-Saharan Africa 
Anglophone region and for each country level.  
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Table 3.12.1: Correlation analysis on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors in 
Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone region 
Variables Rules 
&Laws  
(1) 
Corpo. 
Strategy 
(2) 
Executive 
Compen 
(3) 
Board 
Effective 
(4)
Board  
Financial 
report (5)
Board 
Trspy 
(6)
Enfmen
t rules 
(7) 
Board 
Disc. 
(8) 
Board 
Dual 
(9) 
1.Rules &Laws 
(Q8) 
1         
2.Corporate  
strategy (Q31) 
0.28** 1        
3.Executive) 
compensation 
(Q32)  
-0.59 0.13** 1       
4.Board 
effectiveness 
(Q33) 
0.32** 0.53** 0.01 1      
5.Financial 
report (Q34) 
0.36** 0.54** 0.03 0.56** 1     
6.Board 
transparency 
(Q35) 
0.49** 0.45** -0.06 0.54** 0.65** 1    
7. 
Enforcement 
rules (Q36) 
0.33** 0.66** 0.23 0.66** 0.69** 0.53** 1   
8.Board 
disclosure 
(Q37) 
0.45** 0.42** -0.05 0.52** 0.65** 0.76** 0.56** 1  
9.Board 
duality (Q38) 
-0.14 0.12** -0.20** 0.21** 0.23** 0.27** 0.18** 0.30** 1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
3.10.1 Results of correlation analysis on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors in 
 Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone region 
Table 3.12.1 column 1 shows that there is a positive significant correlation of 0.28 
between corporate strategy and rules and laws that promote corporate governance of firms.  
This result implies that the role and responsibility of boards of directors in term of  
committed to guiding and reviewing corporate strategy of firms have a direct effect on rules 
and law that promote corporate governance practice of firms in Sub-Saharan African 
Anglophone region. This result is consistent with other variables such as board effectiveness, 
board financial reporting system, board transparency, board enforcement of corporate 
governance policy, and commitment of board to disclosure and communication.  
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Table 3.12.2: Correlation analysis on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors in 
Ghanaian firms 
Variables Rules 
&Laws  
(1) 
Corpo. 
Strategy 
(2) 
Executive 
Compen 
(3) 
Board 
Effective 
(4)
Board  
Financial 
report (5)
Board 
Trspy 
(6)
Enfmen
t rules 
(7) 
Board 
Disc. 
(8) 
Board 
Dual 
(9) 
1.Rules &Laws 
(Q8) 
1         
2.Corporate  
strategy (Q31) 
0.08 1        
3.Executive) 
compensation 
(Q32)  
-0.33** 0.22** 1       
4.Board 
effectiveness 
(Q33) 
0.24** 0.30** 0.01 1      
5.Financial 
report (Q34) 
0.31** 0.35** 0.03 0.39** 1     
6.Board 
transparency 
(Q35) 
0.55** 0.14 -0.23** 0.44** 0.42** 1    
7. 
Enforcement 
rules (Q36) 
0.20* 0.52** -0.02 0.51** 0.67** 0.26** 1   
8.Board 
disclosure 
(Q37) 
0.61** 0.11 -0.18* 0.42** 0.45** 0.73** 0.34** 1  
9.Board 
duality (Q38) 
0.43** 0.29 -0.32** 0.24** 0.27** 0.39** 0.21* 0.35** 1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
3.10.2 Results of the correlation analysis on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors 
 in Ghana 
At each country level Table 4.14.2 column 1 indicates that in Ghanaian firms,’ executive 
compensation have negative significant correlations of -0.33 with corporate governance 
system in terms of rules and laws that promote corporate governance of firms in Ghana.  
However, other variables for firm’s role and responsibility of boards of directors such as 
board effectiveness, level of commitment of board to financially reporting system, board 
transparency and board enforcement of corporate governance have significant positive 
correlation with corporate governance system in terms of rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance of firms in Ghana. Also, board disclosure and board duality (separation 
between role and responsibility of Chairman and CEO) has significant positive correlation 
with corporate governance system in terms of rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance of firms in Ghana.  
This result suggests that the level of commitment of board members to executive 
compensation in Ghanaian firms does not have a direct relationship with rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance. This may likely be due to directors being only after the 
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payment of their own compensation but issues of rules and laws of corporate governance are 
not of interest to them.  
Table 3.12.3: Correlation analysis on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors in 
Nigeria 
Variables Rules 
&Laws  
(1) 
Corpo. 
Strategy 
(2) 
Executive 
Compen 
(3) 
Board 
Effective 
(4)
Board  
Financial 
report (5)
Board 
Trspy 
(6)
Enfmen
t rules 
(7) 
Board 
Disc. 
(8) 
Board 
Dual 
(9) 
1.Rules &Laws 
(Q8) 
1         
2.Corporate  
strategy (Q31) 
0.02 1        
3.Executive) 
compensation 
(Q32)  
0.09 -0.08 1       
4.Board 
effectiveness 
(Q33) 
0.09 0.17** -0.55 1      
5.Financial 
report (Q34) 
-0.02 0.11* -0.20 0.53** 1     
6.Board 
transparency 
(Q35) 
-0.07 0.13* -0.10 0.48** 0.69** 1    
7. 
Enforcement 
rules (Q36) 
0.02 0.20** -0.07 0.67** 0.60** 0.54** 1   
8.Board 
disclosure 
(Q37) 
-0.12* 0.09 -0.08 0.47** 0.68** 0.73** 0.61** 1  
9.Board 
duality (Q38) 
-0.13* 0.10 -0.10 0.29** 0.34** 0.37** 0.29** 0.45** 1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
3.10.3 Results of the correlation analysis on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors 
 in Nigeria 
Table 3.10.3 column 1 illustrates that for firms in Nigeria the role and responsibility of 
board of directors such as level of commitment to boards disclosure and communication and 
board duality (separation between role and responsibility of Chairman and CEO) have a 
negative significant correlation of -0.12 and -0.13 respectively with corporate governance 
system in terms of rules and laws that promote corporate governance of firm in Nigeria.  
This result indicates that the level of supervision of board members to the process of 
disclosure and communication with firms in Nigeria is not having a direct effect on rules and 
laws that promote corporate governance practice. This may likely be due to the fact that the 
board members are less commitment to the supervision role and responsibility of disclosure 
and communication within their firms in Nigeria. Also, in Nigerian firms, although there may 
be separation between the role and responsibility of chairman and CEO (board duality) based 
on the finding in the above. However, the separation of power between roles of chairman and 
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CEO (board duality) may not be well implemented in order in order to promote rules and 
laws of corporate governance practices.    
 
Table 3.12.4 Correlation analysis on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors in 
South Africa 
Variables Rules 
&Laws  
(1) 
Corpo. 
Strategy 
(2) 
Executive 
Compen 
(3) 
Board 
Effective 
(4)
Board  
Financial 
report (5)
Board 
Trspy 
(6)
Enfmen
t rules 
(7) 
Board 
Disc. 
(8) 
Board 
Dual 
(9) 
1.Rules &Laws 
(Q8) 
1         
2.Corporate  
strategy (Q31) 
0.11 1        
3.Executive) 
compensation 
(Q32)  
-0.13 0.59** 1       
4.Board 
effectiveness 
(Q33) 
-0.11 0.48** 0.38** 1      
5.Financial 
report (Q34) 
0.12 0.54** 0.34** 0.53** 1     
6.Board 
transparency 
(Q35) 
0.17 0.40** 0.26* 0.38** 0.42** 1    
7. 
Enforcement 
rules (Q36) 
0.30* 0.50** 0.17 0.43** 0.57** 0.55** 1   
8.Board 
disclosure 
(Q37) 
0.15 0.44** 0.32** 0.32** 0.62** 0.33** 0.39** 1  
9.Board 
duality (Q38) 
0.20 -0.30* -0.39** -0.29* -0.30* -0.23 -0.40** -0.25* 1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
3.10.4 Results of the correlation analysis on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors 
in South Africa 
Table 3.10.4 column 1 provides evidence that the level of monitoring and enforcement of 
corporate governance practices (board enforcement) has a significant positive  correlation of 
0.30 with rules and laws that promote corporate governance system of firms in South Africa.  
This finding suggests that board members of firms in South Africa show more 
commitments on  monitoring and enforcements of corporate governance practices and as  a 
result, this have had  a significant effect on promotion of  laws and rules on  corporate 
governance of firms in South Africa. 
3.11   Methodology on the effect of external factors on corporate governance system  
This section describes the methodology, descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of 
the effect external factor underpinning corporate governance of listed firms using survey 
questionnaire as a sources of data. Moreover, the categories of respondents for this study 
include following; legislators, regulators, academician, individual investors, institutional 
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investor, accountant/auditors, executive director, non-executive director, company executive 
(CEO) company employee, judiciary/legal and others such as students. 
3.12 Definition of the Variables in each Section  
The instrument used to collect data for this study is through a survey questionnaire 
consists of 37 statements (sub-variables) which are divided into various sections, as it shows 
in the Tables below.  
 Table 3.13.1 Indicate the section, variables and statements under the Economic factor in 
Section I of the survey questionnaire for corporate governance  
 
Section 
   
Variables 
 
          Statements  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         I 
       
 
Domestic investment  
(Dinvt_Q39) 
 
Good corporate governance practice within 
firms is important to attracting domestic 
investment in a nation. 
 
  
Foreign investment 
(Finvt_Q40) 
 
Good corporate governance practice of firms 
is important in attracting foreign investment for 
a country 
 
 
Growth  
(Growth_Q41) 
 
Corporate governance influences the growth 
and development of firms and this, in turn 
influences the economy of a nation. 
 
 
equity of market 
(Equity_Q42) 
 
Shareholder protection can affect the level of 
equity markets. 
 
 
Macro-economic policies 
(Macro_Q43) 
 
    Macro-economic policies influence the way 
firms are managed in such way as to influence 
the relationship between firms and shareholders 
 
 
Financial intermediation 
(Banks_Q44) 
 
Banks play a predominant role in financial 
intermediation of firms in your country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
        I 
 
Firms Control 
(Firms_Q45) 
       
    Firms in your country own and control major 
local banks by creating a form of conglomerate 
business organization 
 
 
 
Privatization  
(Privatization_Q46) 
    
 There are conflict and problem associated 
with corporate governance before or after 
privatization of state-owned companies in your 
country. 
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Transparency 
(Transparency_Q47) 
 
There is no transparency in the sales of state-
owned companies and appointment of the 
board of director in your country 
 
 
Local investor  
(Control_Q48) 
 
      
The local investors are unable to use voting 
power to enforce corporate governance and 
there is no effective corporate control. 
 
Total Economic factor 
     ( Teco_Q39-48) 
 
 
denote the variable for Economic  factor effect on 
corporate governance practice and it addition of 
all statements under section I. 
 
Table 3.13.2 showing the section, variables and statements under the societal and culture in 
Section J of the survey questionnaire  
Section   Variables              Statements  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         J 
 
Stakeholders Interest 
(Stakeholders_Q49) 
 
Corporate governance within firms should consider the 
interest of all shareholders (employee, customers) 
individual and community goal 
  
Socio-political 
environment  
(Sociopol_Q50) 
 
Corporate governance guidelines and regulation should be 
drawn in a such a way that they reflect the socio-political 
and cultural environment of each nation 
 
 
National culture  
(Culture_Q51)  
 
National culture affects enforcement procedure in 
accounting systems and these influences corporate 
governance practice of a firm in a country 
 
Business ethic 
(Ethic_Q52) 
 
 
The business ethics and value that characterize a society 
will influence the level of confidence in the integrity and 
probity of firm and capital market 
 
 Total Societal and 
Cultural Factor 
    ( Tscf_Q49-52) 
denote the variable for societal and cultural factor, it is 
the addition of  statements under section J 
 
Table 3.13.3 Illustrate the section, variables and statements under the corruption and bribery in 
Section K of the survey questionnaire for corporate governance of firms. 
     Section      Variables                  Statements  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduction  corruption 
     (Reduction_Q53) 
  
 
Reduction in corruption and bribery will help to improve 
corporate governance practice 
 
 Regulatory authorities  
  (Level_Q54) 
 
 
Level of corruption influence the ability of the regulatory 
authorities to enforce compliance within corporate 
governance principles and accountability within firms  
 
Job security  
(Wages_Q55) 
 
 
Job security and payment of satisfactory living wages will 
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      k 
 
  
influence the level of corruption 
Conflict 
Interest 
 (Interest_Q56) 
 
Conflict of interest, unsound ethics and greed influence 
the corporate governance practice of a firm 
 
Economic hardship 
(Econmic_Q57) 
  
 
Economic hardship will influence the level of corruption 
among employees to the extent that corporate governance 
practice are undermine 
  
 
Internal control  
( Internal_Q58) 
 
 
 
Lack of internal control system will influence level of 
corruption among employee to the extent that corporate 
governance practices are undermined with firms. 
Total Corruption 
(Tcorpt_Q53-58 )   
Proxy as  the variable for influence of corruption and 
bribery on corporate governance practice, it is the addition 
of   all the statements under section K 
Table 3.13.4 indicate the section, variables and statements under the political environment in 
Section L of the survey questionnaire.  
Section   Variables                   Statements  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        L 
  
Government 
Ownership 
(Ownership_Q59) 
 
The government exerts substantial influence over the 
ownership of companies in my country of operation 
 
 
Monetary Policies 
(Econ_Q60) 
 
The political environment, by influencing fiscal and monetary 
policies has a substantial impact on corporate governance 
practices. 
 
Type of government  
(Type_Q61) 
 
Prolonged period of military or civilian rule in a country will 
influence the corporate governance practice of firms 
 
 
Government  influence  
(Interferes_Q62) 
 
The government interferes with the work of regulatory and 
supervisory bodies with regard to appointments or incentives 
for company executive within firms  
Politician influences 
(Politician_Q63) 
 
 
Politician exert undue influence over the ministries and 
agencies responsible for monitoring and enforcement of 
corporate governance guidelines and regulation within firms  
Total 
 political environment 
       (Tpol_Q59-63) 
 
  
This indicates political environment factor variable  and it 
covers the addition of  statements under Section L 
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Table 3.13.5  Showing the section, variables and statements under the ownership structure in 
Section M of the survey questionnaire  
Section   Variables                 Statement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
       M 
 
Board  
members (Board_Q64) 
  
 
Board members and senior management are generally 
majority stock holders of companies in your country 
 
Foreign 
 nationals 
(Foreign_Q65) 
 
Foreign national are generally majority of shareholders of 
companies in your country 
 
Government majority  
 
(Govt_Q66) 
 
The government holds majority of stock in companies in your 
country 
 
 
Family  
majority (Family_Q67) 
 
 
Family members generally hold the majority of stocks in 
companies in your country 
Single family dominate 
the management 
(Single_68) 
 
Where a single family dominate the management of a firm, 
this will be reflected in corporate governance practice of firm 
Total  
ownership structure 
(Town_Q64-68) 
 
 This is proxy as the variable for ownership structure effects 
upon corporate governance; it is the addition of all the 
statements (sub-variables) under section M of the survey 
questionnaire. 
 
 Table 3.13.6 illustrate the section, variables and statements under the Accounting system in 
Section N of the survey questionnaire for corporate governance of firms  
Section Variables                 Statements  
 
 
 
 
 
 
          N 
 
Financial information  
(Information_Q69) 
 
Firms prepared financial information that accord with 
statutory and ethical obligation in my country 
 
Enforcement of rules on 
accounting  
(Profession_Q70) 
 
The Institute of Chartered Accountant or equivalent ( 
professional body of accountants)  play a role in 
enforcing good accounting and financial reporting 
practices in my country 
  
 
 Accounting Standards  
(Standard_Q71) 
 
 
The Accounting standards Board (national equivalent) 
issues standards that are in line with international 
accounting standards  
 Total Accounting system 
(Tacct_Q69-71) 
Represents variable for the influence of accounting 
system on corporate governance, it is the addition of 
statements (sub-variables) under section N of the survey 
questionnaire. 
 
 
3.12.1 The dependent variables  
The equation below is the corporate governance system (Total_cs) which is the addition 
of statements or items (sub-variables) under section B of the survey questionnaire.  
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Total_cs = Rules_cs (Q8) +   Agencie_cs (Q9) +   Legal_cs(Q10)+ Organise_Cs (Q11) 
 
 3.12.2 The Independent variables  
These include the following below:  
Teco_(Q39-48) this is proxy as the variable for economic factor which influences corporate 
governance practice and it covers statements or items (sub-variables) 39-48 under Section I 
of the survey questionnaire. 
Tscf_(Q49-52) denote the variable for societal and cultural factor effect on corporate 
governance practice and it covers statements or items (sub-variables) 49-52 under Section J 
of the survey questionnaire.  
 
Tcorpt_(Q53-58)   indicate the variable that influence corruption and bribery on corporate 
governance practice, this covers statements or items under (sub-variables) 53-58 of Section K 
of the survey questionnaire.  
 
Tpol_(Q59-63) illustrate political environment factor variable that impacts on corporate 
governance practice, and covers statements or items under (sub-variables) 59-63 of Section L 
of the survey questionnaire. 
 
 
Town_(Q64-68) is proxy as the variable for ownership structure effects upon corporate 
governance and covers statements or items under Section M (sub-variables) 64-68 of the 
survey questionnaire. 
 
Tacct_(Q69-71) represents variable for the influence of accounting system on corporate 
governance, it covers statements or items under Section N (sub-variables) 69-71 of the survey 
questionnaire. 
3.13. Model for the analysis of effect of external factors on the corporate governance system 
The equation below examines the contribution that each external factor makes to the 
corporate governance system. 
Thus for i-th respondent total corporate governance system of firm (Total_Q8-11) can be determined as 
follows: 
Total_(Q8-11) = β0 +β1(Tec_Q39-48)  + β2 (Tsc_Q49-52) + β3(Tcorpt_Q53-58)  + β4(Tpol_ Q59-63)  + β5(Town_ Q64-68) +β6(Tacct_Q69-71) + β7(GR) + β8(NR)  +μi     
 
The dependent variable is proxy as corporate governance system (Total_Q8-11) with 
independent variables indicated as economic factor (Tec_Q39-48), societal and cultural factor 
(TSc_Q49-52), Corruption and bribery (Tcorrpt_Q53-58), political environment (Tpol_Q59-
63), ownership structure (Town_Q64-68) and accounting system (Tacct_Q69-71).  Other 
control variables GR and NR include dummies indicating if the firms are located in Ghana and 
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Nigeria with respondents are regulator bodies or non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate 
governance (the reference category being South Africa firms). Finally, μỉ is the random error 
term, which is independently and identically distributed.  
3.13.1 Model for the analysis of economic factors on the rules and laws guiding corporate 
governance practice 
This equation below examines the contribution of the economic factor makes to the rules 
and laws of corporate governance practice. 
Thus for i-th respondent on rules and law guiding corporate governance of firm (Rules_cg) can be 
determined as follows:  
 
Rules_Q8= β0 +  β1(Dinvt_Q39) +  β2(Finvt_Q40)   + β3(Growth_Q41) + β4(Equity_Q42) + β5 (Macro_Q43 + 
β6(Banks_Q44) + β7 (Firms_Q45)  +  β8 (Privatization_Q46) +  β9 ( Transparency_Q47)  + β10 
(Control_Q48)+  β11(G) + β12(N) + μi 
 
Where dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws guiding corporate governance 
(Rules_Q8)and  independent variables are  Domestic investment (Dinvt_Q39) foreign 
investment (Finvt_Q40), growth (Growth_Q41), equity (Equity_Q42), macro-economic 
(Macro_Q43), financial intermediation (Banks_Q44), firms control (Firms_Q45), 
privatisation (privitization_Q46), transparency (Transparency_Q47), and local investor 
control (control_Q48). Other control variables G and N include dummies indicating if the 
respondents are located in Ghana and Nigeria (the reference category being South Africa). 
Finally, μỉ is the random error term, which is independently and identically distributed.  
 
3.13.2 Model for the analysis of influence of societal and cultural factor on the rules and laws 
guiding corporate governance practice 
This equation below examines the contribution of societal and cultural factors make to 
the rules and laws of corporate governance practice. 
Thus for i-th respondent on rules and law guiding corporate governance of firm (Rules_cg) can be 
determined as follows:  
Rules_Q8 = β0 +  β1(stakeholders_Q49) +  β2(Sociopol_Q50)   + β3(Culture_Q51) + β4(Ethics_Q52) +   β5(G) + 
β6(N) + μi 
 
The dependent variable is shown as rules and laws guiding the promotion of corporate 
governance practice (Rules_Q8) and independent variables are stakeholder interest 
(Stakeholders_Q49), socio-political and cultural environment (Socipol_Q50), national culture 
on enforcement of accounting procedure (Culture_Q51), and business ethic (Ethics_Q52). 
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Other control variables G and N include dummies indicating if the respondents are located in 
Ghana and Nigeria (the reference category being South Africa). Finally, μỉ is the random error 
term, which is independently and identically distributed.  
3.13.3 Model for the analysis of influence of corruption and bribery on the rules and laws 
guiding corporate governance practice 
This equation below examines the contribution of corruption and bribery factor makes to 
the rules and laws of corporate governance practice. 
Thus for i-th respondent on rules and law guiding corporate governance of firm (Rules_cg) can be 
determined as follows:  
Rules_Q8 = β0 + β1(Reduction_Q53) + β2(Level_Q54)  + β3(Wages_Q55) + β4(Interest_Q56) + β5 
(Economic_Q57) + β6(Control_Q58) + β5(G) + β6(N) + μi 
 
The dependent variable is rules and laws guiding the promotion of corporate governance 
practice (Rules_Q8) independent variables are reduction in corruption (Reduction_Q53), 
regulatory authority (Level_Q54), Job security (Wages_Q55), conflict Interest 
(interest_Q56), economic hardship (Economic_Q57), and Internal control (Control_Q58). 
Other control variables G and N include dummies indicating if the respondents are located in 
Ghana and Nigeria (the reference category being South Africa). Finally, μỉ is the random 
error term, which is independently and identically distributed.  
3.13.4 Model for the analysis of political environment effect on the rules and laws guiding 
corporate governance practice. 
This equation below examines the contribution of political environment makes to the 
rules and laws of corporate governance practice. 
Thus for i-th respondent on rules and law guiding corporate governance of firm (Rules_cg) can be 
determined as follows:  
 
Rules_Q8 = β0 + β1(Ownership_Q59) + β2(Environment_Q60)  + β3(Type_Q61) + β4(Interferes_Q62) + β5 
(Politician_Q63) +  β5(G) + β6(N) + μi 
 
The dependent variable is shown as rules and laws guiding the promotion of corporate 
governance practice (Rules_Q8) and  independent variables includes government influence 
(Ownership_Q59), political influences with fiscal and monetary policies (Environment_Q60), 
type of government (Type_Q61), government interferences on regulatory bodies 
(Interferes_Q62) and politician influences on regulatory agencies  (Politician_Q63) Other 
control variables G and N include dummies indicating if the respondents are located in Ghana 
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and Nigeria (the reference category being South Africa). Finally, μỉ is the random error term, 
which is independently and identically distributed.  
3.13.5 Model for the analysis of effect of ownership structure on the rules and laws guiding 
corporate governance practice. 
This equation below examines the contribution of ownership structure makes to the rules 
and laws of corporate governance practice. 
Thus for i-th respondent on rules and law guiding corporate governance of firm (Rules_cg) can be 
determined as follows:  
 
Rules_Q8 = β0 + β1(Board_Q64) + β2(Foreign_Q65)  + β3(Govt_Q66) + β4(Famly_Q67) + β5 (Single_Q68)  + 
β5(G) + β6(N) + μi 
The dependent variable is proxy for rules and laws guiding the promotion of corporate 
governance practice (Rules_Q8) and independent variables consist of board members and 
senior management as major stockholders (Board_Q64), foreign nationals are majority of 
stockholders (Foreign_Q65_), governments are majority of stockholders (Govt_Q66), family 
is majority of stockholders (Family_Q67), and single family dominant the management 
(Single-Q68). Other control variables G and N include dummies indicating if the respondents 
are located in Ghana and Nigeria (the reference category being South Africa). Finally, μỉ is 
the random error term, which is independently and identically distributed.  
 
3.13.6 Model for the analysis accounting system on the rules and laws guiding corporate 
governance practice. 
This equation below examines the contribution of accounting system makes to the rules 
and laws of corporate governance practice. 
Thus for i-th respondent on rules and law guiding corporate governance of firm (Rules_cg) can be 
determined as follows:  
 
Rules_Q8 = β0 +  β1(Information_Q69) +  β2(Profession_Q70   + β3(Standard_Q71 + β5(G) + β6(N) + μi 
 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws guiding the promotion of corporate 
governance practice (Rules_Q8) and independent variables are proxy for financial 
information are prepared according to statutory and ethical obligations (Information_Q69), 
enforcement of rules accounting and financial reporting by professional accounting body 
(Profession_Q70) and accounting standard board issues standard in line with international 
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accounting standard (Standard_Q71). Other control variables G and N include dummies 
indicating if the respondents are located in Ghana and Nigeria (the reference category being 
South Africa). Finally, μỉ   is the random error term, which is independently and identically 
distributed.  
 
Table 3.14: Showing descriptive statistic of external factors variables effects on corporate 
governance of firms based on average per question for each group in the survey questionnaire 
      SSAA firms     
Variables Code Mean T-test N 
Economic  Tecon_(Q39-48) 4.11* 62.97 541 
Societal and Cultural  Tscf_(Q49-52) 4.42* 67.40 541 
Corruption and bribery Tcorpt_(Q53-58) 4.54* 79.60 541 
Political environment Tpol_(Q59-63) 4.12* 37.75 541 
Ownership structure Tows_(Q64-68) 2.62* -18.81 541 
Accounting System Tacct_(Q69-71) 4.18/* 49.90 541 
Corporate governance system TCg_(Q8-Q11) 3.57* 21.04 541 
     
Ghanaian Firms     
Economic  Tecon_(Q39-48) 4.11* 28.32 150 
Societal and Cultural  Tscf_(Q49-52) 4.30* 27.93 150 
Corruption and bribery Tcorpt_(Q53-58) 4.45* 32.29 150 
Political environment Tpol_(Q59-63) 4.21* 21..48 150 
Ownership structure Tows_(Q64-68) 2.32 -16.66 150 
Accounting System Tacct_(Q69-71) 4.18* 27.27 150 
Corporate governance system TCg_(Q8-Q11) 3.18* 4.50 150 
     
Nigerian Firms     
Economic  Tecon_(Q39-48) 4.11* 53.67 320 
Societal and Cultural  Tscf_(Q49-52) 4.45* 58.14 320 
Corruption and bribery Tcorpt_(Q53-58) 4.56* 68.04 320 
Political environment Tpol_(Q59-63) 4.16* 30.97 320 
Ownership structure Tows_(Q64-68) 2.78* -9.84 320 
Accounting System Tacct_(Q69-71) 4.12* 34.54 320 
Corporate governance system TCg_(Q8-Q11) 3.47* 17.16 320 
     
South African Firms     
Economic  Tecon_(Q39-48) 4.08* 22.20 71 
Societal and Cultural  Tscf_(Q49-52) 4.52* 25.62 71 
Corruption and bribery Tcorpt_(Q53-58) 4.63* 36.14 71 
Political environment Tpol_(Q59-63) 3.74* 9.74 71 
Ownership structure Tows_(Q64-68) 2.46* -13.00 71 
Accounting System Tacct_(Q69-71) 4.46* 30.00 71 
Corporate governance system TCg_(Q8-Q11) 4.55* 32.65 71 
Note: This table reports the summary descriptive statistic for the variables of the study. The dependent variable is indicated 
as total corporate governance system which is represented by TCg_(Q8-Q11) is the addition of all the items or variable 
under section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent variables are external factors such as economic is shown as 
total economic factors indicated by Tecon_(Q39-48) which is the addition of all items or variables under section I of the 
survey questionnaire,  total societal and cultural is illustrated as Tscf_(Q49-52) which is the addition of all the items or 
variable under section J of the survey questionnaire, corruption and bribery is shown as total corruption and bribery is 
indicated as Tcorpt_(Q53-58) which is the addition of all items or variable within section K of the survey questionnaire, 
Total political environment represented as Tpol_(Q59-63) is the addition of all items under environment in section K,  
ownership structure total is  shown as Tows_(Q64-68) is the total items or variable under section M of the survey 
questionnaire and accounting system total indicated as Tacct_(Q69-71) is the addition of all  items or statements under 
accounting system in section N of the survey questionnaire.   
*T-Test value is Indicate that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96). T-
Test equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n) 
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3.14 Results of the descriptive statistic of external factors variables on corporate governance of 
firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries 
We provide the summary of the descriptive statistics for external factors that influence 
corporate governance of firms as it shown in the above Table. There is evidence that the T-
test and mean value for the ownership structure variable is negative and it is very low for 
each of the country. This suggests that board members, government, foreign national and 
family are not the majority of stock holders in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa firms. 
The above Table also indicate that the corporate governace system in South Africa  have 
the highest T-test and mean value as  compared with Ghana and Nigeria. This finding implies 
that corporate governance system in South African firms is better than Ghanaian and 
Nigerian firms.   
Table: 3.14.1: Showing the descriptive statistics of sub-variable of economic factor on corporate 
governance of firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries. 
Variables Countries N Mean T-test 
 
 
Domestic Investment (Q39) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.53* 
4.68* 
4.63* 
4.64* 
 
 
29.28 
55.65 
24.90 
66.92 
 
Foreign Investment (Q40) 
 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.49* 
4.67* 
4.65* 
4.62* 
 
26.07 
58.87 
28.96 
66.11 
 
Growth (Q41) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.51* 
4.61* 
4.65* 
4.59* 
 
26.80 
54.34 
24.83 
63.76 
 
Equity Market (Q42) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.47* 
4.46* 
4.54* 
4.48* 
 
25.36 
38.41 
22.37 
51.03 
 
Macro –Economic Policy (Q43) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.44* 
4.41* 
4.58* 
4.44* 
 
23.83 
36.55 
19.87 
47.85 
 
Financial Intermediation (Q44) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.32* 
3.37* 
4.42* 
3.77* 
 
17.20 
  4.83 
17.86 
13.99 
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Firms Control (Q45) Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
2.08* 
1.96* 
3.80* 
2.24* 
-10.34 
-18.79 
    6.13 
-14.73 
 
Privatization  (Q46) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.02* 
4.29* 
3.44* 
4.21* 
 
 
 
15.52 
30.26 
  3.01 
-14.73 
 
Transparency (Q47) 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
4.02* 
4.28* 
3.05 
4.06* 
12.37 
27.59 
  0.40 
28.63 
 
 
Local investor (Q48) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.19* 
4.37* 
3.04 
4.14* 
 
14.43 
28.17 
  0.28 
23.94 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96).  
Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n). 
 
Table 3.14.1 provides the summary of descriptive statistics. There is indication that firm in 
Ghanaian and Nigerian, firms control (Q45) (firms own and control major local banks by 
creating a form of conglomerate business organisation) have a higher T-test and lower mean 
value. This finding suggests that in Nigerian and Ghanaian firms the respondents show that 
firms are not owned and controlled by major local banks by creating a form of conglomerate 
business organisation. Thus, in South African the respondents agree that firms owned and 
controlled by major local banks by creating a form of conglomerate business organisation. 
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Table: 3.14.2: describes the descriptive statistics of societal and culture factor on corporate 
governance of firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries. 
      Variables Countries N Mean T-test 
 
Stakeholder Interest (Q49) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.41* 
4.60* 
4.61* 
4.55* 
 
 
 
24.32 
56.12 
22.61 
61.11 
 
 
Socio-Political Environment 
(Q50) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.35* 
4.55* 
4.54* 
4.50* 
 
22.24 
41.38 
17.76 
51.31 
 
National Culture (Q51) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.05* 
4.15* 
4.35* 
4.15* 
 
13.40 
22.61 
14.04 
29.39 
 
Business Ethic (Q52) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.38* 
4.51* 
4.58* 
4.48* 
 
24.14 
51.60 
20.48 
58.35 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96). 
Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n).  
Table 3.14.4 Reports the descriptive statistics of societal and culture factor on corporate 
governance of firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries. 
      Variables Countries N Mean T-test 
     
 
Reduction corruption (Q53) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.59* 
4.75* 
4.68* 
4.72* 
 
 
30.43 
62.97 
22.47 
74.09 
 
Regulatory authority (Q54) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.39* 
4.64* 
4.68* 
4.58* 
 
 
23.32 
54.00 
28.31 
61.25 
 
Job security   (Q55) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.15* 
4.15* 
4.31* 
4.17* 
 
16.57 
20.57 
12.40 
28.65 
 
Conflict  interest   (Q56) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
 
150 
320 
71 
 
4.49* 
4.58* 
4.70* 
 
25.00 
49.59 
26.53 
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Sub-region (SSAA 541 4.57* 59.86 
 
Economic hardship  (Q57) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.49* 
4.56* 
4.68* 
4.56* 
 
25.35 
46.51 
22.47 
58.52 
 
Internal control  (Q58) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.60* 
4.66* 
4.77* 
4.66* 
 
31.10 
57.11 
35.51 
70.20 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96).  
Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n).. 
 
The descriptive statistics result from the above Table show that each sub-variable (item or 
statement) for corruption and bribery have a mean value of above 4.00 with positive high T-
test value. This result implies that respondents total agree that corruption and bribery hinders 
the development of corporate governance of firms in across the countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa Anglophone region.      
Table 3.14.4: Showing the descriptive statistics of political environment on corporate 
governance of firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries. 
      Variables Countries N Mean T-test 
 
Government Ownership 
(Q59) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
3.91* 
3.77* 
3.34* 
3.75* 
 
  9.86 
11.82 
  2.36 
15.24 
 
Monetary Policies (Q60) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.39* 
4.35* 
4.49* 
4.39* 
 
21.83 
38.01 
25.11 
48.63 
 
Government Type (Q61) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.41* 
4.37* 
4.46* 
4.38* 
 
25.40 
31.42 
20.17 
43.38 
 
Government Influence 
(Q62) 
 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.05* 
3.98* 
2.92 
3.86* 
 
12.49 
17.18 
-0.55 
18.02 
 
 
Political Influence (Q63) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
 
150 
320 
71 
 
4.27* 
4.31* 
3.46* 
 
 3.64 
28.58 
  3.05 
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Sub-region (SSAA 541 4.20* 29.09 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96).  
Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n). 
 
Table 3.14.4 presents the summary of the descriptive statistics on sub-variables on political 
environment. The result indicates that in South Africa   government influence (Q62) has a 
lower T-test value which is insignificant on the mean value. This finding suggests that the 
issue of government interferences with the regulatory agencies with regard to appointment of 
directors in South African firms is not so important to have effect on corporate governance 
practice. However, this has a negative effect in Ghana and Nigeria because the T-test and 
mean value are higher in those two countries. 
Table 3.12.5: Illustrates  the descriptive statistics for ownership structure of firms in Sub-
Saharan Africa Anglophone  (SSAA) countries. 
      Variables Countries N Mean T-test 
 
Board member (Q64) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.12* 
4.09* 
2.56* 
3.34* 
 
 
 
-10.36 
 20.74 
 -3.71 
  5.94 
 
Foreign National (Q65) 
 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
1.69* 
1.85* 
2.06* 
1.84* 
 
-19.33 
-30.70 
 -8.61 
-35.04 
 
Government Majority (Q66) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
1.79* 
1.79* 
1.70* 
1.79* 
 
-20.02 
-33.70 
-22.36 
-15.94 
 
Family Majority (Q67) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
1.96* 
2.07* 
1.77* 
2.00* 
 
-13.84 
-19.57 
-14.81 
-27.05 
 
Single Family (Q68) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.06* 
4.11* 
4.23* 
4.11* 
 
14.75 
24.82 
17.57 
32.27 
 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96).  
Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n). 
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The Table show that in Ghanaian and South African firms’ board members (Q64) have a 
higher T-test and lower mean value. This finding implies that the respondents disagree that 
board members and senior management are majority stockholder of firms in Ghana and South 
Africa. In Nigerian firms there is evidence of higher T-test and mean value, this suggest that 
in Nigerian firms the respondent claim that board members are the majority stockholders of 
firms. 
Table 3.14.6: Reports the  descriptive statistics of accounting system on corporate governance of 
firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries. 
      Variables Countries N Mean T-test 
 
Financial Information (Q69) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
3.97* 
3.90* 
4.31* 
3.98* 
 
15.43 
18.09 
21.07 
27.46 
 
Professional bodies (Q70) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.27* 
4.23* 
4.49* 
4.27* 
 
25.50 
29.34 
23.69 
42.19 
 
Accounting Standard (Q71) 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.29* 
4.23* 
4.59* 
4.29* 
 
22.57 
30.99 
26.80 
43.80 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96).  
Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n). 
 
The above Table reports that all the sub-variables under accounting system show higher value 
of mean and T-test in all the selected countries. This result suggests that financial 
information, professional bodies and accounting standard are modifier for effective corporate 
governance of firms in all the selected countries in the Sub-region. 
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3.15 Results of correlation Analysis on influence of external factors on corporate governance of 
firm in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries.  
In this section the Tables below presents the correlation analysis on influence of 
external factors on corporate governance of firm.  
 
Table 3.15.1: Showing the correlation analysis on influence of external factors on corporate governance of 
firm in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone countries.  
 
Variables 
 
Corp.gov 
   ( 1) 
 
Economic 
  ( 2) 
Societal 
    & 
Cultural 
   ( 3) 
Corruption 
    & 
bribery  
   (4) 
Political  
       
Environment 
     (  5) 
Ownership 
 
Structure 
   ( 6) 
Accounting 
 
System 
  ( 7) 
1.Corp.gov    1         
2.Economic    -0.03      1      
3.Societal & 
cultural 
 
    0.08 
 
     0.44** 
 
    1 
    
4.Corruption 
& bribery 
 
    0.11* 
 
      0.46** 
 
    0.51** 
 
     1 
 
   
  
5.Political 
environment 
 
    -0.20** 
 
    0.42** 
 
    0.31** 
 
      0.22** 
 
      1 
  
6.ownership 
structure 
 
   0.01 
 
   -0.11** 
 
   -0.06 
 
      -0.05 
 
      - 0.06 
 
     1 
 
7.Accounting 
system 
 
  0.28** 
 
    0.19** 
 
0.25** 
 
       0.24** 
 
         0.10* 
 
      -0.03 
 
     1 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
3.15.1 Results of correlation analysis on influence of external factors on corporate governance of 
firm in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone (SSAA) region.  
Table 3.15.1 reports on the correlation results of external factors effect on corporate 
governance of firms in SSAA region. There is evidence that corruption and bribery have a 
positive significant correlation coefficient of 0.11 with corporate governance system. This 
result suggests that corruption and bribery may likely influence the promotion of sound 
corporate governance practice. The political environment has a negative significant 
correlation coefficient of -0.20 with corporate governance system, this finding show that the 
political environment in the SSAA region hinders the development of sound corporate 
governance. In addition, accounting system has significant positive relationship with 
correlation coefficient of 0.28 on corporate governance system. This result indicates that 
adequate preparation of financial information that accords with ethical, professional 
accounting bodies and accounting standard board plays vital roles in promoting sound 
corporate governance of firms in the SSAA region. 
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Table 3.15.2: presents the correlation analysis on influence of external factors on corporate 
governance in Ghanaian firms.  
 
Variables 
 
Corp.gov 
   ( 1) 
 
Economic 
  ( 2) 
Societal 
    & 
Cultural 
   ( 3) 
Corruption 
    & 
bribery  
   (4) 
Political  
       
Environment 
     (  5) 
Ownership 
 
Structure 
   ( 6) 
Accounting 
 
System 
  ( 7) 
1.Corp.gov    1         
2.Economic    -0.31**    1         
3.Societal & 
cultural 
 
   -0.25** 
 
   0.57** 
 
     1 
    
4.Corruption 
& bribery 
 
    -0.13 
 
   0.57** 
 
   0.60** 
    
    1 
   
5.Political 
environment 
 
    -0.43** 
 
    0.57** 
 
   0.37** 
 
    0.35** 
 
    1 
  
6.ownership 
structure 
 
   0.37** 
 
     -0.35** 
 
-0.31** 
 
      -0.26** 
 
  -0.31** 
 
   1 
 
7.Accounting 
system 
 
   0.12 
 
    0.15 
 
   0.35** 
 
      0.36** 
 
   0.07 
 
   0.01 
 
   1 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
3.15.2: Results of the correlation analysis on influence of external factors on corporate 
governance in Ghanaian firms 
Table 3.15.2 show the correlation analysis outcome on influence of external factors on 
corporate governance system in Ghanaian firms. The results indicate that economic factor has 
a negative significant correlation with corporate governance system with a coefficient of -
0.31. This finding implies that the implementation of Ghanaian economic policies is deterring 
the promotion of a sound corporate governance of firms in Ghana; this may be due to lack of 
proper implementation of the economic policies. In addition, societal and cultural factor is 
negatively significant correlated with corporate governance system with coefficient of -0.25. 
This result suggest that societal and cultural factors hinder the promotion of sound corporate 
governance of firms in Ghana, thus regulatory and supervisory bodies of corporate 
governance Ghana needs to consider the issue of societal and cultural factors in the 
formulation and implementation of corporate governance policy in Ghana.   
Moreover, in Table 3.15.2 political environment factor has a negative significant 
correlation with corporate governance system with a coefficient of 0.43. This finding 
indicates that the Ghanaian political environment have a setback on the promotion of sound 
corporate governance. This may likely be due to prolonged military rules and political 
interferences on the regulatory and supervisory agencies in Ghana. In addition, ownership 
structure of firm in Ghana plays a vital role in enhancing sound corporate governance. Table 
3.15.2 indicate that ownership structure has a significant positive relationship with corporate 
governance with correlation coefficient of 0.37.  
 
Chapter Three: Methodology and Descriptive Statistics of the study 
 
154 
 
Table 3.15.3: Reports the correlation analysis on influence of external factors on corporate 
governance in Nigerian firms.  
 
Variables 
 
Corp.gov 
   ( 1) 
 
Economic 
  ( 2) 
Societal 
    & 
Cultural 
   ( 3) 
Corruption 
    & 
bribery  
   (4) 
Political  
       
Environment 
     (  5) 
Ownership 
 
Structure 
   ( 6) 
Accounting 
 
System 
  ( 7) 
1.Corp.gov      1       
2.Economic      0.15**     1      
3.Societal & 
cultural 
 
      0.12* 
 
    0.44** 
 
   1 
    
4.Corruption 
& bribery 
 
      0.07 
 
    0.44** 
 
    0.42** 
 
    1 
   
5.Political 
environment 
 
     0.11 
 
   0.34** 
 
   0.43** 
 
   0.24** 
 
     1 
  
6.ownership 
structure 
 
    0.22** 
 
   0.52 
 
    0.12 
 
    0.03 
 
      0.03 
 
    1 
 
7.Accounting 
system 
 
   0.24** 
 
   0.24** 
 
   0.19** 
 
    0.17** 
 
      0.20** 
 
    0.23 
 
    1 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
3.15.3 Results of the correlation analysis on influence of external factors on corporate 
governance in Nigerian firms 
In Table 3.15.3 there is indication that economic factor has a positive significant 
correlation with corporate governance system with a coefficient of 0.15, also societal and 
cultural factor is significantly correlated with corporate governance system with coefficient 
of 0.12. This result implies that economic, societal and cultural factor may likely influence 
the promotion of sound corporate governance practice in Nigerian firms. In addition, 
ownership structure has a positive significant correlation with corporate governance system 
with coefficient of 0.22. This finding indicates that the kind of ownership structure of 
Nigerian firms may likely have effect on promotion of sound corporate governance in 
Nigerian firms. The accounting system is positively correlated with corporate governance 
with coefficient of 0.24. This results show that adequate preparation of financial information 
that accord with ethical, professional accounting bodies and accounting standard board plays 
vital roles in promoting sound corporate governance in Nigerian firms. 
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Table 3.15.4: Describes the correlation analysis on influence of external factors on corporate 
governance in South African firms.  
 
Variables 
 
Corp.gov 
   ( 1) 
 
Economic 
  ( 2) 
Societal 
    & 
Cultural 
   ( 3) 
Corruption 
    & 
bribery  
   (4) 
Political  
       
Environment 
     (  5) 
Ownership 
 
Structure 
   ( 6) 
Accounting 
 
System 
  ( 7) 
1.Corp.gov     1            
2.Economic     0.23      1      
3.Societal & 
cultural 
 
     0.25* 
 
      0.14 
 
    1 
    
4.Corruption 
& bribery 
 
     0.42** 
 
       0.20 
 
  0.41** 
 
      1 
   
5.Political 
environment 
 
      -0.11 
 
      0.37** 
 
     -0.14 
 
     -0.03 
 
    1 
  
6.ownership 
structure 
 
      -0.11 
 
      -0.15 
 
     -0.08 
 
     0.03 
 
      0.09 
 
     1 
 
7.Accounting 
system 
 
      0.48** 
 
       0.11 
 
      0.18 
 
     0.20 
 
     0.02 
 
     0.07 
 
     1 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
3.15.4 Results of correlation analysis on influence of external factors on corporate governance in 
South African firms. 
Table 3.13.4 summarises the result of correlation analysis on influence of external factors 
on corporate governance of firms in South Africa. We notice that societal and cultural factor 
has a significant positive correlation with corporate governance system. This result suggests 
that societal and cultural situation of South African may likely have impact in the promotion 
of sound corporate governance of firms in South Africa. Beside this, corruption and bribery is 
significantly correlated with corporate governance and this indicates that corruption may 
likely hinder the enhancement of good corporate governance of firms in South Africa.  
Moreover, accounting system has a coefficient of 0.48; it significant  has  positive 
relationship with corporate governance system  thus, it  implies that adequate accounting 
system of firms plays vital roles in promoting sound corporate governance of firms in South 
Africa.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter provided the methodology and descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
by adopting a pilot study prior to collection of data by administering a survey questionnaire. 
To identify components that is important for corporate governance practice of listed 
firms and effect of such components on corporate governance practice. The next chapter 
therefore, presents the results of the regression analysis on institutional characteristic of 
corporate governance such as regulatory framework, enforcement, disclosure and 
transparency, shareholder rights and ownership concentrations. 
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Chapter Four 
Results of the data analysis on effect of institutional characteristics of 
corporate governance and corporate governance system 
This Chapter examines key challenges of corporate governance of listed firms, exploring 
empirical evidence from listed firms. The key objectives include identification and examine 
the effect of the important components of corporate governance such as regulatory 
framework, enforcement, transparency and disclosure, and level of concentration.   
The Table below describes the sections, statements and variables on institutional 
characteristics of corporate governance as it indicate in the survey questionnaire. 
Table 4: Show the statements and variables institutional characteristics of corporate governance 
practices 
 
 Sections                        Statements          Variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 B: Effective corporate 
governance system     
 
 
 
 
 
Q8.There are adequate and effective rules and  laws that 
promote corporate governance of firms in my country 
 
 
Rules and laws 
Q9. The supervisory, regulatory and enforcement 
agencies have the power, resources and authority to 
enforce compliance with laws and regulations and 
guidelines on corporate governance in my country of 
operation 
 
 Agencies power 
 
Q10. A good legal system in my country of operation 
helps to improve the corporate governance of firms 
 
  Legal system 
Q11.A well organised legislature and sound regulatory 
and supervisory agencies in place promote corporate 
governance 
 
Agencies organ  
 
      
 
   C:  Regulatory 
framework of corporate 
governance    
Q12.Stock markets listing rules and corporate code of 
conduct for firms are often abused or ignored 
 Stock market 
 
Q13.The rules and regulation for appointing and 
removal of auditors are frequently violated 
Auditor 
appointment 
Q14. Rules and regulations for a formal and transparent 
board nomination and election process of firms are often 
ignored. 
Board nomination 
Q15.Rules and regulation for disclosure and 
communication are not followed 
Disclosure 
Q16.Rules and regulations regarding the required 
independent status of board members are often violated 
Independent board 
 
 
  D: Enforcement of 
corporate governance 
practices        
Q17. There is sufficient investigation of apparent non-
compliance with laws/regulations by enforcement 
agency. 
 
Non-compliance 
Q18. There is appropriate legal protection of investors 
and creditors from fraud perpetrated by managers and 
controlling shareholders within firms. 
 
Investor 
protection 
Q19.There are appropriate mechanism for investigating 
the illegal or inappropriate treatment of minority 
shareholders within firms 
 
Minority 
shareholder 
 
 
  E:Transparency and 
disclosure of corporate 
governance          
Q20.Generally in the firm your country, insider trading 
laws, rules, and regulations are followed 
Insider trading 
Q21.There is equal access to information for all 
shareholders in firm 
Information 
access 
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Q22.There is confidence in the autonomy and 
independence of auditors for firms within your country 
Auditor 
Independence 
Q23.There are transparency in mergers and acquisition 
of firms in your country 
Merger & 
Acquisition 
        
 
   F: Shareholder rights     
 
             
             
Q24.The basic shareholders rights in your firm are not 
protected 
Shareholders’ 
rights 
Q25.Minority shareholders rights of your firm are often 
violated 
Shareholder 
violation 
Q26.Minority shareholders are often not allowed to 
express their view at general meeting of firm in your 
country 
 
Shareholder 
meeting 
Q27. Shareholders are not allowed to speak at company 
meeting only if they are known to agree with the board 
of directors. 
 
Shareholder 
alignment 
 
Section Statements Variables 
 
 
    G: Ownership 
concentration       
 
 
           
 
Q28.The firms in your country have a variety of 
composition of ownership 
 
Ownership 
composition 
Q29.There is large concentration of ownership 
(few shareholders having majority of shares) in 
firms in your country 
 
Large concentration 
Q30.Preferential treatment is often given to large 
shareholders of firms in your country 
 
Preferential 
treatment 
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4.1 Results of the effect of institutional characteristics of corporate governance and the 
corporate system.  
This section provides empirical evidences on institutional characteristics of corporate 
governance and corporate governance system. Below are the model estimate and the Table 
showing results of the data analysis. 
Table 4.1: Showing OLS estimate of corporate governance system on institutional 
characteristics of  corporate governance  
 Dependent variable: Total effective corporate governance system 
Total_cg = β0 +β1(Trfw_C) + β2 (Tenfm_D) + β3(Tdis_E) + β4(Tshrt_F) + β5(Towc_G) +β6(RG) + β7(RN) + μi    
  All countries with    
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the countries 
Ghana and Nigeria 
as dummy  
Ghana Nigeria South Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 6.18** 
0.93 
(6.64) 
15..08** 
1.12 
(13.43) 
7.72** 
1.45 
(5.31) 
12.87** 
1.35 
(9.54) 
10.56** 
2.41 
(4.38) 
 
Regulatory 
framework 
 
0.05* 
0.03 
(1.87) 
-0.02 
0.03 
(-0.07) 
0.14** 
0.04 
(3.01) 
-0.07* 
0.03 
(-1.10) 
 
0.15** 
0.06 
(2.56) 
 
Enforcement 
 
0.42** 
0.04 
(9.56) 
 
 
0.16** 
0.05 
(3.52) 
0.31** 
0.07 
(4.71) 
-0.12 
0.05 
(-0.31) 
 
0.32* 
0.14 
(2.32) 
Disclosure & 
transparency 
 
0.15** 
0.04 
(4.53) 
0.07* 
0.03 
(2.05) 
0.06 
0.05 
(1.18) 
0.06 
0.05 
(1.22) 
0.01 
0.08 
(0.18) 
Shareholders’ 
rights 
 
-0.04 
0.03 
(-1.59) 
-0.02 
0.02 
(-0.83) 
-0.01 
0.04 
(-0.16) 
-0.05 
0.07 
(-0.82) 
-0.05 
0.11 
(-0.41) 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
0.24** 
0.06 
(4.25) 
0.05 
0.05 
(1.03) 
0.03 
0.08 
(0.43) 
0.14* 
0.08 
(1.90) 
0.14 
0.09 
(1.65) 
Regulators  0.57** 
0.19 
(3.00) 
   
Ghana  -4.34** 
0.35 
(-12.78) 
   
Nigeria  -3.36** 
0.34 
(-9.89) 
   
R-square 0.29 0.45 0.46 0.05 0.22 
F-statistic 44.59 62.54 29.62 3.19 3.68 
No of 
observation 
541 541 150 320 71 
The dependent variable is indicated as total effective corporate governance system which is the addition of all the 
items or variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent variables are regulatory framework 
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is shown as total regulatory framework which is the addition of all items or variables under section C of the survey 
questionnaire, enforcement is illustrated as total enforcement which is the addition of all the items or variable 
under section D of the survey questionnaire, transparency and disclosure is shown as total disclosure and 
transparency which is the addition of all items or variable within section E of the survey questionnaire, Total 
shareholders’ rights  is the addition of all items under shareholders rights in section F, and  ownership 
concentration is the total items or variable under section G of the survey questionnaire. 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being 
South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent  level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
The Key findings from the above Table 4.1 are based on the opinion of the respondents this 
include the following; 
1. Enforcement of corporate governance has a positive effect (0.16) on the corporate 
governance system.  
2. Disclosure and transparency of corporate governance practice has a positive impact 
(0.07) on the corporate governance system.  
3. Respondents from regulatory bodies believe that corporate governance system is better 
than respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders. 
4. South African firms have a better corporate governance system than Ghanaian and 
Nigerian firms. 
5. The regulatory framework plays a vital role to improve corporate governance system 
in Ghanaian firm 
7. The regulatory framework hinders effective corporate governance system in Nigerian 
firms. 
8. Higher concentration of ownership structure seems to affect corporate governance 
system. 
10. There is evidence that the R-square for Nigeria is low, the reason may be due to other 
factors that may affects corporate governance system which are not mentioned in this 
study. 
11. The regulatory framework of corporate governance has a positive relationship effect 
(0.15) on the corporate governance system.  
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In conclusion from the above results, there is evidence that enforcement, disclosure, 
transparency and regulatory framework of corporate governance are important to bring 
sound corporate governance practices. 
Table 4.1 columns 2 illustrate the regression result for all the countries together; there is 
evidence of positive significant relationship between enforcement and corporate governance 
system with coefficient of 0.16. Also, disclosure and transparency has a positive significant 
coefficient of 0.07 relationships with corporate governance system.  
Moreover, we find that firms in Ghana and Nigeria are negatively significant relation 
with corporate governance system. However, firms in South Africa that is used as a 
reference category have a positive significant relation with corporate governance system. 
This finding suggests that South African firms seem to have better corporate governance 
system than firms in Ghana and Nigeria. This may be due to the past reforms carried out by 
South Africa government on corporate governance practices of firms such as the King 
Reports of corporate governance (1994, 2002 and 2010). The Reports followed the corporate 
governance international standard such as Cadbury report of UK and OECD guideline on 
corporate governance practices. 
 Furthermore, Table 4.1 columns 3, and 5 illustrate the OLS estimate at country level for 
firms in Ghana, and South Africa, as evidence in each country. We find that regulatory 
framework and enforcement have a positive significant relation with corporate governance.  
In Column 4 for Nigerian firms the result shows that regulatory framework has negative 
significant relation with corporate governance system. This result implies that Nigerian 
corporate governance may have a   weak regulatory framework that can promote sound 
corporate governance. In addition, this finding reveals that in Nigeria there may be a lack of 
enforcement of corporate governance. Also in Nigerian firms ownership is concentrated as a 
result of lack of enforcement of corporate governance. 
In Table 4.1 Column 4 in Nigeria, there is evidence of low value of R-square. The 
reason for this value there may be other factors that can affect corporate governance system 
which are not mention in this study.  
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4.2 Effect of institutional characteristics on rules and laws of corporate governance 
This section reports the empirical evidences on effect of institutional characteristics on   
rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices of firms for all the countries 
together. Below are the models estimate and the results of data analysis on Table 4.2.  
The Model estimate on regulatory framework of corporate governance in section C is as 
follow below; 
1. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Stk_Mkt12) +  β2(Dis_Com15)  + β3(Ind_Bod16) β4(G) + β5(N) + μi  
The Model estimate on enforcement of corporate governance in section D is as follow 
bellow; 
2. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Non_compl17) +  β2(Invtr_Prot18)    + β3(Mino_Shdt19) β4(G) + β5(N) + μi   
The Model estimate on disclosure and transparency in section E is as follow bellow; 
3. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Insd_Trad20) +  β2(Inform_Accf21)   + β3(Aud_Indpend22) + β4(MA_23)+ β5(G) + β6(N) + μi  
The Model estimate on shareholder rights in section F is as follow bellow; 
4. Rule_cg= β0 +  β1(Shd_rigt24) +  β2(Shd_Violt25)   + β3(Shd_Allg27) +β4(G) + β5(N) + μi  
The Model estimate on ownership concentration in section G is as follow bellow; 
5. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Larg_Con29) +  β2(Pref_Treat30)   + β3(G) + β4(N) + μi 
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Table 4.2   OLS estimate on sub-variable of institutional characteristics on rules and laws in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries  
Dependent variable: rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice (Q8) 
 Regulatory 
framework   
(Section C) 
 
          ( 1) 
 
                    Enforcement (Section D) 
                            (2) 
 
Disclosure & Transparency (Section E) 
                      (3) 
 
Shareholders’ rights  
        (Section F) 
       
             ( 4) 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
(Section G) 
      ( 5) 
     
Variable Disclosu
re (Q15) 
 (1a) 
Independe
nt board 
(Q16) (1b) 
Non-compliance 
(Q17)  
      (2a) 
Investor 
protection      
(Q18) 
      (2b) 
Minority 
Shareholder 
(Q19)   (2c) 
Insider 
Trading 
(Q20) (3a) 
Information 
Access 
(Q21) 
       ( 3b) 
Auditor 
Independent 
(Q22) 
 ( 3c) 
Shareholder 
rights (Q24) 
 
      (4a) 
shareholder 
alignment 
(Q27) 
 ( 4b) 
Preferential 
Treatment  
      (Q30) 
      ( 5a) 
 0.09* 
0.05 
(1.89 
0.19** 
0.04 
(4.32) 
0.11** 
0.03 
(3.43) 
0.09* 
0.04 
(2.10) 
0.22** 
0.40 
(5.50) 
0.12** 
0.04 
(2.92) 
0.20** 
0.40 
(5.01) 
-0.10** 
0.03 
(-3.05) 
0.10* 
0.05 
(2.34) 
-0.11* 
0.04 
(-2.39) 
-0.18** 
0.05 
(-3.77) 
Ghana -1.87** 
0.13 
(-14.04) 
-1.63** 
0.14 
(-12.01) 
-1.73** 
0.13 
(-12.84) 
-2.13** 
0.12 
(-17.31) 
-2.26** 
0.12 
(-19.44) 
Nigeria -2.16** 
0.13 
(-16.19) 
-2.08** 
0.13 
(-16.63) 
-2.09** 
0.13 
(-16.47) 
-2.29** 
0.13 
(-17.46) 
-2.48** 
0.11 
(-23.44) 
R-square 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.53 
F-stat. 88.70  138.46 112.76 95.16 119.82 
No of 
observati
on 
541  541 541 541 541 
No of 
countries 
3  3 3 3 3 
 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice (Rules_cg) The Independent variables are regulatory framework such as Disclosure (Q15)  
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Independent board (Q16), Enforcement such as Non-Compliance (Q17),Investor protection (Q18) and Minority shareholders (Q19).Disclosure and transparency such as Insider trading (Q20), 
information access (Q21), and Auditor independent (Q22). Shareholders’ rights (Q24) and Shareholders’ alignment with board of directors (Q27). Ownership concentration such as preferential treatment of large 
shareholders (Q30).  
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South Africa. 
 There is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples. The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the parentheses 
refer to t-statistics. F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
  *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
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The Key results from the above Table 4.2 are based on the opinion of the respondents include 
the following; 
1. Proper disclosure and communication of rules and regulation (Q15) is likely to improve 
rules and laws corporate governance practices. 
2. When there are rules and regulations regarding the required independent status of board 
(Q16) consequently rules and laws for effective corporate governance may improve. 
3. Investigation of non-compliance (Q17) may strengthen the rules and laws that promote 
effective corporate governance practice. 
4. When there is appropriate legal protection of investors and creditors from fraud penetrated 
by managers and controlling shareholders (Q18) seem to enhance rules and laws for effective 
corporate governance practices. 
5. When there is appropriate mechanism for investigating the illegal or inappropriate 
treatment of minority shareholder (Q19) this is more likely to improve rules and laws on 
effective corporate governance practices. 
6. Insider trading (Q20), information access (Q21) and merger and acquisition (Q23) may 
increase the quality of rules and laws that promote sound corporate governance practices. 
7. The basic shareholder rights (Q24) seem to enhance rules and laws; however shareholder 
alignment (Q27) hinders rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices. 
8. Preferential treatment to larger shareholder (Q30) may hinder rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance. 
In summary from the above finding the following sub-variables matter in order to promote 
effective corporate governance practice; 
1. There are rules and regulations regarding the required independent status of board 
members (Q16) seem to improve rules and laws that promote corporate governance. 
2. When there are appropriate mechanism for investigating the illegal or inappropriate 
treatment of minority shareholders (Q19) this may enhance rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance. 
3. When there is equal access to information for all shareholders in firms (Q23) this is likely 
to bring effective rules and laws that promote good corporate governance. 
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Table 4.2 indicate the estimate result for each sub-variable of regulatory framework, 
enforcement, disclosure and transparency, shareholders’ rights, and ownership concentration 
on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice.  
Table 4.2 Column 1 (1a and 1b) the OLS estimate indicates that regulatory framework 
such as rules and regulatory for disclosure and communication and required independent 
status of board members (disclosure Q15) and (independent board Q16) respectively have 
significant positive effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice.  
In Table 4.2 Column 2 (2a, 2b, and 2c), we find that sufficient investigation of apparent 
non-compliance with rules and regulations (non-compliance Q17) Investor protection (Q18) 
and minority shareholder (Q19). These sub-variables have a positive effect on rules and laws 
that promote corporate governance practice. This result suggest that non-compliance, legal 
protection of investors and mechanism of investing inappropriate treatment of minority 
shareholders matter to improve rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices.   
Table 4.2 Column 3 (3a, 3b and 3c provide the estimate of insider trading laws (Q20), 
and equal access of information for all shareholders (Q21) these two sub-variables have a 
positive effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices. This implies 
that the insider trading rules, laws and regulation, in addition to equal accesses of information 
for all shareholders increase the quality of rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
practices in the region. However, confidence in the autonomy and independence of auditors 
(Q22) has a negative significant relationship with rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practice. This finding suggests that confidence in autonomy and independence of 
auditors may inhibit rules and laws that promote corporate governance and this because of 
corrupt practices among the auditors.  
In Table 4.2 Column 4 (4a and 4b) we find that basic rights protections of shareholders 
(Q24) has a significant positive relationship on of rules and laws. This result indicates that 
when the basic shareholders rights are protected corporate governance practice seem to be 
improving because shareholders may be able to exercise their own rights in the firms they 
invested in; this can allow them to get their return and invest more to the company. As a 
result, this can lead to effective corporate governance practices. Also, when shareholders are 
allowed to speak at company meeting only if they are to agree with board of directors 
(Shareholder alignment Q27) have a negative impact on rules and laws. This evidence 
suggests that this may adversely affect the corporate governance practice by not allowing 
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shareholders to express their feeling or opinion at the meeting. In Column 5 sub-variable 
under ownership concentration which is preferential treatment for larger shareholder (Q30) 
have negative significant effect on corporate governance across countries in the region.  
4.3 Results of the effect of institutional characteristic on corporate governance based on 
each country  
This section presents the empirical evidences on effect of institutional characteristics on 
rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices of firms for each of the country. 
Below are the models estimate and the results of data analysis on Table 4.3.  
 The Model estimate on regulatory framework of corporate governance in section C is 
as follow below; 
1. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Stk_Mkt12) + β2(Bod_Nom14) + β3(Dis_Com15)  + β4(Ind_Bod16) + μi  
The Model estimate on enforcement of corporate governance in section D is as follow 
bellow; 
2. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Non_compl17) +  β2(Invtr_Prot18)    + β3(Mino_Shdt19) + μi  
The Model estimate on disclosure and transparency in section E is as follow bellow; 
3. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Insd_Trad20) +  β2(Inform_Accf21)   + β3(Aud_Indpend22) + β4(MA_23+ μi  
The Model estimate on shareholder rights in section F is as follow bellow; 
4. Rule_cg= β0 +  β1(Shd_rigt24) +  β2(Shd_Violt25)   + β3(Shd_Allg27) + μi  
The Model estimate on ownership concentration in section G is as follow bellow; 
5. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Larg_Con29) +  β2(Pref_Treat30)   +  μi  
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Table 4.3 showing OLS estimate on institutional characteristics and rules and laws of corporate governance of in each country  
Dependent Variable: Rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice 
 Regulatory framework  (Section C) 
(1) 
   Enforcement  (Section D) 
(2) 
  Disclosure & Transparency  (Section E) 
(3) 
Shareholders’ rights 
      (Section  F) 
(4) 
Ownership 
concentration 
(Section G) 
(5) 
 Stock Mkt 
  (Q12) 
    
( 1a) 
Board  
Nominat
ion 
(Q14)  
(1b) 
Disclosu
re (Q15) 
 
 
(1c) 
Indepen
dent  
Board  
(Q16) 
 ( 1d) 
Non- 
Compl
iance 
(Q17) 
(2a) 
Investor 
Protection 
(Q18) 
 
  ( 2b) 
Minority 
Shareholde
r (Q19) 
 
 ( 2c) 
Insider 
trading 
(20) 
 
     (3a) 
Informatio
n access  
 (Q21) 
 
 (3b) 
Auditor 
independe
nt (Q22) 
 
   ( 3c) 
Merger 
& 
Acquisiti
on (Q23) 
 ( 3d) 
Shareholder 
Rights (Q24) 
     
       
 (4a) 
 
Shareholde
r violation 
(Q25) 
 
 (4b) 
Large 
Concentrat
ion (Q29) 
 
   ( 5a) 
Preferen
tial 
Treatme
nt (Q30) 
(5b) 
Ghana -0.01 
0.06 
(-0.21) 
0.23** 
0.08 
(2.72) 
0.33* 
0.08 
(4.26) 
-0.24** 
0.08 
(-2.94) 
0.29** 
0.08 
(3.58) 
0.39** 
0.08 
(4.97) 
0.19* 
0.08 
(2.35) 
0.15* 
0.07 
(2.24) 
0.46** 
0.07 
(6.68) 
-0.06 
0.05 
(-1.14) 
0.17* 
0.08 
(2.17) 
0.21* 
0.11 
(2.04) 
0.06 
0.12 
(0.48) 
-0.21 
0.12 
(-1.81) 
-0.44** 
0.09 
(-4.83) 
R-square 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.15 0.15 0.31 0.31 
F-stat 16.85 16.85 16.85 16.85 73.79 73.79 73.79 37.54 37.54 37.54 37.54 6.41 6.41 21.33 21.33 
Nigeria 0.08* 
0.04 
(1.91) 
0.03 
0.06 
(0.50) 
 
-0.04 
0.06 
(-0.79) 
-0.10* 
0.05 
(-2.28) 
-0.12* 
0.04 
(-2.69) 
0.09 
0.05 
(1.82) 
-0.01 
0.05 
(-2.14) 
-0.06 
0.05 
(-1.17) 
-0.03 
0.05 
(-0.68) 
0.08 
0.04 
(1.77) 
0.01 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.07 
0.05 
(1.32) 
-0.12* 
0.06 
(-2.06) 
0.10* 
0.05 
(1.91) 
-0.04 
0.05 
(-0.83) 
R-square   0.3   0.3   0.3   0.3 025 0.25 0.25 37.54 37.54 37.54 37.54 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 
F-stat 7.14 7.14 7.14 7.14 2.74 2.74 2.74 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.39 1.39 1.24 1.24 
South 
Africa 
-0.01 
0.09 
(-0.15) 
0.15 
0.12 
(1.30) 
0.13 
0.09 
(1.41) 
-0.03 
0.09 
(-0.33) 
0.01 
0.07 
(0.09) 
 
0.06 
0.10 
(0.60) 
0.20* 
0.09 
(2.26) 
0.04 
0.13 
(0.31) 
0.02 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.17* 
0.09 
(1.97) 
0.06 
0.10 
(0.54) 
-0.02 
0.11 
(-0.19) 
0.10 
0.10 
(0.92) 
0.01 
0.11 
(0.59) 
 
-0.09 
0.10 
(-0.88) 
R-square  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.26 0.4 0.4 
F-stat  2.19  2.19  2.19  2.19 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Total No. 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 
 
 The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws (Q8). The Independent variables are regulatory framework such as stock market listing rules (Q12).Board nomination 
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 (Q14) Disclosure (Q15), Independent board (Q16). Enforcement such as Non-compliance (Q17), investors protection (Q18) and Minority shareholders (Q19) Disclosure and transparency such 
as Insider trading (Q20), information access (Q21), and Auditor independent (Q22) Shareholders’ rights such as protection of shareholders’ rights (Q24) and Shareholders’ alignment with board of directors 
(Q27).Ownership concentration such as large concentration (Q29) preferential treatment of large shareholders (Q30).  
There is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples. The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the parentheses 
refer to t-statistics. F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
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The Key findings from the above Table 4.3 are based on the perception of the respondents 
which include the following; 
Table 4.3.1 showing the differences and similarities on the key finding from Table 4.3   
                Ghana      Nigeria       South  Africa 
1. Independent board (Q16) 
may inhibit rules and laws that 
improve effective corporate 
governance in Ghanaian firms. 
1. Independent board (Q16) 
may inhibit rules and laws that 
improve effective corporate 
governance in Nigerian firms 
 
 2.The regulation on stock 
market (Q12) is likely to 
strengthen rules and laws that 
promote effective corporate 
governance 
 
 3.Investigation of non-
compliance (Q17) seems to 
deter rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance 
in Nigerian firms 
 
 4. Shareholders violation (Q25) 
Are likely to inhibit rules and 
laws that promote corporate 
governance practice in Nigerian 
firms.  
 
 5. Large concentration (few 
shareholder having majority of 
shares (Q25) has significant 
effect on rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance 
practice. This in turn may 
weaken corporate governance 
practice in Nigerian firms. 
 
  6.Auditor independence (Q22) 
may provide better rules and 
laws that promote sound 
corporate governance practice 
in South Africa 
  7. In South Africa there are 
appropriate mechanisms for 
investigating the illegal or 
inappropriate treatment of 
minority shareholder (Q19) this 
seems to improve effective rules 
and laws on corporate 
governance.  
 
At each country level Table 4.3 column 1b and 1c show that it is only firms in Ghana 
that disclosure (Q15) has a positive significant relationship on rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance practices. In addition, Independents board (Q16) also has a positive 
significant association on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice.  
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Moreover, board nomination (Q14) enhances the promotion of rules and laws on 
corporate governance practice in Ghanaian firms. This implies that for Ghanaian firms the 
rules and regulation for disclosure and communication are better follow. This seem to  allow 
the shareholders and other stakeholders to have information about what is going on within 
their firms; and other matters that are related to disclosure and disseminating of information 
to the potential shareholders.  
In Nigeria firms stock market listing rules (Q12) has positive significant relation with 
on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. This finding shows what is 
happening in Nigerian capital markets presently which result to weak implementation of 
rules and regulation guiding the capital markets. As a result, most investors do not have 
confident to invest in Nigerian Capital Markets. 
In Nigerian firms the rules and regulation required for independent board member (Q16) 
is negatively significant on rules and laws. However, the rules and regulation regarding the 
required independent status of board seem to deter corporate governance system. This is may 
be  due to lack of implementation by the regulatory agencies of corporate governance such  as 
Securities Exchange Commission in Nigeria (SEC) that stipulated that a minimum of five 
members with a majority of non-executive directors; and not more than two of the same 
family should sit at the same time on the board of a  firm. In addition, there should not be 
cross membership of the boards of two or more companies, to avoid conflict of interest and 
misappropriate of corporate opportunity.  
Moreover, in Table 4.3 Column 2 (2a, 2b and 2c), we find that all enforcement of 
corporate governance sub-variables in Ghanaian firms have a positive significant relationship 
on rules and laws guiding promotion of corporate governance practice. This result suggests 
that Ghana enforcement policy and the enforcement agency may improve corporate 
governance system in terms of rules and laws. There are Institutional bodies such as Ghana 
Securities Exchange Commission, Bank of Ghana, Institute of Directors and Registered 
General Department (RGD). All these bodies are involved in implementation so as to ensure 
that enforcement of good corporate governance practices of firms are adopted in Ghana. They 
carry out their function through seminars, public lecture, and training to different categories 
of stakeholders of corporate governance in Ghana.   
In South African firms’ mechanism for investigating the illegal or inappropriate 
treatment of minority shareholders (Q19) has a positive effect on rules and laws guiding 
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promotion of corporate governance practice. This may be due to compliance of the King 
Report Code of corporate governance which strengthened rules and laws on corporate 
governance in South Africa. The structure, strategy and governance of capital markets in 
South Africa have also been overhauled. The self regulation via Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange have also introduced stringent corporate governance requirement so that 
implementation of enforcement policy can be improve corporate governance system.      
Furthermore, there is evidence within Nigerian firms’ that enforcement of corporate 
governance variable such as sufficient investigation of apparent non-compliance with 
laws/regulations (Q17) has a negative impact on rules and laws guiding promotion of 
corporate governance practice.  
This result indicates that in Nigerian firms the degree of investigation on non-
compliance with laws or regulations by enforcement agency seem to be  very weak to move 
the corporate governance system forward in terms of rules and regulation. This may be due 
to lack of implementation of enforcement policy of non-compliance with laws and 
regulation by institutional bodies such Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN), National Insurance Commission (NICOM), and Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC). In addition, corruption by the officers of these institutional bodies may 
also make it difficult for them to carry out their proper duties of enforcing the rules and 
laws.  
Based on results within countries level in Table 4.3 Column 3 (3a, 3b 3c and 3d) which 
shows the estimate for sub-variables under disclosure of corporate governance and on rules 
and laws guiding promotion of corporate governance practice.  Thus, in Ghana firm there is 
evidence of positive effect of insider trading laws (Q20) and positive effect of equal access of 
information for all shareholders in firms on rules and laws .There is also positive effect of 
Transparency in the merger and acquisition of firms (Q21) on rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance practice. This results indicate that the quality of disclosure and 
transparency in term of insiders trading laws, equal access to information to all shareholders 
and transparency in the merger and acquisition for Ghanaian firms have enhance the 
promotion of rules and laws that guide corporate governance practice in Ghanaian firms.  
In South African firms, confidence in the autonomy and independence of auditors (Q22) 
has a significant positive relationship with rules and laws guiding promotion of corporate 
governance practice. This evidence is because of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
Chapter Four: Results of the data analysis on  institutional characteristics  of corporate governance 
173 
 
that carried out innovation in disclosure and transparency aimed at exposing conflict of 
interest among the stakeholders of corporate governance. This action is carried out by 
compulsory requirement for listed firms to disclose their compliance with King Reports on 
issue of disclosure and transparency that indicate the level of confidence in the autonomy and 
independence of auditor.   
Moreover, in Table 4.3 Columns 4a and 4b. We find that shareholders rights such as 
basic rights to protection of shareholders are not protected (Q24) has a positive effect on rules 
and laws guiding promotion of corporate governance practice of firms in Ghana. This finding 
supports the World Bank ROSC (2005) report on Ghana that revealed that in West Africa 
Sub-region Ghana have better basic shareholder protections and this can improve corporate 
governance practice. However, in Nigerian firms the degree of violation of minority 
shareholder rights (Q25) has a negative influence on rules and laws guiding promotion of 
corporate governance practice. This implies that minority shareholder rights violations are 
more prominent within Nigerian firms; this may be due to lack of implementation of 
enforcement policy and law regarding to minority shareholders rights in Nigerian firms. 
Furthermore, conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders as well as those 
between controlling and minority shareholders lie at the heart of the corporate governance 
literature. With the exception of the US and the UK, ownership concentration is commonly 
high in all parts of the world. As a result Table 4.2 and 4.3 Column 5a and 5b reveals that in 
Nigerian firms’ larger concentration of ownership (Q29) have a significant negative 
relationship with rules and laws that guide promotion of corporate governance practice. This 
finding suggests that when there is large concentrated ownership the controlling owner may 
be unwilling to dilute their ownership. This is generally known as non-dilution of 
entrenchment (Claessens et.al 2002) and this is likely affect the corporate governance system.  
In addition, in Ghanaian firms, preferential treatment to large shareholders (Q30) has a 
significant negative relationship with rules and laws that guide promotion of corporate 
governance practice. This result may affect effective corporate governance practice in 
Ghanaian firms because the minority shareholders may not be able to express their own on 
decision taken by management of firms. 
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4.4 The regulatory bodies and non- regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance for 
firms  
This section provides the effect of institutional characteristic (such as regulatory 
framework, enforcement, disclosure and transparency, shareholders rights and ownership 
concentration) on corporate governance system of firms. The results of the data analysis on 
each table for each section are classified into two categories such as regulatory bodies and 
non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance of firms.  
4.4.1 Result on effect of institutional characteristics and corporate governance system using 
respondents from regulatory bodies of corporate governance  
Table 4.4.1 below provides the result of institutional characteristic on corporate 
governance system using respondents from regulatory bodies of corporate governance. Below 
are the models estimate and the Table showing results of data analysis. 
Table 4.4.1: Showing OLS estimate of Institutional characteristics on corporate governance system for 
respondents from regulatory bodies  
Total_cg = β0 +β1(Trfw_C) + β2 (Tenfm_D) + β3(Tdis_E) + β4(Tshrt_F) + β5(Towc_G) +β6(RG) + β7(RN) + μi    
 Dependent variable: Total effective corporate governance system 
 
 
All observation All observation 
including Ghana 
&Nigeria as 
dummy  
variables 
Ghana Nigeria South Africa 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 7.22** 
1.60 
(4.53) 
14.20** 
2.50 
(5.67) 
6.30* 
3.11 
(2.03) 
11.56** 
2.80 
(4.13) 
11.33* 
4.50 
(2.27) 
 
 
Regulatory 
framework 
 
-0.06 
0.05 
(-1.11) 
-0.08 
0.05 
(-1.52) 
-0.01 
0.12 
(-0.01) 
-0.13 
0.09 
(-1.53) 
0.13 
0.12 
(1.07) 
Enforcement 
 
0.48** 
0.09 
(5.42) 
0.26* 
0.10 
(2.59) 
0.32 
0.18 
(1.76) 
0.08 
0.10 
(0.82) 
 
0.33 
0.24 
(1.40) 
Disclosure 
&transparency 
 
0.21** 
0.08 
(2.72) 
 
0.12 
0.08 
(1.57) 
0.28* 
0.14 
(1.95) 
-0.01 
0.12 
(-0.11) 
0.12 
0.43 
(0.28) 
Shareholders’ 
rights 
 
-0.07 
0.05 
(-1.38) 
-0.00 
0.05 
(-0.07) 
-0.11 
0.11 
(-1.06) 
0.06 
0.15 
(0.39) 
-0.24 
0.57 
-0.42 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
0.23* 
0.09 
(2.57) 
0.06 
0.10 
(0.62) 
0.25 
0.16 
(1.52) 
0.26 
0.16 
(1.61) 
0.16 
0.12 
(1.30) 
Ghana  -3.73** 
0.93 
(-4.03) 
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Nigeria  -2.41** 
0.90 
(-2.68) 
   
R-square 0.35 0.44 0.41 0.09 0.46 
F-statistic 12.53 12.87 4.36 1.55 0.69 
No of 
observation 
125 125 38 77 10 
The dependent variable is indicated as total corporate governance system which is represented by corporate 
governance system is the addition of all the items or variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The 
Independent variables are regulatory framework is shown as total regulatory framework which is the addition of all 
items or variables under section C of the survey questionnaire, enforcement is illustrated as total enforcement 
which is the addition of all the items or variable under section D of the survey questionnaire, transparency and 
disclosure is shown as total disclosure and transparency which is the addition of all items or variable within section 
E of the survey questionnaire, Total shareholders’ rights  is the addition of all items under shareholders rights in 
section F, and  ownership concentration is the total items or variable under section G of the survey questionnaire. 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South Africa there is a  test 
for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
The key results from Table 4.4.1 are based on the opinion of the respondents include the 
following: 
1. The respondents from regulatory bodies believe that enforcement of corporate governance 
is likely to improve corporate governance system in all the countries together.  
2. In Ghanaian firms respondents from regulatory bodies indicate that disclosure and 
transparency may enhance better corporate governance system. 
Table 4.4.1 Column 2 the estimate shows that enforcement of corporate governance has a 
significant positive effect on corporate governance system. This implies that enforcement of 
corporate governance plays a vital role to improve corporate governance practice of firms. 
Thus, the dummy variable proxies as Ghana and Nigerian firms have a significant negative 
relationship on corporate governance system. This indicates that the regulatory bodies of 
corporate of firms in Ghana and Nigeria reveal that Ghanaian firms and Nigerian firms are 
less likely to increase quality of corporate governance system. This result also suggests that 
there may be weak implementation of the corporate governance codes of best practices of 
firms in both countries.  
Table 4.4.1 Column 3 illustrates the results of the data analysis for regulatory bodies’ 
category at each country level for firms in Ghana. The result shows that only disclosure and 
transparency have a positive significant relationship with corporate governance system.  
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4.4.2 Results on the effect of corporate governance system and institutional characteristics of 
corporate governance using respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate 
governance  
Table 4.4.2 below provides the result of institutional characteristic on corporate 
governance system using respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate 
governance. Below are the models estimate and the Table reports the results of data analysis. 
Table 4.4.2: Showing OLS estimate on corporate governance system and institutional 
characteristics of corporate governance using respondents from non-regulator of firms  
Total_cg = β0 +β1(Trfw_C) + β2 (Tenfm_D) + β3(Tdis_E) + β4(Tshrt_F) + β5(Towc_G) +β6(RG) + β7(RN) + μi    
Dependent variable: Total effective corporate governance system 
 
 
All observation All observation 
including Ghana 
&Nigeria as 
dummy  
variables 
Ghana Nigeria South Africa 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 5.98** 
1.13 
(5.31) 
15.20** 
1.22 
(11.85) 
9.02** 
1.73 
(5.22) 
13.11 
1.50 
(8.79) 
9.50** 
2.76 
(3.60) 
Regulatory 
framework 
 
0.08* 
0.03 
(2.56) 
0.02 
0.03 
(0.56) 
0.17** 
0.04 
(3.71) 
-0.06 
0.04 
(-1.57) 
0.16* 
0.07 
(2.26) 
Enforcement 
 
0.41** 
0.05 
(8.13) 
0.14** 
0.05 
(2.65) 
0.29** 
0.07 
(4.32) 
-0.05 
0.05 
(-0.98) 
0.33* 
0.16 
(2.08) 
Disclosure 
&transparency 
 
0.14** 
0.04 
(3.38) 
0.07* 
0.04 
(1.84) 
0.03 
0.05 
(0.64) 
0.09* 
0.05 
(1.73) 
0.03 
0.09 
(0.32) 
Shareholders’ 
rights 
 
-0.04 
0.03 
(-1.21) 
-0.03 
0.03 
(-0.99) 
0.02 
0.05 
(0.35) 
-0.07 
0.07 
(-1.00) 
-0.03 
0.03 
(-0.25) 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
0.23** 
0.07 
(3.36) 
0.05 
0.06 
(0.81) 
-0.09 
0.10 
(-0.92) 
0.10 
0.08 
(1.23) 
0.15 
0.10 
(1.43) 
Ghana  -4.55** 
0.38 
(-12.10) 
   
Nigeria  -3.57** 
0.37 
(-9.67) 
   
R-square 0.29 0.48 0.53 0.05 0.23 
F-statistic 32.93 53.26 23.77 2.30 3.25 
No of 
observation 
416 416 112 243 61 
The dependent variable is indicated as total corporate governance system which is represented by corporate 
governance system is the addition of all the items or variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The 
Independent variables are regulatory framework is shown as total regulatory framework which is the addition of all 
items or variables under section C of the survey questionnaire, enforcement is illustrated as total enforcement 
which is the addition of all the items or variable under section D of the survey questionnaire, transparency and 
disclosure is shown as total disclosure and transparency which is the addition of all items or variable within section 
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E of the survey questionnaire, Total shareholders’ rights  is the addition of all items under shareholders rights in 
section F, and  ownership concentration is the total items or variable under section G of the survey questionnaire. 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South Africa there is a test for 
outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
The main findings from the above Table are based on the opinion of the respondents include 
this the following; 
1.  The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholder indicate that enforcement of corporate 
governance is likely to improve corporate governance system in all the countries in the Sub-
region (SSAA) 
 2. In Ghanaian firms’ respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders show that disclosure 
and transparency can increase the quality of the corporate governance system. 
3. In Nigerian firms the respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders believe that disclosure 
and transparency may improve corporate governance system. 
In this section, we present analysis of the data for non-regulatory stakeholders’ category 
of corporate governance using all the countries as observation as it is shown in Table 4.4.2 
Column 2. There is evidence that enforcement, disclosure and transparency have a positive 
significant impact on corporate governance system. In addition, firms in Ghana and Nigerian 
firms have a negative significant relation with corporate governance system.  
Furthermore, Table 4.4.2 Column 3, 4 and 5 illustrates the OLS estimate at each country 
level, firms in Ghana and South Africa; we find that regulatory framework and enforcement 
have a positive significant relation with corporate governance. This evidence implies that the 
non-regulatory respondent indicate that regulatory framework and enforcement of corporate 
governance seem to promote corporate governance of firms in Ghana and South Africa. 
4.5 Results of sub-variables of corporate governance system and sub-variables of 
institutional characteristics of corporate governance of firms  
In this section we present the empirical analysis of the sub-variables of institutional 
characteristic of corporate governance on corporate governance system in term of rules and 
laws.  
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4.5.1 Results on the effect of sub-variables of corporate governance system and institutional 
characteristics of corporate governance using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-
regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance in SSAA 
 This section provides Table 4.5.1 below shown the result of sub-variables of 
institutional characteristic on sub-variables of corporate governance system using 
respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance. Below are also the 
models estimate and the Table illustrating results of data analysis 
The Model estimate on regulatory framework of corporate governance in section C is as 
follow below; 
1. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Stk_Mkt12) +  β2(Dis_Com15)  + β3(Ind_Bod16) β4(G) + β5(N) + μi   
The Model estimate on enforcement of corporate governance in section D is as follow 
bellow; 
2. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Non_compl17) +  β2(Invtr_Prot18)    + β3(Mino_Shdt19) β4(G) + β5(N) + μi  
The Model estimate on disclosure and transparency in section E is as follow bellow; 
3. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Insd_Trad20) +  β2(Inform_Accf21)   + β3(Aud_Indpend22) + β4(MA_23)+ β5(G) + β6(N) + μi  
The Model estimate on shareholder rights in section F is as follow bellow; 
4. Rule_cg= β0 +  β1(Shd_rigt24) +  β2(Shd_Violt25)   + β3(Shd_Allg27) +β4(G) + β5(N) + μi  
 
The Model estimate on ownership concentration in section G is as follow bellow; 
5. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Larg_Con29) +  β2(Pref_Treat30)   + β3(G) + β4(N) + μi  
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Table 4.5.1: Showing OLS estimate on Sub-variables of institutional characteristics and rules and laws based on respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders  
Dependent variable: rule and law that promote corporate governance 
                 
                    Regulatory  Bodies 
 
                                  Non-Regulatory Stakeholders 
 
Variable              Enforcement 
                   ( 1) 
           (Section D) 
Disclosure & 
Trspy 
(2) (Section E) 
Ownership  
Conc. 
(3) Section (G) 
Regulatory  
Frame Work 
    ( 4) (Section E) 
 
Enforcement  
           (Section D) 
                  (5) 
Shareholders’ rights 
               ( 6) 
Ownership 
Conc.    ( 7) 
 
 Non-
Compliance 
(Q17) 
(1a) 
Minority  
Shareholder 
(Q19) 
(1b) 
Information  
Access  
(Q21 )      
 (2a) 
Large 
concentration 
  (Q29) 
 (3a) 
Independent  
Board  (Q16) 
 
 ( 4a) 
Non-
Compliance 
(Q17) 
(5a) 
Investor 
Protection 
  ( Q 18)    
   ( 5b)   
Minority 
Sharehol
der (Q19) 
( 5c) 
Shareholder 
rights  (Q24) 
 
      (6a) 
Shareholder 
alignment 
  (Q27) 
   ( 6b) 
Preferential 
Treatment 
(Q30) 
       (7a) 
 0.19* 
0.08 
(2.40) 
0.28** 
0.09 
(2.99) 
 
 
0.24* 
0.10 
(2.31) 
-0.26* 
0.13 
(-2.07) 
 
 
0.22** 
0.05 
(4.48) 
0.11* 
0.05 
(2.22) 
0.09** 
0.04 
(2.62) 
0.21** 
0.04 
(4.75) 
0.13** 
0.05 
(2.62) 
-2.14* 
0.13 
(-2.18) 
-0.17** 
0.05 
(-3.17) 
Constant                  2.51** 
                0.50 
                  (4.98) 
       
2.64** 
0.54 
(4.89) 
5.84** 
0.60 
(9.80) 
3.85** 
0.21 
(18.06) 
                     2.97** 
                     0.22 
                   ( 13.37) 
             4.56** 
             0.32 
             (14.47) 
5.21** 
0.33 
(15.70) 
Ghana                  -1.39** 
                  0.35 
                 (-3.94) 
                    
-1.15** 
0.39 
(-2.96) 
-2.32** 
0.30 
(-7.78) 
-1.88** 
0.15 
(-12.99) 
-1.65** 
0.15 
(-11.08) 
 
-2.14** 
0.13 
(-16.12) 
2.26** 
0.13 
(-17.66) 
Nigeria                 -1.90** 
                  0.34 
                (-5.53) 
-1.46** 
0.38 
(-3.90) 
-2.39** 
0.28 
(-8.53) 
-2.20** 
0.14 
(-15.32) 
-2.10** 
0.14 
(-15.54) 
-2.23** 
0.14 
(16.25) 
-2.51** 
0.12 
(21.81) 
R-square                0.43 0.43 0.44 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.55 
F-stat.              17.93 15.05 18.43 79.24 121.99 85.37 101.58 
No of 
observation 
            541 541 541 541 541 541 541 
No of 
countries 
             3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
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 The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws (Q8). The Independent variables are regulatory framework such as stock market listing rules (Q12).Board nomination 
 (Q14) Disclosure (Q15), Independent board (Q16). Enforcement such as Non-compliance (Q17), investors protection (Q18) and Minority shareholders (Q19) Disclosure and transparency such 
as Insider trading (Q20), information access (Q21), and Auditor independent (Q22) Shareholders’ rights such as protection of shareholders’ rights (Q24) and Shareholders’ alignment with board of directors 
(Q27).Ownership concentration such as large concentration (Q29) preferential treatment of large shareholders (Q30).  
There is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples. The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the parentheses 
refer to t-statistics. F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
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The key results of the above Table are based on the opinion of the respondents this include 
following; 
1. The respondents from regulatory bodies believe that investigation of non-compliance 
(Q17) and minority shareholder (Q19) are likely to boost the rules and laws that promote 
effective corporate governance practice  
2. The respondents from regulatory bodies indicated that information access (Q21) can 
enhance rules and laws that promote effective corporate governance practice.  
3. The respondents from regulatory bodies view that large concentration (few shareholder 
having majority of shares, (Q29) may deters rules and laws that promote effective corporate 
governance practice. 
4. The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholder believe that independent board (Q16) is 
likely to promote rules and laws that guide corporate governance practices. 
5. The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholder indicate that investigation of non-
compliance (Q17), investor protection (Q18) and minority shareholder (Q19) may improve 
the quality on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice.  
6. The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholder show that basic shareholder rights (Q24) 
is likely to enhance rules and laws on corporate governance, however shareholders alignment 
(27)  seem to hinders the rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices. 
7. The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholder view that preferential treatment of large 
shareholders (Q30) may deter rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices. 
The result in the regulatory bodies’ category in Table 4.5.1 column 1 indicates that under 
the enforcement of corporate governance non-compliance with law/regulations (Q17) in 
Column 1a has a positive influence on rules and laws that promote corporate governance.  
In addition, minority shareholder (Q19) in column 1b also has a positive significant with 
rules and laws that promote corporate governance. This result implies that regulator bodies of 
corporate governance shows that compliance and treatment of minority shareholders can 
enhance rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
In Table 4.5.1 Column 2, there is disclosure and transparency under this is equal access 
of information for all shareholders (Q21) in column 2a. We find that equal access of 
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information for all shareholders have positive significant association on rules and laws. This 
finding indicates that equal access of information to shareholders seems to enhance 
promotion of rules and laws that guide promotion of corporate governance practice.  
Moreover, in column 3a large concentration of ownership (Q29) has a negative effect on 
rules and laws that promote corporate governance. This result implies that large ownership 
concentration hinders the rules and laws that promote corporate governance; this may result 
to a lack of proper protection for the minority shareholders rights in firms. 
Furthermore, Table 4.5. 1 which is the right hand side of the Table, the result of the data 
analysis is for   non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance of firms. In Column 4a 
under the regulatory framework, independent status of board members (Q16) has a significant 
positive relation with corporate governance in terms of rules and laws. This shows that laws 
regarding to independent status of board members have an impact on the rules and laws that 
guide the promotion of corporate governance.  
Under the enforcement of corporate governance in Column 5 non-compliance with 
law/regulations (Q17) have a positive significant relationship with corporate governance 
system in terms of rules and laws. Others such as protection of investors (Q18) in Column 5b 
and minority shareholder (Q19) in Column 5c also have a positive significant relationship on 
rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. The above results imply that 
enforcement of corporate governance important in all the countries. 
In addition, in Table 4.5.1 in Column 6a under the shareholders rights that there are basic 
rights protections of shareholders (Q24) has a positive effect on rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance. In column 6b when shareholders are allowed to speak at company 
meeting only if they are agree with the board of directors (Q27) is negatively significant with 
rules and laws. This result is consistent with the evidence from Table 4.2 Column 4 (4a and 
4b). Finally, in Column 7a under the ownership concentration there is preferential treatment 
of large (Q30) has a negative significant relation with rules and laws that promotes corporate 
governance. 
4.5.2 Results on the effect of sub-variable on corporate governance system and institutional 
characteristic of corporate governance using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-
regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance for firms in Ghana 
This section provides Table 4.5.3 below showing the result of sub-variables of 
institutional characteristic on sub-variables of corporate governance system using 
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respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance. Below are the 
models and the Table shows the results of data analysis 
The Model estimate on regulatory framework of corporate governance in section C is as 
follow below; 
1. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Stk_Mkt12) + β2(Bod_Nom14) +  β3(Dis_Com15)  + β4(Ind_Bod16)  + μi  
The Model estimate on enforcement of corporate governance in section D is as follow 
bellow; 
2. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Non_compl17) +  β2(Invtr_Prot18)    + β3(Mino_Shdt19)  + μi   
The Model estimate on disclosure and transparency in section E is as follow bellow; 
3. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Insd_Trad20) +  β2(Inform_Accf21)   + β3(Aud_Indpend22) + β4(MA_23) + μi  
The Model estimate on shareholder rights in section F is as follow bellow; 
4. Rule_cg= β0 +  β1(Shd_rigt24) +  β2(Shd_Violt25)   + β3(Shd_Allg27)  + μi  
The Model estimate on ownership concentration in section G is as follow bellow; 
5. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Larg_Con29) +  β2(Pref_Treat30)    + μi 
Chapter Four: Results of the data analysis on  institutional characteristics  of corporate governance 
184 
 
Table 4.5.2: Showing OLS estimate of rules and laws on institutional characteristics using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders of 
firms in Ghana 
Dependent variable: rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice 
 Regulatory Bodies                                                   Non-regulatory   Stakeholders 
Variables Enforcement 
(1) 
Disc. Trspy 
             ( 2) 
Owship  
Conc. (3) 
Regulatory frame Work (5) Enforcement   ( 6)      Disclosure  &  Trspy 
                 ( 7) 
Shareholders 
Rights   (8) 
Ownership 
Conc. (9) 
 Investor 
protection        
(Q18) 
       
      (1a) 
Information 
Access (Q21) 
          
      
      (2a) 
Preferential  
treatment 
(Q30) 
(3a) 
Board  
Nominatio
n (Q14) 
 
(5a) 
 
Disclosure 
(Q15) 
 
 
(5b) 
 
Indepen
dent 
(Q16) 
 
(5c) 
Non- 
Complia
nce 
(Q17) 
(6a) 
 Investor 
Protection 
(Q18) 
 
(6b) 
Insider 
Trading 
(Q20) 
 
   (7a) 
Informat
ion 
access 
(Q21) 
(7b) 
Merger 
& 
aqusition 
(Q23) 
(7c) 
Shareholder 
Rights 
 (Q24) 
 
(8a) 
Prefrential 
Treatment 
(Q30) 
     
 (9a) 
 0.57** 
0.15 
(3.76) 
0.55** 
0.21 
(2.67) 
-0.43* 
0.17 
(-2.58) 
0.21* 
0.10 
(2.07) 
0.37** 
0.09 
(3.97) 
-0.23* 
0.10 
(-2.28) 
0.42** 
0.10 
(4.39) 
0.35** 
0.10 
(3.71) 
0.15* 
0.08 
(2.02) 
0.46** 
0.08 
(6.01) 
0.19* 
0.09 
(2.19) 
0.24* 
0.12 
(1.93) 
-0.48** 
0.11 
(-4.40) 
Constant 0.57** 
0.29 
(2.00) 
0.55** 
0.43 
(1.28) 
3.82** 
0.79 
(4.84) 
                        1.63** 
                        0.48 
                       (3.41) 
                 0.26* 
                 0.16 
                  (1.66) 
                      0.73** 
                      0.27 
                    (2.71) 
0.24** 
0.75 
(3.25) 
 6.15** 
0.77 
(7.98) 
R-square 0.58 0.54 0.50                       0.38                  0.63                       0.51  0.16  0.28 
F-stat 15.82 9.85 11.11                       12.72                 61.81                         27.08   5.22   13.86 
No. of 
Observatio
n 
38 38 38                       112                 112                     112 112   112 
 
 The dependent variable is indicated as rule and law (Q8). The Independent variables are regulatory framework such as board nomination (Q14) Disclosure (Q15), independent board (Q16) 
Enforcement such as Non-compliance (Q17) and investors (Q18), Disclosure and transparency such as Insider trading (Q20), and information Access (Q21), Shareholders’ rights such as protection 
of shareholders’ rights (Q24) and Ownership concentration such as preferential treatment of large shareholders (Q30).  
There is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples. The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the parentheses 
refer to t-statistics. F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
 *significant at 5 percent level 
*Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors
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The findings from the above Table 4.5.2 are based on the opinion of the respondents include 
the following; 
1. The regulatory bodies show their view that investors protection (Q18) may increase the 
quality of rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices. 
3. The regulatory bodies indicate that preferential treatment (Q30) is likely to hinder rules 
and laws that enhance corporate governance practice. 
4. The non-regulatory stakeholders’ respondents believe that board nomination (Q14), and 
disclosure (Q15) are more likely to improve rules and laws that guide corporate governance 
practice. 
5. The non-regulatory stakeholder’ respondents show that independent board seem to weaken 
rules and laws for effective corporate governance practices. 
7. The non-regulatory stakeholders’ respondents found that insider trading (Q20), information 
access (Q21) and merger and acquisition (Q23) may boost rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance practices. 
In this section, we classified the data from various stakeholders of corporate governance 
of firms in Ghana into regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders’ respondents.  
We find that under regulatory bodies’ respondents’ sub-variables of enforcement of 
corporate such as investors’ protection (Q18) in Table 4.5.2 Column 1a has a positive 
association on rules and laws. The disclosure and transparency, and equal access of 
information to all shareholders (Q21)) in Table 4.5.2 Column 2a has a positive significant 
effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance.  
In addition, sub-variable under ownership structure which is preferential treatment of 
large shareholders (Q30) in Table 4.5.2 Column 3a has a negative significant effect on rules 
and laws. This finding implies that the regulatory bodies’ respondents in Ghana believe that 
investors’ protection, equal access to information to all shareholders are likely to promote 
rules and laws for corporate governance practices. However, preferential treatments of larger 
shareholders seem to hinder the promotion of rules and laws because this is against the 
principle and guideline for corporate governance practices.  
Furthermore, we estimate the non-regulatory data for this study and there is evidence that 
sub-variable under regulatory framework which are rules and regulations for board 
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nomination (Q14) in Column 5a has a positive significant impact on rules and laws. In 
addition, rules and regulations for disclosure and communication (Q15) in Column 5b have 
positive significant association on rules and laws for corporate governance. However, rules 
and regulations regarding independent status of board member (Q16) in Column 5c have a 
negative effect on of rules and laws. 
 The sub-variables under enforcement of corporate which are non-compliance with 
laws/regulation (Q17) in Column 6a, and investor protection (Q18) in Column 6b have a 
positive significant impact on rules and laws. In addition, we find that disclosure and 
transparency sub-variables such as insider trading (Q20) in Column 7a, equal access of 
information to shareholders (Q21) in Column 7b and transparency in merger and acquisition 
(Q23) in column 7c. All these sub-variables mention above have a positive significant impact 
on rules and laws.  
The sub-variable for shareholders’ rights which is basic rights protections of 
shareholders (Q24) in Column 8a has a significant positive association with rule and laws. 
From the above evidence, this implies that the non-regulatory stakeholders’ respondents in 
Ghana shows, non-compliance, insider trading, investor protection, equal access to 
information to all shareholders, basic shareholders rights and merger and acquisition are 
likely to promote rules and laws that promote corporate governance in Ghanaian firms.  
Non-regulatory stakeholders show that that independent status of board members (Q16) 
deters rules and laws on corporate governance practice. In addition, preferential treatment of 
large shareholders (Q30) in Table 4.5.2 Column 9a has a negative effect on rules and laws for 
corporate governance practice. This suggests that preferential treatment of large shareholders 
may hamper the promotion of rules and laws for corporate governance practice. 
       4.5.3 Result on the effect of sub-variables of corporate governance system and institutional 
characteristics of corporate governance using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-
regulatory stakeholders of firms in Nigeria. 
This section provides Table 4.5.3 below illustrate the result of sub-variables of 
institutional characteristic on sub-variables of corporate governance system using 
respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate 
governance. Below are also the models and Table illustrates the results of data analysis 
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The Model estimate on regulatory framework of corporate governance in section C is as 
follow below; 
1. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Stk_Mkt12) +  β2(Dis_Com15)  + β3(Ind_Bod16)  + μi  
The Model estimate on enforcement of corporate governance in section D is as follow 
bellow; 
2. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Non_compl17) +  β2(Invtr_Prot18)    + β3(Mino_Shdt19)  + μi   
The Model estimate on disclosure and transparency in section E is as follow bellow; 
3. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Insd_Trad20) +  β2(Inform_Accf21)   + β3(Aud_Indpend22) + β4(MA_23) + μi  
The Model estimate on shareholder rights in section F is as follow bellow; 
4. Rule_cg= β0 +  β1(Shd_rigt24) +  β2(Shd_Violt25)   + β3(Shd_Allg27) + μi  
The Model estimate on ownership concentration in section G is as follow bellow; 
5. Rules_cg= β0 + β1(Own_Comp28)  β2(Larg_Con29) +  β3(Pref_Treat30)   + μi 
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Table 4.5.3: Showing OLS estimate of rules and laws on institutional characteristics of corporate governance using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-
regulatory stakeholders of firms in Nigeria 
Dependent variable: rule and law that promote corporate governance practice. 
   
                                         Regulatory Bodies         
 
                Non-regulatory  Stakeholders 
Variables 
 
Enforcement 
(Section D) 
 
(1) 
Disclosure & Transparency 
           (Section E)   
            
               ( 2) 
 
Shareholders’ Rights 
(Section F) 
 
(3) 
Ownership conc. 
(Section G) 
      
   ( 4) 
Regulatory 
Frame Wk 
(Section C) 
 (5) 
Enforcement  
           
 (Section D) 
(6) 
Ownership Concentration 
                       
          (Section G) 
                    ( 7) 
 Non-
Compliance 
     ( Q17) 
     (1a) 
Information   
        access  
        (Q21) 
         (2a) 
  Merger & 
Acquisition  
(Q23) 
         (2b)          
Shareholde
r rights 
    (Q24) 
    (3a) 
Shareholder 
violation 
    (Q25) 
      (3b) 
Ownership 
compostion 
     (Q28) 
       (4a) 
Stock 
market 
   (Q12) 
     (5a) 
 
Independent 
board 
     ( Q16) 
       (5b) 
Non-
Compliance 
        (Q17) 
        (6a) 
Ownership 
composition 
         (Q28) 
          ( 7a) 
Preferntial  
Treatment 
 ( Q30) 
       
        (7 b) 
 -0.23* 
0.10 
(-2.22) 
       -0.23* 
        0.13 
        (-1.78) 
   0.23* 
   0.12 
   (1.98) 
    0.31* 
    0.12 
    (2.66) 
 
 
 
 
-0.26* 
0.12 
(-2.27) 
    -0.28* 
    0.12 
    (-2.32) 
   0.10* 
   0.04 
   (2.31) 
    -0.12* 
      0.05 
      (-2.58) 
     -0.08* 
     0.05 
     (-1.70) 
  0.15* 
  0.07 
  (2.34) 
 -0.10* 
   0.05 
  (-1.76) 
Constant 1.95** 
0.22 
(8.85) 
                  1.87** 
                   0.33 
                 (5.76) 
                1.54** 
                0.63 
               (2.44) 
      1.84* 
        0.73 
      (2.51) 
              1.75** 
               0.11 
            ( 16.02) 
    1.75** 
    0.10 
    (17.53) 
                    1.21** 
                    0.31 
                   (3.88) 
R-square 0.07                  0.09              0.10      0.09               0.06   0.03                  0.03 
F-stat 1.79                   1.80           2.08         2.31              2.86    1.22                   2.79 
No. of Observation 77                77                77          77                   243      243                  243 
 
 The dependent variable is indicated as rules and law that promote corporate governance (Q8). The Independent variables are regulatory framework such as Independent board (Q16)  
Enforcement such as non-compliance with rules and laws (Q17) and investors protection (Q18) Disclosure and transparency such as Insider trading (Q20) information access (Q21) Shareholders’ 
rights such as protection of shareholders’ rights (Q24)  and Ownership concentration such as  composition of ownership (Q28)  and   preferential treatment of large shareholders (Q30).  
 There is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples. The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the parentheses 
refer to t-statistics. F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level 
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The key results from the above Table are based on the opinion of the respondents this 
include the following; 
The respondents from regulatory bodies indicate that investigation of non-compliance (Q17) 
may decrease the quality of   the rules and laws that promote corporate governance in 
Nigerian firms 
1. They also view that information access (Q21) seem to hinder rules and laws that can 
promote corporate governance practice in Nigerian firms. 
2.  The respondents from regulatory bodies believe that merger and acquisition (Q23) is 
likely to improve the rules and laws that enhanced corporate governance practices. 
3. They also view that shareholder violation (Q25) may hamper the promotion of rules 
and laws on corporate governance practices. 
4. The respondents from regulatory bodies’ show that ownership composition (Q28) 
seems to deter rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices in Nigerian firms. 
5. The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders believe that stock market rules and 
codes (Q12) is more likely to improve rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
practices in Nigerian firms. 
6.  The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders indicate that independence of 
board (Q16) can weaken the rules and laws that improve corporate governance practices. 
7. The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders found that investigation of non-
compliance (Q17) may deter rules and laws that provide effective corporate governance 
practices. 
8. Table 4.5.3 also report that non-regulatory stakeholder view that ownership 
composition (Q28) may improve rules and laws that enhanced effective corporate governance 
practices. 
We find that in 4.5.3 Column 1a under the regulatory bodies’ category the sub-variable 
of enforcement of corporate which is non-compliance (Q17) has a negative significant effect 
on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. In addition, equal access of 
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information to shareholders (Q21) in Column 2a has a negative impact on rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance practice. However, transparency in merger and acquisition 
(Q23) in Column 2b has a positive significant effect on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practices.   
The sub-variables under shareholders’ rights such as   basic rights protections of 
shareholders (Q24) in Column 3a have a positive significant impact on rule and laws. 
However, other sub-variables that under shareholders rights such as minority shareholders 
violation (Q25) in Column 3b have a negative significant relation with rule and laws. In 
addition, ownership concentration sub-variable which is composition of ownership (Q28) in 
Column 4a has negative effect on rule and laws.  
These results suggest that the regulatory stakeholders’ respondents in Nigeria indicate 
that sub-variables such as non-compliance, equal access of information to all shareholders, 
minority shareholders violation, and ownership composition seem to hinder the promotion of 
rules and laws on corporate governance practices in Nigerian firms. However, they believe 
that basic shareholders protection and merger and acquisition may enhance rules and laws 
that promote corporate governance practices. 
Moreover, in Table 4.5.3 we estimate sub-variables of institutional frameworks 
(characteristic) of corporate governance on sub-variable of corporate governance system 
using non-regulatory stakeholders’ respondents of firms in Nigeria. We find that sub-variable 
of regulatory frame work such as stock market listing rules (Q12) in Column 5a has a positive 
significant effect on rule and laws. However, rules and regulations regarding required 
independent status of board member (Q16) in Column 5b has a negative significant 
association with rules and laws. In addition, the enforcement of corporate governance sub-
variable which is non-compliance (Q17) in Column 6a has negative significant effect on rule 
and laws.  
Finally, ownership concentration sub-variable which is composition of ownership (Q28) 
in Column 7a is positively significant with rules and laws. Under the same ownership 
concentration sub-variable preferential treatment of large shareholders (Q30) in Column 7b 
has a negative significant effect on rule and laws. From the above finding, this implies that 
non-regulatory stakeholder’s respondent in Nigeria shows that sub-variables such as stock 
markets listing rules and ownership composition may promote rules and laws for corporate 
governance practices. Thus, non-compliance, preferential treatment of large shareholders and 
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independent status of board members may deter the promotion of rules and laws that guide 
corporate governance practices of Nigerian firms. 
In summary, we found that in all the firms in the two countries (Ghana and South Africa) 
regulatory framework and enforcement variables of corporate governance have a positive 
significant effect on the corporate governance system. However, in Nigerian firms, regulatory 
framework has a negative effect on corporate governance system. This may be due to lack of 
implementation of regulatory frameworks of corporate governance by the regulatory 
bodies/agencies in Nigeria. This finding is consistent with Okike (2007) and Okpara (2010) 
the authors claimed that lack of implementation of regulatory framework in Nigeria may be 
due to corruption that is prevalent among the officials of regulatory and supervisory bodies. 
 In addition, in Nigerian firms the following sub-variables such as non-compliance with 
law/regulation (Q17) and minority shareholders rights violation (Q25) seem to hinder rules 
and laws that promote effective corporate governance. This suggests that in Nigerian firms 
there is a lack of compliance with law and regulation on corporate governance, as well as a 
lack of appropriate law to protect shareholders rights. This may be due to poor 
implementation of rules and laws on enforcement of corporate governance in Nigeria. This 
finding is inconsistent with ECA (2002), OECD (2004) the organisations explained that there 
is need for separating the government’s policy making and regulatory through establishing 
independent and strong regulatory and enforcement mechanism. Arun and Turner (2004) also 
argue that there is need for appropriate laws to protect the minority shareholders. 
In Ghanaian firms preferential treatment of large shareholders (Q30) also deter rules and 
laws that promote effective corporate governance. In Nigerian and Ghanaian, firms’ 
ownership concentration is prevalent and therefore there is likely to be preferential treatment 
for large shareholders. This finding is consistent with La Portal (1997) who argues that large 
shareholders have outright control of the firm and they managed with higher percentage of 
ownership. 
Finally, both the respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders of 
corporate governance indicate that enforcement of corporate governance matter most in order 
to achieved effective corporate governance practice. The non-regulatory stakeholders also 
believe that regulatory framework needs to be strong in order to promote effective corporate 
governance practice. 
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 Conclusion 
This Chapter has provided the effect of institutional characteristics on corporate 
governance system using Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa as case studies. The chapter also 
identify the component that can promote and hinder corporate governance practice in each 
country and in the region (SSAA). The next chapter (five) assesses the effect of other 
components of corporate governance such as role and responsibilities’ of the board of 
directors of listed firms on corporate governance system. The chapter further classifies the 
respondents as regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholder of corporate governance. 
The objective of classification is to identify the view of each respondent for the robustness 
results of the study.  
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Chapter Five 
Results of the data analysis on impact of role and responsibilities of firm’s 
board of director on corporate governance system.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effect of role and responsibilities of board 
of directors of listed firms on corporate governance system. The chapter further classifies the 
respondents as regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholder of corporate governance. 
The objective of classification is to identify the view of each respondent for the robustness 
results of the study. 
The Table below provides information on section, statements and variables for role and 
responsibilities of the board of directors as it shows in the survey questionnaire for this study.  
Table 5: Illustrates the section, statements and variables on role and responsibilities of the 
board of directors in firms  
Section                 Statements     Variables 
 
 
 
 
H:Role and 
responsibilities of the 
board of directors 
Q31.Board members are not fully committed 
to reviewing and guiding corporate strategy 
 
Corporate strategy 
Q32.Board members in your companies do not 
pay attention to executive compensation 
 
Executive compensation 
Q33.Board members in your companies are 
not effectively committed to their 
responsibility 
 
Board responsibility 
Q34.The board members often demonstrate 
lack of a lack of concern as to the integrity of 
companies financial reporting system 
 
Financial reporting 
Q35.Board members show lack of concern in 
ensuring a formal and transparent board 
nomination and election process 
 
Board transparency 
Q36.Board members do not show concern 
about proper monitoring and enforcement of 
laws, rules and regulation of corporate 
governance practices 
 
Enforcement rules 
Q37.Board members do not adequately 
surprise the process of disclosure and 
communication 
 
 Board disclosure 
Q38.There are separation between the roles of 
the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) 
 
Board duality 
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5.1 Results of the effects on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors on 
governance system   
This section provides empirical evidences on impact of the firm’s board of director roles 
and responsibility on corporate governance system of firms. Table below reports the model 
estimate and results of the data analysis  
Table 5.1: Showing OLS estimate on corporate governance system and role and responsibility of 
firm’s boards of directors. 
Total_cg = β0 +β1(corp_strgy) + β2 (Exec_comp) + β3(Bod_Eff) + β4(Bod_Frept) + β5(Bod_Trpy) + β6 (Bod_Enfm)  
+ Β7(Bod_Disc + β8(Bod_Duality) + β9(G) + β10(N) + β11(GR) + β12(NR)  + μi   
Dependent variable: Total effective corporate governance system 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the countries 
All the countries 
with Ghana and 
Nigeria as dummy  
Ghana Nigeria South Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 12.63 
0.61 
(20.57) 
17.01** 
0.63 
(27.12) 
11.29** 
1.02 
(11.12) 
13.30** 
0.80 
(16.55) 
15.80** 
1.79 
(8.85) 
Corporate 
strategy 
-0.22** 
0.10 
(-2.18) 
-0.09 
0.10 
(-0.32) 
0.08 
0.14 
(0.54) 
0.12 
0.14 
(0.83) 
-0.46 
0.33 
(-1.40) 
Executive 
compensation 
0.18 
0.12 
(1.41) 
0.06 
0.10 
(0.63) 
-0.09 
0.20 
(-0.46) 
0.19 
0.16 
(1.15) 
0.26 
0.29 
(0.91) 
Board 
effectiveness 
0.20* 
0.11 
(1.85) 
0.12 
0.09 
(1.40) 
-0.02 
0.14 
(-0.11) 
0.31** 
0.12 
(2.58) 
0.86** 
0.30 
(2.82) 
Financial 
reporting  
-0.07 
0.12 
(-0.56) 
-0.13 
0.10 
(-1.29) 
0.01 
0.15 
(0.08) 
-0.19 
0.15 
(-1.25) 
-0.45 
0.34 
(-1.32) 
Board 
Transparency 
0.57** 
(0.13) 
(4.313) 
0.19* 
0.11 
(1.53) 
0.09 
0.17 
(0.53) 
0.09 
0.16 
(0.58) 
0.02 
0.30 
(0.01) 
Enforcement rules 0.03 
0.13 
(0.20) 
0.08 
0.11 
(0.75) 
-0.06 
0.17 
(-0.36) 
0.05 
0.13 
(0.36) 
-0.36 
0.30 
(-1.21) 
Board disclosure  0.33** 
0.14 
(2.44) 
0.09 
0.11 
(0.83) 
0.60** 
0.17 
(3.47) 
-0.36** 
0.17 
(-2.07) 
0.04 
0.21 
(0.18) 
Board  duality -0.64** 
0.15 
(-4.26) 
-0.23* 
0.13 
(-1.81) 
0.19 
0.24 
(0.82) 
-0.27* 
0.16 
(-1.72) 
0.60** 
0.30 
(1.99) 
Regulator  0.60** 
0.19 
(3.07) 
   
Ghana  -5.04** 
0.31 
(-16.40) 
   
Nigeria  -3.59** 
0.30 
(-11.97) 
   
R-square 0.17 0.45 
 
0.22 0.06 0.27 
F-statistic 13.16 39.39 5.08 3.09 2.85 
No of observation 541 541 150 320 71 
The dependent variable is indicated as total effective corporate governance system which is represented by corporate 
governance system is the addition of all the items or variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent 
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variables are the role and responsibility of boards of directors which comprises each items or statement in section H of the 
survey questionnaire. Each of such items or statement which are variables include Level of commitment to corporate 
strategy (Corporate Strategy), adequate attention to executive compensation (Executive Compensation), Effective committed 
to their responsibility (Board Effectiveness), Level of ensuring of a formal and transparent board nomination and election 
process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about enforcement of corporate governance policy (Enforcement of 
corporate governance policy), Level of concern to the integrity of companies financial reporting system (Financial Reporting 
system), Level of ensuring of a formal and transparent board nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level 
of concern about enforcement of corporate governance policy (Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Supervision of 
process of disclosure and communication (Board disclosure and communication) and Separation between roles of Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Board non-duality). 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being 
South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and 
Numbers in the parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
The key findings from the above Table are based on the opinion of the respondents this include 
the following; 
1. When there is transparent in board nomination and election process (Q35), this is likely to 
promote effective corporate governance practice in all the countries in the Sub-region. 
2. A possible interpretation is that although there is separation of role between chairman and 
CEO (Q38) this may hinder corporate governance practices. This may be due to 
incompetence and inefficiency of both chairman and CEO. This result is based on the 
perception of the respondents 
3. In Ghanaian firms board disclosure and communication (Q37) may enhance the promotion 
of effective corporate governance system within Ghanaian firms. 
4. Board effectiveness (Q33) is likely to promote corporate governance system in Nigerian 
firms. 
5. Board disclosure (Q37) and board duality (Q38) seem to hinder the promotion of effective 
corporate governance system in Nigerian firms.  
6. Board effectiveness (Q33) and board duality (38) may improve corporate governance 
system in South Africa firms.  
In conclusion from the above finding there is indication that the following matter as role and 
responsibilities of the board of directors; 
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1. Commitment of board members in ensuring a formal and transparency board nomination 
and election process (Q35) this is more likely to promote rules and laws for sound corporate 
governance practice. 
2. Commitment of board members to disclosure and communication (Q37), and commitment 
to effective responsibility (Q33) these are likely to increase the quality of rules and laws that 
promote good corporate governance. 
 In Table 5.1 Column 2 there is evidence that board transparency has a significant 
positive impact on corporate governance system with coefficient of 0.19. However, board 
duality has a significant negative relationship with corporate governance system.  This result 
is based on the perception of the respondents. In addition, the result of the estimate on 
regulators shows a positive significant relationship with corporate governance system.  
The above results suggest that regulatory bodies for corporate governance of firms may 
likely promote good corporate governance system. Firms in Ghana and Nigeria have 
negatively significant with corporate governance system. This result implies that the role 
and responsibilities of the board of directors of firms in Ghana and Nigeria are less likely to 
promote corporate governance system in compared with the board of directors of South 
African firms. 
Moreover, within the country, Table 5.1 Column 3 illustrates that in Ghana firms’ board 
supervision on disclosure and communication has a significant positive effect on corporate 
governance system. While in Nigerian firm as it show in Column 4 board effectiveness has a 
positive significant with corporate governance system. Supervision on disclosure, 
communication and board effectiveness have a significant negative effect on corporate 
governance system. This finding suggests that the board of directors in Ghanaian firms are 
more concern on supervision process on disclosure and communication in their firms than 
that of Nigerian firms. Thus, board effectiveness to their responsibility is more pronounced 
within Nigerian firms. This may be due to various financial scandals that occurred recently 
in financial and non-financial firms in Nigeria.  
There is a low value of R-square in the estimate for Nigeria. The reason for this value 
seems to   other factors that can affect corporate governance system which are not mention 
in this study.  
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In case of South Africa firms as shown in Table 5.1 Column 5, board effectiveness and 
board duality have significant positive effect on corporate governance. This result implies 
that board members of firms in South Africa are more effective in carry out their role and 
responsibility in order to promote good corporate governance practice. In addition, the 
separation between role and responsibility of the Chairman and Chief Executive officer is 
likely to promote good corporate governance of firms in South Africa. This results is based 
on perception of the respondents 
5.2 Results of the effect of role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors on rules 
and laws of corporate governance.  
The corporate governance system in terms of rules and law operating in an environment 
through the regulatory bodies of corporate governance depend on the level of effectiveness of 
role and responsibility of firm’s board of directors. This study use empirical analysis to 
shows role and responsibility of firm’s board directors on corporate governance system; in 
term of rules and law. Below are the model estimate and the Table shown the results of the 
data analysis. 
Table 5.2: Showing OLS estimate for rules and laws of corporate governance practice and role 
and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors.  
Rules_cg = β0 +β1(corp_strgy) + β2 (Exec_comp) + β3(Bod_Eff) + β4(Bod_Frept) + β5(Bod_Trpy) + β6 (Bod_Enfm)  
+ Β7(Bod_Disc + β8(Bod_Duality) + β9(G) + β10(N) + β11(GR) + β12(NR)  + μi     
Dependent variable: rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
  
Variables 
All observation 
for the countries 
All the countries 
with Ghana and 
Nigeria as dummy 
Ghana Nigeria South Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1.72** 
0.27 
(6.47) 
4.46** 
0.26 
(16.92) 
1.70** 
0.48 
(3.55) 
1.41** 
0.27 
(5.32) 
3.52** 
0.69 
(5.10) 
Corporate 
strategy 
0.03 
0.44 
(0.76) 
-0.01 
0.04 
(-0.36) 
0.07 
0.07 
(1.05) 
0.01 
0.05 
(0.28) 
 
-0.14 
0.13 
(-1.13) 
Executive 
compensation 
-0.10* 
0.05 
(-1.76) 
-0.16** 
0.04 
(-3.71) 
-0.25** 
0.10 
(-2.63) 
0.08 
0.05 
(1.44) 
0.23* 
0.11 
(2.00) 
Board 
effectiveness 
0.03 
0.05 
(0.60) 
0.01 
0.04 
(0.32) 
-0.04 
0.06 
(-0.59) 
0.09** 
0.04 
(2.28) 
0.25** 
0.12 
(2.16) 
Financial 
reporting  
0.01 
0.05 
(0.13) 
-0.03 
0.04 
(-0.59) 
0.03 
0.07 
(0.45) 
0.03 
0.05 
(0.64) 
0.00 
0.13 
(0.01 
Board 
Transparency 
0.31** 
0.06 
(5.34) 
0.11** 
0.05 
(2.30) 
0.11 
0.08 
(1.33) 
-0.02 
0.05 
(-0.27) 
-0.08 
0.12 
(-0.68) 
Enforcement rules 0.03 
0.05 
(0.47) 
0.03 
0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
0.08 
(-0.61) 
0.01 
0.04 
(0.32) 
-0.15 
0.11 
(-1.30) 
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Board disclosure  0.19** 
0.06 
(3.25) 
0.12** 
0.05 
(2.48) 
0.38** 
0.08 
(4.62) 
-0.11* 
0.06 
(-1.95) 
-0.05 
0.08 
(-0.59) 
Board  duality -0.27** 
0.07 
(-4.19) 
-0.06 
0.05 
(-1.07) 
0.28** 
0.11 
(2.50) 
-0.10* 
0.05 
(-1.81) 
0.20* 
0.12 
(1.70) 
Regulator  -0.00 
0.08 
(-0.05) 
 
   
Ghana  -1.96** 
0.13 
(15.04) 
   
Nigeria  -2.20** 
0.13 
(-17.32) 
   
R-square 0.28 0.55 0.47 0.06 0.23 
F-statistic 26.13 63.73 15.41 2.54 2.36 
No of observation 541 541 150 320 71 
The dependent variable is indicated as adequate and effective rule and laws that promote corporate governance items or 
variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent variables are the role and responsibility of boards of 
directors which comprises each items or statement in section H of the survey questionnaire. Each of such items or statement 
which are variables include Level of commitment to corporate strategy (Corporate Strategy), adequate attention to executive 
compensation (Executive Compensation), Effective committed to their responsibility (Board Effectiveness), Level of 
ensuring of a formal and transparent board nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about 
enforcement of corporate governance policy (Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Level of concern to the integrity 
of companies financial reporting system (Financial Reporting system), Level of ensuring of a formal and transparent board 
nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about enforcement of corporate governance policy 
(Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Supervision of process of disclosure and communication (Board disclosure 
and communication) and Separation between roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Board duality). 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South Africa 
there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and 
Numbers in the parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
The key results from above Table are based on the perception of the respondents this include 
the following; 
1. In all the countries together, executive compensation (Q32) may deter rules and laws that 
promote effective corporate governance practices. 
2. The board transparency (35) and board disclosure (Q37) are likely to enhance rules and 
laws that promote corporate governance practices. 
3. Board disclosure (Q33) and board duality (Q38) have positive effect on rules and laws that 
promote sound corporate governance practices. 
4. Board effectiveness (Q33) seems to increase the quality of rules and laws for effective 
corporate governance practices in Nigerian firms. 
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5. Board disclosure (Q37) and board duality (Q38) may inhibit the promotion of effective 
corporate governance system in Nigerian firms. This finding is based on the perception of the 
respondents 
6. In South African firms, there are evidence that executive compensation (Q32) is likely to 
enhance rules and laws that promote sound corporate governance practices.  
In conclusion from the above finding there is indication that the following matter as role and 
responsibilities of the board of directors for sound corporate governance practice. 
1. Commitment of board members in ensuring a formal and transparency board nomination 
and election process (Q35) can provide rules and laws that promote sound corporate 
governance. 
2. Commitment of board members to disclosure and communication (Q37) may increase the 
quality of rules and laws that promote good corporate governance. 
In Table 5.2 Column 2 this study find that executive compensation have negative effect 
on rules and law of corporate governance system. This result suggests that level of adequate 
attention of board members to executive compensation does not promote effective corporate 
rules and laws on corporate governance. This seems to absence of executive compensation 
committee, this may give opportunity for the director to award themselves compensation and 
this is not good for interest of the shareholders. 
 In Column 2 there is a positive relationship between board transparency, board 
disclosure and communication and rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
practices. The dummy variables which are proxies as Ghanaian and Nigerian firm have 
negative effects on rules and laws. This result implies that generally the role and 
responsibilities of firm’s board of directors in Ghanaian and Nigerian firms do not provide 
effective rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. This may be due to 
incompetency of the board of directors in both countries. 
Moreover, Table 5.2 Column 3 shows that in Ghanaian firms executive compensation is 
less likely to promote rules and laws, thus board disclosure, communication board and duality 
(separation between the roles and responsibility of chairman and CEO) are likely to promote 
rules and law of corporate governance. This result is based on opinion of the respondents. 
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 In Nigerian firms, commitment of board to effective role and responsibility has 
influence on rules and law of corporate governance. However, board disclosure, 
communication board and duality (separation between the roles and responsibility of 
chairman and CEO) can deter rules and laws on corporate governance practice. This result is 
based on the perception of the respondents from the survey questionnaire used for this study.  
 In South African firms, executive compensation, effectiveness of board and duality may 
likely promote rules and law of corporate governance system.  
5.3 Results of the effect of role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors on power 
and authority of regulatory agencies for corporate governance  
From the corporate governance literature, corporate governance depend on efficiency, 
power, resources and authority of the regulatory bodies in monitoring, enforcing, and 
regulating  corporate governance practices of firms. Thus, the Table below reports the model 
estimate and the results of the data analysis. 
Table 5.3: Showing OLS estimate on power of regulatory agencies for corporate governance 
and role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors.  
Agencies_cg = β0 +β1(corp_strgy) + β2 (Exec_comp) + β3(Bod_Eff) + β4(Bod_Frept) + β5(Bod_Trpy) + β6 (Bod_Enfm)  
+ Β7(Bod_Disc + β8(Bod_duality) + β9(G) + β10(N) + β11(GR) + β12(NR)  + μi   
Dependent variable: authority and power of regulatory agencies of corporate governance 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the countries 
All the countries 
with Ghana and 
Nigeria as dummy 
Ghana Nigeria South Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 2.71** 
0.31 
(8.71) 
3.55** 
0.32 
(10.36) 
1.92** 
0.54 
(3.60) 
3.05** 
0.45 
(6.81) 
3.58** 
0.65 
(5.50) 
Corporate 
strategy 
-0.18** 
0.05 
(-3.41) 
0.03 
0.05 
(0.54) 
0.06 
0.07 
(0.81) 
 
0.20 
0.08 
(0.25) 
-0.36** 
0.12 
(-3.02) 
Executive 
compensation 
0.00 
0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
0.05 
(-0.38) 
-0.19* 
0.11 
(1.83) 
-0.02 
0.09 
(-0.26) 
0.26** 
0.11 
(2.45) 
Board 
effectiveness 
0.09 
0.06 
(1.59) 
0.04 
0.05 
(0.95) 
-0.03 
0.07 
(-0.38) 
0.13* 
0.07 
(1.96) 
0.29** 
0.11 
(2.61) 
Financial 
reporting  
0.01 
0.06 
(0.18) 
-0.00 
0.05 
(-0.07) 
-0.04 
0.08 
(-0.47) 
0.02 
0.08 
(0.29) 
0.01 
0.12 
(0.04) 
Board 
Transparency 
0.20** 
0.07 
(2.91) 
0.10* 
0.06 
(1.72) 
-0.03 
0.09 
(-0.35) 
0.12 
0.09 
(1.37) 
-0.03 
0.11 
(-0.28) 
Enforcement rules -0.10 
0.06 
(1.53) 
-0.05 
0.05 
(-1.01) 
0.03 
0.09 
(0.29) 
-0.12 
0.08 
(-1.62) 
-0.10 
0.11 
(-0.93) 
Board disclosure  0.28** 
0.07 
(4.10) 
0.16* 
0.06 
(2.84) 
0.48** 
0.09 
(5.27) 
-0.04 
0.10 
(0.44) 
-0.06 
0.08 
(-0.75) 
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Board  duality -0.01 
0.08 
(-0.12) 
0.09 
0.07 
(1.45) 
-0.00 
0.12 
(-0.01) 
0.16* 
0.09 
(1.81) 
0.22* 
0.11 
(1.96) 
Regulator  0.46** 
0.10 
(4.59) 
   
Ghana  -1.96** 
0.16 
(-12.37) 
   
Nigeria  -0.57** 
0.16 
(-3.69) 
   
R-square 0.16 0.43 0.32 0.05 0.32 
F-statistic 12.39 35.55 8.17 2.03 3.62 
No of observation 541 541 150 320 71 
The dependent variable is indicated as power and authority of the supervisory, enforcement and regulatory agencies items or 
variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent variables are role and responsibility of boards of 
directors which comprises each items or statement in section H of the survey questionnaire. Each of such items or statement 
which are variables include Level of commitment to corporate strategy (Corporate Strategy), adequate attention to executive 
compensation (Executive Compensation), Effective committed to their responsibility (Board Effectiveness), Level of 
ensuring of a formal and transparent board nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about 
enforcement of corporate governance policy (Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Level of concern to the integrity 
of companies financial reporting system (Financial Reporting system), Level of ensuring of a formal and transparent board 
nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about enforcement of corporate governance policy 
(Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Supervision of process of disclosure and communication (Board disclosure 
and communication) and Separation between roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Board duality). 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South Africa 
there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and 
Numbers in the parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
The following key findings are based on the perception of the respondents 
1. When board directors are committed to transparency (Q35) this is likely to increase the 
power of regulatory agencies of corporate governance practice. 
2. There is evidence that adequate disclosure (Q37) may strengthen the power of regulatory 
agencies. 
3. There is evidence that executive compensation (Q32) reduce the power and authority of 
regulatory agencies. 
4. When board members are effective (Q33) in Nigerian firms, this may enhance the power 
of the regulatory agencies 
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 5. In South African firms commitments of board member to corporate strategy (Q31) seem 
to hinder the power and authority of the regulatory agencies. 
6. There are indications that executive compensation (Q32) and board effectiveness (Q33) are 
likely to increase the power and authority of regulatory agencies in South Africa. 
7. Board duality (Q38) may enhance the power and authority of regulatory agencies to 
perform their role and responsibility in South Africa. 
In conclusion from the above finding there is indication that the following matter as role and 
responsibilities of the board of directors; 
1. Commitment of board members in ensuring a formal and transparency board nomination 
and election process (Q35) is likely to promote rules and laws that promote sound corporate 
governance. 
2. Commitment of board members to disclosure and communication (Q37) this may increase 
the quality of rules and laws that promote good corporate governance. 
Table 5.3 Column 2 reveals that commitment of board to transparency; disclosure and 
communication seem to improve the authority and power of the regulatory agencies. The 
dummy variable such as regulator has a positive effect on power and authority of regulatory 
agencies. However, Ghanaian and Nigerian firms have negative impact on power and 
authority of regulatory agencies. This result suggests that various reforms on role and 
responsibilities of the board of directors adopting in Nigerian and Ghanaian firms may be 
weak to increase the power and authority of the regulatory agencies.  
Nevertheless, we estimate the regression analysis in each country, Table 5.3 Column 3 
which indicated as Ghanaian firms. The result shows that executive compensation variable 
has a negative effect on power and authority of the regulatory agencies. However, board 
disclosure and communication have a positive relationship on power and authority of 
regulatory agencies. 
In addition, Column 4 illustrates Nigerian firms; the board effectiveness and board 
duality have positive influence on power and authority of regulatory agencies. For South 
African firms, as shown in Column 5 corporate strategy, executive compensation and board 
duality have positive effect on power and authority of regulatory agencies in order to 
promote sound corporate governance of firms in South Africa.     
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5.4 Effect on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors’ variables on 
corporate governance system using respondent from regulatory bodies  
The regulatory bodies of corporate governance play a vital role in making sure that the 
board of director of listed firms perform their role and responsibility within their firms by 
strengthening their duties through issuing of code of best practices of corporate governance. 
The board members need to comply with the rule and regulation guiding the code of 
corporate governance and the Companies Act. 
5.4.1 Effect of role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors’ variables on corporate 
governance system using respondent from regulatory bodies  
In this sub-section, we present extension of the impact of role and responsibility of firm’s 
board of directors on corporate governance system. Below are the Table showing the model 
estimate and the results of the data analysis. 
Table 5.4.1: Showing OLS estimate on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors and 
corporate governance system using respondents from regulatory bodies  
Total_cg = β0 +β1(corp_strgy) + β2 (Exec_comp) + β3(Bod_Eff) + β4(Bod_Frept) + β5(Bod_Trpy) + β6 (Bod_Enfm)  
+ Β7(Bod_Disc + β8(Bod_Duality) + β9(G) + β10(N) + β11(GR) + β12(NR)  + μi    
Dependent variable: : Total effective corporate governance system 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the countries 
All the countries 
with Ghana and 
Nigeria as dummy 
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 13.90** 
1.28 
(10.88) 
16.89** 
1.70 
(11.14) 
11.29** 
1.02 
(11.12) 
17.10** 
2.12 
(8.07) 
Corporate 
strategy 
-0.68** 
0.19 
(-3.58) 
-0.45** 
0.19 
(-2.39) 
0.08 
0.14 
(0.54) 
-0.25 
0.38 
(-0.66) 
Executive 
compensation 
0.22 
0.25 
(0.90) 
-0.05 
0.23 
(-0.23) 
-0.09 
0.20 
(-0.46) 
-0.17 
0.42 
(-0.41) 
Board 
effectiveness 
0.56** 
0.20 
(2.89) 
0.29 
0.18 
(1.65) 
-0.02 
0.14 
(-0.11) 
0.34 
0.27 
(1.27) 
Financial 
reporting  
-0.02 
0.25 
(-0.07) 
-0.17 
0.22 
(-0.76) 
0.01 
0.15 
(0.08) 
-0.27 
0.41 
(0.67) 
Board 
Transparency 
0.35 
0.28 
(1.25) 
0.02 
0.25 
(0.09) 
0.09 
0.17 
(0.53) 
0.28 
0.43 
(0.66) 
Enforcement rules 0.03 
0.24 
(0.13 
0.16 
0.22 
(0.72) 
-0.06 
0.17 
(-0.36) 
-0.07 
0.32 
(-0.23) 
Board disclosure  0.45* 
0.27 
(1.68) 
0.25 
0.24 
(1.06) 
0.60** 
0.17 
(3.47) 
-0.67 
0.46 
(-1.47) 
Board  duality -1.16** 
0.34 
(-3.36) 
-0.56* 
0.32 
(-1.75) 
0.19 
0.24 
(0.82) 
0.56 
0.50 
(1.12) 
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Ghana  -4.75** 
0.84 
(-5.68) 
  
Nigeria  -3.34** 
0.87 
(-3.84) 
  
R-square 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.15 
F-statistic 4.76 8.60 5.08 1.45 
No of observation 125 125 38 77 
The dependent variable is indicated as total corporate governance system which is represented by corporate governance 
system is the addition of all the items or variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent variables are 
the role and responsibility of boards of directors which comprises each items or statement in section H of the survey 
questionnaire. Each of such items or statement which are variables include Level of commitment to corporate strategy 
(Corporate Strategy), adequate attention to executive compensation (Executive Compensation), Effective committed to their 
responsibility (Board Effectiveness), Level of ensuring of a formal and transparent board nomination and election process 
(Board Transparency), Level of concern about enforcement of corporate governance policy (Enforcement of corporate 
governance policy), Level of concern to the integrity of companies financial reporting system (Financial Reporting system), 
Level of ensuring of a formal and transparent board nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of 
concern about enforcement of corporate governance policy (Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Supervision of 
process of disclosure and communication (Board disclosure and communication) and Separation between roles of Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Board duality). 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South Africa 
there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in 
the parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
The key results from the above Table are based on the opinion of the respondents include the 
following; 
1. In all the countries together the respondents from regulatory bodies indicate that 
commitment of board members to corporate strategy (Q31) seem to hinders corporate 
governance system. 
2.  They also believe that commitment of board of director to disclosure (Q37) may promote 
effective corporate governance system. 
3. In Ghanaian firms respondents from regulatory bodies’ view that board disclosure (Q37) is 
likely to improve corporate governance system.  
In addition, Table 5.4.1 Column 2 provides evidence that corporate strategy and board 
duality have negative impact on corporate. This finding indicates that in all the countries 
together regulatory bodies’ respondent shows that corporate strategy and board duality can 
deter the promotion of sound corporate governance practices.  
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Moreover, we estimate across each country as indicated in Column 3 for Ghanaian firms. 
The result shows that board disclosure and communication has a positive relationship with 
corporate governance system in order to promote corporate governance practice. The finding  
suggest that the regulatory bodies respondents believe that  board of directors in Ghanaian 
firms are more concern on disclosure and communication in order to promote sound 
corporate governance system in Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five: Results of the data analysis on impact of role and responsibilities of firm’s  board of directors  
206 
 
5.4.2 Results of the effect of rule and law with role and responsibility of firm’s boards of 
directors’ variables using respondents from regulatory bodies  
This section examines the effect of rules and laws on role and responsibility of firm’s 
boards of directors using respondents from regulatory bodies. The Table below reports the 
model estimate and the results of the data analysis 
Table 5.4.2: Showing OLS estimate on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors and 
rules and laws using respondents from regulatory bodies. 
Rules_cg = β0 +β1(corp_strgy) + β2 (Exec_comp) + β3(Bod_Eff) + β4(Bod_Frept) + β5(Bod_Trpy) + β6 (Bod_Enfm)  
+ Β7(Bod_Disc + β8(Bod_Duality) + β9(G) + β10(N) + β11(GR) + β12(NR)  + μi    
Dependent variable: rules and laws that promote corporate governance  
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the countries 
All the countries 
with Ghana and 
Nigeria as dummy 
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.24** 
0.56 
(2.23) 
4.27** 
0.76 
(5.60) 
2.40** 
1.01 
(2.37) 
 
0.95 
0.82 
(1.17) 
Corporate 
strategy 
-0.07 
0.08 
(-0.85) 
-0.17** 
0.09 
(-2.03) 
-0.16 
0.13 
(-1.20) 
-0.11 
0.15 
(-0.78) 
Executive 
compensation 
0.02 
0.11 
(0.22) 
-0.11 
0.10 
(-1.04) 
-0.14 
0.19 
(-0.73) 
0.20 
0.16 
(1.27) 
Board 
effectiveness 
0.11 
0.09 
(1.26) 
0.04 
0.08 
(0.47) 
-0.21 
0.13 
(-1.64) 
0.17 
0.10 
(1.61) 
Financial 
reporting  
0.05 
0.11 
(0.42) 
-0.02 
0.10 
(-0.20) 
-0.20 
0.15 
(-0.13) 
0.11 
0.16 
(0.68) 
Board 
Transparency 
0.06 
0.12 
(0.53) 
-0.05 
0.11 
(-0.45) 
0.05 
0.16 
(0.30) 
-0.05 
0.17 
(-0.27) 
Enforcement rules 0.06 
0.11 
(0.55) 
 
0.05 
0.09 
(0.51) 
0.14 
0.16 
(0.90) 
-0.25** 
0.12 
(-2.00) 
Board disclosure  0.41** 
0.12 
(3.46) 
 
0.34** 
0.11 
(3.17) 
0.49** 
0.14 
(3.53) 
0.03 
0.18 
(0.20) 
Board  duality -0.32** 
0.15 
(-212) 
-0.09 
0.14 
(0.65) 
0.00 
0.21 
(0.01) 
0.10 
0.19 
(0.54) 
     
Ghana  -1.69** 
0.38 
(-4.50) 
  
Nigeria  -2.07** 
0.39 
(-5.30) 
  
R-square 0.33 0.46 0.59 0.10 
F-statistic 7.03 9.70 5.15 0.97 
No of observation 125 125 38 77 
The dependent variable is indicated as adequate and effective rule and laws that promote corporate governance items or 
variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent variables are the role and responsibility of boards of 
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directors which comprises each items or statement in section H of the survey questionnaire. Each of such items or statement 
which are variables include Level of commitment to corporate strategy (Corporate Strategy), adequate attention to executive 
compensation (Executive Compensation), Effective committed to their responsibility (Board Effectiveness), Level of 
ensuring of a formal and transparent board nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about 
enforcement of corporate governance policy (Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Level of concern to the integrity 
of companies financial reporting system (Financial Reporting system), Level of ensuring of a formal and transparent board 
nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about enforcement of corporate governance policy 
(Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Supervision of process of disclosure and communication (Board disclosure 
and communication) and Separation between roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Board duality). 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South Africa 
there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and 
Numbers in the parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
The following are the key results from the above Table 
1. In Column 2 (all the countries together) the respondents from regulatory bodies indicate 
that commitment of board members to corporate strategy (Q31) seem to deter the rules and 
laws on corporate practice. 
2. The respondents from regulatory bodies also indicate that board disclosure (Q37) may 
improve the rules and laws on corporate governance practice. 
3. In Nigerian firms respondents from regulatory bodies believe that commitment of board of 
directors to enforcement of corporate governance (Q33) can hinders the rules and laws of 
effective corporate governance practice. 
We carried out the estimate on the rules and laws of corporate governance with the 
variables proxies for role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors. In Table 5.4.2 
Column 2 we observed that respondents from regulatory bodies indicate that board disclosure 
and communication have a positive relationship with rules and law that promote corporate 
governance of firm. However, the respondents indicate that commitment of board of directors 
to corporate strategy may hinder rules and laws that promote corporate governance. 
Furthermore, we estimate the regression within each country and the results shows that in 
Ghanaian firms as it indicated in Table 5.4.2 Column 3. The commitment of the board 
members to disclosure and communication has a positive effect on rules and laws of 
corporate governance. This implies that the regulatory bodies’ respondents for Ghanaian 
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firms believe that commitment of board members to disclosure and communication may 
promote rules and laws on corporate governance.  
 In Table 5.4.2 Column 4 the result shows that commitment of the boards of directors of 
Nigerian firms to enforcement of corporate governance policy may less likely to promote rule 
and law of corporate governance. This finding implies that the regulatory bodies’ shows that 
board members in Nigerian firms are not committed to enforcement of corporate governance 
policy.  
5.4.3 Results of the OLS estimate on power and authority of regulatory and supervisory 
agencies and role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors’ variables using respondents 
from regulatory bodies. 
 
This study examines the effect of role and responsibility of firm’s boards directors on 
power and authority of regulatory and supervisory agencies using respondents from regulator 
bodies. The Table below provide the information on the model estimate and results of the 
data analysis. 
Table 5.4.3: Showing OLS estimate on role and responsibility of firm’s director and power and 
authority of regulatory agencies for corporate governance using respondents from regulatory 
bodies  
Agencies_cg = β0 +β1(corp_strgy) + β2 (Exec_comp) + β3(Bod_Eff) + β4(Bod_Frept) + β5(Bod_Trpy) + β6 (Bod_Enfm)  
+ Β7(Bod_Disc + β8(Bod_duality) + β9(G) + β10(N) + β11(GR) + β12(NR)  + μi   
Dependent variable: power and authority of regulatory agencies for corporate governance 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the countries 
All the countries 
with Ghana and 
Nigeria as dummy 
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 3.71** 
0.70 
(5.33) 
4.19** 
0.88 
(4.77) 
3.72** 
1.24 
(2.10) 
4.91** 
0.93 
(5.30) 
Corporate 
strategy 
-0.43** 
0.10 
(-4.12) 
-0.13 
0.10 
(-1.35) 
-0.15 
0.16 
(-0.89) 
-0.17 
0.17 
(-0.10) 
Executive 
compensation 
0.05 
0.14 
(0.39) 
-0.02 
0.12 
(-0.13) 
-0.29 
0.23 
(-1.25) 
 
-0.13 
0.18 
(-0.71) 
Board 
effectiveness 
0.28** 
0.11 
(2.63) 
0.15 
0.09 
(1.59) 
-0.09 
0.15 
(-0.62) 
0.25** 
0.12 
(2.14) 
Financial 
reporting  
-0.04 
0.14 
(-0.30) 
-0.09 
0.12 
(-0.74) 
-0.02 
0.19 
(-0.11) 
-0.27 
0.18 
(-1.51) 
Board 
Transparency 
0.18 
0.15 
(1.22) 
0.06 
0.13 
(0.47) 
-0.20 
0.19 
(-1.01) 
0.42** 
0.19 
(2.21) 
Enforcement rules -0.07 
0.13 
(-0.56) 
0.03 
0.11 
(0.30) 
0.14 
0.19 
(0.73) 
-0.06 
0.14 
(-0.46) 
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Board disclosure  0.31** 
0.15 
(2.11) 
0.23* 
0.12 
(1.84) 
0.50** 
0.17 
(2.94) 
-0.32 
0.20 
(-1.58) 
Board  duality -0.49** 
0.19 
(-2.64) 
 
-0.28* 
0.17 
(1.71) 
-0.39 
0.26 
(-1.47) 
0..22 
0.22 
(-0.99) 
     
Ghana  -1.81** 
0.43 
(4.18) 
  
Nigeria  -0.27 
0.45 
(-0.59) 
  
R-square 0.26 0.49 0.43 0.17 
F-statistic 5.00 10.96 2.76 1.79 
No of observation 125 125 38 77 
The dependent variable is indicated as power and authority of the supervisory, enforcement and regulatory agencies items or 
variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent variables are role and responsibility of boards of 
directors which comprises each items or statement in section H of the survey questionnaire. Each of such items or statement 
which are variables include Level of commitment to corporate strategy (Corporate Strategy), adequate attention to executive 
compensation (Executive Compensation), Effective committed to their responsibility (Board Effectiveness), Level of 
ensuring of a formal and transparent board nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about 
enforcement of corporate governance policy (Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Level of concern to the integrity 
of companies financial reporting system (Financial Reporting system), Level of ensuring of a formal and transparent board 
nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about enforcement of corporate governance policy 
(Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Supervision of process of disclosure and communication (Board disclosure 
and communication) and Separation between roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Board duality). 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South Africa 
there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and 
Numbers in the parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
Key findings from the above Table include the following: 
  1. In Column 2 (all the countries together) respondents from regulatory bodies found that 
board disclosure (Q37) is likely to improve the power and authority of regulatory agencies in 
order to perform their role effectively. 
  2. In all the selected countries together respondents from regulatory bodies view that board     
duality (Q38) seem to inhibits the power and authority of the regulatory agencies 
    3. The respondents from regulatory bodies in Nigerian firms found that board effectiveness 
(Q33) is more likely to enhance the power and authority of regulatory agencies for the power 
and authority of regulatory agencies in order to perform their role and responsibility 
adequately. 
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3. The regulatory bodies also believe that board transparency (Q35) seem to provide more 
power and authority for regulatory agencies in Nigeria.   
In Table 5.4.3 Column 2 the result indicate that board disclosure and communication 
have positive influence on power and authority of the supervisory and regulatory agencies in 
order to promote effective corporate governance practice. However, Ghanaian and Nigerian 
firms as dummy variables has a negative impact on power and authority of the supervisory 
and regulatory agencies.  
Beside this, within each country the result of the regression illustrates in Column 2 
provides evidence that in Ghana firms’ commitment of the boards of directors to disclosure 
and communication may promote the power and authority of the supervisory and regulatory 
agencies. Contrarily, the board duality (separation between the role and duties of Chairman 
and CEO) has a negative effect on power and authority of the supervisory agencies. In 
Nigerian firms commitments of the board to effective responsibility and board transparency 
can promote the power and authority of the regulatory and supervisory agencies.  
5.5 Effect of role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors ‘variables on corporate 
governance system using respondents’ non-regulatory stakeholders. 
In this section we provide the result of the regression analysis between the variables for 
corporate governance system and the variables for role and responsibility of the firm’s boards 
of directors using non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance in the sample for the 
analysis of the data. The non-regulatory stakeholders are Legislators, Academician, 
Individual Investors, Institutional investors, Accountants/Auditors, Executive Directors, 
Companies Executive (CEO), companies’ employee, judiciary/legal and others such as 
students. The Tables below illustrate the results of the analysis for the various estimates. 
5.5.1 Effect of role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors’ variables on corporate 
governance system using respondents from non- regulatory stakeholders  
In this sub-section of this study examines the impact of role and responsibility of firm’s 
board of directors’ variables on corporate governance system using non-stakeholders of 
corporate governance in the sample for regression analysis. The Table below illustrates the 
model estimate and results of the data analysis. 
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Table 5.5.1: Showing OLS estimate on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors and 
corporate governance system using non-regulatory stakeholders  
Dependent variable:  Total effective corporate governance system 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the countries 
All the countries 
with Ghana and 
Nigeria as dummy 
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 12.35** 
0.71 
(17.50) 
16.85** 
0.68 
(24.78) 
11.20** 
1.21 
(9.25) 
17.10** 
2.12 
(8.07) 
Corporate 
strategy 
-0.73 
0.12 
(-0.60) 
0.11 
0.10 
(1.04) 
0.23 
0.16 
(1.43) 
-0.25 
0.38 
(-0.66) 
Executive 
compensation 
0.15 
0.14 
(1.02) 
0.06 
0.12 
(0.55) 
-0.19 
0.24 
(-0.79) 
-0.17 
0.42 
(-0.41) 
Board 
effectiveness 
0.06 
0.13 
(0.45) 
0.05 
0.10 
(0.46) 
0.06 
0.16 
(0.35) 
0.34 
0.27 
(1.29) 
Financial 
reporting  
-0.04 
0.14 
(-0.29) 
-0.07 
0.11 
(-0.62) 
0.07 
0.17 
(0.42) 
-0.27 
0.41 
(-0.67) 
Board 
Transparency 
0.68** 
0.15 
(4.47) 
0.25** 
0.13 
(2.03) 
0.12 
0.21 
(0.58) 
0.28 
0.43 
(0.66) 
Enforcement rules 0.00 
0.15 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
0.12 
(-0.11) 
-0.21 
0.20 
(-1.07) 
-0.07 
0.32 
(-0.23) 
Board disclosure  0.28* 
0.16 
(1.78) 
0.01 
0.13 
(0.10) 
0.50** 
0.22 
(2.28) 
-0.67 
0.46 
(-1.47) 
Board  duality -0.57** 
0.17 
(-3.39) 
-0.19 
0.14 
(-1.39) 
0.31 
0.28 
(1.10) 
-0.56 
0.50 
(-1.12) 
     
Ghana  -5.07** 
0.34 
(-15.12) 
  
Nigeria  -3.66** 
0.32 
(-11.39) 
  
R-square 0.18 0.47 0.24 0.15 
F-statistic 10.83 36.34 4.14 1.45 
No of observation 416 416 112 243 
The dependent variable is indicated as total corporate governance system which is represented by corporate governance 
system is the addition of all the items or variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent variables are 
the role and responsibility of boards of directors which comprises each items or statement in section H of the survey 
questionnaire. Each of such items or statement which are variables include Level of commitment to corporate strategy 
(Corporate Strategy), adequate attention to executive compensation (Executive Compensation), Effective committed to their 
responsibility (Board Effectiveness), Level of ensuring of a formal and transparent board nomination and election process 
(Board Transparency), Level of concern about enforcement of corporate governance policy (Enforcement of corporate 
governance policy), Level of concern to the integrity of companies financial reporting system (Financial Reporting system), 
Level of ensuring of a formal and transparent board nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of 
concern about enforcement of corporate governance policy (Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Supervision of 
process of disclosure and communication (Board disclosure and communication) and Separation between roles of Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Board duality). 
Chapter Five: Results of the data analysis on impact of role and responsibilities of firm’s  board of directors  
212 
 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South Africa 
there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in 
the parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
 
Key results from the above Table include the following below: 
1. In column 2 respondents from non-regulatory stakeholder show that board transparency 
(Q35) may improve corporate governance system  
2. The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholder in Ghana found that board disclosure 
(Q37) is likely to enhance corporate governance system. 
We estimate across the countries and there is evidence that the respondents from non-
regulatory stakeholders show that commitment of the board to transparency improve 
corporate governance system as shown in Table 5.5.1 Column 2. In Column 3 for Ghanaian 
firms, the commitments of the board to transparency have a positive influence on corporate 
governance system. This result suggests that respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in 
Ghana believe that commitment of the board to transparency may promote corporate 
governance system in Ghanaian firms.  
5.5.2 Effect of role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors’ variables and rules and laws 
of corporate governance using respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders.  
This section assesses the effect of the role and responsibility of firm’s board of director 
on rule and laws of corporate governance practices using non-regulatory stakeholders of 
corporate governance. The Table below provides the information on the model estimate and 
results of the data analysis. 
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Table 5.5.2: Showing OLS estimate on role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors and 
rules and laws using non-regulatory stakeholders  
Rules_cg = β0 +β1(corp_strgy) + β2 (Exec_comp) + β3(Bod_Eff) + β4(Bod_Frept) + β5(Bod_Trpy) + β6 (Bod_Enfm)  
+ Β7(Bod_Disc + β8(Bod_Duality) + β9(G) + β10(N) + β11(GR) + β12(NR)  + μi     
 Dependent variable: rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the countries 
All the countries 
with Ghana and 
Nigeria as dummy 
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.90** 
0.31 
(6.20) 
4.46** 
0.26 
(16.92) 
1.53** 
0.58 
(2.65) 
1.54** 
0.27 
(5.78) 
Corporate 
strategy 
0.09 
0.05 
(1.62) 
-0.01 
0.04 
(-0.36) 
0.13* 
0.08 
(1.73) 
0.02 
0.05 
(0.32) 
Executive 
compensation 
-0.14** 
0.06 
(-2.17) 
-0.16** 
0.04 
(-3.71) 
 
-0.28** 
0.12 
(-2.39) 
0.04 
0.05 
(0.71) 
Board 
effectiveness 
-0.00 
0.06 
(-0.08) 
0.01 
0.04 
(0.32) 
0.03 
0.08 
(0.45) 
0.08* 
0.04 
(1.91) 
Financial 
reporting  
0.02 
0.06 
(0.29) 
-0.03 
0.04 
(-0.59) 
0.06 
0.08 
(0. 76) 
0.02 
0.05 
(0.45) 
Board 
Transparency 
0.38** 
0.07 
(5.70) 
0.11** 
0.05 
(2.30) 
0.14 
0.10 
(1.37) 
-0.04 
0.05 
(-0.67) 
Enforcement rules -0.02 
0.06 
(-0.25) 
0.00 
0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.15 
0.10 
(-1.54) 
0.08* 
0.05 
(1.75) 
Board disclosure  0.13* 
0.07 
(1.94) 
0.12** 
0.05 
(2.48) 
0.31** 
0.10 
(2.94) 
-0.13** 
0.06 
(-2.22) 
Board duality -0.28** 
0.07 
(-3.85) 
-0.06 
0.05 
(-1.7) 
0.38** 
0.14 
(2.78) 
-0.12** 
0.05 
(2.89) 
     
Ghana  -1.96** 
0.13 
(-15.04) 
  
Nigeria  -2.20** 
0.13 
(-17.32) 
  
R-square 0.29 0.55 0.49 0.10 
F-statistic 20.53 63.76 12.17 3.35 
No of observation 416 416 112 243 
The dependent variable is indicated as adequate and effective rule and laws that promote corporate governance items or 
variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent variables are the role and responsibility of boards of 
directors which comprises each items or statement in section H of the survey questionnaire. Each of such items or statement 
which are variables include Level of commitment to corporate strategy (Corporate Strategy), adequate attention to executive 
compensation (Executive Compensation), Effective committed to their responsibility (Board Effectiveness), Level of 
ensuring of a formal and transparent board nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about 
enforcement of corporate governance policy (Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Level of concern to the integrity 
of companies financial reporting system (Financial Reporting system), Level of ensuring of a formal and transparent board 
nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about enforcement of corporate governance policy 
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(Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Supervision of process of disclosure and communication (Board disclosure 
and communication) and Separation between roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Board duality). 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South Africa 
there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in 
the parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
 
Key findings from the above Table include the following: 
1. In column 2 the respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders (all the countries together) 
indicate that executive compensation (Q32) may hinder the rules and laws that promote 
effective corporate governance practice. 
2. The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholder show that board transparency (Q35) 
increase the quality of rules and laws for sound corporate governance practice. 
3.  The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholder also found that board disclosure (Q37) 
is likely to enhance rules and laws that promote sound corporate governance practice. 
4. In Ghanaian firms respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders believe that commitment 
of board member to corporate strategy (Q31) may provide good quality of rules and laws for 
effective corporate governance practice. 
5. In Ghanaian firms respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders provide evidence that 
board duality (Q38) may improve the rules and laws that enhance sound corporate 
governance practice.  
6. In Nigerian firms respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders show that board 
effectiveness (Q33) matter in order to improve rules and laws that promote good corporate 
governance. 
7. In Nigerian firms respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders indicate that commitment 
of board to enforcement (Q36) of corporate governance is more likely to improve rules and 
laws that enhance good corporate governance.  
8. In Nigerian firms respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders found that board duality 
(Q38) seem to deter rules and laws that bring good corporate governance practice. 
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Table 5.5.2 Column 2 shows that executive compensation and board duality have a 
negative effect on rules and laws of corporate governance practices. Also, board 
transparency, board disclosure and communication are more likely to promote effective rules 
and law of corporate governance practice in all the selected countries together.  
Furthermore, Table 5.5.2 Column 3 and 4 contain information of the regression analysis 
in each of the country. In Ghanaian firms there is evidence that executive compensation has a 
negative influence on rule and laws of the corporate governance. This implies that 
respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders indicate that the degree of board commitment 
to executive compensation may not promote rules and laws for corporate governance 
practices. On the other hand, board disclosure, communication and board duality (separation 
between the role and responsibility of Chairman and CEO) has a positive effect on the rules 
and law of corporate governance. 
 In Nigerian firms commitment of the board effectiveness and enforcement of corporate 
governance policy seem to promote rules and laws of corporate governance practice. Thus, 
board disclosure, communication and board duality (separation between the role and 
responsibility of Chairman and CEO) have negative relationship with the rules and law of 
corporate governance. The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in Nigerian firms 
indicate that commitment of board to board effectiveness and enforcement may promote rules 
and laws that promote corporate governance practice in Nigeria. Contrarily, the non-
stakeholders believe that board disclosure, communication and board duality hinder the 
promotion of rules and laws on corporate governance practices. 
5.5.3 The Effect of role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors’ variables on power and 
authority of regulatory and supervisory agencies using respondent from non-regulatory 
stakeholders  
This section provides the assessment of the effect of the role and responsibility of firm’s 
board of director on rule and laws of corporate governance practices using non-regulatory 
stakeholders of corporate governance. The Table below illustrates the model estimate and 
results of the data analysis. 
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Table 5.5.3:  Showing the result of the OLS estimate on power and authority of regulatory and 
supervisory agencies and role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors’ variables using 
respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders. 
Agencies_cg = β0 +β1(corp_strgy) + β2 (Exec_comp) + β3(Bod_Eff) + β4(Bod_Frept) + β5(Bod_Trpy) + β6 (Bod_Enfm)  
+ Β7(Bod_Disc + β8(Bod_duality) + β9(G) + β10(N) + β11(GR) + β12(NR)  + μi   
 Dependent variable: power and authority of regulatory and supervisory agencies of corporate 
governance 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the countries 
All the countries 
with Ghana and 
Nigeria as dummy 
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 2.71** 
0.31 
(8.71) 
3.28** 
0.35 
(9.39) 
1.47** 
0.63 
(2.32) 
2.44** 
0.49 
(4.96) 
Corporate 
strategy 
-0.18** 
0.05 
(-3.41) 
0.08 
0.05 
(1.43) 
0.09 
0.08 
(1.10) 
0.09 
0.09 
(1.07) 
Executive 
compensation 
0.00 
0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
0.06 
(-0.45) 
-0.17 
0.13 
(-1.33) 
0.02 
0.10 
(0.20) 
Board 
effectiveness 
0.09 
0.06 
(1.59) 
-0.00 
0.05 
(-0.03) 
0.02 
0.08 
(0.20) 
0.06 
0.08 
(0.76) 
Financial 
reporting  
0.01 
0.06 
(0.18) 
0.04 
0.06 
(0.65) 
-0.03 
0.09 
(-0.35) 
0.07 
0.09 
(0.79) 
Board 
Transparency 
0.20** 
0.07 
(2.91) 
0.13 
0.06 
(1.94) 
-0.00 
0.11 
(-0.01) 
0.13 
0.10 
(1.24) 
Enforcement rules -0.10 
0.06 
(-1.53) 
-0.08* 
0.06 
(-1.37) 
-0.03 
0.11 
(-0.29) 
-0.11 
0.09 
(-1.30) 
Board disclosure  0.28 
0.07 
(4.10) 
0.13** 
0.07 
(2.05) 
0.46** 
0.12 
(3.98) 
0.02 
0.11 
(0.15) 
Board  duality -0.01 
0.08 
(-0.12) 
0.15** 
0.07 
(2.12) 
0.15 
0.15 
(1.00) 
0.21** 
0.09 
(2.22) 
     
Ghana  -1.94** 
0.17 
(-11.27) 
  
Nigeria  -0.62** 
0.17 
(-3.78) 
  
R-square 0.16 0.42 0.34 0.08 
F-statistic 12.39 29.68 6.57 2.70 
No of observation 416 416 112 243 
The dependent variable is indicated as power and authority of the supervisory, enforcement and regulatory agencies items or 
variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent variables are role and responsibility of boards of 
directors which comprises each items or statement in section H of the survey questionnaire. Each of such items or statement 
which are variables include Level of commitment to corporate strategy (Corporate Strategy), adequate attention to executive 
compensation (Executive Compensation), Effective committed to their responsibility (Board Effectiveness), Level of 
ensuring of a formal and transparent board nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about 
enforcement of corporate governance policy (Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Level of concern to the integrity 
of companies financial reporting system (Financial Reporting system), Level of ensuring of a formal and transparent board 
nomination and election process (Board Transparency), Level of concern about enforcement of corporate governance policy 
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(Enforcement of corporate governance policy), Supervision of process of disclosure and communication (Board disclosure 
and communication) and Separation between roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (Board duality). 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South Africa 
there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and 
Numbers in the parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
 
Key findings from the above Table are: 
1. The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders (all the countries together) indicate 
level of commitment of board members to enforcement of corporate governance (Q36) seem 
to deters the power and authority of regulatory agencies to perform their function. 
2. They also believe that board disclosure (Q37) may increase the power and authority of 
regulatory agencies to perform their roles and responsibilities.    
3. The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders found that board duality (Q38) can 
strengthen the power and authority of the regulatory agencies to perform their function 
effectively. 
4. In Nigerian firms respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders show that board duality is 
likely to increase the power and authority of the regulatory agencies to enable them perform 
their duties effectively.   
Table 5.5.3 examines empirically the effect of role and responsibility of firm’s directors’ 
variables and the power and authority of the regulatory and supervisory agencies of corporate 
governance on non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance using regression 
analysis.  Column 2 shows that enforcement of corporate governance policy has a negative 
effect on power and authority of regulatory and supervisory agencies of corporate 
governance. Thus, board disclosure, communication and board duality (separation between 
the role and responsibility of Chairman and CEO) seem to provide stronger power and 
authority of regulatory and supervisory agencies of corporate governance. In addition, 
Ghanaian and Nigerian firms as dummy variables have negative effect on promotion of 
power and authority of regulatory and supervisory agencies of corporate governance. 
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Furthermore, this study estimate across the countries in Column 3 and 4 the results show 
that in Ghanaian firms the level of commitments for board to disclosure and communication 
has a significant positive impact on the power and authority of regulatory and supervisory 
agencies. This finding indicates that respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in 
Ghanaian firms believe that commitments of board to disclosure and communication can 
promote strong power and authority of regulatory agencies in Ghana. In Nigerian firms board 
duality (separation between the role and responsibility of Chairman and CEO) have positive 
effect on power and authority of regulatory and supervisory agencies of corporate 
governance.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the effect of role and responsibilities of board of directors of 
listed firms on corporate governance system and the suggestion of regulatory bodies and non-
regulatory stakeholder of corporate governance. The next Chapter (six) will assesses the 
effect of external factor such as economic, societal and cultural, political environment, 
corruption and bribery ownership structure and accounting system   on corporate governance 
system using Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa as case studies. The chapter further classifies 
the respondents as regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholder of corporate governance. 
The objective of classification is to identify the suggestion of each respondent for the 
robustness results of the study 
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Chapter Six 
Results of data analysis on the effects of external factors on corporate 
governance system of firms 
Summary 
The objective of this chapter is to assess the effect of external factors such as economic, 
societal and cultural, political environment, corruption and bribery ownership structure and 
accounting system   on corporate governance system using Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa 
as case studies. The chapter further classifies the respondents as regulatory bodies and non-
regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance. The objective of classification is to identify 
the suggestion of each respondent for the robustness results of the study.  
The Table below describes the sections, statements, variables and sub-variables on external 
factors on corporate governance practices as it indicated in the survey questionnaire. 
 Table 6: Provides the section, statements and variables on external factors influence corporate 
governance practices. 
Section Statements Variables 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
               
 
I: Effect of Economic 
factor 
Q39.Good corporate practice 
within firms is attracting domestic 
investment in a nation 
 
Domestic investment 
Q40.Good corporate governance 
practices within firms is important 
in attracting foreign investment 
 
Foreign investment 
Q41.Good corporate governance 
influences the growth and 
development of firms and this, in 
turn influences the economy of a 
nation 
 
Growth 
 
Q42.Shareholder protection can 
affect the level of equity markets 
 
Equity market 
Q43.Macroeconomic policies 
influences the way firms are 
managed in such a way as to 
influence the relationship between 
firms and shareholders 
 
Macro-economic policy 
Q44.Banks play a predominant 
role in financing of firms in your 
country 
 
Financial intermediation 
Q45.Firms in your country own 
and control major local banks by 
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creating a form of conglomerate 
business organisation 
 
Firms control 
Q46.There are conflicts and 
problems associated with 
corporate governance before or 
after privatization of state-owned 
companies in your country 
 
Privatisation 
Q47.There is no transparency in 
the sales of state-owned companies 
and appointment of the board of 
directors 
Transparency 
Q48.The local investors are unable 
to use voting power to enforce 
corporate governance and there is 
no effective corporate control 
Local investor 
Section             Statements                Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 J: Effect of Societal and 
Cultural factor 
Q49.Corporate governance within 
firms should consider the interest 
of all shareholders (employee, 
customers) individual and 
community goal 
 
 
Stakeholder interest 
Q50.Corporate governance 
guidelines and regulation should 
be drawn in a such a way that they 
reflect the socio-political and 
cultural environment of each 
nation 
 
 
Socio-political environment 
 
Q51.National culture affects 
enforcement procedure in 
accounting systems and these 
influences corporate governance 
practice of a firm in a country 
 
National culture 
Q52.The business ethics and value 
that characterize a society will 
influence the level of confidence in 
the integrity and probity of firm 
and capital markets 
 
 
Business ethics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 K: Effect of Corruption 
and bribery 
Q53.Reduction in corruption and 
bribery will help to improve 
corporate governance practice 
 
    Reduction corruption   
Q54.Level of corruption influence 
the ability of the regulatory 
authorities to enforce compliance 
within corporate governance 
principles and accountability 
within firms 
Regulatory authority 
Q55.Job security and payment of 
satisfactory living wages will 
influence the level of corruption 
Job security 
Q56.Conflict of interest, unsound 
ethics and greed influence the 
corporate governance practice of a 
Conflict interest 
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firm 
Q57.Economic hardship will 
influence the level of corruption 
among employees to the extent 
that corporate governance practice 
are undermine 
 
Economic hardship 
Q58.Lack of internal control 
system will influence level of 
corruption among employee to the 
extent that corporate governance 
practices are undermined with 
firms 
 
Internal control 
         
 
L:The influence of political 
environment 
 
 
   
Q59.The government exerts 
substantial influence over the 
ownership of companies in my 
country of operation 
 
 
Government ownership  
Q60. The political environment, 
by influencing fiscal and monetary 
policies has a substantial impact 
on corporate governance practices. 
Monetary policies 
 
Q61.Prolonged period of military 
or civilian rule in a country will 
influence the corporate governance 
practice of firms 
 
Government type 
 
Q62.The government interferes 
with the work of regulatory and 
supervisory bodies with regard to 
appointments or incentives for 
company executive within firms 
 
Government influence 
Q63.Politician exert undue 
influence over the ministries and 
agencies responsible for 
monitoring and enforcement of 
corporate governance guidelines 
and regulation within firms 
 
Politician influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 M: Effect of ownership 
structure 
Q64.Board members and senior 
management are generally 
majority stock holders of 
companies in your country 
 
Board member 
Q65.Foreign national are generally 
majority of shareholders of 
companies in your country 
 
 
Foreign national 
Q66.The government holds 
majority of stock in companies in 
your country 
 
Government majority 
Q67.Family members generally 
hold the majority of stocks in 
companies in your country 
Family majority 
Q68.Where a single family 
dominate the management of a 
firm, this will be reflected in 
corporate governance practice of 
firm 
Single family 
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N: Effect of Accounting 
system 
Q69.Firms prepared financial 
information that accord with 
statutory and ethical obligation in 
my country 
 
Financial information 
Q70.The Institute of Chartered 
Accountant or equivalent 
(professional body of accountants)  
play a role in enforcing good 
accounting and financial reporting 
practices in my country 
 
 
Professional bodies 
Q71.The Accounting standards 
Board (national equivalent) issues 
standards that are in line with 
international accounting standards 
 
 Accountant standard  
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6.1 Results on effect of external factors on corporate governance system of firms.  
This section provides the regression results on the effect of external factors such as 
economic, societal and cultural, corruption, political environment, ownership structure and 
accounting system and corporate governance system of firms. Below are the model estimate 
and the results of the data analysis. 
Table 6.1: The effect of external factors on corporate governance system of firms.  
Total_cg = β0 +β1(Tec_I) + β2 (Tsc_J) + β3(Tcorrpt_K) + β4(Tpol_L) + β5(Town_M) +β6(Tacct_N) + β7(GR) 
+ β8(NR)  +μi    
 Dependent variable: Total effective corporate governance system 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the countries 
All countries  
with  Ghana and 
Nigeria as 
dummy  
Ghana Nigeria South 
Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 10.34** 
1.49 
(6.96) 
16.40** 
1.23 
(13.31) 
13.14** 
1.94 
(6.79) 
11.43** 
1.60 
(7.16) 
5.72** 
2.84 
(2.02) 
Economic 
 
-0.03 
0.03 
(-0.88) 
-0.02 
0.02 
(-0.69) 
-0.01 
0.04 
(-0.23) 
0.05 
0.03 
(1.51) 
0.06 
0.04 
(1.47) 
Societal and 
cultural 
0.08 
0.06 
(1.33) 
-0.04 
0.05 
(-0.84) 
-0.16* 
0.06 
(1.88) 
0.04 
0.07 
(-0.61) 
-0.01 
0.09 
(-0.06) 
Corruption 0.08* 
0.05 
(1.70) 
0.03 
0.04 
(0.70) 
0.06 
0.06 
(1.07) 
-0.02 
0.05 
(-0.37) 
0.20** 
0.07 
(2.75) 
Political 
environment 
-0.18** 
0.03 
(-5.52) 
-0.05** 
0.03 
(-1.99) 
-0.18** 
0.05 
(3.70) 
0.02 
0.04 
(0.49) 
-0.08 
0.05 
(-1.49) 
Ownership 
structure 
-0.03** 
0.04 
(-0.08) 
-0.03 
0.04 
(-0.85) 
0.19** 
0.06 
(3.02) 
-0.23** 
0.05 
(-4.43) 
-0.09 
0.09 
(-1.05) 
Accounting 
system 
0.42** 
0.06 
(6.55) 
0.29** 
0.05 
(5.64) 
0.21** 
0.10 
(2.22) 
0.24** 
0.06 
(3.79) 
0.52** 
0.13 
(4.09) 
Regulators  0.47** 
0.19 
(2.46) 
   
Ghana  -5.14** 
0.28 
(-18.17) 
   
Nigeria  -3.64** 
0.26 
(-13.86) 
   
R-square 0.14 0.47 0.29 0.12 0.38 
F-statistic 14.52 52.59 9.64 7.31 6.75 
No of 
observation 
541 541 150 320 71 
The dependent variable is indicated as total corporate governance system which is represented by corporate 
governance system is the addition of all the items or variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The 
Independent variables are economic factor is shown as total economic factor which is the addition of all items or 
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variables under section I of the survey questionnaire, societal and cultural factor  is illustrated as total societal 
and cultural which is the addition of all the items or variable under section J of the survey questionnaire, 
corruption and bribery is shown as total corruption and bribery  which is the addition of all items or variable 
within section K of the survey questionnaire, Total political environment   is the addition of all items under 
political environment  in section L, ownership structure is the total items or variable under section M, and 
accounting system is the total of all items or statements under section  N  of the survey questionnaire. 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being 
South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
The main findings from above Table are based on the opinion of the respondents include the 
following; 
1. There are evidence that political environment may hinders the promotion of effective 
corporate governance system of firms. 
2. Accounting system seem to promote effective corporate governance system of firms 
3. The regulators believe that corporate governance system may be better than non-regulatory 
stakeholders.  
4. The regulators believe that Ghanaian and Nigerian firms may not promote corporate 
governance system; however South African firms are better to improve corporate governance 
system.  
5. In Ghanaian firms the societal and cultural factors can hinder the promotion of sound 
corporate governance system. 
6. In Ghanaian firms ownership structure matter in order to promote sound corporate 
governance system. 
7. In Nigerian firms ownership structure seem to deter the promotion of effective corporate 
governance system.  
8. In South Africa firms’ corruption seem to increase as corporate governance reforms are 
introduced.  Thus, corruption is likely to hinder the promotion of sound corporate governance 
practice of South African firms. 
In conclusion from the above results it shows that accounting system adopted by a nation 
plays a vital role to promote sound corporate governance system. 
This study examines external factors on corporate governance system as shown in 
Column (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) in Table 6.1. In Column 2 we find that political 
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environment have a negative effect on corporate governance system. This result implies that 
the political environment in the SSAA region does not enhance corporate governance 
system. This may be due to government exerting substantial influence on process of 
acquiring ownership of firms. In addition, politicians and friends of government in power 
interfere on work of regulatory and supervisory bodies of corporate governance. Also, 
prolong military rules across the countries in the Sub-region did not help the matter because 
during the military regimes there are no corporate governance frameworks. Also, there are 
no institutions to formulate policies on corporate governance practices.  
The Accounting system adopted can promote the development of effective corporate 
governance. This evidence suggests that accounting system is one of the modifiers of 
corporate governance practice. It is through the quality of accounting system shareholders, 
potential investors and other stakeholders will be able to receive financial information about 
their firms.   
Besides this, Column 3, 4 and 5 illustrate the estimate within each country. There is 
evidence that in Ghanaian firms’ societal and cultural factor has a negative significant effect 
with coefficient of -0.16 on corporate governance system. This is likely to hinder the 
promotion of sound corporate governance system. This finding may be due to the guidelines 
on corporate governance system adopted does not taken the socio-cultural environment of 
the country into consideration in the formulation of the principle on corporate governance 
guideline.  
In addition, the political environment in Ghana has a negative significant relationship 
with coefficient of -0.18 on corporate governance system. It is recently that Ghana has a 
democratically stable government as a result the institutional frameworks for corporate 
governance is not so strong to promote sound corporate governance. Also, this may be an 
interference of the government and politician on the regulatory and enforcement bodies of 
corporate governance. The accounting system within the firms in Ghana has a positive 
impact with coefficient of 0.29 on corporate governance system. This result suggests that 
proper adoption of accounting standard may improve the development of corporate 
governance in Ghanaian firms. 
 In Nigerian firms we find a negative significant effect of ownership structure on 
corporate governance system with estimate coefficient of -0.23. This result shows that 
ownership structure of firms in Nigeria may hinders effective corporate governance system. 
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This is likely due to lack of proper method of acquiring ownership through stockholding 
within firm, the controlling owners and the incompetency of those on board of management.  
However, we find that in Nigerian firms accounting system has a significant positive 
relationship on corporate governance system with coefficients of 0.21. This evidence 
indicates that adoption and implementation of proper accounting standard may promote 
corporate governance practice within firms. In addition, accounting system is one of the 
accelerators or modifier for corporate governance practices. It is through accounting system 
that will enable the shareholders, potential investors and other stakeholders of corporate 
governance of firms received financial information. The estimate shows a small R-square 
value for Nigeria in Column 4. This because there may be other factors not mention in this 
study that can affect the corporate governance practices in Nigerian firms. 
 In South African firms corruption has a positive significant impact on corporate 
governance system with coefficient of 0.20. This result implies that in South Africa, 
development of corporate governance seem to be affected by corruption in such a way that 
corruption interferes with different corporate governance policy adopted by the government 
of South Africa. This may hinder the promotion of good corporate government of firms in 
South Africa. Thus, accounting system has a positive significant effect with coefficient of 
0.52 on corporate governance system. This result shows that the positive effect on 
accounting practice on corporate governance system may likely promote sound corporate 
governance practice in South Africa.  
In all the countries together using Ghana and Nigeria Nigerian firms as a dummy 
variable in references to South African firms as it show in Column 2.  There is evidence that 
both countries have a negative significant relationship on rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance. This result suggests that the implementation of rules and laws guiding 
corporate governance in these countries may be weak in compared with that of South Africa. 
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6.1.1 Results on the effect of economic factor on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance of firms 
Below are the model estimate and Table shows the results of the data analysis 
Table 6.1.1: The effects of economic factor on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance of firms.   
Rules_Q8= β0 +  β1(Dinvt_Q39) +  β2(Finvt_Q40)   + β3(Growth_Q41) + β4(Equity_Q42) + β5 (Macro_Q43 + 
β6(Banks_Q44) +  β7 (Firms_Q45)  +   β8 (Privatization_Q46)  +  β9 ( Transparency_Q47)  + β10 
(Investor_Q48)+  β11(G) + β12(N) + μi 
Dependent variable:  Rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the 
countries 
All countries  
with  Ghana and 
Nigeria as 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria South 
Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 2.92** 
0.47 
(6.22) 
5.37** 
0.41 
(13.04) 
4.96** 
0.64 
(7.80) 
0.70* 
0.43 
(1.62) 
3.21** 
0.86 
(3.75) 
Foreign 
Investment 
0.14 
0.10 
(1.47) 
0.16* 
0.08 
(1.99) 
0.01 
0.14 
(0.05) 
0.04 
0.07 
(0.48) 
0.38** 
0.17 
(2.27) 
Growth  -0.09 
0.10 
(-0.94) 
-0.99 
0.08 
(-1.23) 
-0.13 
0.15 
(-0.91) 
0.15* 
0.07 
(1.69) 
 
-0.01 
0.18 
(-0.05) 
Equity Market 0.03 
0.08 
(0.33) 
-0.01 
0.06 
(-0.12) 
0.26** 
0.13 
(2.04) 
-0.04 
0.06 
(-0.58) 
-0.16 
0.14 
(-1.15) 
Macro-economic 
policies 
0.06 
0.07 
(0.89) 
-0.11* 
0.06 
(-1.85) 
-0.27** 
0.14 
(-2.01) 
-0.09 
0.06 
-(1.18) 
0.21 
0.12 
(1.67) 
Financial 
intermediation 
0.08** 
0.04 
(2.33) 
0.02 
0.03 
(0.68) 
0.11 
0.09 
(1.29) 
0.07** 
0.03 
(2.67) 
-0.06 
0.11 
(-0.52) 
Firms control  0.27** 
0.04 
(6.88) 
0.04 
0.03 
(1.20) 
0.10 
0.07 
(1.51) 
-0.04 
0.04 
(-1.18) 
0.13 
0.07 
(1.86) 
Privatization  -0.05 
0.06 
(-078) 
-0.00 
0.05 
(-0.40) 
 
0.14 
0.13 
(1.13) 
-0.02 
0.06 
(-0.31) 
-0.02 
0.07 
(-1.75) 
Transparency  -0.16** 
0.06 
(-2.78) 
 
-0.05 
0.05 
(-1.22) 
-0.08 
0.09 
(-0.90) 
 
0.07 
0.05 
(1.26) 
-0.02 
0.07 
(-0.29) 
Local investor  -0.28** 
0.06 
(-5.12) 
-0.14** 
0.05 
(-3.07) 
-0.70** 
0.11 
(-6.65) 
0.02 
0.05 
(0.34) 
-0.11* 
0.07 
(-1.75) 
Ghana  -1.10** 
0.14 
(14.65) 
   
Nigeria  -2.16** 
0.13 
(16.22) 
   
R-square 0.31 0.54 0.50 0.06 0.25 
F-statistic 23.90 51.90 13.30 1.99 2.01 
Chapter Six: Results of the data analysis on  the effect of external factors on corporate governance system 
228 
 
No of observation 541 541 150 320 71 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws which is item or statement 8 under section B of the survey 
questionnaire.  The independent variables are economic factor  which are items or statements under section I of 
the survey questionnaire Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being 
South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
The key results from the above Table are based on the opinion of the respondents this include 
the following; 
1. There is evidence that good corporate governance that attracts foreign investment (Q40) is 
more likely to improve rule and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
2. The macro-economic policy (Q43) may hinder the rules and laws that enhance corporate 
governance practice of firms. 
3. The local investors (Q48) are unable to use voting power to enforce corporate governance, 
this discourages improvement of rules and laws that promote effective corporate governance 
practice. 
4. In Ghanaian firms shareholders protection which affect equity market (Q42) seem to 
improve rules and laws that promote corporate governance.  
5. In Nigerian firms good corporate governance that influence growth and development 
(Q41) is likely to enhances rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
6. In Nigerian firms the role of banking in financial intermediation (Q44) can improve rules 
and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
In conclusion what is important from the above finding is that when there is a good 
corporate governance practice this is likely to attract foreign investment. 
We estimate sub-variables of economics factors on the rules of laws that promote 
corporate governance as shown in the Table 6.1.1. In Column 2, there is evidence that foreign 
investment (Q40) may likely improve rules and laws that guide corporate governance 
practice. This result has to do with all the selected countries together in the Sub-region. 
In Column 2 macroeconomic policies (Q43) have a negative significant effect on rules 
and laws that promote corporate governance. This finding implies that a lack of proper 
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implementation of macro-economic policies may result from poor quality of governance. 
This indicates that government expenditure may be misappropriated as a result of corruption, 
lack of transparency and accountability. This can lead to increase in national deficit. Thus an 
increase in national deficit brings weak economy such as high inflation rate, high interest rate 
and high unemployment rate. Consequently, investors may move from equity or capital 
markets to money markets because the money markets are free but capital markets are risky. 
In addition, this finding suggests that the corporate governance system such as rules; laws 
power and authority of the regulatory agencies are very weak. This can brings lack of 
confidence to the investors in equity markets. 
In addition, local investor voting power and control (Q48) have a negative relationship with 
rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. This result implies that a large 
number of listed firms are subsidiaries of foreign multinational and there are minority of 
shares with float for local investors. As a result, local investors may not be able to use voting 
power to enforce corporate governance and there is no effective control due to limited float 
(Kapumpa, 2001. Mensah, 2001). 
Furthermore, within each country, in Table 6.1.1 Column 3 as it illustrates in Ghanaian 
firms, equity market (Q42) has a positive significant effect on rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance practice with coefficient of 0.26. This implies that rules and laws of 
corporate governance in regard to shareholder protection are likely improving corporate 
governance of firms in Ghana. However, micro economic policies have a negative significant 
effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice with coefficient of -0.27. 
This result indicates the way firms are manage in Ghana, government micro economic 
policies negatively affecting the relationship between firms and shareholders. This result 
suggests that this may be due to poor implementation of micro-economic policies and weak 
institutional framework of corporate governance in Ghana.  
In Nigerian firm in Column 4, there is evidence that growth and development of the 
economy have a positive effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
This finding implies that when there is an improvement in growth and development in a 
nation through sound economic policy, there is need for stringent rules and laws that enhance 
corporate governance so that investors will have confidence to invest in firms.   
In South African firms as it shows in Column 5, foreign investments influence rules and 
laws guide corporate governance system with positive significant coefficient of 0.38. This 
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result shows that good corporate governance within South Africa firms is likely to attract 
foreign investors. However, local investor voting power and control have a negative 
relationship with rules and law of corporate governance system with coefficient of -0.11. This 
result is consistent with Ghanaian firms in column 4. 
6.1.2 Results on effect of societal and cultural factor on rules and laws of corporate governance 
of firms.  
Below are the model estimate and Table shows the results of the data analysis. 
Table 6.1.2: Describes the effects of societal and cultural factor on rules and laws of corporate 
governance of firms. 
Rules_Q8 = β0 +  β1(stakeholders_Q49) +  β2(Sociopol_Q50)   + β3(Culture_Q51) + β4(Ethics_Q52) +   β5(G) + 
β6(N) + μi 
Dependent variable:  Rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the 
countries 
All countries  
with  Ghana and 
Nigeria as 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria South 
Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 2.81** 
0.51 
(5.52) 
 
5.45** 
0.38 
(14.38) 
4.91 
0.67 
(7.37) 
1.20** 
0.42 
(2.83) 
4.01** 
0.75 
(5.34) 
Stakeholders  
interest 
0.07 
0.09 
(0.77) 
 
0.09 
0.07 
(1.29) 
0.12 
0.13 
(0.90) 
0.11 
0.07 
(1.48) 
0.02 
0.13 
(0.15) 
Socio-political 
environment 
-0.07 
0.09 
(-0.88) 
-0.09 
0.06 
(-1.54 
-0.26* 
0.14 
(1.85) 
 
-0.02 
0.06 
(-0.27) 
0.14 
0.11 
(1.27) 
 National culture  -0.03 
0.06 
(-0.41) 
-0.09** 
0.04 
(-1.98) 
-0.28** 
0.10 
(-2.71) 
0.06 
0.04 
(1.29) 
-0.05 
0.12 
(-0.43) 
 Business ethics -0.03 
0.06 
(-0.41) 
-0.13* 
0.07 
(-1.89) 
-0.24 
0.14 
(-1.65) 
-0.04 
0.08 
(-0.48) 
-0.01 
0.13 
(-0.08) 
Ghana  -2.33** 
0.12 
(-19.55) 
   
Nigeria  -2.54** 
0.11 
(-23.60) 
   
R-square 0.06 0.52 0.18 0.13 0.26 
F-statistic 0.76 95.11 8.05 1.00 1.44 
No of observation 541 541 150 320 71 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws which is item or statement 8 under section B of the survey 
questionnaire.  The independent variables which are societal and culture  which are items or statements under 
section J of the survey questionnaire Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference 
category being South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
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 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
The key results from the above Table are based on the opinion of the respondents this include 
the following; 
1. There is evidence that national culture that affect the enforcement of accounting system 
(Q51) seem to hinder the improvement of rules and laws for sound corporate governance 
practice. Corporate  
2. The result reveals that business ethic (Q52) may inhibit the rules and laws for effective 
corporate governance practice.  
3. The socio-political and cultural environment (Q50) can hinders the development of rules 
and laws that promote sound corporate governance practice in Ghanaian firms.   
4. The national culture that affects the enforcement of accounting system (Q51) discourages 
rules and laws that can improve corporate governance practice in Ghanaian firms. 
Table 6.1.2 Column 2 illustrates the estimate using all the countries with dummy 
variable. The result indicates that business ethics has a significant negative effect on rules 
and laws of corporate governance. This evidence suggests that business ethics and values 
that characterise a society which influence the level of confidence in the integrity and 
probity of firm and capital market (Q52) may deters  the rules and law that promote effective 
corporate governance. This result implies that there is a lack of proper business ethics and 
values within the society and it can have negative effect on promotion of effective corporate 
governance practice of firm. 
In addition, in Ghanaian firms the socio-political and cultural environment (Q50) have a 
negative influence on rules and  laws  with coefficient of -0.26 and this does not  promote  
effective corporate governance system. Also, the national culture on enforcement of 
accounting procedure (Q46) is negatively significant with -0.28 on rules and laws of 
corporate governance. This result suggests that the Ghanaian culture on enforcement of 
accounting procedure seem to inhibit the development of sound corporate governance 
practice of firms in Ghana.  
6.1.3 Result on effect of corruption and bribery on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance of firms.  
 Below are the model estimates and Table reports the results of the data analysis. 
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Table 6.1.3: The effects of corruption and bribery on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance of firms.   
Rules_Q8 = β0 + β1(Reduction_Q53) + β2(Regulatory_Q54)  + β3(Job_Q55) + β4(Interest_Q56) + β5 
(Economic_Q57) + β6(Control_Q58) + β5(G) + β6(N) + μi 
Dependent variable:  Rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the 
countries 
All countries  
with  Ghana and 
Nigeria as 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria South 
Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 2.23** 
0.54 
(4.10) 
5.12** 
0.40 
(12.70) 
4.27** 
0.71 
(6.04) 
1.44** 
0.43 
(3.34) 
3.39** 
0.90 
(3.75) 
Reduction in 
corruption 
0.10 
0.12 
(0.88) 
0.11 
0.08 
(1.36) 
0.18 
0.16 
(1.14) 
0.06 
0.09 
(0.64) 
0.12 
0.12 
(1.00) 
Regulatory 
authority  
-0.11 
0.11 
(-1.05) 
-0.16** 
0.08 
(-2.14) 
-0.33** 
0.15 
(-2.19) 
-0.02 
0.08 
(-0.28) 
0.04 
0.16 
(0.26) 
Job security  -0.02 
0.06 
(-0.37) 
-0.05 
0.04 
(-1.28) 
0.05 
0.12 
(0.46) 
-0.04 
0.04 
(-1.10) 
-0.22** 
0.09 
(-2.60) 
Conflict interest  -0.12 
0.11 
(-1.04) 
-0.14* 
0.08 
(-1.83) 
 
-0.39** 
0.17 
(-2.67) 
 
0.09 
0.08 
(1.11) 
0.03 
0.16 
(0.19) 
Economic 
hardship  
-0.12 
0.10 
(1.17) 
-0.16** 
0.07 
(-2.17) 
-0.50** 
0.16 
(-3.11) 
0.05 
0.07 
(0.68) 
0.62** 
0.18 
(3.46) 
Internal control  0.28** 
0.12 
(2.32) 
0.24** 
0.08 
(2.89) 
0.49** 
0.19 
(2.62) 
-0.08 
0.06 
(-0.97) 
-0.36 
0.27 
(-1.36) 
Ghana  -2.32** 
0.12 
(-19.50) 
   
Nigeria  -2.53** 
0.11 
(-23.62) 
   
R-square 0.15 0.52 0.21 0.12 0.23 
F-statistic 1.37 72.99 6.43 0.68 3.15 
No of observation 541 541 150 320 71 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws which is item or statement 8 under section B of the survey 
questionnaire.  The independent variables which are corruption and bribery which are items or statements under 
section K of the survey questionnaire Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference 
category being South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 pecent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
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Key findings from above Table are based on the opinion of the respondents include the 
following; 
1. Corruption within the regulatory authority authorities (Q54) can deters the development 
of rules and laws that improve corporate governance practice. 
2. Conflict of interest and greediness within firms (Q56) may hinder rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance practice. 
3. The economic hardship that encourages corruption among employee (Q57) has a negative 
effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
 4. The level of internal control system within firms (Q58) can increase the quality of rules 
and laws that corporate governance practice. 
5. In South African firms, job security and payment of satisfactory living wages which 
influence corruption (Q55) is less likely to improve rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practice. 
6. In South African economic hardship that affects corruption among employee (Q57) seem 
to increases as the corporate governance reforms are introduced in South Africa. 
In conclusion from the above finding when there is adequate internal control system in 
firms this increases the quality of rules and laws that bring good corporate governance 
practice.  
 In Table 6.1.3 Column 2, the following corruption variables such as corruption within 
regulatory authorities (Q54) conflict of interest and greediness (Q56) and economic hardship 
(57) have a negative effect on rules and laws of corporate governance practices. This result 
suggests that these sub-variables may hinder the promotion of rules and laws that bring 
sound corporate governance in the Sub-region (SSAA). Also, lack of internal control system 
is another barrier that weakens the development of rules and laws that can promote good 
corporate governance of firm in the Sub-region. The evidence from the above suggests that 
corruption and bribery can alter the rules and laws process in corporate governance practices 
through lack of adequate internal control system, conflict of interest, greediness, economic 
hardship which may result to endemic corruption in the society.   
In Table 6.1.3 Column 3, we find that in Ghanaian firms’ corruption sub-variables such 
as corruption within regulatory authorities of corporate governance (Q54) has a negative 
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significant relationship with coefficient of -0.33 on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practices. Conflict of interest and greediness (Q56) is negatively significant with 
coefficient of -0.39 and economic hardship (Q57) has a negative effect with coefficient of 
0.50 on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. This result implies that 
corruption may be endemic within Ghanaian society and this cannot promote rules and laws 
on corporate governance practices of firms in Ghana.  
Moreover, in South African firms job security and payment of satisfactory living wages 
(Q55) have a negative influence on rule and law that promote corporate governance with 
coefficient of -0.22. This result indicates that the issue of job security and payment of 
satisfactory living wages does not matter because corruption has been institutionalised and 
endemic in the system. This seems to deter the development of corporate governance 
practice in South Africa.  The government of South African introduced various corporate 
governance reforms as a result of impact of economic hardship which result into corruption 
that seem to endemic and institutionalised in South Africa. Consequently, this may 
discourage promotion of effective corporate governance practice.  
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6.1.4 Results on effects of political environment on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance of firms.  
Below are the model estimates and the Table showing the results of the data analysis 
Table 6.1.4: The effects of political environment on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance of firms.   
Rules_Q8 = β0 + β1(Ownership_Q59) + β2(Monetary_Q60) + β3(Type_Q61) + β4(Government_Q62) + β5 
(Politician_Q63) +  β5(G) + β6(N) + μi 
Dependent variable:  Rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the 
countries 
All countries  
with  Ghana and 
Nigeria as 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria South 
Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 3.48** 
0.37 
(9.52) 
5.31** 
0.29 
(18.56) 
5.50** 
0.58 
(9.46) 
1.04** 
0.28 
(3.74) 
4.87** 
0.73 
(6.65) 
Government 
ownership  
-0.01 
0.05 
(-0.17) 
-0.01 
0.04 
(-0.20) 
-0.05 
0.09 
(-0.55) 
-0.04 
0.04 
(-0.90) 
-0.04 
0.07 
(-0.50) 
Monetary policies  -0.07 
0.09 
(-0.84) 
-0.21** 
0.06 
(-3.21) 
-0.57** 
0.12 
(-4.77) 
0.06 
0.07 
(0.80) 
-0.08 
0.16 
(-0.49) 
Type of 
government  
0.24** 
0.07 
(3.17) 
0.08 
0.06 
(1.40) 
0.03 
0.13 
0.21 
0.03 
0.06 
(0.58) 
0.07 
0.13 
(0.58) 
Government 
influence  
-0.30** 
0.06 
(-5.14) 
-0.12** 
0.04 
(-2.72) 
-0.34** 
0.11 
(-2.96) 
-0.03 
0.04 
(-0.59) 
0.03 
0.08 
(0.39) 
Politician 
influence  
-0.16** 
0.07 
(-2.45) 
0.02 
0.05 
(0.44) 
0.14 
0.11 
(1.27) 
0.12** 
0.06 
(2.10) 
-0.10 
0.07 
(-1.40) 
Ghana  -2.16** 
0.13 
(-17.12) 
   
Nigeria  -2.41** 
0.12 
(20.78) 
   
R-square 0.14 0.52 0.31 0.27 0.05 
F-statistic 16.80 83.68 12.61 11.77 0.73 
No of observation 541 541 150 320 71 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws which is item or statement 8 under section B of the survey 
questionnaire.  The independent variables which are political factor  which  are items or statements under section 
L of the survey questionnaire Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category 
being South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
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The main findings from above Table are based on the opinion of the respondents include the 
following; 
1. The political environment that influences fiscal and monetary policies (Q60) can hinder 
the rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
2. The level of interference of government with the work of regulatory and supervisory 
bodies (Q62) discourages the rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices. 
3. The political environment that influences fiscal and monetary policies (Q60) may inhibit 
the rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice in Ghanaian firms. 
4. The level of political influence over the ministry and agencies in charge of corporate 
governance (Q63) has effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance in 
Nigerian firms. 
In all the countries together in respect to Column 2 of the Table 6.1.4, there is evidence 
that political influence with fiscal and monetary policies (Q60) have a negative impact on 
rules and laws guiding the promotion of corporate governance practice. The political 
environment that influences fiscal and monetary policies hinders corporate governance 
practices. This result suggests that in countries where political elites are corrupt there is 
likely to be lack of accountability and transparency. This may lead to weak institutions and 
poor governance. These may also results to poor implementation of fiscal and monetary 
policies which may result to high inflation rate in the selected countries in the Sub-region. 
In addition, governance influence on regulatory agencies (Q59) has a negative 
significant impact on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices. This 
because government may impose their own political friends as head and board members of 
those regulatory agencies such as Securities and Exchange Commission and Central Banks 
who are also boards members of some listed firms. At the end of the day, the regulatory 
agencies may not have free hand to enforce and regulate corporate governance policy for 
firms in the in the selected countries in the Sub-region.  
In Column 3 Ghanaian firms, the political influence with fiscal and monetary policy has 
a significant negative relationship with coefficient of 0.57 on rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance practice. This result implies that in Ghana the political institution 
seem to be weak to implement a strong and vibrant fiscal and monetary policy that can 
promote corporate governance practice. Presently, in Ghana the institutional frameworks for 
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policy implementation may be weak compiled with institutionalised socio-political 
corruption within country. This has negatively affected government official in the ministries, 
and agencies concerned with fiscal and monetary policies and regulatory agencies on 
corporate governance policy to perform their duties.  
In addition, governance influence on regulatory agencies sub-variable has a negative 
significant effect on rules and laws of corporate governance with coefficient of -0.34. This 
result may be due to imposition of political elites who are friends to the government in 
power as heads and members of board of the regulatory agencies. As a result, those political 
elites and friends are board’s members and chairman of some listed firms in Ghana. Thus, 
officer in charge of those regulatory agencies may not be able to perform their duties as a 
result of interferences by such boards’ members and chairman of those regulatory agencies. 
 In Nigerian firms, the politicians influence on regulatory agencies sub-variable (Q63) 
has significant positive impact on rules and law that promote corporate governance 
practices.  This finding implies that board members and chairman may be incompetent, but 
are politicians and friends to officials of government in power. They also own majority of 
share in some listed companies. As a result, they can easily manipulate the officers in charge 
of supervision and regulatory of corporate governance. The policies and reforms on 
corporate governance such as multiplicity of code of corporate governance for listed firm are 
on paper and are not properly implemented. This may be due to  incompetent of the board 
members and chairman who do not give freehand to those officers in charge of the 
regulatory and supervision of corporate governance policy.   
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six: Results of the data analysis on  the effect of external factors on corporate governance system 
238 
 
6.1.5 Results on the effect of ownership structure on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance of firms 
Below are the model estimate and Table illustrates the result of the data analysis. 
Table 6.1.5: The effect of ownership structure on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance of firms.   
Rules_Q8 = β0 + β1(Board_Q64) + β2(Foreign_Q65)  + β3(Govt_Q66) + β4(Famly_Q67) + β5 (Single_Q68)  + 
β5(G) + β6(N) + μi 
Dependent variable:  Rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the 
countries 
All countries  
with dummy 
Ghana Nigeria South 
Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 2.33** 
0.32 
(7.26) 
3.93** 
0.25 
(15.50) 
0.71 
0.45 
(1.58) 
1.99** 
0.27 
(7.46) 
3.12** 
0.67 
(4.63) 
Board members  -0.16** 
0.04 
(-4.51) 
0.06 
0.04 
(1.61) 
0.11 
0.08 
(1.41) 
-0.04 
0.04 
(-0.91) 
0.06 
0.07 
(0.76) 
Foreign national  0.39** 
0.07 
(5.61) 
0.23** 
0.05 
(4.50) 
0.52** 
0.13 
(4.16) 
-0.05 
0.06 
(-0.84) 
0.04 
0.08 
(0.49) 
Government  
majority  
-0.08 
0.08 
(-0.96) 
0.03 
0.06 
(0.96) 
0.14 
0.14 
(1.00) 
-0.12** 
0.06 
(-2.02) 
-0.16 
0.16 
(-1.00) 
Family  majority  -0.05 
0.06 
(-0.80) 
0.05 
0.04 
(1.12) 
0.22** 
0.09 
(2.58) 
0.01 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.06 
0.11 
(0.52) 
Single family  -0.01 
0.06 
(0.24) 
 
-0.05 
0.04 
(-1.16) 
-0.08 
0.09 
(-0.95) 
0.04 
0.05 
(0.79) 
0.031** 
0.12 
(2.54) 
Ghana  -2.18** 
0.12 
(18.23) 
   
Nigeria  -2.56** 
0.12 
(-21.29) 
   
R-square 0.10 0.53 0.34 0.24 0.21 
F-statistic 10.44 85.79 14.48 11.58 11.52 
No of observation 541 541 150 320 71 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws which is item or statement 8 under section B of the survey 
questionnaire.  The independent variables are indicates as ownership structure which  are items or statements 
under section M of the survey questionnaire Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria 
(reference category being South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
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The main results from the above Table are based on the opinion of the respondents 
include the following; 
1. When foreign national are generally majority of shareholder of companies (Q65) this is 
more likely to improve the rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
2. Particularly in Ghanaian firms when family are majority of stockholders (Q62) such 
situation improve rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice.   
3. More especially, in Nigerian firms when government are majority of stockholders (Q66) 
there is evidence that this situation hinders rules and laws that promote corporate governance. 
4. In South African firms particularly the result reveal that when single family dominate the 
management this may be reflected in the rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
practice. 
In conclusion what matter from the above finding is that when foreign national are majority 
of stockholders (Q65) this may increase the quality of rules and laws that promote good 
corporate governance.  
In column 2, when foreign national are majority of stockholders have a significant 
positive effect on rules and laws guiding the promotion corporate governance of firms. This 
finding suggests that when foreign national are majority of the stocks in a firms; this may   
sound corporate ideas into the firms in the Sub-region which can promote corporate strategy 
and corporate governance practice of firms.  
Furthermore, Table 6.1.5 Column 3, the regression result indicate that foreign national 
have  a majority of stock holders seem to improve rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practice. This result implies that foreign ownership may bring new strategy to 
improve the corporate governance of Ghanaian firms. In addition, family members are 
majority stockholders variable can improve corporate governance. This indicates that the 
family members may decide that they want their firms to comply with corporate governance 
code of best practices. Such family-owned firms will like to follow the code of corporate 
governance regulation so that they can be one of the best firms in corporate governance 
compliance. In such situation, Ghanaian firm who are family-owned is likely to practice good 
corporate governance in order to attract more investors into their firms so that the firm will 
not collapse. 
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In Nigerian, government as majority stockholders variable of firms have a negative influence 
on rules and laws that promote corporate governance. This evidence shows that when 
government are majority of stockholders of firms there may be tendency that there will be 
favouritism such that most of the chairman and directors of such companies will be 
politicians and friends to officials of the government in power. These sets of people seem to 
be incompetent to carry out their duties and there may be lack of accountability and 
transparency in the activities of such firms. This situation cannot promote effective corporate 
governance practices. This finding is consistent with what occurs at   presently in state-owned 
companies in Nigeria. Where companies are control and managed by political elite and 
friends to officials of the government in power with no accountability and most of these 
companies are collapsing presently.  
In South Africa when single family dominates the management of firm it has a positive 
effect on rules and laws that guide corporate governance. This finding buttresses or supports 
the effect of family-owned firms whereby the family will follow the rules and laws that can 
promote effective corporate governance in the management of the firms so that the firms will 
attract more investors the firms may not collapse.  
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6.1.6 Results on the effect of accounting on the rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance of firms. 
Below are the model estimates and the Table shows the results of the data analysis. 
Table 6.1.6: The effects of accounting system on rules and laws that promotes corporate 
governance of firms.   
Rules_cg = β0 +  β1(Information_(Q69) +  β2(Profession_(Q70)   + β3(Standard_(Q71) + β5(G) + β6(N) + μi 
Dependent variable:  Rules and laws that promote corporate governance  
 
Variables 
All observation 
for the 
countries 
All countries  
With Ghana and 
Nigeria as  
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria South 
Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.77** 
0.39 
(1.99) 
4.05** 
0.31 
(12.92) 
2.51** 
0.74 
(3.74) 
1.39** 
0.26 
(5.25) 
2.45** 
0.71 
(3.46) 
Financial 
information  
0.19** 
0.07 
(3.00) 
0.08* 
0.05 
(1.68) 
0.10 
0.13 
(0.79) 
0.02 
0.04 
(0.36) 
0.40** 
0.14 
(2.94) 
Professional 
bodies  
0.03 
0.08 
(0.33) 
0.00 
0.06 
(0.02) 
-0.20 
0.17 
(-1.13) 
0.01 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.27* 
0.15 
(1.85) 
 
Accounting 
standard  
0.16** 
0.08 
(1.95) 
0.01 
0.06 
(0.16) 
0.02 
0.15 
(0.14) 
0.06 
0.06 
(1.01) 
-0.21 
0.17 
(-1.24) 
Ghana  -2.24** 
0.12 
(-18.50) 
   
Nigeria  -2.46** 
0.11 
(-22.20) 
   
R-square 0.37 0.50 0.11 0.05 0.18 
F-statistic 16.96 108.22 5.53 0.56 4.81 
No of observation 541 541 150 320 71 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws which is item or statement 8 under section B of the survey 
questionnaire.  The independent variables are indicates as accounting system which   are items or statements 
under section N of the survey questionnaire Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria 
(reference category being South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
Key findings from the above Table are: 
1. When firms prepared financial information that accord with statutory and ethical obligation 
(Q69) may bring quality to the rules and laws that enhance corporate governance practice. 
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2. In South Africa firms’ enforcement of rules on accounting and financial reporting by 
professional accounting body (Q70) seem to increase the quality of rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance practice. 
In conclusion from the above finding there is a need to prepared financial information in 
accord with statutory and ethical obligation. As a result, this may provide good quality of 
rules and laws that promote corporate governance. 
In all the countries together in Table 6.1.6  Column 2 there is evidence that when  
financial information are prepared according to statutory and ethical obligation this  provide  
a significant positive relationship on rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
system of firms.  
In Column 5 in South African firms adequate financial information that are prepared 
according to statutory and obligation (Q69) can increase the quality of rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance practice. Financial reporting by professional accounting body 
(Q70) in South Africa has a positive effect on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practice. This finding implies that adoption of sound accounting standard in 
South African firms bring adequate rules and laws that promote effective corporate 
governance practices.  
 
6.2 Results on effect of external factors on corporate governance system using 
respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate 
governance.   
In this section, we provide the results of the regression analysis for two categories of 
respondents such as regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate 
governance. We provide evidence based on these two categories of respondents in order to 
identify the convergent and divergent view of these two categories of respondent.  Below are 
the model estimates and the Table showing the results of the data analysis. 
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Table 6.2: Effects of external factors on corporate governance system using respondents from 
regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance.   
Dependent variable: Total effective corporate governance system 
 Regulatory bodies Non-Regulatory stakeholders 
 
Variables 
All 
countries 
observation 
All 
countries  
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria All 
 counties 
observation 
All 
countries  
with 
dummy  
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept 8.10** 
2.56 
(3.17) 
14.16** 
2.42 
(5.85) 
15.51** 
3.85 
(4.03) 
4.46** 
2.99 
(1.49) 
11.18** 
1.82 
(6.15) 
17.21** 
1.46 
(11.82) 
12.40** 
2.33 
(5.32) 
13.74** 
1.84 
(7.48) 
Economic 
 
-0.05 
0.07 
(-0.73) 
-0.01 
0.06 
(-0.16) 
-0.17 
0.11 
(-1.59) 
0.08 
0.08 
(1.09) 
-0.02 
0.04 
(-0.65) 
-0.02 
0.03 
(-0.70) 
0.03 
0.05 
(0.62) 
0.04 
0.04 
(0.99) 
Societal and 
cultural 
0.20 
0.13 
(1.57) 
-0.08 
0.12 
(-0.63) 
-0.23 
0.24 
(-0.98) 
0.22 
0.14 
(1.56) 
0.06 
0.07 
(0.80) 
-0.03 
0.06 
(-0.51) 
-0.13 
0.09 
(-1.35) 
-0.20 
0.08 
(-0.25) 
Corruption 0.07 
0.10 
(0.66) 
0.03 
0.09 
(0.35) 
0.28* 
0.14 
0.51 
(1.94) 
-0.03 
0.12 
(-0.25) 
0.07 
0.05 
(1.32) 
0.02 
0.04 
(0.44) 
0.03 
0.06 
(0.41) 
-0.02 
0.05 
(-0.46) 
Political 
environment 
-0.22** 
0.06 
(-3.51) 
-0.04 
0.06 
(-0.72) 
-0.12 
0.15 
(-0.76) 
0.02 
0.07 
(0.03) 
-0.17 
0.04 
(-4.47) 
-0.06* 
0.03 
(1.95) 
-0.21** 
0.06 
(-3.69) 
0.03 
0.04 
(0.81) 
Ownership 
structure 
0.13 
0.09 
(1.47) 
-0.02 
0.09 
(-0.02) 
0.15 
0.16 
(0.90) 
-0.19 
0.13 
(-1.45) 
0.03 
0.05 
(-0.64) 
-0.04 
0.04 
(-1.01) 
0.18** 
0.07 
(2.55) 
-0.22** 
0.06 
(-4.03) 
Accounting 
system 
0.46** 
0.13 
(3.52) 
0.42** 
0.12 
(-3.55) 
0.13 
0.22 
(0.61) 
0.49** 
0.14 
(3.54) 
0.40** 
0.07 
(5.49) 
0.26** 
0.06 
(4.51) 
0.23** 
0.11 
(2.03) 
0.16** 
0.07 
(2.30) 
Ghana  -4.76** 
0.80 
(-5.95) 
   -5.17** 
0.31 
(-16.84) 
  
Nigeria  -2.76** 
0.72 
(-3.84) 
   -3.81** 
0.29 
(13.33) 
  
R-square 0.23 0.43  0.29 0.12 0.49 0.31 0.11 
F-statistic 5.91 10.89  4.70 9.65 48.54 7.69 5.21 
No of 
observation 
125 125 38 77 416 416 112 243 
The dependent variable is indicated as total corporate governance system which is represented by corporate 
governance system is the addition of all the items or variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The 
Independent variables are economic factor is shown as total economic factor which is the addition of all items or 
variables under section I of the survey questionnaire, societal and cultural factor  is illustrated as total societal 
and cultural which is the addition of all the items or variable under section J of the survey questionnaire, 
corruption and bribery is shown as total corruption and bribery  which is the addition of all items or variable 
within section K of the survey questionnaire, Total political environment   is the addition of all items under 
political environment  in section L, ownership structure is the total items or variable under section M, and 
accounting system is the total of all items or statements under section  N  of the survey questionnaire. 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being 
South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
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*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors 
The main findings from the above Table include are based on the opinion of the respondents 
include the following; 
1.  The respondents from regulatory bodies indicate that accounting system can improve 
corporate governance system of firms in all the countries together (SSAA). 
2.  In Column 3 respondents from regulatory bodies in Ghana believe that corruption has a 
direct relationship with corporate governance system which may later in turn hinders the 
corporate governance system. 
4. The respondent from non-regulatory stakeholders show that political environment may 
deters corporate governance system of firms in all the countries together (SSAA). 
5. Respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders also suggest that accounting system is 
likely to improve corporate governance system of firms in all the countries together (SSAA). 
6. In Ghana respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders believe that ownership structure 
can improve corporate governance system. 
7. In Nigeria non-regulatory stakeholders provide evidence that ownership structure seem to 
inhibit effective corporate governance system. 
In Table 6.2 Column 2, accounting system has a positive significant relationship on 
corporate governance system and this may promote of corporate governance in all countries 
in the region. This because quality of accounting system practices of a firm is the accelerator 
or modifier of a sound corporate governance practice.  Thus, when a firms follow standard 
accounting system this will reflect in the proper dissemination and timely of financial 
information to all the stakeholders such as investors, employee, potential investors, 
government, customers, creditors and the public.  
In addition, the regulatory bodies believe that corruption has a negative effect on 
corporate governance in Ghana as indicated in Column 3. This result implies that corruption 
has discourages the promotion of effective corporate governance practice. This may be due 
corruption which has been institutionalised in every sector of the economy in Ghana.  In 
Nigeria, the accounting system is likely to improve corporate governance system. Proper 
accounting practice will improve corporate governance practice of firms in Nigeria because 
accounting systems is one of the accelerators of a good corporate governance practices. 
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Moreover, in Column 7 the non-regulatory stakeholders believe that political 
environments do not improve corporate governance system in the region. However, 
accounting system is likely to provide sound corporate governance of firms in the region.  
Furthermore, in Ghanaian firms, the non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate 
governance view are that political environment has a negative effect on corporate system. 
This may not promote effective corporate governance practice. In sum, it shows that non-
regulatory stakeholders indicate that ownership structure and accounting system are 
important in promoting effective corporate governance system in Ghanaian firms. 
In Nigerian firms, the finding from non-regulatory stakeholders’ shows that ownership 
structure may hinders the development of sound corporate governance. This result suggests 
that when there is lack of appropriate procedure in acquisition of ownership, and lack of due 
process in the selection of board of directors. However, accounting system provide effective 
corporate governance system of firms in Nigeria because accounting system is one of the 
modifiers of corporate governance practices. 
The convergence between the regulatory bodies and non regulatory stakeholders’ 
respondent is accounting system of firms. However, the divergence is corruption which the 
regulatory bodies in Ghana believe are affecting corporate governance system. Also, non-
regulatory stakeholders in the Sub-region show that political environment in the selected 
countries seem to hinders the development of sound corporate governance system. In 
addition, non-regulatory stakeholders in Ghana indicate that ownership structure of 
Ghanaian firms may provide good corporate governance system. However, the non-
regulatory stakeholders in Nigeria indicate that this can deters the promotion of good 
corporate practice. 
6.2.1 Results on effect of economic factor on rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders. 
 We present the OLS estimate of sub-variables of economic factors on rules and laws 
guiding corporate governance; using both regulatory and non-regulatory respondents. Below 
are the model estimates and the Table illustrates results of the data analysis. 
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Table 6.2.1: Effect of economic factor on the rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders . 
Rules_Q8= β0 +  β1(Dinvt_Q39) +  β2(Finvt_Q40)   + β3(Growth_Q41) + β4(Equity_Q42) + β5 (Macro_Q43 + 
β6(Banks_Q44) +  β7 (Firms_Q45)  +  β8 (Privatization_Q46)  +  β9 ( Transparency_Q47)  + β10 
(Investor_Q48)+  β11(G) + β12(N) + μi 
Dependent variable:  Rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
 Regulatory bodies Non-regulatory stakeholders 
 
Variables 
All 
countries 
All 
countries  
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria All 
countries 
All 
countries 
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 3.36** 
0.97 
(3.47) 
6.63** 
1.01 
(6.57) 
5.06** 
1.42 
(3.56) 
0.36** 
1.37 
(0.26) 
2.86** 
0.55 
(5.19) 
5.11** 
0.46 
(11.07) 
4.49** 
0.77 
(5.85) 
0.59** 
0.46 
(1.30) 
Foreign 
Investment 
-0.09 
0.25 
(-0.38 
-0.01 
0.22 
(-0.03) 
-0.35 
0.37 
(-0.95) 
-0.12 
0.36 
(-0.33) 
0.19* 
0.11 
(1.69) 
0.20** 
0.09 
(2.14) 
0.02 
0.17 
(0.01) 
0.07 
0.09 
(0.79) 
Growth  -0.01 
0.19 
(-0.07) 
-0.14 
0.17 
(0.83) 
-0.23 
0.27 
(-0.86) 
0.33 
0.24 
(1.38) 
-0.12 
0.12 
(-1.00) 
-0.07 
0.10 
(-0.74) 
 
-0.08 
0.19 
(-0.43) 
0.08 
0.10 
(0.82) 
Equity Market 0.09 
0.17 
(0.52) 
0.09 
0.15 
(0.61) 
-0.02 
0.29 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
0.19 
(-0.34) 
0.02 
0.09 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
0.07 
(0.32) 
0.26* 
0.16 
(1.69) 
0.02 
0.06 
(0.03) 
Macro-economic 
policies 
0.05 
0.16 
(0.30) 
 
-0.25* 
0.15 
(-1.67) 
-0.03 
0.34 
(-0.09) 
-0.16 
0.18 
(-0.91) 
0.06 
0.08 
(0.70) 
-0.09 
0.06 
(-1.43) 
-0.37** 
0.16 
(-2.27) 
-0.05 
0.06 
(-0.79) 
Financial 
intermediation 
0.14 
0.09 
(1.65) 
0.12 
0.08 
(1.52) 
0.58* 
0.29 
(2.00) 
-0.03 
0.09 
(-0.34) 
0.08** 
0.04 
(1.98) 
0.00 
0.03 
(0.10) 
0.10 
0.10 
(1.02) 
0.09** 
0.03 
(3.16) 
Firms control  0.12 
0.09 
(1.25) 
-0.08 
0.09 
(0.92) 
0.15 
0.16 
(0.93) 
0.10 
0.15 
(0.70) 
0.29** 
0.04 
(6.72) 
0.06 
0.04 
(1.56) 
0.11 
0.08 
(1.31) 
-0.06 
0.04 
(-1.60) 
Privatization of 
firms 
-0.06 
0.13 
(-0.47) 
0.09 
0.12 
(0.77) 
-0.42 
0.32 
(-1.33) 
0.18 
0.14 
(1.26) 
-0.06 
0.08 
(-0.83) 
-0.03 
0.06 
(-0.47) 
0.30** 
0.13 
(1.96) 
 
-0.07 
0.06 
(-1.15) 
Transparency  -0.09 
0.12 
(0.74) 
0.13 
0.11 
(1.13) 
0.06 
0.23 
(0.26) 
0.01 
0.13 
(0.07) 
-0.17** 
0.07 
(-2.58) 
-0.09* 
0.05 
(-1.66) 
-0.15 
0.09 
(-1.60) 
0.09* 
0.06 
(1.67) 
Local investor  -0.35** 
0.14 
(-2.51) 
-0.29** 
0.12 
(-2.38) 
-0.33 
0.26 
(1.26) 
-0.08 
0.17 
(-0.48) 
-0.27** 
0.06 
(-4.46) 
-1.12** 
0.05 
(-2.38) 
-0.80** 
0.12 
(-6.52) 
0.04 
0.05 
(0.46) 
Ghana  -2.47** 
0.43 
(-5.79) 
   -1.95** 
0.15 
(-13.39) 
  
Nigeria  -2.56** 
0.43 
(-5.95) 
   -2.18** 
0.14 
(-15.33) 
  
R-square 0.24 0.43    0.58 0.54 0.10 
F-statistic 3.69 7.03    46.03 11.94 2.27 
No of observation 125 125 38 77 416 416 112 243 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws which is item or statement 8 under section B of the survey 
questionnaire.  The independent variables are economic factor  which are items or statements under section I of 
the survey questionnaire Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being 
South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
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The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 per cent level. 
*significant at 5 per cent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
The key findings from the above Table are: 
1. We find that respondents from regulatory bodies argue that macro-economic policies 
(Q43) and local investor voting power and control (Q48) can hinders the rules and 
laws that promote corporate governance. This finding is common selected countries in 
the region (SSAA). 
2. In Ghana, regulatory bodies indicate that financial intermediation (Q44) of banks in 
Ghana provide sound corporate governance practice of firms through improvement of 
rules and laws. 
3. In all the countries together as it shown in Column 6 respondents from non-regulatory 
stakeholders believe that foreign investment (Q40) is likely to improve the rules and 
laws that enhance corporate governance practice. 
4. In all the countries together respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders believe that 
when there is no transparency in sales and appointment of firms (Q47) this may 
inhibits the rules and laws on corporate governance. 
5. The non-regulatory stakeholders support the statement that local investor voting 
power and control (Q48) discourage the rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practice.  This finding is for  all the selected countries as it shown in 
Column 6 
6. In Column 7 respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in Ghana indicate that 
equity market (Q42) and issue of conflict of interest in privatization of firms (Q46) 
may enhance rules and laws that promote corporate governance. 
7.   In Column 7 respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in Ghana show that 
macro-economic policies (Q43) can deter rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance. 
8. In Column 8 respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in Nigeria believe that 
financial intermediations in Nigerian banks (Q44) seem to improve rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance practice. 
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In Column 2 of Table 6.2.1 regulatory bodies show that macro-economic policies (Q43) 
has a negative significant effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
practices. This finding implies that in the selected countries in the region there is lack of 
adequate implementation of macro-economic policies, this may hinders the development of 
the rules and laws guiding the promotion of corporate governance.   
 In addition, regulators bodies’ respondents indicate that local investors voting power 
and control may inhibit rules and laws and this may not improve corporate governance of 
firm. This result indicates that public investors may not be able to use voting power to 
enforce corporate governance and there is no effective control due to limited float.  
Within each country, the regulatory bodies indicate that in Ghanaian firms financial 
intermediation is more likely to improve rules and laws that guide corporate governance 
because recently there is influx of foreign banks from West African sub-region such as 
Nigeria and that of South Africa. These banks are able to provide credit facilities to their 
customers. In addition, they are able to financially assistant for small, medium, and large 
scale enterprises in Ghana. As a result, all the rules and laws related to corporate governance 
practices need to be followed.   
In Ghanaian firms, the non-regulatory stakeholders indicate that shareholders protection 
in relation to equity markets (Q42) has a positive significant influence on rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance practice of firms. This because there  are influx of foreign 
banks and firms from West African sub-region such as Nigeria and that of South Africa into 
Ghana.  Consequently there is likely to be more enforcement of shareholders protection so as 
to enhance the equity markets in Ghana.  Also macro-economic policies in Ghana hinder 
promotion of corporate governance practices and this result is consistent with the finding in 
Column 2.  
In addition, the privatization of firm (Q46) has positive effect on rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance practices. This indicate that non-regulatory stakeholders 
respondent believe that conflicts and problem associated with corporate governance before or 
after privatization of state-owned companies have influence on the rules and law that promote 
corporate governance practice. Moreover, local voting power and control (Q48) discourage 
promotion the promotion of rules and laws on corporate governance of firms in Ghana this 
result is consistent with finding in Column 2. 
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 In Nigerian firms, the non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance believe that 
financial intermediation (Q44) encourage the promotion of rules and laws for sound corporate 
governance of firm in Nigeria. This because of various bank reforms that have taken place in 
recent times in Nigeria which the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) mandate bank to provide 
more credit facilities with stringent rules and laws guiding the provision and return of the 
credit facilities.  
Furthermore, transparency in sales of state owned companies and appointment of boards 
of directors (Q47) have more influence on rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
practices. This finding is consistent with what happens in recent times on how most of the 
appointment of the boards of directors and sales of state owned-companies are not transparent 
and accountable. Consequently, this may not promote good corporate governance practices of 
firms in Nigeria.   
Against this background, there is convergence between the regulatory bodies and non-
regulatory stakeholders on issue of macro-economic policies, both respondents indicate that 
this hinder the promotion of rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices, 
particularly in the selected countries in the region. In addition, there is convergence on banks 
financial intermediation particularly in Ghana and Nigeria.  
The divergence between regulatory bodies’ respondent and non-regulatory stakeholders 
include the following; the non-regulatory stakeholders show that foreign investment promote 
rules and laws that guide corporate governance by attracting more foreign investors. This will 
bring good corporate governance practice to the nations.  In addition, the non-regulatory 
stakeholders in Ghanaian firms view that shareholders protection can affect equity markets; 
this will influence the promotion of rules and laws that guide corporate governance practices. 
Also, in Ghanaian firms the non-regulatory stakeholders show that the conflict and problems 
associated with corporate governance before and after privatisation of state-owned companies 
can have effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance. In Nigeria the non-
regulatory stakeholder provide the evidence that transparency in sales of state owned 
companies and appointment of the board of directors can have effect on rule and laws on 
corporate governance practice. 
 In all the countries together, using Ghana and Nigeria Nigerian firms as a dummy 
variable in references to South African firms as it show in Column 2 and 7. There is evidence 
that both countries have a negative significant effect on rules and laws that promote corporate 
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governance. This result suggests that the implementation of rules and laws guiding corporate 
governance in these countries seem to be weak in compared with that of South Africa. This 
finding is consistent with the estimate for all the sub-variables on rules and laws guiding the 
promotion of corporate governance practices. 
6.2.2 Results on effect of societal and cultural factor on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders. 
Below are the model estimates and the Table shows results of the data analysis. 
Table 6.2.2: The effects of societal and cultural factor on rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory 
stakeholders.   
Rules_Q8 = β0 +  β1(stakeholders_Q49) +  β2(Sociopol_Q59)   + β3(Culture_Q51) + β4(Ethics_Q52) +   β5(G) + 
β6(N) + μi 
Dependent variable:  Rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
 
 Regulatory bodies Non-regulatory stakeholders 
 
Variables 
All 
countries 
All 
countries  
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria All 
countries 
All 
countries 
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 3.17** 
0.84 
(3.78) 
6.54** 
0.79 
(8.27) 
6.02** 
0.92 
(6.56) 
 
1.60** 
0.98 
(1.62) 
2.66** 
0.63 
(4.23) 
5.04** 
0.44 
(11.36) 
4.32** 
0.90 
(4.80) 
1.06** 
0.46 
(2.30) 
Stakeholders  
interest 
0.19 
0.18 
(1.06) 
0.12 
0.14 
(0.86) 
0.16 
0.21 
(0.76) 
-0.03 
0.18 
(-0.18) 
0.04 
0.11 
(0.37) 
0.09 
0.08 
(1.17) 
0.11 
0.17 
(0.67) 
0.16** 
0.06 
(-1.99) 
Socio-political 
environment 
-0.27 
0.17 
(-1.61) 
-0.30** 
0.14 
(-2.19) 
-0.45** 
0.20 
(-2.31) 
-0.09 
0.17 
(-0.53) 
-0.01 
0.10 
(-0.10) 
-0.04 
0.07 
(-0.56) 
-0.18 
0.19 
(-0.99) 
-0.01 
0.06 
(-0.10) 
 National culture  0.07 
0.11 
(0.68) 
-0.07 
0.09 
(0.78) 
-0.32** 
0.14 
(-2.26) 
0.16 
0.11 
(1.56) 
 
-0.07 
0.08 
(-0.94) 
-0.10** 
0.05 
(-1.91) 
-0.27** 
0.14 
(-1.99) 
 
0.03 
0.05 
(0.69) 
 Business ethics -0.21 
0.20 
(-1.06) 
-0.22 
0.16 
(-1.41) 
-0.33 
0.23 
(-1.44) 
0.02 
0.20 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
0.12 
(-0.26) 
-0.09 
0.08 
(1.12) 
-0.17 
0.18 
(0.91) 
-0.05 
0.08 
(-0.68) 
Ghana  -2.46** 
0.32 
(-7.78) 
   -2.31** 
0.13 
(17.81) 
  
Nigeria  -2.52** 
0.29 
(8.56) 
   -2.54** 
0.12 
(-21.93) 
  
R-square 0.15 0.41  0.10 0.04 0.55 0.11 0.19 
F-statistic 3.35 13.88  4.71 1.39 82.39 3.34 7.180 
No of observation 125 125 38 77 416 416 112 243 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws which is item or statement 8 under section B of the survey 
questionnaire.  The independent variables are societal and cultural  factor  which are items or statements under 
section J of the survey questionnaire Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference 
category being South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
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**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
Key findings from the above Table are: 
1. In Column 2 there is evidence from the Table that respondents from regulatory bodies from 
all the selected countries together support that socio-political and cultural environment (Q50) 
is likely to hinder the rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
3.  In Column 3 respondents from regulatory bodies in Ghana indicate that national culture on 
enforcement of accounting procedure (Q51) can deters the rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance practice. 
4. The respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in all the countries suggest that national 
culture on enforcement of accounting procedure (Q51) seem to inhibit the rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance practice. 
5. In Column 8 the respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in Nigeria believe that 
when corporate governance of firms consider the interest of the stakeholder (Q49), this is 
likely to improve rules and laws that promote corporate governance. 
We find that in Table 6.2.2 Column 2 the regulatory bodies of corporate governance 
believe that socio-political and cultural environment have a negative effect on rules and laws 
that enhance corporate governance practice. This finding indicate that the regulator bodies of 
corporate governance of firms  in all the country together believes  that socio-political and 
cultural environment can  hinders the rules and laws that promote  corporate governance 
practice. 
Moreover, within each country the regulatory bodies respondent in Ghanaian firms’ 
view that socio-political and cultural environment have negatively influence on rules and 
laws guiding corporate governance. In addition, the regulatory bodies support that national 
culture on enforcement of accounting procedures also has a negative influence on rules and 
laws promote corporate governance practice. Thus, these two sub-variables hinder the 
promotion of rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice in Ghana. These 
finding imply that socio-political cultural environment that is endemic with corruption does 
not encourage promotion of rules and laws on corporate governance practice. 
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 The non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance in Column 6 indicate that 
nation’s culture on enforcement of accounting procedures has a negative effect on rules and 
laws that promote corporate governance practice. This provides evidence of convergence 
between regulatory bodies’ respondents and non- regulatory stakeholders’ respondents of 
corporate governance in Ghanaian firms. This result indicates that in all the countries 
together particularly in Ghana. There is possibility that culture on enforcement of accounting 
procedure shows culture of lack of proper accountability, culture of nepotism and 
favouritism that cut across the sectors of economy in Ghana and countries across the Sub-
region.  
In Nigerian firms, the non-regulatory stakeholders for corporate governance in Nigeria 
found that the interest of all the stakeholders of corporate governance plays a vital role in 
promotion of rules and laws that develop corporate governance practices of firms in Nigeria. 
This result support the stakeholder theory on corporate governance practice that explain that  
interest of the employee, customers, individual and community goal should be taken into 
consideration  in corporate governance practice. This result is the divergence between 
regulatory bodies and non-stakeholders respondents. 
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6.2.3 Results on effects of corruption and bribery on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders of 
corporate governance.   
Below are the model estimates and the Table showing results of the data analysis. 
Table 6.2.3: The effect of corruption and bribery on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders  
Rules_Q8 = β0 + β1(Reduction_Q53) + β2(Regulatory_Q54)  + β3(Job_Q55) + β4(Interest_Q56) + β5 
(Economic_Q57) + β6(Control_Q58) + β5(G) + β6(N) + μi 
 
Dependent variable:  Rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
 Regulatory bodies Non-regulatory stakeholders 
 
Variables 
All 
countries 
All 
countries  
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria All 
countries 
All 
countries 
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 2.67** 
0.87 
(3.08) 
5.71** 
0.80 
(7.15) 
3.86** 
1.22 
(3.15) 
2.03* 
1.08 
(1.88) 
 
2.44** 
0.67 
(3.66) 
5.17** 
0.47 
(10.95) 
4.57** 
0.90 
(5.10) 
1.19** 
0.46 
(2.57) 
Reduction in 
corruption 
0.39* 
0.21 
(1.87) 
0.39** 
0.17 
(2.34) 
0.25 
0.34 
(0.74) 
-0.05 
0.22 
(-0.24) 
0.04 
0.14 
(0.03) 
 
0.03 
0.09 
(0.33) 
0.17 
0.20 
(0.83) 
0.09 
0.10 
(0.87) 
regulatory 
authority  
-0.23 
0.24 
(-0.97) 
-0.35* 
0.19 
(-1.86) 
-0.67** 
0.34 
(-2.00) 
-0.07 
0.24 
(-0.28) 
-0.08 
0.12 
(-0.69) 
-0.11 
0.08 
(-1.28) 
-0.22 
0.17 
(-1.29) 
0.02 
0.09 
(0.21) 
Job security  0.07 
0.13 
(0.53) 
-0.07 
0.10 
(-0.63) 
0.02 
0.27 
(0.90) 
-0.08 
0.11 
(-0.66) 
0.04 
0.06 
(-0.63) 
-0.05 
0.04 
(-1.16) 
0.10 
0.13 
(0.78) 
-0.03 
0.04 
(-0.75) 
Conflict interest  -0.35* 
0.19 
(-1.82) 
-0.09* 
0.15 
(-1.88) 
-0.51 
0.38 
(-1.36) 
-0.06 
0.24 
(-0.23) 
0.02 
0.13 
(0.16) 
-0.06 
0.09 
(-0.62) 
-0.43* 
0.22 
(-1.95) 
0.09 
0.09 
(1.03) 
Economic 
hardship  
-0.12 
0.10 
(-1.17) 
-0.16** 
0.07 
(-2.17) 
0.11 
0.43 
(0.25) 
0.30 
0.24 
(1.27) 
-0.12 
0.12 
(-1.08) 
-0.14* 
0.08 
(-1.81) 
-0.64** 
0.18 
(-3.50) 
0.10 
0.07 
(0.14) 
Internal control  0.28** 
0.12 
(2.32) 
0.24** 
0.08 
(2.89) 
0.38 
0.34 
(1.04) 
-0.11 
0.20 
(-0.53) 
0.22 
0.14 
(1.53) 
0.16* 
0.10 
(1.67) 
0.48** 
0.23 
(2.07) 
-0.07 
0.09 
(-0.85) 
Ghana  -2.31** 
0.31 
(-7.44) 
   -2.32** 
0.13 
(-17.80) 
  
Nigeria  -2.46** 
0.29 
(-8.48) 
   -2.53** 
0.12 
(-21.81) 
  
R-square 0.15 0.52 0.31 0.12 0.10 0.55 0.22 0.16 
F-statistic 7.45 72.99 2.27 6.41 5.54 61.82 4.86 12.75 
No of observation 125 125 38 77 416 416 112 243 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws which is item or statement 8 under section B of the survey 
questionnaire. The independent variables are corruption which is items or statements under section K of the 
survey questionnaire Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South 
Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
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Key findings from the above Table include the following: 
1. In Column 2 respondents from regulatory bodies in all the countries believe that reduction 
in corruption (Q53) is more likely to improve rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practice.  
2. In Column 2 respondents from regulatory bodies in all the countries believe that corruption 
within regulatory authorities of corporate governance (Q54) seem to hinders rules and laws 
that promote corporate governance practice. 
3. In all the countries as it shown in column 2, respondents from regulatory bodies indicate 
that conflict of interest and greediness (Q56) discourage the rules and laws that promotion of 
corporate governance practice.   
4.  In all the countries in column 2, respondents from regulatory bodies show that economic 
hardship that bring corruption (Q57)  can deters rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practice. 
5. The respondents from regulatory bodies in all the countries agree that when there is 
adequate internal control system (Q58) this is more likely to improve rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance practice. 
6. In Ghana non-regulatory stakeholders indicate that the when there is adequate internal 
control system (Q58) can improve rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
7. In Column 7 respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in Ghana believe that conflict 
of interest and greediness (Q56) may hinder the rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practice. 
Table 6.2.3 Column 2 the respondents from regulatory bodies found that reduction in 
corruption (Q53) encourage sound rules and laws that promote of corporate governance. 
This result indicates that regulatory bodies’ respondents believe that reduction in corruption 
in the SSAA region provides good corporate governance practice. This finding supports the 
argument that once there is a strong institution in place to reduce corruption that is endemic 
in all sectors of the economy in the Sub-region. This may improves corporate governance 
practice of firms. This result suggests that reduction in corruption and bribery will give 
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confidence to the domestic and foreign investors, thus this will improve the economy of the 
countries across the region.     
In addition, regulatory bodies respondents indicate that corruption within regulatory 
authorises of corporate governance (Q54) have a negative effect on rules and laws that guide 
promotion of corporate governance practice. This finding shows that corruption and bribery 
is endemic among the official of regulatory of corporate governance in the region. This is 
seemed to deter the promotion of corporate governance practices. As a result, institutional 
framework, corporate governance reforms that are introduce by the governance may not be 
properly implemented as result of endemic corruption among the officials of the regulatory 
bodies.  
The regulatory bodies’ respondents believe that conflict of interest and greediness (Q56) 
is negatively associated with rules and laws guiding corporate governance of firm in all the 
countries in the SSAA region. This evidence indicates that conflict of interest, unsound 
ethics and greed among stakeholders of corporate governance can  hinders the promotion of 
rules and laws guide corporate governance practice. This situation cut across all the sectors 
of the economy of the countries in the SSAA region where there are greediness, unsound 
business ethics, and conflict of interest. As a result, there may be lack of proper 
implementation of corporate governance regulatory framework and enforcement of the rules 
and laws that promote corporate governance practice.  
Furthermore, in Column 2 the regulatory bodies’ respondents indicate that economic 
hardship (Q57) has a negative influence on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practice. This result reflects what is happening in the recent times across the 
countries in the SSAA region where the economic hardship among the employee of labour 
are facing. The employee can easily compromise to bribery and corruption. They may do 
their proper official work and this situation cut across all the sectors of the economy in the 
region.    
In addition, the regulatory bodies respondents show that lack of internal control in a 
firm will influence employee and this can  lead to  corruption among employee  have 
influence on  the rules and laws that promote  corporate governance. Internal control system 
is very important in a firm. This result implies that once there is no internal control there is 
no check and balance for the management and employee over the lay down rules and laws 
that can enhance corporate governance practices.  
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Moreover, within Ghanaian firm the regulatory bodies’ respondents indicate that 
corruption within regulator authorities of corporate governance discourage rules and laws 
that promote corporate governance. Also there is evidence that sub-variable conflict of 
interest, unsound ethics and greed among stakeholders of corporate governance hinder the 
promotion of rules and laws guide corporate governance practice in Ghanaian firms. These 
two findings from Ghanaian firms are consistent with the result for all the countries together 
countries as it show in Column 2. 
Furthermore, we analysed non-regulatory stakeholders of corporate governance 
respondents, by estimated corruption variables with rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practice. The result in Table 6.2.3 Column 6 shows that in all the countries 
together economic hardship variables have a negative effect on rules and laws, this influence 
the level of corruption among the employee of firms, hindering the development of 
corporate governance practice across the countries in the region. This result is in 
convergence with regulatory bodies’ respondent as illustrates in Column 2. 
In addition, the non-regulatory stakeholder respondents indicate that   lack of internal 
control in a firm will influence employee and this can  lead to  corruption among employee  
have influence on  the rules and laws that promote  corporate governance. This result is a 
convergence with the regulatory bodies respondents as it provide in column 2 of the Table 
6.2.3.  
In Ghanaian firms Column 7, the non-regulatory stakeholders’ respondents believe that 
conflicts of interest and greediness with economic hardship variables may not enhance 
corporate governance practice within firms in Ghana. This result shows convergence with 
the finding from regulatory bodies’ respondents in Ghana. The non- regulatory stakeholders 
also believe that lack of internal control in a firm will influence employee and this can lead 
to corruption among employee which has influence on the rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance. This result is also convergence with the finding from regulatory 
bodies as it shows in Column 2 of the Table 6.2.3.  
The divergence between regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders’ respondents are 
as follows: the regulatory bodies believe that reduction in corruption and bribery may likely 
enhance rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices. Also the regulatory 
bodies respondent indicate that corruption within regulatory of corporate governance hinders 
the promotion of rules and laws on corporate governance.   
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6.2.4 Results on effects of political environment on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders of 
corporate governance.   
 Below are the model estimates and the Table indicates the results of data analysis. 
 Table 6.2.4: The effects of political environment on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders of 
corporate governance.   
 Rules_Q8 = β0 + β1(Ownership_Q59) + β2(Monetary_Q60) + β3(Type_Q61) + β4(Government_Q62) + β5 
(Politician_Q63) +  β5(G) + β6(N) + μi 
 Dependent variable:  Rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
 Regulatory bodies Non-regulatory stakeholders 
 
Variables 
All 
countries 
All 
countries  
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria All 
countries 
All 
countries 
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 3.070** 
0.74 
(4.13) 
4.63** 
0.70 
(6.65) 
4.70** 
1.41 
(3.34) 
1.60* 
0.72 
(1.61) 
3.57** 
0.42 
(8.50) 
5.50** 
0.31 
(17.50) 
5.67** 
0.64 
(8.89) 
1.06** 
0.29 
(3.62) 
Government 
ownership  
-0.10 
0.11 
(-0.92) 
-0.08 
0.09 
(-0.83) 
-0.40** 
0.19 
(-2.11) 
0.02 
0.12 
(0.19) 
0.02 
0.06 
(0.28) 
0.02 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.05 
0.11 
(0.49) 
-0.02 
0.04 
(-1.57) 
Monetary policies  0.05 
0.17 
(0.31) 
0.04 
0.15 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
0.29 
(-0.03) 
0.01 
0.17 
(0.08) 
 
-0.10 
0.10 
(-0.96) 
-0.28** 
0.07 
(-3.94) 
-0.71** 
0.13 
(-5.42) 
0.07 
0.08 
(0.95) 
Type of 
government  
0.14 
0.15 
(0.98) 
-0.04 
0.13 
(-0.33) 
-0.18 
0.27 
(-0.66) 
-0.10 
0.15 
(-0.68) 
0.26** 
0.09 
(2.95) 
0.11* 
0.08 
(1.80) 
0.09 
0.15 
(0.63) 
0.08 
0.06 
(1.31) 
Government 
influence  
-0.30** 
0.09 
(-3.51) 
-0.20** 
0.08 
(-2.50) 
-0.30 
0.18 
(-1.63) 
-0.01 
0.08 
(-0.12) 
 
-0.33** 
0.08 
(-4.08) 
-0.07 
0.06 
(-1.21) 
-0.35** 
0.15 
(-2.40) 
-0.03 
0.04 
(-0.59) 
Politician 
influences  
-0.07 
0.12 
(-0.55) 
0.09 
0.11 
(0.77) 
0.26 
0.31 
(0.84) 
0.23* 
0.14 
(1.69) 
-0.16* 
0.08 
(-1.96) 
-0.02 
0.06 
(-0.31) 
0.10 
0.13 
(0.76) 
-0.01 
0.06 
(-0.20) 
Ghana  -1.71** 
0.36 
(-4.77) 
   -2.23** 
0.14 
(-16.53) 
  
Nigeria  -2.05** 
0.33 
(-6.21) 
   -2.48** 
0.13 
(-19.87) 
  
R-square 0.19 0.40 0.28 0.10 0.13 0.56 0.36 0.27 
 
F-statistic 5.45 10.91 2.52 1.03 12.67 75.07 11.96 1.77 
No of observation 125 125 38 77 416 416 112 243 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws which is item or statement 8 under section B of the survey 
questionnaire. The independent variables are political environment which is items or statements under section L of 
the survey questionnaire Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being 
South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors 
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Key findings from above Table include the following: 
1.In Column 2 respondents from regulatory bodies from all the countries suggest that when 
government influence the work of regulatory bodies (Q62) this may hamper the rules and 
laws that promote corporate governance practice.  
2. In Column 3 respondents from regulatory bodies in Ghana believe that when government 
exerts substantial influence over ownership of firms (59) this is likely to hinder the rules and 
laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
3.  In Column 4 respondents from regulatory bodies in Nigeria indicate that politician      
influence on regulatory agencies (Q63) has a direct relationship with the rules and laws. 
However this in turn allows the politicians interfere with duties of the regulatory agencies in 
Nigeria. 
4. In Column 6 respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in all the countries found that 
political influence in fiscal and monetary policies (Q60) discourage the improvement of rules 
and laws on corporate governance practices. 
5. In Column 6 the non-regulatory stakeholders shows that the type of government (military 
or democratic) (Q61) is more likely to influences the rules and laws on corporate governance. 
7. In Column 7 respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in Ghana indicate that when 
government influence the work of regulatory bodies (Q62) this may hamper the rules and 
laws that promote corporate governance practice.  
Table 6.2.4 Column 2 provides across countries using dummy variables, the regulatory 
bodies’ respondents show that government interferes on work of regulatory bodies  have a 
negative impact on rules and laws guiding corporate governance. This evidence indicates 
that the regulatory agencies that are in charge of enforcement, supervisory and regulatory 
will not have free hand to carry out their duties in enforcing the rules and laws that can 
promote sound corporate governance practices.  
In Ghanaian firms the regulatory bodies’ respondents indicate that government influence 
over ownership of companies’ sub-variable has a negative significant effect on rules and laws 
guiding the corporate governance practice. This result suggest that in Ghana  the government 
put more influence  on the acquisition and control of firms as a result the rules and laws 
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guiding the ownership and control may  not be properly follow; hence this may hinders the 
promotion of corporate governance practices. 
In Nigerian firms, the regulatory bodies’ respondents believe that politician’s influences 
sub-variable has a negative significant effect on rules and laws guiding corporate governance. 
This finding implies that politician interfere with ministries and agencies responsible for 
monitoring and enforcement of corporate governance guideline and regulation of firms in 
Nigeria. This may not allow the ministry and agencies to have free hand in carrying out their 
duty. This finding supports the evidence in recent times when guidelines and regulations for 
acquisition and merges are not followed. As a result, this led to the crises that are happening 
in Nigerian Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). 
In Column 6 the respondents’ from non-regulatory stakeholders indicate that political 
influences with fiscal and monetary policies sub-variable have a negative effect on rules and 
laws that guide the promotion corporate governance. This result implies that those fiscal 
policies which deal with   government expenditure and monetary policy that concerning with 
supply of money are hindering the promotion of rules and laws that guide corporate 
governance practice. This may be due to lack of proper implementation of fiscal and 
monetary policies which result from institutionalised socio-political corruption across the 
countries in the Sub-region. This can definitely weaken rules and laws guiding corporate 
governance practice of firms across countries in the Sub-region.   
Moreover, in all the countries together in Column 6, non-regulatory stakeholders’ 
respondents show that the types of government either prolonged military or civilian rules also 
have influence on rules and laws of corporate governance. This result suggests that the recent 
democratic government that stabilised across the countries in SSAA region establishes 
framework and institutions on development of corporate governance policy for firms across 
the countries in the region. However, during the prolonged military regime particularly in 
Ghana and Nigeria there are absence of frameworks and institution for corporate governance 
policy. 
In addition,  the respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in  Ghanaian firms in 
Column 7 shows that political influences with fiscal and monetary policies have a negative  
significant effect on rules and laws that guides the promotion corporate governance. This 
finding is consistent in all the countries as it shown in Table 6.2.4 Column 6. Also, sub-
variable government interference on activities of regulatory and supervisory bodies’ has a 
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negative influence on rules and laws that guides corporate governance. This result is 
convergence with regulatory bodies view as it shows across countries in Column 2 of the 
Table 6.2.4.  
The divergence from each categories of respondents are follow; the regulatory bodies 
respondent from Ghanaian believe that government exert substantial influence over the 
ownership of Ghanaian firms hinders the promotion of rules and laws for corporate 
governance practices. Also the non-regulatory stakeholders’ respondents across countries also 
found that political influences with fiscal and monetary policies have a negative effect on 
rules and laws that guides the promotion corporate governance. 
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6.2.5 Results on effect of ownership structure on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance of firms using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders 
of corporate governance.   
Below are the model estimate and the Table showing results of the data analysis. 
Table 6.2.5: The effect of ownership structure on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance of firms using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders 
of corporate governance.   
Rules_Q8 = β0 + β1(Board_Q64) + β2(Foreign_Q65)  + β3(Govt_Q66) + β4(Famly_Q67) + β5 (Single_Q68)  + 
β5(G) + β6(N) + μi 
Dependent variable:  rule and law that promote corporate governance 
 Regulatory bodies Non-regulatory stakeholders 
 
Variables 
All 
countries 
All 
countries  
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria All 
countries 
All 
countries 
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 2.30** 
0.63 
(3.65) 
3.94** 
0.61 
(6.48) 
2.30** 
1.09 
(2.11) 
1.74** 
0.75 
(2.32) 
2.36** 
0.37 
(6.35) 
3.88** 
0.28 
(13.88) 
0.36** 
0.50 
(0.71) 
2.04** 
0.28 
(7.39) 
Board members  -0.21** 
0.06 
(-3.37) 
-0.02 
0.13 
(-0.12) 
-0.16 
0.16 
(-0.98) 
0.10 
0.09 
(1.04) 
-0.15** 
0.04 
(3.46) 
-0.10** 
0.04 
(2.49) 
-0.21** 
0.09 
(-2.31) 
-0.07* 
0.04 
(-1.75) 
Foreign national  0.61** 
0.14 
(4.28) 
0.44** 
0.12 
(3.52) 
0.53* 
0.27 
(1.93) 
0.05 
0.16 
(0.33) 
0.35** 
0.08 
(4.28) 
0.18** 
0.06 
(3.27) 
0.57** 
0.15 
(3.90) 
-0.09 
0.06 
(-1.52) 
Government 
majority  
-0.08 
0.14 
(-0.58) 
-0.02 
0.13 
(-0.12) 
0.19 
0.25 
(0.77) 
-0.41** 
0.19 
(-2.18) 
-0.08 
0.10 
(-0.78) 
0.02 
0.07 
(0.28) 
0.04 
0.18 
(0.22) 
-0.07 
0.06 
(1.06) 
Family majority  -0.05 
0.13 
(-0.40) 
0.06 
0.11 
(0.51) 
 
0.16 
0.21 
(0.75) 
0.04 
0.13 
(0.26) 
-0.06 
0.07 
(-0.86) 
0.05 
0.05 
(1.00) 
0.25** 
0.10 
(2.62) 
0.00 
0.05 
(-0.03) 
Single family  -0.06 
0.12 
(-0.53) 
-0.10 
0.10 
(-0.93) 
-0.32 
0.21 
(-1.50) 
0.04 
0.12 
(0.35) 
0.03 
0.07 
(0.46) 
-0.05 
0.05 
(-0.93) 
-0.04 
0.10 
(-0.43) 
0.05 
0.05 
(1.08) 
Ghana  -1.10** 
(0.31 
(-6.36) 
   -2.20** 
0.13 
(-16.90) 
  
Nigeria  -2.09** 
0.32 
(6.47) 
   -2.66** 
0.13 
(-20.44) 
  
R-square      0.20 0.43 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.56 0.38 
 
0.12 
F-statistic 5.75 12.53 2.80 1.04 6.25 75.02 12.95 1.60 
No of observation 125 125 38 77 416 416 112 243 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws which is item or statement 8 under section B of the survey 
questionnaire. The independent variables are ownership structure  which are items or statements under section J 
of the survey questionnaire Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category 
being South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
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Key findings from the above Table are: 
1. In Table 6.2.5 Column 2 provide evidence from regulatory bodies in all the counties 
together shows that when foreign national are majority of stockholders of firms (Q65) this is 
more likely to improve rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
3. In Column 4 respondents from regulatory bodies in Nigeria indicate that when government 
are majority of stockholders of firms (Q66) in Nigeria this can hinders rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance practice. 
4. In Column 6 in all the countries together the respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders 
believe that when board members and senior management are majority stockholders of firms 
(Q64) may deters rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
5. In Column 6 in all the countries together respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders   
show that  when foreign national are majority of stockholders of firms (Q65) can increase the  
quality of   rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
6. In Column 7 respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in Ghana show that when 
family are the majority of stockholders in Ghanaian firms (Q67) it may improve rules and 
laws on corporate governance practice. 
In Column 2 the regulatory bodies’ respondents believe that foreign national are 
majority stockholders’ variable have positive effect on rules and laws guiding corporate 
governance. This result implies that when foreign national are majority of stockholders new 
ideas on implementation of corporate governance policy for firms which is based on 
international norms of practice business may integrate to firms. Therefore, this can improve 
the quality of corporate governance practices of firms across countries in the Sub-region.   
 In Column 3 the regulatory bodies respondents support that within each country such as 
in Ghanaian firms  sub-variable indicate as  foreign national are majority stockholders has a 
positive significant effect on rules and laws guiding corporate governance of Ghanaian 
firms.  This finding is consistent with Column 2 where the result of the estimate is shown 
across the countries. This is likely to expose the corporate governance practice of Ghanaian 
firms into international standard through influx of new idea and internal norms on corporate 
governance. 
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 In addition, in Nigerian firms regulatory bodies’ respondents show that when 
government are majority of stockholders it has a negative impact on rules and laws that 
guide corporate governance practice. This result may be consistent with what is happening 
in recent times in the business sectors in Nigeria where top government officials and 
politician are using their veto power to acquired shares in the selling of state-owned 
companies. At the end of the day they dictate and control the management and directors on 
how the firms should be carrying out their activities. Thus, this may hinder the rules and 
laws guiding corporate governance of firms in Nigeria. 
 Moreover, respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders in Column 6, indicate that 
when board members and senior management are majority of stockholders this provide a 
negative significant effect on rules and laws. This finding indicates that minority 
shareholders who are not board member and senior management may not have their rights. 
 Beside this, non-regulatory stakeholders’ respondents in Ghanaian and Nigerian firms 
show that when board members and senior management as majority of stockholders this 
may weaken the rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice because there 
may be veto power in all their decision which may affect the minority shareholder rights.  
The non-regulatory stakeholders also believe that when foreign national are majority of 
stockholders this improve rules and laws that promote effective corporate governance 
practice across countries as it illustrate in Column 7. This result is convergence with the 
view of regulatory bodies’ respondents in Column 2. In addition, the non-regulatory 
stakeholders’ respondents in Ghanaian firms also believe that when family are majority of 
stockholders it may improve rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
This evidence support the effects of family-owned firms where by the family will follow the 
rules and laws that promote effective corporate governance in the management of the firms 
so that the firms will attract more investors so that the firms not collapse.   
 
 
6.2.6 Results on effect of accounting system on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance and of firms using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory 
stakeholders of corporate governance.   
Below are the model estimates and the Table showing results of the data analysis. 
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Table 6.2.6: The effect of accounting system on rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance and of firms using respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory 
stakeholders of corporate governance.   
Rules_Q8 = β0 +  β1(Information_(Q69) +  β2(Profession_(Q70)   + β3(Standard_(Q71) + β5(G) + β6(N) + μi 
Dependent Variable: rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
 Regulatory bodies Non-regulatory stakeholders 
 
Variables 
All 
countries 
All 
countries  
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria All 
countries 
All 
countries 
with 
dummy 
Ghana Nigeria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 1.03* 
0.79 
(1.30) 
4.47** 
0.80 
(5.61) 
3.24** 
1.44 
(2.24) 
1.29* 
0.71 
(1.81) 
0.67 
0.44 
(1.52) 
3.93** 
0.34 
(11.42) 
2.29** 
0.89 
(2.58) 
1.39** 
0.27 
(5.06) 
Financial 
information  
0.08 
0.14 
(0.56) 
-0.01 
0.12 
(0.05) 
-0.12 
0.28 
(-0.43) 
-0.09 
0.12 
(-0.71) 
0.23** 
0.07 
(3.16) 
0.10* 
(1.88) 
0.16 
0.15 
(1.05) 
0.04 
0.04 
(0.94) 
Professional 
bodies  
-0.01 
0.16 
(-0.05) 
0.02 
0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.77 
0.36 
(-0.21) 
-0.07 
0.13 
(-0.52) 
0.06 
0.10 
(0.61) 
0.04 
0.07 
(0.60) 
-0.21 
0.21 
(-1.03) 
0.04 
0.06 
(0.63) 
Accounting 
standard  
0.21 
0.16 
(1.31) 
-0.04 
0.13 
(-0.33) 
-0.06 
0.28 
(-0.20) 
0.27 
0.15 
(1.19) 
0.12 
0.09 
(1.31) 
 
0.02 
0.07 
(0.29) 
0.04 
0.18 
(0.19) 
-0.01 
0.06 
(-1.3) 
Ghana  -2.17** 
0.33 
(-6.55) 
   -2.24** 
0.13 
(-17.14) 
  
Nigeria  -2.39** 
0.31 
(-7.61) 
   -2.47** 
0.12 
(-20.82) 
  
R-square 0.21 0.34 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.54 0.17 0.11 
F-statistic 6. 64 12.34 1.20 0.43 0.65 96.77 0.62 0.58 
No of observation 125 125 38 77 416 416 112 243 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws which is item or statement 8 under section B of the survey 
questionnaire.  The independent variables are accounting system  which are items or statements under section N of 
the survey questionnaire Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being 
South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples.  
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the standard error and numbers in the 
parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
Key finding from the above Table include the following: 
1.In Column 6 the respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders show that when financial 
information are prepared according to statutory and ethical obligation this is likely to improve 
rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice.  
In Table 6.2.6 Column 6 respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders  believe  that 
when  financial information are prepared according to statutory and ethical obligation this 
may enhance the promotion of rules and laws that guides corporate governance practice. 
This result suggests that in the SSAA region adequate preparation of financial information 
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according to statutory and ethical obligation encourages the promotion of rules and laws for 
effective corporate governance practice. 
Conclusion 
The next chapter (seven) presents the conclusion and recommendations based on the findings 
in Chapter four, five and six. The chapter seven provides the summary of key components 
that are important for effective corporate governance practices of listed firms, differences 
similarities for respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders. It also 
includes policy implication and limitation of the study. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
7.1 The effect of institutional characteristics of corporate governance and corporate 
governance system 
This chapter provides empirical results to identify which components are important for 
corporate governance practice for listed firms in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone countries. 
The chapter also examines the effect of each of the component of corporate governance on 
corporate governance system. 
  In all the selected countries there is evidence that enforcement and disclosure and 
transparency have a positive significant effect on corporate governance system. This result 
indicates that enforcement, disclosure and transparency play a vital role in promotion of 
corporate governance system in the region. In addition, Ghanaian and Nigerian firms have a 
negative significant impact on corporate governance system; while South African firms that 
are constant (reference category) having a positive significant relationship with corporate 
governance system.  
Furthermore, Table 4.1 Column 3 and 5 reveal the results within each country such that 
in Ghanaian and South African firms. The variables such as regulatory framework and 
enforcement of corporate governance have a positive significant impact on corporate 
governance system.  However, Nigerian firms indicated in Column 4 show that regulatory 
framework has a negative significant relationship with corporate governance system. This 
result suggests that in Ghanaian and South African firms’ regulatory frameworks and 
enforcement may be stronger in promotion of corporate governance system. However, in 
Nigerian firms’ enforcement of corporate governance may be weak in promotion of corporate 
governance system. This finding is consistent with Okike (2007) and Okpara (2010) the 
authors claimed that lack of implementation of regulatory framework in Nigeria may be due 
to corruption that is prevalent among the officials of regulatory and supervisory bodies. This 
finding supports the World Bank ROSC group report on firms in Nigeria that generally there 
is need for improvement of corporate governance practice in Nigeria.  
There are laws in the book for regulatory framework and enforcement policy of 
corporate governance in Nigeria however, there are no laws to implement those rules and 
regulations on regulatory framework and enforcement of corporate governance practices. The 
institutional bodies and corporate governance system may look good on paper but when they 
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are compromised with corruption, lack of implementation and incompetence the result is 
likely to be weak corporate governance practices among firms in Nigeria. However, the 
improvement of corporate governance practices in South African firms this is due to  the 
King Reports on Codes of corporate governance I, II and III with the primary objective to 
promote sound corporate governance practices in South Africa.  
Moreover, ownership concentration is significant with corporate governance system in 
the region. The implication is that ownership concentration is prevalent in firms of Sub-
Saharan African Anglophone countries.  As a result, the controlling owner may be unwilling 
to dilute their ownership, generally known as non-dilution of entrenchment. (Claessens et al. 
2002). This may affect effective corporate governance system in terms of decision making, 
control rights and cash flow rights. 
Table 4.2 and 4.3 reveal a situation where each sub-variable under regulatory 
framework is estimated with sub-variable of corporate governance system such as rules and 
laws.  There is indication that in Nigerian firms’ stock market listing rules and corporate 
code of conduct has an impact on corporate governance system such as rules and laws. This 
result really shows what is happening in the Nigerian capital markets presently. This may be 
due to lack of implementation of stock markets listing rules and corporate code of conduct 
for firms. Thus, Nigerian capital markets seem to be presently weak to the extent that 
investors do not have confidence to invest in the markets.  
In addition, in Ghanaian firms rules and regulations for disclosure and communication 
may improve corporate governance system. However, in Nigerian firms’ rules and 
regulations regarding the required independent status of board members is likely to hinder 
corporate governance system. This is seem to lack of implementation by the regulators such 
as Securities Exchange Commission in Nigeria (SEC) that stipulated that a minimum of five 
members with a majority of non-executive directors and not more than two of the same 
family should sit on the board of firms at the same times. Thus, in Ghana the regulatory 
body such as Ghana Securities Exchanged (GSE) is silent on size of board members.  
In addition, enforcement of corporate governance may be better in Ghanaian and South 
African firms than Nigerian firms. In Nigerian firms the degree of investigation to non-
compliance with laws or regulations by enforcement agency seems to be weak to move the 
corporate governance system forward. Also in Ghanaian firms insider trading, equal access to 
information and merger and acquisition can move Ghana corporate system forward with rules 
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and laws.  In South African firms the confidentiality and autonomy of auditors seem to be 
important to promote sound corporate governance systems.  
The basic shareholder rights are more likely to promote effective corporate governance 
system in Ghanaian firms than Nigerian firms. This result is consistent with World Bank 
ROSC (2010) report on firms in West Africa Sub-region, that firms in Ghana may have better 
basic shareholder protections. This may be the reason for some foreign investors within West 
Africa Sub-region moving to Ghana in recent times.  
In Nigerian firms, minority shareholders violation has not improved corporate governance 
system this evidence supports the result that shareholders are allow to speak at company 
meeting only if they agree with boards of directors. Consequently, the above findings may 
not provide effective corporate governance system in Nigerian firms. In addition, in Nigerian 
firms the following sub-variables such as non-compliance with law/regulation (Q17) and 
minority shareholders rights violation (Q25) seem to hinder rules and laws that promote 
effective corporate governance. This suggests that in Nigerian firms there is a lack of 
compliance with law and regulation on corporate governance, as well as a lack of appropriate 
law to protect shareholders rights. This may be due to poor implementation of rules and laws 
on enforcement of corporate governance in Nigeria. This finding is inconsistent with ECA 
(2002), OECD (2004) the organisations explained that there is need for separating the 
government’s policy making and regulatory through establishing independent and strong 
regulatory and enforcement mechanism. Arun and Turner (2004) also argue that there is need 
for appropriate laws to protect the minority shareholders. 
 
Furthermore, preferential treatment to larger share holders seems to hinder corporate 
governance system in Ghanaian and Nigerian firms thus, ownership concentration is 
prevalent and therefore there is likely to be preferential treatment for large shareholders. This 
finding is consistent with La Portal (1997) who argues that large shareholders have outright 
control of the firm and they managed with higher percentage of ownership. This result 
suggests that the controlling owner will be unwilling to dilute their ownership, and this is 
generally known as non-dilution of entrenchment (Claessens et.al 2002). This finding also 
implies that minority shareholders may not be able to express their own view. Also, because 
the controlling shareholder (large shareholders) having preferential treatment over minority 
shareholders and can exercise their power by matching significant control right with 
significant cash flow rights.  
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7.1.1 Views of respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders on 
institutional characteristics of corporate governance practice and corporate governance system 
From Table 4.4.1 the respondents from regulatory bodies’ category of corporate 
governance in all the countries together show that enforcement of corporate governance has a 
significant effect on corporate governance system. This result implies that the regulatory 
bodies of corporate governance of firms in the selected countries believe that enforcement of 
corporate governance seem to promote the corporate governance practices in the countries.  
Also, Ghanaian and Nigerian firms indicate a negative significant relation with corporate 
governance system with South Africa as a reference. Thus, at each country level firms in 
Ghana indicate that disclosure and transparency is significant.  
Furthermore, in Table 4.4.2, for all the countries together the non-regulatory 
stakeholders’ believe that enforcement of corporate governance may promote sound 
corporate governance of firms. For firms in Ghana and South Africa the regulatory 
framework and enforcement corporate governance practices have a positive significant 
association with corporate governance system. However, in Nigeria the non-regulatory 
stakeholders show that disclosure and transparency is likely to improve the quality of rules 
and laws. 
Based on the above findings, the main divergence between two categories is that 
regulatory bodies believe in enforcement of corporate governance practices. Respondents 
from non-regulatory stakeholders indicate that regulatory frameworks of corporate 
governance are also important to promote sound corporate governance. In addition, 
respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders found that disclosure and transparency may 
improve corporate governance.  
The convergence between the regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders are on 
enforcement of corporate governance. However, based on the above evidence the regulatory 
bodies’ category have mostly likely failed in the implementation of the regulatory framework 
which is one of the components of corporate governance codes of best practices issued by 
Securities Exchange Commission and relevant bodies. This may be due to socio political 
corruption and incompetency among the officials of the institutional bodies in charge of 
corporate governance practices of firm in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries.  
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In addition, we estimated the sub-variables of corporate governance on sub-variables of 
institutional characteristic  of corporate governance on corporate governance system with 
regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders respondents. The Table below illustrates 
the divergence between the respondents in the selected countries. 
Table 7.1: illustrate the divergent views between respondents from regulatory bodies and non-
regulatory stakeholders on institutional characteristics of corporate governance and corporate 
governance system 
Respondent from regulatory bodies of corporate 
governance 
Respondents from Non-regulatory stakeholder of 
corporate governance 
1. Regulatory bodies indicated that information access 
(Q21) may enhance rules and laws that promote 
effective corporate governance practice 
1. Non-regulatory stakeholders believe that 
independent board (Q16) is likely to promote rules and 
laws that guide corporate governance practices. 
 
3. Regulatory bodies view that large concentration 
(few shareholder having majority of shares, (Q29) 
may deters rules and laws that promote effective 
corporate governance practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Investor protection (Q18) may  increase  the quality 
of  rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
 
 
 
3. They indicate that shareholder alignment (Q27) 
hinders the rules and laws that can promote corporate 
governance practices. 
 4. Non-regulatory stakeholder view that preferential 
treatment of large shareholders (Q30) may deters rules 
and laws that can promote corporate governance 
practices. 
In all the selected countries the following are the convergence views from the 
respondents 
1. The two categories of respondents believe that investigation of non-compliance (Q17) is 
likely to enhance rules and laws that promote corporate governance of firms. 
2. Both respondents show that investigating the illegal or inappropriate treatment of minority 
shareholder may increase the quality of rules and laws that promote corporate governance. 
In Ghana the following are the divergence views the non-regulatory stakeholders believe 
in the following  
1. Rules and regulation on board nomination (Q14) seems to enhance rules and laws on 
corporate governance practice 
2. They indicate that rules and regulation on disclosure (Q15) are more likely to improve 
rules and laws that guide corporate governance practice. 
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3. They show that violation of rules and regulation on independent board (Q25) may weaken 
rules and laws for effective corporate governance practices. 
4. They all believe that investigation of non-compliance (Q17) is more likely to enhance rules 
and laws that promote corporate governance of firms 
5. Non-regulatory stakeholders’ respondents indicate that insider trading (Q20) can improve 
laws and rules on corporate governance practices 
6. They found that merger and acquisition (Q23) may boost rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance practices 
7. Non-regulatory stakeholder show that basic shareholder rights (Q24) is likely to enhance 
rules and laws on corporate governance 
In Ghana the findings below are the convergent between respondents from regulatory 
bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders are stated below: 
1. Both respondents indicate that show their view that investor protection (Q18) can increase 
the quality of rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices 
   2. The respondents claim that information access (Q21) can enhance rules and laws that 
promote effective corporate governance practice. 
3.  Both respondents view that preferential treatment of large shareholders (Q30) may deters 
rules and laws that can promote corporate governance practices. 
The areas of divergence in Nigeria are shown in the Table below. 
Table 7.2:  divergent  views between respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory 
stakeholders in Nigerian on institutional characteristics of corporate governance practices and 
corporate governance system 
Respondents from regulatory bodies of corporate 
governance 
Respondents from Non-regulatory stakeholder of 
corporate governance 
 
1. They believe that merger and acquisition (Q23) is likely to 
improve the rules and laws that enhance corporate 
governance practices. 
 
 
1. Non-regulatory stakeholders believe that stock market 
rules and codes (Q12) may improve rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance practices in Nigerian firms. 
 
2. They view that basic shareholder rights (Q24) is  likely to 
enhance rules and laws on corporate governance 
. 
 
3 The regulatory bodies show that ownership composition 
(Q28) can hinders rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practices in Nigerian firms. 
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In Nigeria the convergence views between respondents from regulatory bodies and non-
regulatory stakeholders: They are all believe that that investigation of non-compliance (Q17) 
is more likely hinder rules and laws that promote corporate governance of firms. 
Generally, both the respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders 
of corporate governance indicate that enforcement of corporate governance matter most in 
order to achieved effective corporate governance practice. The non-regulatory stakeholders 
also believe that regulatory framework needs to be strong in order to promote effective 
corporate governance practice. 
7.2 The effect of role and responsibility of the board of director on corporate 
governance system. 
This study examines the effect of role and responsibility of firms boards of directors in 
the corporate governance system. This study provides the empirical evidence in all the 
selected countries that the commitment of board to transparency in board nomination and 
election process improve corporate governance system. However, board duality (separation 
of role between the chairman and CEO) may hinder corporate governance practices. This 
finding may be due to incompetence and inefficiency of both the chairman and CEO. This 
evidence implies that there may be separation of roles and responsibilities between the 
Chairman and Chief Executive officer. However, this is less likely to promote good corporate 
governance practice. This result is based on the opnion of the respondents from the 
questionnaire. 
 The attention to executive compensation by board members has a negative influence on 
rules and laws of corporate governance of firms. This result seem to be regard as absence of 
an executive compensation committee and this may give opportunity for the directors to 
award themselves compensation which is not in the good interest of the shareholders. 
 In addition, there is evidence that commitment of board to transparency in board 
nomination and election process, board disclosure and communication increase the quality of 
rules and laws on corporate governance. These two variables have a positive significant effect 
on rules and laws of corporate governance, power and authority of the regulatory agencies of 
corporate governance. This result suggests that the formal and transparency board nomination 
election process, and board disclosure and communication have more influence to promote 
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sound corporate governance in term of rules and law and the power and authority of the 
regulatory agencies in the region. 
Moreover, within each country we observe that for Ghanaian firms’ commitment of the 
board members; to process of disclosure and communication have a positive effect on rules 
and laws of corporate governance practice. Also, we find that disclosure and communication 
has a significant positive relationship with power and authority of regulatory agencies. This 
result suggests that board of directors of firms in Ghana are more committed to the process of 
disclosure and communication and this may promote the power and authority of the 
regulatory agencies in Ghana. However, executive compensation is negatively associated 
with all the sub-variables of corporate governance system. This finding is consistent with the 
results when all the countries are taken into consideration.  
Nevertheless, in South African firms’ board effectiveness, executive compensation and 
board duality (separation between the role and responsibility of Chairman) may strongly 
promote a sound corporate governance system. This finding may be due to introduction of 
King II and III Reports on Code of corporate governance that lay more emphasis on issue of 
board of directors’ effective role and responsibility, separation of role and responsibility 
between Chairman and CEO and executive compensation. 
7.2.1 View of respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders on roles and 
responsibility of the board of directors and corporate governance system 
We further provide more evidence for this study by classifying the finding from this 
study into two categories; regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders. There are 
convergences in the findings for the two categories. This includes the commitment of boards’ 
members to disclosure and communication which has a positive effect the corporate 
governance system. However, board non-duality has a negative effect on the corporate 
governance system. This result implies that both the regulatory bodies and non-regulatory 
stakeholders of corporate governance believe that effective disclosure and communication is 
likely to promote corporate governance of firms.  
The separation of role and responsibility between Chairman and CEO does not really 
promote corporate governance is also a convergence. In addition, there is convergence on 
commitment of the board to corporate strategy which has a negative influence on the power 
and authority of the regulatory agencies.  
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Furthermore, another area of convergence is that using Ghanaian and Nigerian firms as 
dummy variables this show a significant negative relationship with corporate governance 
system. This result implies that the roles and responsibilities of firm’s board of directors in 
Ghanaian and Nigerian firms are less effective in promoting corporate governance as 
compared with that of South African firms.  The convergence in Nigeria is that respondents 
believe that board effectiveness (Q33) is more likely to enhance rules and laws, the power 
and authority of regulatory agencies. 
The areas of divergence for selected countries are shown in the Table below. 
Table 7.3: Ddivergent views between respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory 
stakeholders on role and responsibilities of the board of directors and corporate governance 
system 
Respondents from regulatory bodies of corporate 
governance 
Respondents from Non-regulatory stakeholder of 
corporate governance 
1. Regulatory bodies indicate that commitment of 
board members to corporate strategy (Q31) seem to 
deters the rules and laws on corporate governance 
practice. 
 
1. There is indication that level of commitment of 
board members to enforcement of corporate 
governance (Q36) may inhibit power and authority of 
regulatory agencies to perform their function 
effectively. 
 
 2. They believe that executive compensation (Q32) is 
likely to hinder the rules and laws that promote 
effective corporate governance practice. 
 
 
Table 7.4:  Reports the divergence view between respondents from regulatory bodies and non-
regulatory stakeholders in Nigerian on role and responsibilities of the board of directors and 
corporate governance system 
 
Respondents from regulatory bodies of corporate 
governance 
Respondents from Non-regulatory stakeholder of 
corporate governance 
1. The regulatory bodies also believe that board 
transparency (Q35) may provide more power and 
authority for regulatory agencies in Nigeria.   
 
1.Respondents from non-regulatory stakeholders 
found that board duality (Q38) may  hinders rules and 
laws that bring good corporate governance practice 
 
7.3 The effect of external factors on corporate governance practice 
In this study, we explored the external factors that impact corporate governance system 
in the selected countries in order to determine the extent to which external factors affect 
corporate governance practice. We found that in all the countries selected in the region, the 
political environment hinders the promotion of corporate governance system. This is 
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because politicians and friends of officials of the governments in power interfering with the 
work of regulatory and supervisory agencies of corporate governance. This evidence is due 
to prolonged military dictatorship that ruled the countries in the region not helping the 
matter because during the military regimes there were no corporate governance frameworks 
and no strong institutions to formulate the policies. It was during the democratic rules that 
such institutional frameworks on corporate governance were formulated such as Code of 
Best Practices or Guideline on Principle and Practice of corporate governance in Nigeria and 
Ghana. 
 In Nigerian firms ownership structure hinder the promotion of corporate governance 
system. This may be due to a lack of proper due process in acquisition of shares in firms and 
most cases the boards of directors and senior management are the majority stockholders of 
firms. In Ghana, societal and cultural factors hinder the corporate governance system. This 
result indicates that the Ghanaian corporate governance Code of Best practices needs to take 
into consideration the socio-cultural environment in formulating corporate governance 
policies for Ghanaian firms.  
 However, the accounting system plays a vital role in promoting corporate governance 
across countries in the region, and in each country such as Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. 
This result suggests that it is through the quality of accounting system that shareholders, 
potential investors and other stakeholders of firms will be able to receive financial 
information about their firms.   
Moreover, we extend this study by examines the impact of external factors sub-variables 
on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices of firms. Thus, under the 
economic factor the results show that in the region as a whole and specifically in Nigerian 
firms the role of bank in financing firms (financial intermediation) may likely promote 
corporate governance. This result suggests that if a bank finances the firm they may promote 
the rules and laws that can enhance effective corporate governance through issuing of credit 
facilities and long-term loan to the firms in Nigeria and in the Sub-region. As a result, there 
will be corporate rules and laws that will be implemented, as well as proper monitoring of 
their funds and corporate policy. In addition, firms can also control banks which may also 
promote rules and laws that can bring good corporate governance through creating a 
conglomerate business organisation across the countries in the region.  
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 In addition, the local investor voting power and control variable has a significant 
negative relationship with rules and laws of corporate governance of firms in all the 
countries. This finding indicates that a large number of listed firms are subsidiaries of foreign 
multinational and there are minority of shares with float for local investors. Consequently, 
public investors may not be able to use voting power to enforce corporate governance and 
there is no effective control due to limited float (Kapumpa, 2001. Mensah, 2001). 
 In all the countries together, particularly in Ghana macro-economic policies seem to 
hinder promotion of corporate governance practices. This evidence indicates that macro-
economic policies may be not well implemented to the extent that it has a negative effect on 
rules and laws of corporate governance practice.  This result suggests that a lack of proper 
implementation of macro-economic policies is likely to result from poor quality of 
governance. This indicates that government expenditure may be misappropriated as a result 
of corruption, lack of transparency and accountability in the countries in the Sub-region. This 
may lead to increase in national deficit. Thus an increase in national deficit can brings weak 
economy such as high inflation rate, high interest rate and high unemployment rate. 
Consequently, investors may move from equity or capital markets to money markets because 
the money markets are free but capital markets are risky. In addition, this shows that the 
corporate governance system such as rules; laws power and authority of the regulatory 
agencies seem to be very weak. This will brings lack of confidence to the investors in equity 
markets 
In Nigerian firms, growth and development of firms that influence the economy may 
promote good corporate governance; policy for development of growth of the firms is 
recently implemented through the introduction of various economic reforms by past and 
present democratically elected governments in Nigeria. Besides this, firms across countries 
and in particular in South African firms, foreign investment promotes corporate governance 
through inflow of capital and new corporate strategy and policy. This may attract investors by 
building more confidence for them in order to invest across the countries in the region. 
Furthermore, in all the countries together particularly in Ghana, national culture affects 
procedure in the accounting system, business ethics and socio-political cultural environment 
may hinder rules and laws that promote corporate governance. These results suggest that the 
governments in the Sub-region need to take into consideration the socio-cultural and business 
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ethics environment of Ghana in the formulation of guidelines on corporate governance 
practice or Code of Best practice on corporate governance of firms in Ghana. 
  In addition, corruption deters rules and laws that promote effective corporate 
governance particularly in South Africa; as a result of institutionalised corruption in the sub-
region. This finding supports the evidence that in recent time, corruption is prevalent across 
sectors of the economy and in society at large. Consequently, the rules and laws can be easily 
altered or not properly implemented by the enforcement and supervisory agencies of 
corporate governance.  
The type of government in power influences the promotion of rules and laws on 
corporate governance, especially as the majority of the countries in SSAA were ruled by the 
military for a long period. Thus, during this period there were no institutional frameworks for 
development of corporate governance. Also, government and politicians’ interferences with 
activities of regulatory bodies of corporate governance may inhibit the development of sound 
corporate governance in Ghana and Nigeria. This result suggests that the officials in charge 
of enforcement of corporate governance may not have a free hand in implementing corporate 
governance rules and laws. This seems to deter the development of corporate governance of 
firms in those two countries.    
 Nevertheless, the sub-variable under ownership structure such as when board members 
and senior management are the majority of stockholders, this does not promotes corporate 
governance practices. This is because most of the rules and laws concerning minority 
shareholders rights and protection may not be followed. The finding shows that minority 
shareholders may not have rights to express their own opinion or grievances.  
Moreover, when foreign nationals are the majority of stock holders this may bring a new 
strategy, such as standard norms on corporate governance practices. Consequently, this seems 
to enhance sound corporate governance and bring more confidence to domestic investors. In 
addition, in Ghanaian and South African firms when family members are the majority of 
stockholders this is likely to improve corporate governance. This finding supports the effect 
on family-owned firms where by the management may comply with rules and laws that guide 
the corporate governance practices in order to build confidence and attract  investors so that 
there will be strong capital base for their firms.  
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Furthermore, in all the countries together accounting sub-variables such as financials 
information are prepared according to the statutory and ethical obligation and the role played 
by the accounting standard board  seem to enhances and promotes the rules and laws that can 
bring sound corporate governance. This result suggests that the quality of accounting system 
is a modifier or accelerator for sound corporate governance practice. 
In all the countries together using Ghanaian and Nigerian firms as dummy variables in  
references  to South African firms  as indicated in the entire Tables of this study. The results 
show that that both countries (Nigerian and Ghanaian firms) have a significant negative 
relationship on rules and laws that promote corporate governance. This result suggests that 
the external factors may weaken the implementations of rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance of firms in these countries in comparison to that of South African 
firms.  
7.3.1 View of respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory stakeholders on external 
factors of corporate governance practices 
There is evidence of convergence on the view of both regulatory bodies and non-
regulatory stakeholders’ respondents of corporate governance. The two categories believe 
that the accounting system may play a vital role in the promotion of sound corporate 
governance. This evidence is indicated in all the selected countries together.  
Moreover, under the economic factor there are convergences on financial intermediation 
by banks and that banks play a major role in promotion of   corporate governance through 
given credit facilities and loans. The local investors are unable to use voting power to enforce 
corporate governance which may not enhance corporate governance practice of firms and this 
is also part of convergent view.  
Furthermore, the two categories of respondents from all the countries together indicate 
that when foreigners are the majority of stockholders this may promote rules and laws on 
corporate governance practices. Beside this, sub-variables under corruption such as economic 
hardships, conflict of interest and lack of internal control that hinder corporate governance 
practices are under the convergent view. 
In Ghana macro-economic policies influence the way firms are managed in relation to 
shareholder deters rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice is a convergent 
view. Under the political environmental factor the issue of government interfering with 
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regulatory agencies which inhibit rules and laws on corporate governance are also among the 
convergent view. 
The areas of divergence for all the selected countries are shown in the Table below. 
Table 7.5: the divergent views between respondents from regulatory bodies and non-regulatory 
stakeholders on external factor of corporate governance practices and corporate governance 
system 
Respondents from regulatory bodies of corporate 
governance 
Respondents from Non-regulatory stakeholder of 
corporate governance 
1. They believe that reduction in corruption and 
bribery may enhance rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance practices. 
1. They show that when board members and senior 
members are majority this may hinder corporate 
governance practice. 
2. They indicate that corruption within regulatory 
bodies’ officials of corporate governance deters the 
promotion of rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance. 
 2. They found that financial information is prepared 
according to statutory and ethical obligation this may 
promote rules and laws on corporate governance. 
 2.In Ghana particularly, they indicate that when family 
owned majority of stockholders this is likely to 
promote corporate governance practices 
 3.In Ghana the non-regulatory stakeholders show that 
equity market is likely to improve rules and laws on 
corporate governance practice 
 
 4.Non-regulatory stakeholders in Ghana show that 
ownership structure of Ghanaian firms may promote 
corporate governance system 
 5.Non-regulatory stakeholders in Nigeria show that 
ownership structure of Nigerian firms seem to  hinder 
corporate governance system 
 6. They found that political influences with fiscal and 
monetary policies have a negative effect on rules and 
laws that promote corporate governance 
  7. They show that the type of government (military or 
democratic) influence the rules and laws on corporate 
governance practices. 
7.4 Recommendation on the effect of institutional characteristics on corporate 
governance system 
From the evidence documented in this study, it shows that regulatory frameworks, 
enforcement, disclosure and transparency are real input guiding efficient practices of 
corporate governance system. Generally, we find that in Ghanaian and Nigerian firms, the 
corporate governance system are relatively weak in compared with South African firms. This 
is due to the negative significant effect of Ghanaian and Nigerian firms on rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance practices.  
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Furthermore, in Nigerian firms the implementation of regulatory frameworks and 
enforcement policies are not improving corporate governance systems as a result of lack of 
action to execute the regulatory and enforcement policy of corporate governance. This may 
also be due to corruption, ineffective, compromised positions as a result of corruption within 
the institutional bodies. Moreover, there are multiple codes of best practices on corporate 
governance for Nigerian firms. This is may be due to inadequacies of Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) code of 2003. Thus, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) after post 
consolidation issued a code of corporate governance for bank in 2006. In 2009 the National 
Insurance Commission (NACOIM) issued a code of corporate governance for the insurance 
industry and in 2010 the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) reviewed the 2003 code. 
 Against this background, the recommendations for this study are based on the opinion or 
perception of the respondents to the survey questionnaire. Firstly, there is a need for sound 
the effective corporate governance system of firms in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone 
countries, most especially in Nigerian firms because Nigeria has a larger market for foreign 
and domestic investment. In addition, Nigeria has the highest population in Africa. Nigeria 
has abundant natural resources. As a result, foreign investors may like to invest in Nigeria. 
Therefore a sound corporate governance practice is necessary for the country.  
Secondly, the federal government of Nigeria need to reform the institutional bodies that 
are in charge of corporate governance of firms in Nigeria. In addition, there should be a 
stringent penalty for any offenders of rules and regulations of corporate governance practices.   
There is also a need for reform of corporate governance of firms in Nigeria which will be 
tailored towards international corporate governance standard such as Cadbury Report 1992 
and King Report (1994, 2002 and 2010). The Federal government established Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria Act (FRC) under the Act, there is the directorate of corporate 
governance whose objective is to promote effective corporate governance practices of firms. 
However, the act is not yet well implemented. 
Thirdly, there is a need to issue only one code of corporate governance for each industry 
such as financial or non-financial.  This must follow the international standard both in context 
and the implementation. The codes should be reviewed a similar way as in the UK Financial 
Reporting Council in 2012. Also in Ghana there is a need for such a council, and the Ghana 
law of 1963 Act 179 seem to be outdated. There is a need to reform the law and include a 
modern corporate codes and law guiding Business Corporation which must include 
international standards for corporate governance practices.     
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In addition, regulatory and supervisory agencies should promote a culture of ‘’whistle 
blowing’’ meaning that the regulatory and supervisory agencies will setup a hotline where the 
stakeholders of corporate governance can report any violation and this complaint will be 
investigated. There must be prudent monitoring of rules and laws and stringent penalties with 
requirements of corporate governance rules, regulatory framework and enforcement policy. 
Also any official of the institutional bodies found guilty of corruption or ineffectiveness 
should be punished.  
Generally, in all the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries there is need 
for strong shareholders activism through the establishment of shareholders association with  
the aim and objective of promoting the interest, welfare, enlighten, and dissemination of 
information related to management of firms shareholders to shareholders. 
7.5 Recommendation for the effect of role and responsibilities of the board of director of 
firms on corporate governance system 
The recommendations stated below are reflection from the opinion or perception of the 
respondents from the survey questionnaire used for this study. We recommend that the role 
and responsibility of the boards of directors in the area of corporate strategy need to be 
improved by increasing the number and role of independent directors, which will see the 
development of corporate strategy as team work with themselves and management. They will 
all work together to make more valuable contributions toward better corporate strategy that 
will promote corporate governance system.  
 In addition, in Ghanaian and Nigerian firms the regulatory and supervisory bodies of 
corporate governance need to put emphasis on nonbinding advisory vote by shareholders on 
executive compensation which is similar to UK firms. This can allow shareholders to express 
their opinion on executive compensation. Also, there is a need for more competent and 
efficient persons to act as either Chairman/Chairperson or Chief Executive Officers of firms 
who are ready to make sure that their role and responsibilities will enhance good corporate 
governance practice. It is necessary to reform the Ghana Corporate Law of 1963 Act 179 
which lay more emphasis on responsibilities of firm’s boards of directors on financial 
reporting, disclosure and communication. 
Furthermore, in all the selected countries together  there is a need for more strengthening 
of the role and responsibility of firm’s boards of directors and proper monitoring of the board 
members by regulatory and supervisory agencies. The shareholders need to have control over 
the boards of directors by using voting power and hold the board of directors for non-
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performance through shareholders activism. The shareholders can influence corporate 
behaviour through shareholders activism in order to exercise their rights as the owners of the 
firms. They should ensure that the board of directors are qualified for their positions, have a 
clear understanding of their role and are not subjected to undue influence.  
7.6 Recommendation for the effect of external factor on corporate governance system 
From the empirical evidence from this study, we recommend that the guidelines and 
regulation of corporate governance across countries in the region particularly in Ghana 
should be drawn in such a way that it reflects the socio-political and cultural environment of 
their respective country. The regulator believes that reduction in corruption and bribery can 
move corporate governance forward. As a result there is a need to strengthen the anti-
corruption agencies to provide more public campaigns against corruption and allow legal 
institution to prosecute corrupt officers and politicians. Thus, from our findings, the 
regulatory bodies of corporate governance believe that reduction in corruption can enhance 
good corporate governance practice. Also, the government and politicians should stop 
interfering with ministries and agencies responsible for monitoring, enforcing corporate 
governance particularly in Nigeria.   
Moreover, the sales of state-owned companies and appointment of directors should 
follow due process in order to bring transparency and accountability and this will promote 
sound corporate governance practice.  In addition, there is need for local investors enforcing 
corporate governance by giving them right to express their own view and use their voting 
power. The board members and senior management having majority control can hinder the 
promotion of corporate governance. Thus, in such a situation the regulatory and supervisory 
agencies of corporate governance should make sure that the minority shareholders rights are 
not violated.  
7.7 Limitation of the study 
The recommendations are based on the reflection from opinion of the respondents from 
the survey questionnaire used for this study. Consequently, the limitation is that the opinion 
of these respondents cannot be questioned or probed for given their opinion through the 
survey questionnaire. In addition, there is a level of researcher imposition, this implies that 
when developing the data instrument (survey questionnaire), we may be making our own 
assumption as to what is important and not important in this study. Thus, the researcher may 
be missing something that is of important. Also there may be other components or factors that 
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affect corporate governance of listed firms in SSAA countries which this study has not 
mentioned in the survey questionnaire this is likely for further research study.  
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Covering Letter for survey questionnaire 
Brunel University 
London UK 
School of Social Sciences 
Department of Economics and Finance 
A Covering Letter 
Dear Respondent, 
I am a PhD student at Brunel University London UK under the supervision of Professor Len 
Skerratt, a visiting Professor of Accounting and Finance Brunel University London UK.  
This study will ask that you complete the survey questionnaire that is made up of section A to 
O (attached) which takes approximately 20-25 minutes to complete. Any information you 
provide will be kept strictly confidential and will not be attributed to you or organisation. The 
completed questionnaire response will be stored in a secure environment and the results will 
be used for only academic purposes. 
If you have any question or concern about the study, please contact the researcher: Mr 
Adeoye Afolabi  PhD student,  Brunel University, School of Social Sciences, Department of 
Economic and Finance, London UB8 3PH UK, e-mail: Adeoye.Afolabi@brunel.ac.uk, 
Adeoye.afolabi@yahoo.co.uk. 
Your help would be greatly appreciated, thank you very much for your time and cooperation. 
 Consent 
 Would you like to have a copy of results of this study?   Yes                No     
If your answer is yes, please provide your e-mail address or postal address. Thank you for 
your participation  
E-mail:           Postal address: 
Researcher Signature 
Date 
Cordially, 
Adeoye Afolabi 
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Survey Questionnaire 
Section A: Questions 1-7 are related to your background. Please mark(X) only one option. 
1. Gender: Male  Female  
2. Occupation: Legislator   Executive Director    
  Regulator    Non-Executive Director                      
  Academician   Company Executive (CEO)   
  Individual investor  Company employee    
  Institutional investor          Judiciary or Legal             
  Accountant/Auditor           Other (Specify)………….    
 
3. Years of experience in your occupation:    ____ year 
 
4. Formal education: Diploma/Certificate   Bachelor Degree         
Master Degree   Doctoral Degree  
Professional certificate/other           
5. Your location: ____  
 
6. How do you rate your knowledge  on corporate governance of firms in your country 
Low    Medium   High         
7. Type of Firm:                     Financial Firm               Non-Financial   Firm     
Section B: Statements 8-11 relate to your views on effectiveness of corporate governance 
practice. Please rate the extent to which you agree with each statement (X) 
according to the scale below. Please this applies to all sections. 
1=strongly disagree  2=disagree  3=Undecided   4=Agree  5=strongly Agree 
 
8. There are adequate and effective rules and laws that promote the practice of 
good corporate governance of firms in my country of operation.  
1 2 3 4 5
9. The supervisory, regulatory and enforcement agencies have the power, 
resources and authority to enforce compliance with laws and regulations and 
guidelines on corporate governance in my country of operation. 
1 2 3 4 5
10.  A good legal system in my country of operation helps to improve the 
corporate governance of firms.  
1 2 3 4 5
11.  A well-organized legislature and sound regulatory and supervisory 
agencies in place promote good corporate governance. 
1 2 3 4 5
 
Section C: Statements 12-16 relate to your views on regulatory framework of corporate 
governance practice in your country.  
12. Stock markets listing rules and corporate codes of conduct for firms are often 
abused or ignored. 
1 2 3 4 5
13. The rules and regulation for appointing and removal of auditors are frequently 
violated. 
1 2 3 4 5
14. Rules and regulations for a formal and transparent board nomination and 
election process of firms are often ignored. 
1 2 3 4 5
15.  Rules and regulation for disclosure and communication are not often followed 1 2 3 4 5
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16.  Rules and regulations regarding the required independent status of board 
members are often violated. 
1 2 3 4 5
                     
Section D: Statements 17-19 relate to your views on enforcement of corporate governance 
practice.  
 
17. There is sufficient investigation of apparent non-compliance with 
laws/regulations by the enforcement agency. 
1 2 3 4 5
18.  There is appropriate legal protection of investors and creditors from fraud 
perpetrated by managers and controlling shareholders within firms. 
1 2 3 4 5
19. There are appropriate mechanisms for investigating the illegal or 
inappropriate treatment of minority shareholders within firms. 
1 2 3 4 5
 
Section E: Statements 20-23 relate to your views on transparency and disclosure of 
corporate governance practice.  
  
20.  Generally, in firms in your country, insider trading laws, rules and 
regulations are followed.  
1 2 3 4 5
21. There is equal access to information for all shareholders in  firms  1 2 3 4 5
22. There is confidence in the autonomy and independence of auditors for 
firms within your country.  
1 2 3 4 5
23.  There are transparency in  mergers and acquisitions of  firms in your 
country    
1 2 3 4 5
          
Section F:        Statements 24-27 relate to your view on shareholders’ rights.  
 
24. The basic shareholders rights in your firm are not protected 1 2 3 4 5
25. Minority shareholder rights of your firm are often violated  1 2 3 4 5
26. Minority shareholders are often not allowed to express their view at 
general meetings of firms in your country.  
1 2 3 4 5
27. Shareholders are allowed to speak at company meetings only if they are 
known to agree with the board of directors. 
1 2 3 4 5
               
Section G: Statements 28-30 relate to your views on ownership concentration.  
 
28. The firms in your country have a variety of  composition of ownership 1 2 3 4 5
29. There is large concentration of ownership (few shareholders having majority of 
shares) in firms in your country.  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3
 
4
 
5
30. Preferential treatment is often given to large shareholders of firms in your 
country 
1 2 3 4 5
 
Section H:      Statements 31-38 relate to your view regarding role and responsibility of board of 
directors.  
 
31. Board members are not fully committed to reviewing and   guiding 
corporate strategy in your firm. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4
 
5
32. Board members of companies in your country do not pay adequate 1 2 3 4 5
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attention to executive compensation in your firm.  
33. Board members of companies in your country are not effectively 
committed to their responsibility in your firm 
1 2 3 4 5
34. The board members often demonstrate a lack of concern as to the integrity 
of companies’ financial reporting system of firm in your country. 
1 2 3 4 5
35. Board members show lack of concern in ensuring a formal and 
transparent board nomination and election process in your firm. 
1 2 3 4 5
36. In your firm of country operation, board members do not show concern 
about proper monitoring and enforcement of laws, rules and regulations of 
corporate governance practices. 
1 2 3 4 5
37. Board members do not adequately supervise the process of disclosure and 
communication in your firm. 
1 2 3 4 5
38. There is separation between the roles of the chairman and Chief Executive 
officer of firms in your country. 
1 2 3 4 5
 
Section I: Questions 39-48 relate to your views on economic factors with regard to 
corporate governance practices.  
 
39. Good corporate governance practice within firms is important in 
attracting domestic investment in a nation. 
1 2 3 4 5
40. Good corporate governance practice within firms is important in 
attracting foreign investment in a nation. 
1 2 3 4 5
41. Corporate governance influences the growth and development of firms and 
this, in turn influences the economy of a nation. 
1 2 3 4 5
42. Shareholder protection can affect the level of equity markets.  1 2 3 4 5
43. Macro-economic policies influence the way firms are managed in such way 
as to influence the relationship between firms and shareholders. 
1 2 3 4 5
44. Banks play a predominant role in financing of firms in your country. 1 2 3 4 5
45. Firms in your country own and control major local banks by creating a 
form of conglomerate business organization.  
1 2 3 4 5
46. There are conflicts and problems associated with corporate governance 
before or after privatization of state-owned companies in your country. 
1 2 3 4 5
47. There is no transparency in the sales of state-owned companies and 
appointment of the board of director in your country. 
1 2 3 4 5
48. The local investors are unable to use voting power to enforce corporate 
governance and there is no effective corporate control. 
 
1 2 3 4 5
 
Section J: Statements 49-52 relate to your views on societal, cultural and family factors 
upon corporate governance practices.  
 
49. Corporate governance practices within firms should consider the interests 
of all stakeholders (employee, customers), individual and community goals.  
1 2 3 4 5
50. Corporate governance guidelines and regulations should be drawn in such 
a way that they reflect the socio-political and cultural environment of each 
nation.   
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4
 
5
51. National culture affects enforcement procedures in accounting systems and 
these influences corporate governance practice of firms in your country. 
1 2 3 4 5
52. The business ethics and values that characterize a society will influence the 1 2 3 4 5
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level of confidence in the integrity and probity of firms and capital markets.  
 
Section K: Statements 53-58 relate to your views on the influence of corruption and bribery 
on corporate governance practices.  
 
53. Reduction in corruption and bribery will help to improve corporate 
governance practices of firms 
1 2 3 4 5
54. Levels of corruption in a country influence the ability of regulatory 
authorities to enforce compliance with corporate governance principles and 
accountability within firms. 
1 2 3 4 5
55. Job security and payment of satisfactory living wages will influence the 
level of corruption. 
1 2 3 4 5
56. Conflicts of interest, unsound ethics and greed influence the corporate 
governance practices of a firm.  
1 2 3 4 5
57. Economic hardship will influence levels of corruption among employees to 
the extent that corporate governance practices are undermined within firms.  
1 2 3 4 5
58. Lack of internal control system will influence levels of corruption among 
employees to the extent that corporate governance practices are undermined 
within firms. 
1 2 3 4 5
 
Section L: Statements 59-63 relate to your views on how a country’s political environment 
may influence corporate governance practices within firms.  
59. The government exerts substantial influence over the ownership of companies 
in my country of operation.   
1 2 3 4 5
60. The political environment, by influencing fiscal and monetary policies, has a 
substantial impact on corporate governance practices 
1 2 3 4 5
61. Prolonged period of military or civilian rule in a country will influence the 
corporate governance practices of firms.  
1 2 3 4 5
62. The government interferes with the work of regulatory and supervisory 
bodies with regard to appointments or incentives for company executive within 
firms. 
1 2 3 4 5
63. Politicians exert undue influence over the ministries and agencies responsible 
for monitoring and enforcement corporate governance guidelines and 
regulations within firms.   
1 2 3 4 5
        
Section M:      Statements 64- 68 relate to your view on ownership structure in your firm.  
 
64. The Board members and senior management are  generally majority 
stock holders of companies in your country 
1 2 3 4 5
65. Foreign national are generally the majority shareholders of companies in 
your country. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4
 
5
66. The government holds the majority of stock in companies in your 
country. 
1 2 3 4 5
67. Family members generally hold the majority of stocks in companies in 
your country. 
1 2 3 4 5
68. Where a single family dominates the management of a firm, this will be 
reflected in corporate governance practice of firm.  
1 2 3 4 5
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Section N: Statements 69-71 relate to your views on how accounting systems influence the 
corporate governance of firm within countries.  
 
 
Section O:      Statements 72 deal with any further comments.  
72. Any further comments on issue of corporate governance of firms in your country  
 
 
69. Firms prepare financial information that accord with statutory and ethical 
obligations in my country. 
1 2 3 4 5
70. The Institute of Chartered Accountants or the equivalent (professional 
body of accountants) play a role in enforcing good accounting and financial 
reporting practices in my country of operation. 
1 2 3 4 5
71. The Accounting Standards Board (national equivalent) issues standards 
that are in line with international accounting standards. 
1 2 3 4 5
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